The Atlantic Alliance: Diverging Interests, Converging Policies

The questions of whether North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be enlarged and, if so, to what degree have been among most difficult and sensitive issues facing Alliance since end of Cold War. In shaping US National Security Strategy regarding US interests in Europe and US NATO policy, President Clinton has declared his support for NATO membership for well-qualified democracies regardless of geography or history, including those in northeastern Europe. US policy regarding NATO enlargement should seek to strengthen Alliance as well as to bolster democratic advances, deter potential threats, and increase regional stability throughout Europe. However, by promoting a policy that supports NATO membership for Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Administration is jeopardizing vital US national interests and undermining NATO's collective defense mission. [1] This article examines US strategy regarding NATO enlargement, assesses its strengths and weaknesses, and recommends changes to protect vital US interests in Europe while providing Baltic republics with a security alternative to NATO membership. NATO'S Strategic Concept and Enlargement Beginning in 1989, unexpectedly rapid political, military, and social changes resulted in end of ideological and military stalemate in Europe and breakup of Soviet Union. Those changes and regional instability caused by ethnic and religious conflict occurring within Europe prompted NATO to examine and adjust its policies, missions, and structures. NATO's new strategic concept, approved at Washington Summit in April 1999, reflects new security challenges and dangers extant in Europe. It also reflects Alliance's increased commitment to coordinate and cooperate with other international institutions in supporting out of operations (those conducted outside territory of NATO member states). [2] However, despite NATO's increasing involvement in nontraditional operations, Alliance's essential and enduring mission is to guarantee territorial integrity, political independence, and security of its members. [3] It is that mission that has resulted in a flood of Central and Eastern European applicants seeking NATO membership. Article 10 of Washington Treaty provides that the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further principles of this Treaty and to contribute to security of North Atlantic area to accede to this [4] This commitment was reaffirmed by NATO leaders during 1994 Brussels Summit, where they declared that membership in Alliance remained open to those nations who could further principles established in Washington Treaty. [5] The strategic goals served by enlargement and methods used to achieve enlargement were examined following year. The product of that examination was Study on NATO Enlargement, wherein Alliance's principles for accessing new members were documented. The study concluded that enlargement of Alliance contributes to stability and security of Euro-Atlantic area. It also addressed selection and accession of new members and confirmed that accession would occur in accordance with provisions of Article 10 of Washington Treaty, with new members receiving all rights of Treaty membership. [6] However, when addressing rights of new members, study also designated their obligations by declaring that new members must be prepared to contribute to NATO's budget and support Alliance's evolving missions and its fundamental collective defense role. [7] To ensure that new members are able to contribute to NATO's collective defense as well as benefit from it, study states that before accessing new members, Alliance will evaluate effects of their admission to ensure that enlargement will not diminish NATO's military credibility. …

At the center of this work is the analysis of the consequences of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as - the Iran nuclear deal) on divergent foreign policy approaches as the main indicators of the mismatch in relations between the United States and the European Union during the administration of the 45th US President Donald Trump. While the US unilaterally withdrew from this agreement, EU member states remained in it. The United States and the European Union, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, had completely different definitions of their own national security, insisting on their unilateral security, while failing to redefine the problem in the direction of mutual security. However, in addition, the US and EU member states, although both concerned about their own security due to the possible emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, instead of a complementary approach to the issue had a mutually competing one. Using the case study method, as well as the analytical-deductive method and the content analysis method, the author explains the difference in this approach through the concept of the strategic culture of the US and the EU and concludes that they are a consequence of the different understanding of international relations, but also due to the different identity characters of these two actors. The main thesis of the paper is that the US administration of Donald Trump, with its more realistic and Hobbesian view of international relations, and a different understanding of the US national interest in the Middle East, adopted a different approach to curbing Iran's nuclear armament ambitions compared to the approach of the European Union, which is conditioned by a more liberal and Kantian nature of its view on international relations. With unilateral foreign policy actions, Trump's administration risked causing damage and shaking its own credibility in relations with the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union remains committed to multilateralism and the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal. The subject of this research is the direction of the foreign policy actions of the United States and the European Union, in the period from the unilateral withdrawal of Trump's cabinet from the Iran nuclear agreement on May 8th, 2018, until the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a general of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on January 3rd, 2020 in the Republic of Iraq. The current state and perspective of contemporary transatlantic political relations in the context of unilateral withdrawal will be taken into consideration. In accordance with its new foreign policy agenda and strategy, and more inclined to a realistic view of international relations, the Trump administration risked deeper conflicts and divergence with the European Union over regional security issues. Thus, there was a threat to limit the further deepening and strengthening of the transatlantic partnership with the leading member states of the European Union, especially with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of the Republic of France. Additionally, the subject of research will be the patterns of behavior, embodied in speeches and foreign policy actions, which are consistent with the different approaches of the US and the EU to the problem of preventing the theocratic regime in Iran from developing its nuclear program. Accordingly, the focus will be on the period of the Trump administration, which, with its political will to break off with the legacy of the Obama administration, began to perceive Iran as a factor causing instability in the Middle East region. The Trump administration did not ratify the Iran nuclear agreement and continued to act under its obligations, solely because of the unfavorable benefits and a large number of shortcomings for the US. Thus, the paper will analyze whether the US administration of Donald Trump had a concrete foreign policy strategy in relations with the European Union and Iran. Also, the paper will try to answer the question of whether a unilateral or multilateral approach to regional security problems is more fruitful, taking into consideration the question of whether the unilateral approach of the only superpower in the world is more effective or, on the other hand, an international coalition of states is needed to suppress the Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance and international organization comprising North American and European countries. It is generally considered to be among the most powerful, long-enduring, and successful alliances of modern times. It has influenced both the study and practice of international security and politics for more than seventy years. Created in 1949 by twelve countries as a classic treaty-based mutual defense pact, its substantive focus, formal organization, and membership grew steadily from its earliest years. The legacy of World War II and the trials of the Cold War dominated NATO’s first four decades, when the organization’s first secretary general described its purposes for Europe as keeping “the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the post–Cold War transformation of NATO’s political and military functions. Yet the central issue in politics among the allies has often been the “burden sharing” or distribution of costs and benefits. The United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have often wielded outsized roles in such politics, though NATO decisions are taken by consensus traditionally. The endurance of NATO after the Cold War and through many crises is one of the great puzzles in the academic discipline of international relations, and the Alliance is a common object of study in all the main theoretical schools of thought. While NATO’s political structures resemble other international organizations, its standing multinational integrated military structure is unique. Its military policy and strategy evolved with thinking about deterrence in the nuclear age. NATO first embarked on “out-of-area” military operations in the Balkan civil wars of the 1990s, but its largest and longest-running mission began in 2003 with its involvement in Afghanistan, far from its original geographic area of concern. NATO has entered into political and military partnerships with dozens of countries around the world, and its enlarged membership reached thirty countries in 2020. Its global ties add to a longer-standing debate about trans-Atlanticism versus autonomy in European security. NATO and the European Union give important context to one another, though their institutional collaboration has not always been as close as their greatly overlapping membership and neighboring headquarters in Belgium might suggest. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 inaugurated a period of increased tension with NATO, though the Alliance has alternated deterrence and dialog in its relations with Russia both during and since the Cold War. Primary sources and archival material about NATO are increasingly accessible.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they di_er, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identi_ed as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is con_rmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

Committed to restore America to its former glory by advertising the slogan of “America First,” Trump’s leadership exhibited his antagonism to honour the international agreement and partnerships, among which NATO agreement holds the top priority. Former US President Donald Trump’s, labelling of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as obsolete did not only question the significance of NATO as an organisation, but also challenged the traditional values shared among the transatlantic partners as well as the liberal international order it promoted. The article aims to highlights the features of Trump’s personality which impacted the formulation of US foreign policy towards NATO using the theoretical tool of psychoanalysis (understanding Trump’s personality traits and analysing their impact on making of the US foreign policy during Trump’s administration). Although, Trump was not the first US President who accused NATO partners of their inadequacies. However, due to Trump’s aggressive style of conducting the US foreign policy, the NATO partners demonstrated a positive change by making up for their individual lacking in NATO alliance particularly with the issue of burden sharing.

The paper debates the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It argues that the invasion has changed dramatically Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan and deepening frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into NATO, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO (hereafter also referred to as the Alliance). The aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions, by providing an initial assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP, and to sketch out potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security. More specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on the Alliance? How did the war impact on the CSDP and the Union’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Where is EU-NATO cooperation heading as a result of the war? Will the conflict ramp up cooperation between the two organizations or will European defence efforts be channelled mostly through NATO? Will EU leaders grab the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration also in security and defence and or will the war turn into another missed opportunity to promote a more effective burden-sharing in transatlantic security?

With the election of US President Donald Trump, the very essence of transatlantic relations, embedded in the shared ideologies of liberalism, democracy, human rights and globalization has begun to erode. The already strained United States-Europe relationship is now at the lowest ebb under the Trump administration. This rift is visible since long and is continuously widening due to divergence of economic, security, political and environmental interests of the United States (US) and its European allies. This paper discusses the reasons for divergence between the two old partners who have traditionally identified themselves collectively as the ‘West’ and the impact it has had on their partnership. This paper examines the evolution of the US-Europe relations, crisis under Trump's Jacksonian politics leading to divergences on core issues, namely Russia as a threat and energy supplier, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), climate change and Iran. In addition, it deliberates on the future trajectory of transatlantic partnership under Trump administration and offers policy options.

Starting in 2017, Washington plans to begin heel-to-toe rotations of an armored brigade from the United States to Eastern Europe.In some respects, this represents a significant improvement over the assurance and deterrence steps taken by the United States and several of its NATO allies over the last two years.Although the administration's plan is indeed a step in the right direction, it falls short of the hype ascribed by the media, not to mention Moscow.More broadly, the US approach to reassurance and deterrence still suffers from some strategic shortcomings.S tarting in 2017, Washington plans to begin "heel-to-toe" rota- tions of an armored brigade combat team from the United States to Eastern Europe, assuming the US Congress agrees to President Obama's funding request.This decision represents a significant improvement over the assurance and deterrence steps taken by the United States and several of its NATO allies over the last two years.The measures to date have included short-term rotational deployments of forces from North America and/or Western Europe for limited-duration exercises and other training events in Eastern Europe.From both temporal and qualitative perspectives such deployments leave much to be desired.For example, they lack the constancy of heel-to-toe rotations, essentially creating gaps of weeks or months, which Russia could exploit to achieve a fait accompli.Additionally, the deployments to date have not always include armored units, which puts alliance defenses at a disadvantage relative to Russian military power in the region.Deploying an armored brigade combat team on a rotational basis starting in early 2017 will directly address these shortcomings.More broadly, the expanded European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) program signals a renewed American commitment to and leadership of the alliance.This is especially important at a time when Europeans have questioned whether and how their continent figures into Washington's strategic priorities.As the United States deepens its involvement in Iraq and the fight against ISIL, continues to consolidate stability in Afghanistan, and rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region, European allies may have some reason to think Washington's attention is focused elsewhere.The expansion of the ERI program-especially as seen through the media fanfare that greeted its announcement-should provide solace to those concerned about US leadership in NATO.Despite these and other strengths of the ERI expansion though, the program and its centerpiece-a rotationally deployed armored

Following Donald Trump’s election as US president in 2024, which cast doubt on US security commitments, European leaders renewed calls for deeper defence cooperation to deter Russia. Yet multinational efforts often increase political and bureaucratic complexity, delaying decision-making and capability development. Previously, Europe could accept this trade-off because funding was the scarcest resource, and sacrificing speed and autonomy in exchange for cost savings and shared capabilities was considered paramount. Now, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Washington’s increasing scepticism towards European defence have turned time into the critical factor. Time has become Europe’s new ‘currency’ of defence, and militaries must rapidly enhance their capabilities in a far more volatile environment. Rather than abandoning cooperation, European countries – especially the front-line states – should undertake urgent national preparations first, then integrate and coordinate within NATO or European Union structures, balancing immediate speed with longer-term collective-security objectives.

The article examines from an international law and policy perspective the relation between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations and European Union (EU) budgetary constraints. Its aim is to understand whether the binding target to spend 2% of annual gdp on defense that NATO members have undertaken can trump EU rules adopted in the aftermath of the euro-crisis that instead strictly limit governments’ deficits. The topic of this article has acquired particular relevance since the election of US President Trump, who has repeatedly complained about underspending on defense by European countries and threatened to disregard the NATO mutual defense pledge (that an attack on one is an attack on all) vis-a-vis those NATO members who fail to pay their fair share to the organization. By combining in an innovative way conflict-of-laws analysis with public policy research on trade-offs in budget-making, the article claims that EU rules do not legally prevent EU member states from fulfilling their NATO obligations – but make it politically difficult for them to do so. In order to address this state of affairs, the article thus considers how greater integration in the field of defense by EU member states could overcome the problem and revive the transatlantic alliance. In this regard, the article examines extremely recent EU legal and policy developments, including the milestone EU Council decision to establish for the first time a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defense between 25 EU member states in December 2017, and suggests that ultimately defense union stands at the core of the future of Europe – regardless of whether NATO obligations trump EU rules or not.

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022

This study: (The nature of the relationship between media and politics - former US President Donald Trump's dealings with social media as a model) deals with an important topic, which is the interactive nature between the fields of politics and the media, and the aim of this study is to know the nature of this relationship in the United States of America since the inception of this country, and the study focused on the nature of former US President Donald Trump’s dealings with social media. This relationship and the nature of dealing with the media were explained by political leaders in the United States of America through this study, and the researcher reached several results, including: that both media and politics occupy a large area of the history of the United States of America, And that this pattern of dealing with the space of social media has embarrassed the traditional media such as news agencies, satellite channels and famous newspapers in the United States of America and the world. and this relationship emerged through Donald Trump's use of social networking sites and his controversial handling of the media, the nature of this relationship with social networking sites by Trump has resulted in widespread controversy in political and media circles in the United States of America and the world during the spread of corona disease. Just as the media contribute to raising the profile of a political figure, it may stand against a political figure, as happened with Donald Trump, with the decision of social media companies to close Trump's accounts and fight him in the media, which has never happened with any former president in the United States of America.

This study: (The nature of the relationship between media and politics - former US President Donald Trump's dealings with social media as a model) deals with an important topic, which is the interactive nature between the fields of politics and the media, and the aim of this study is to know the nature of this relationship in the United States of America since the inception of this country, and the study focused on the nature of former US President Donald Trump’s dealings with social media. This relationship and the nature of dealing with the media were explained by political leaders in the United States of America through this study, and the researcher reached several results, including: that both media and politics occupy a large area of the history of the United States of America, And that this pattern of dealing with the space of social media has embarrassed the traditional media such as news agencies, satellite channels and famous newspapers in the United States of America and the world. and this relationship emerged through Donald Trump's use of social networking sites and his controversial handling of the media, the nature of this relationship with social networking sites by Trump has resulted in widespread controversy in political and media circles in the United States of America and the world during the spread of corona disease. Just as the media contribute to raising the profile of a political figure, it may stand against a political figure, as happened with Donald Trump, with the decision of social media companies to close Trump's accounts and fight him in the media, which has never happened with any former president in the United States of America.