The Authority of Scripture

Donald G. Bloesch, an evangelical scholar introduces a methodology that employs divine revelation as the primary source for theological investigation in which believing precedes understanding. This method raises three questions: 1) How does Bloesch view scriptural authority in theological investigation? 2) what hermeneutical principle does Bloesch apply to his divine revelation method? 3) how does Bloesch’s method of divine revelation affect doctrinal formation? In response to these questions, this paper aimed to critically analyze Bloesch’s theological method and its implication to doctrinal formulation. The paper followed descriptive and critical analysis methodologies in four sections: Theological background of Donald Bloesch; analysis of Bloesch’s theological method; critical evaluation of Bloesch’s theological method, views of Scriptures, and hermeneutical principle; and implications of Bloesch’s theological method to doctrinal formulation. In response to the questions, this study unveils that Bloesch does not allow Scriptures to communicate God’s message, but he uses Scriptures to confirm conceptualized belief. Based on this belief, he formulated historical-pneumatic hermeneutics, a principle that solely depends on divine revelation. Based on Bloesch’s methodology, doctrinal formulation is affected because it does not rely exclusively on scriptural authority but rather on conceptualized faith.

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all claim that God has given humans a revelation. Divine revelation may be either of God, or by God of propositional truth. Traditionally Christianity has claimed that the Christian revelation has involved both of these. God revealed himself in his acts in history; for example in the miracles by which he preserved the people of ancient Israel, and above all by becoming incarnate (that is human) as Jesus Christ, who was crucified and rose from the dead. And God also revealed to us propositional truths by the teaching of Jesus and his church. Some modern theologians have denied that Christianity involves any propositional revelation, but there can be little doubt that from the second century until the eighteenth century, Christians and non-Christians were virtually unanimous in supposing that it claimed to have such a revelation, and so it is worthwhile investigating its traditional claim. This article is concerned with the Christian claim to have a propositional revelation. The first section describes the process by which Christians of past centuries have come to believe that certain propositions have been revealed. The second assesses alternative philosophical accounts of what constitutes a belief that such-and-such propositions have been revealed, being a ‘justified’ belief (or a ‘warranted’ or ‘rational’ one).

Consideration of what is meant by authority is a vital task for theology, and especially for those involved in theologically engaging with Scripture. After some general reflections on the nature of authority this article turns specifically to examine biblical authority. The challenges facing those who would offer an account of biblical authority are presented. The generating question for the positive proposals advanced in this essay is: what difference does the doctrine of the Trinity make to the account we render of biblical authority? The action of the triune God is the appropriate context for locating Scripture's salvific ministry. Moreover, Scripture is space that God gives us without violating our creatureliness. Scripture is both part of the created order and a participant within God's saving history. The doctrine of the Trinity invites us to articulate an account of biblical authority that is historical and timeful.

This article aims to provide a comprehensive and theological understanding of the phenomenon of dreams within the context of pastoral ministry, particularly from a faith perspective grounded in the authority of Scripture. The author seeks to examine how dreams are portrayed and utilized in biblical narratives as a means of divine revelation, and how these principles can be applied wisely in pastoral care. Additionally, this study intends to construct a biblically and theologically sound framework for evaluating dream experiences, so that church leaders may guide congregants responsibly and avoid misleading or speculative interpretations. Using a qualitative method and a biblical-theological approach, this study analyzes key texts such as Genesis 28, Daniel 2, and Matthew 1, and compares them with theological principles concerning revelation and the authority of Scripture. Theories of general and special revelation are employed to distinguish between dreams as a medium of divine communication and those originating from human psychological processes. The main findings indicate that while dreams may serve as a channel of revelation, their interpretation must be tested against Scripture and accompanied by pastoral wisdom. Therefore, this article offers a theologically grounded and pastorally responsible framework for church leaders to navigate the phenomenon of dreams without falling into spiritual speculation, subjective experience, or cultural syncretism.

This paper analyses the possibility of granting legitimacy to democratic decision-making procedures in a context of deep pluralism. We defend a multidimensional account according to which a legitimate system needs to grant, on the one hand, that citizens should be included on an equal footing and acknowledged as reflexive political agents rather than mere beneficiaries of policies, and, on the other hand, that their decisions have an epistemic quality. While Estlund’s account of imperfect epistemic proceduralism might seem to embody a dualistic conception of democratic legitimacy, we point out that it is not able to recognize citizens as reflexive political agents and is grounded in an idealized model of the circumstances of deliberation. To overcome these ambiguities, we develop an account of democratic legitimacy according to which disagreement is the proper expression of citizens’ reflexive agency and the attribution of epistemic authority does not stem from a major expertise or specific ability, but it comes through the public confrontation among disagreeing agents. Consequently, the epistemic value of deliberation should be derived from the reasons-giving process rather than from the reference to the alleged quality of its outcomes. In this way, we demonstrate the validity of the multidimensional perspective of legitimacy, yet abstain from introducing any outcome-oriented criterion. Finally, we argue that this account of legitimacy is well suited for modeling deliberative democracy as a decision-making procedure that respects the agency of every citizen and grants her opportunity to influence public choices.

The Vatican II Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum is replete with affirmations about the nature of revelation and the authority of Scripture which Baptists can affirm, but the seeming equation of the authority of Scripture and tradition in article 9 is a sticking point that must be addressed before proceeding to other points of difference that owe much to differing perspectives on the authority of tradition. A close reading of article 9 highlights points of Baptist disagreement even while revealing some openings for a Baptist appreciation of the trajectory in the development of Catholic teaching on tradition evident in this text. Baptists cannot offer an unqualified endorsement of article 9, but they can find a place within the pattern of theological contestation that produced it. This text with which Baptists cannot unequivocally agree thus points to a larger opening for convergence between Roman Catholics in their practice of conciliar contestation and Baptists in their identity as dissenting catholics.

Epistemic relativism is becoming a significant challenge to Evangelical Christianity in Indonesia, where truth is increasingly viewed as subjective and context-dependent. This shift is evident in religious education, public discourse, and youth spirituality, undermining confidence in objective truth and the authority of Scripture. This paper proposes Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositionalism as a coherent theological-epistemological response. Through a qualitative-theoretical method and literature-based analysis, the study explores how Van Til’s transcendental argument confronts relativism by asserting that all knowledge relies on presuppositions, which must be grounded in divine revelation to ensure consistency and meaning. Presuppositionalism exposes the internal contradictions of relativism and offers a firm foundation for rationality, morality, and truth. In Indonesia’s pluralistic and relational context, this approach calls for narrative and cultural contextualization, allowing theological convictions to be communicated clearly and compassionately. The paper argues that presuppositionalism is not merely a defensive apologetic, but a constructive framework for discipleship, theological education, and interfaith dialogue. By rooting rationality in revelation, it invites intellectual repentance and cultural engagement grounded in the Gospel. Van Til’s model thus serves as a prophetic call to reestablish truth in a culture marked by confusion, moral ambiguity, and epistemic fragmentation.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology attempts both to familiarize readers with the directions in which the scholarship of this discipline has gone and to pursue the discussion into hitherto under-examined areas. Philosophical theology is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God and of God's relationship to the world and its inhabitants. During the twentieth century, much of the philosophical community (both in the Anglo-American analytic tradition and in Continental circles) had grave doubts about our ability to attain any such understanding. In recent years the analytic tradition in particular has moved beyond the biases that placed obstacles in the way of the pursuing questions located at the interface of philosophy and religion. Written by some of the leading scholars in the field, the articles in the book are grouped into five sections. In the first section, articles focus on the authority of scripture and tradition, on the nature and mechanisms of divine revelation, on the relation between religion and science, and on theology and mystery. The next section focuses on philosophical problems connected with the central divine attributes: aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. In the third section, articles explore theories of divine action and divine providence, questions about petitionary prayer, problems about divine authority and God's relationship to morality and moral standards, and various formulations of and responses to the problem of evil. The fourth section examines philosophical problems that arise in connection with such central Christian doctrines as the trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, original sin, resurrection, and the Eucharist. Finally, the fifth section introduces readers to current work in Jewish, Islamic, and Chinese philosophical theology.

Although Augustine's posthumous influence on Christianity is immense and wide ranging, the authority he exercises among his contemporaries is far more modest and contextual. Subsequent generations overestimate Augustine's actual authority largely because we approach him as readers of a written, monological corpus that has consolidated his power. In his own context, however, Augustine's authority as preacher and bishop lay in complex social dynamics that are dialogical, mutually responsive, and limiting. Although we can no longer hear Augustine as those in his congregation did, we can work to develop hermeneutical practices that retrieve differences in the way written and spoken words generate distinct patterns of authority. Not only is Augustine aware of such differences, but in his practice of exegesis and preaching, the authority of scripture itself functions variously within a range of written and verbal registers. His treatment of the psalms especially emphasizes their status as a living voice inviting the hearer into dialogue with the divine other. An amplified sense of how authority operates in Augustine's work: (1) contributes to historical studies that argue the exercise of episcopal power in the late fourth, early fifth centuries was in fact quite restricted; (2) coheres with theoretical studies that insist the nature of religious power is constituted by multidirectional social and symbolic relations; and (3) comports with theological studies that regard divine revelation as lying not solely in the biblical text but also in the very communicative processes where that text comes to life.

Reviewed by: Scepticism, Truth and Religious Belief in the Thought of John Henry Newman: A Contribution to Contemporary Debate by Daniel John Pratt Morris-Chapman John T. Ford, C.S.C. Scepticism, Truth and Religious Belief in the Thought of John Henry Newman: A Contribution to Contemporary Debate BY DANIEL JOHN PRATT MORRIS-CHAPMAN Dissertation at the University of Bristol. August 2014. Pages xxviii + 346 pages. Although there is abundant literature on John Henry Newman's numerous contributions to theology, spirituality, education, literature and history, Daniel Morris-Chapman is justified in claiming that "Newman's philosophical legacy has been underestimated" (viii). To remedy such minimization, this dissertation undertakes a five-step vindication of Newman's achievements as a philosopher. Morris-Chapman examines philosophical receptions of Newman beginning with his contemporaries and continuing to the present. Not only did British and American philosophers discuss and critique Newman's philosophical writings in the nineteenth century (19), but—surprisingly, given the unecumenical tenor of the times—"soon after its publication (1870) the Grammar of Assent was required reading for students studying in the philosophy department at Harvard" (36). Nonetheless, "Newman's rejection of evidentialist approaches to religious belief isolated his thought from many of his contemporaries" who wanted a scientific [End Page 121] approach to religion (59). Subsequently, however, the "turn to the subject" in twentieth-century philosophy prompted renewed interest in the personalist dimension of Newman's philosophical thought.1 As for Newman's recent influence, Morris-Chapman's second chapter points out that "Newman shares a number of philosophical connections" with two twenty-first century philosophers, Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999) and William Abraham (b. 1947) (115). This connection seems substantiated in regard to the influence of Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus (c.160–c.210) as well as the shared opposition to John Locke; however, one might well debate the extent to which Newman was "shaped by the Thomistic tradition" (98–110). Additionally, the claim that "Newman's conception of liberalism and Chisholm and Abraham's understanding of epistemological Methodism amount to the same thing" (93) is questionable; at most the latter might be construed as a subset of the former. The third chapter is a selective examination of Newman's writings in relation to the "particularist tradition" (that human knowledge begins with particular examples). This treatment is quite cogent regarding Newman's acceptance of the Aristotelian principle that different disciplines require different kinds of proof and also his rejection of Locke's view that only demonstrative types of proof are legitimate. Less satisfactory is the brief engagement (156–68) with Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine—a treatment that fails to notice, much less to appreciate, the implications of Newman's shift in terminology from "tests" in the 1845 edition to "notes" in the 1878 edition.2 The fourth chapter considers select aspects of Newman's Grammar of Assent. On the one hand, Morris-Chapman should be commended for pointing out Newman's evident influence on such philosophers, as Désiré-Joseph Mercier (1851–1926).3 On the other hand, much of this chapter is a rather obtuse discussion devoted to advancing the claim that Newman was "an epistemological particularist" and refuting the position of Marty Miller Maddox, who characterized Newman as an "epistemological methodist" (69).4 What is needed and [End Page 122] unfortunately lacking as a preliminary to this discussion is a succinct synopsis of the Grammar's salient features. Without such an overview, the discussion of the different types of assent, the three kinds of inference, and the nature and function of the illative sense, is confusing and sometimes questionable. The fifth, and final, chapter attempts to illustrate Newman's on-going contribution to the philosophy of religion by showing how William Abraham draws upon various aspects of Newman's philosophy, particularly the illative sense, as a way of Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation.5 This discussion, which fails to acknowledge the various "ideas" of revelation that were implicitly employed by Newman and seemingly also by Abraham, would have been immensely aided by a discerning use of Avery Dulles's Models of Revelation.6 In sum, on the plus side, this dissertation has made...

Given fact that one of John Locke's main interests in writing Essay lay in the principles of morality and revealed religion , at least according to his friend James Tyrrell, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to those sections in Essay, and in correspondence with Stillingfleet, on relation between faith and knowledge. Commentators on Locke have tended to treat his views either as straightforward and unimportant, or as question-begging. Gibson acknowledges centrality of morality and religion in Locke's interests, but has nothing to say on difficulties that arise in fitting Locke's views on these matters into his epistemology.2 Aaron is content to summarize Locke without discussion of any kind. O'Connor claims that Locke has only one thesis-that faith is never logically justified-which he does not openly draw .3 Copleston comes to opposite conclusion to O'Connor. He admitted a divine revelation which gives us certainty about truth of doctrines revealed, since testimony of God admits of no doubt.4 To support this Copleston quotes following passage: We may as well doubt of our own being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true .5 But this does not support thesis. Anyone who believes, as Locke did, that God is a perfectly truthful being will assent to proposition 'Any revelation from God is true'. This last proposition is analytic for Locke and for all theists. But saying this does not settle epistemological question of how anyone knows whether or not a particular proposition is revealed by God. Later on,6 Copleston allows that Locke's repudiation of enthusiasm requires that some sort of rational support is to be given for claiming that a proposition is revealed. What he does not make clear is that since reasons Locke

The traditional view that Richard Hooker argued for the religious authority of Scripture, reason, and tradition, in that order, has come under sustained criticism in recent years, especially from those scholars who assert that Hooker was in fact an orthodox Reformed theologian. Although Hooker placed a distinctively high value on the role of reason in authenticating Holy Scripture, it is claimed that this is fully compatible with the Protestant principle of sola Scriptura, and reflects wider developments in the Reformed tradition on the role of reason in proving that Scripture is divine revelation. This article seeks to refute these claims by examining Reformed thought on the religious authority of Scripture and reason in matters of Christian doctrine, looking at representatives from the Reformers, early orthodoxy, and high orthodoxy. This is then compared with Hooker's work, where, it is argued, the Reformed doctrine that Scripture is the principium cognoscendi theologiae, with reason merely an ancillary ‘handmaid’, is replaced by the radical position that Scripture and demonstrative reasoning are both principial authorities in matters of Christian doctrine. In propounding his triple-source theory of religious authority, therefore, Hooker is concluded to have broken fundamentally with the principle of sola Scriptura.

Experts are paradigmatic examples of people ascribed epistemic authority. But can laypersons reliably tell when experts have such authority? This paper argues that this question differs from widely discussed questions about laypersons’ ability to identify and assess experts. This is because epistemic authority and expertise are not coextensive concepts and because we can rely on experts without believing them on their authority. Assuming a preemptionist account of epistemic authority, I examine how the question regarding laypersons’ ability to reliably identify authoritative expert judgments differs from that regarding laypersons’ ability to identify expertise. One additional challenge laypersons face in identifying authorities emerges from differences between the fine-grained scope of authority and the coarse-grained scope of expertise: whether a person has authority on a particular question depends, in ways that her expertise does not, on the well-foundedness of her belief regarding this particular question. Another additional challenge stems from the tension between using evidence to identify epistemic authorities and believing them on their authority. This paper addresses these two challenges and highlights differences in the resources laypersons can use to tackle these challenges, both in terms of the evidence available to laypersons and the division of labor between experts and laypersons.

The paper analyzes one of the main influences on the results of legal interpretation - epistemic authority. An account of authority is given along with a distinction between two basic types of authority, followed by a brief explanation of practical authority. Epistemic authority and derivative epistemic authority in particular are explained, in order to propose the conditions under which the influence of epistemic authority on judicial interpretation is justified. The general conclusion of the paper is the following: A court or judge Y is rationally justified to defer to the ascription of meaning (interpretation) p to a legal text q of person X, if court or judge Y has good reasons to believe that X has more knowledge, skills, experience or training in ascribing meaning to (interpreting) q.

Viewers have often looked upon the BBC's science documentary strand, Horizon, as an authoritative source for scientific knowledge. Through interviews with the series' producers, this article examines the practices its producers perform to buttress their authority and generate the view that this show is itself a producer of knowledge, even while it is also televising and mediating science. Of particular note are references to science fiction to police boundaries between science and pseudoscience, and the use of original experimental trials to generate witnesses. These position Horizon as at least a node in the network of scientific knowledge production.