The Assessment of the UK Arms Export Regime and the Intractable Israel-Hamas Conflict

PurposeDynamic capabilities (DCs) upgrade operational capabilities. However, DC dimensions of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring may combine in different configurations that result in alternative outcomes, depending on the firm's lifecycle stage. The purpose of this research is to explore configurations of DC dimensions during different stages of firms' lifecycles that result in operational marketing and technological capabilities.Design/methodology/approachGiven the limited understanding of how DC dimensions and operational capabilities interact across a firm's lifecycle, the authors employed a multi-method approach to understand whether different configurations of DC dimensions may lead to operational marketing and technological capabilities and how the firm's lifecycle may condition these configurations. The authors first apply PLS path modelling to assess the validity and reliability of the measures. Then, the authors use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to analyse micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in different growth stages operating in the creative industry within highly competitive and fast-changing environments.FindingsResults show that several configurations of DC dimensions and competitive intensity influence marketing and technological capabilities. Although several configurations include sensing, seizing and reconfiguring, the findings also point to configurations where not all DC dimensions are present.Practical implicationsImproving operational capabilities does not necessarily imply a simultaneous presence of all three DC dimensions. Especially in the growth stage, managers that face resources shortage may only focus on sensing and seizing dimensions when developing marketing capabilities.Originality/valueThis research focuses on configurations of DC dimensions (instead of configurations of different types of DCs) that generate diverse marketing and technological capabilities development paths. The authors provide several equifinal configurations of DC dimensions that lead to operational marketing and technological capabilities. This study contributes to disentangling DCs and their dimensions across different lifecycle stages.

The article examines the interaction between international investment law and international humanitarian law in the context of armed conflicts. It analyses the concept of lex specialis within both legal regimes and considers different approaches to determining their priority of application, namely international humanitarian law, international investment law, and the contextual approach. Particular attention is paid to the practical application of bilateral investment treaties in situations of military occupation of territory and to issues of state responsibility in such circumstances. The study highlights the challenges of protecting investments in contexts of occupation and frozen conflicts, as well as approaches to determining the legal status of investment assets (civilian or military), especially where the activities of an investment object are directed towards the production of dual-use goods. The article further examines arbitral decisions and scholarly opinions concerning the impact of armed conflicts on the operation of bilateral investment treaties. It emphasizes that an international armed conflict may be interpreted differently under the two regimes: as a regular normative condition in international humanitarian law, and as a circumstance of force majeure in international investment law. The necessity of adopting a flexible, contextual approach is underlined, one that simultaneously takes into account the objectives of both regimes (safeguarding investors’ rights under international investment law and ensuring compliance with states’ humanitarian obligations under international humanitarian law).

PurposeThis study aims to provide new understanding on operational and dynamic capabilities supportive to the implementation of performance-based public procurement by focusing on dyadic capabilities of a supplier and a buyer.Design/methodology/approachThe study is based on the qualitative analysis of 20 interviews with informants representing Finnish public organizations and their private sector suppliers. The analysis is aligned with a theoretical framework connecting the phases of procurement and the capability types studied.FindingsThe findings of the study present the role of operational and dynamic capabilities of a buyer and a supplier in the implementation of performance-based procurement at public procurement phases. Preprocurement phase is found to greatly benefit from all three dynamic capabilities, while operational capabilities suffice in the contracting phase.Social implicationsIncreased understanding on capabilities needed in performance-based procurement can increase the chances of success in reaching better value for money of public services and developing supplier markets.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the literature on performance-based public procurement and value-based selling by taking a dyadic approach to the operational and dynamic capabilities needed in business with an emphasis on performance. As the focus in public procurement shifts increasingly from resources to performance, involving a joint effort between buyer and supplier, the study provides insights into role of dyadic capabilities and explains how dynamic and operational capabilities together support the phases of performance-based procurement implementation in the public sector.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law. The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

The analysis of the role of reciprocity in the development, application and sanction of human rights and humanitarian law paints a complex picture, reciprocity permeating both bodies of law and yet playing out differently in each field. Broad statements that reject reciprocity in human rights law altogether, or that insist on the essentially reciprocal nature of humanitarian law, must be considered unsound. The fact that immediate reciprocity plays a much more prominent role in humanitarian law has a significant impact at every stage of the life of these norms. Greater relevance for immediate reciprocity in humanitarian law goes hand in hand with the bilateralisable character of many humanitarian obligations. Human rights, on the contrary, generate substantive obligations which are almost exclusively non-bilateralisable and which correspond to systemic reciprocity. Despite this fundamental difference, both systems contain norms which, by their nature, are of interest to the international community as a whole. Thus the erga omnes character of human rights obligations has been much discussed, while the consequences of characterising humanitarian law obligations in a similar way requires further attention. Human rights and humanitarian law have enjoyed tremendous development since the end of the Second World War, and the shifting role of reciprocity stands as witness to their currently unsettled status. In the largely decentralised legal systems that they represent, reciprocity plays an essential role in generating compliance with norms.

This chapter brings attention to the quite divergent consequences of dealing with the issue of detention by non-State armed groups in non-international armed conflicts under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The conventional approach to detention in international humanitarian law is that armed groups only have a de facto power, bound by humanitarian obligations. Under the laws of war, the question is partly tied to whether States themselves have the prerogative to detain under Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II, a question that is far from settled. Non-State armed groups raise the added problem that they may not be recognized, or be recognized only for the purposes of endorsing humanitarian obligations. If international humanitarian law does not apply to the authority to detain, then the question falls to be resolved by international human rights law. Under the latter, there must be a solid foundation to any deprivation of freedom, and the question cannot simply be one of treating captives humanely. This chapter will suggest that in both cases a theory of non-State actors’ ‘right authority’ is missing when it comes to detaining State troops. Historically, this issue has been obscured by the fact that the right authority has been equated with statehood, but the moment may have come to rediscover how one can identify non-State actors that could be considered privileged in the international legal system.

“Human rights law is centred, indeed built, on the granting of rights to the individual, while humanitarian law is focused on the direct imposition of obligations on the individual.” This view of the nature of the norms of the law of armed conflict – that international humanitarian law is about obligations and international human rights law about rights – is still widely used as an argument against their complementarity. As legal terms, “rights” and “obligations” differ, as does the corresponding terminology of “human rights” and “humanitarian law.” It has thus been argued that:

Urban warfare constitutes one of the most complex forms of military conflict, as combat operations are conducted within urban environments characterized by dense infrastructure, including residential buildings, streets, tunnels, and facilities of vital importance. Such operations present significant legal and operational challenges for both civilians and armed forces, often exceeding those encountered in conventional warfare. One of the primary legal and humanitarian challenges is the high population density in urban areas, which leads to the presence of large numbers of civilians within or near combat zones. This reality complicates the rules of engagement, increases the risk of incidental civilian casualties, and contributes to widespread damage to civilian objects and infrastructure. The urban architecture further compounds operational difficulties, offering opportunities for ambushes and obstructing the maneuverability of military assets. Moreover, international humanitarian law (IHL) imposes strict limitations on the conduct of hostilities, particularly in relation to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, thereby placing considerable legal constraints on the use of force in such settings. These constraints further hinder the delivery of essential supplies, such as ammunition, medical assistance, and other logistical support, particularly under conditions of siege or extensive infrastructural damage. Psychological operations and information warfare, including the use of civilian suffering in the media, can significantly influence public opinion and affect the political objectives and legitimacy of military operations. While modern technologies—such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and signals intelligence (SIGINT)—have become integral to contemporary warfare, their operational effectiveness is often diminished in enclosed, densely populated environments. Accordingly, urban warfare requires a high degree of operational planning, precision, and discipline, with an emphasis on minimizing collateral damage in compliance with IHL. The success of military operations in urban environments ultimately depends on the armed forces’ ability to adapt to the legal and operational complexity of the urban battlefield and to strike a delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian obligations.

Climate change is increasingly displacing populations, creating a category of “climate refugees” who fall outside the protection of traditional international legal frameworks. This article examines the tension between state sovereignty and the humanitarian imperative to protect climate-displaced persons, with a focus on international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law, and human rights law. The study adopts doctrinal and analytical research design, critically evaluating the adequacy of existing instruments, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and non-refoulement principles, in addressing climate-induced cross-border displacement. It identifies significant gaps: the narrow definition of “refugee,” the absence of binding protection for environmental migrants, and the challenges of balancing state discretion with humanitarian obligations. The article also explores emerging normative responses, including soft-law initiatives, national protection mechanisms, and proposals for new legal instruments. Key findings suggest that while IHL and human rights law provide conceptual support, they are insufficient to guarantee uniform protection. The study concludes that reconciling sovereignty and humanitarian protection requires a dedicated legal framework, clear eligibility criteria, and cooperative international mechanisms to address the growing crisis of climate-induced displacement.

Armed conflict increasingly generates profound environmental consequences, yet international humanitarian law (IHL) has historically accorded the natural environment only limited and fragmented protection. This article examines environmental protection during armed conflict through the thematic legal regime established by the long-term, widespread and severe (LWS) harm provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, particularly Articles 35(3) and 55. It interrogates the normative content, scope, and practical effectiveness of these provisions in constraining methods and means of warfare that cause extensive environmental damage. The study undertakes a doctrinal and analytical assessment of the cumulative and conjunctive threshold of long-term, widespread and severe harm, highlighting the interpretive ambiguities that have hindered enforcement and accountability. It critically evaluates how the high evidentiary and temporal thresholds embedded in the LWS standard have limited its operational relevance in contemporary conflicts, especially those involving environmental destruction through resource exploitation, scorched-earth tactics, and the use of environmentally destructive weapons. The article further situates the LWS regime within the broader matrix of IHL principles—distinction, proportionality, and military necessity—while exploring its interaction with emerging norms of international environmental law and international criminal law. The article argues that although the LWS provisions represent a landmark recognition of environmental protection as an autonomous concern in armed conflict, their restrictive formulation has rendered them largely symbolic rather than preventive. It proposes a contextual and evolutive interpretation of Additional Protocol I that lowers reliance on rigid thresholds and integrates environmental harm into proportionality assessments and precautionary obligations. By reframing the LWS provisions as part of a holistic protective regime rather than exceptional prohibitions, the article contributes to contemporary debates on strengthening environmental accountability and enhancing legal protection for the environment during armed conflict.

The debate surrounding peacekeeping missions and humanitarian intervention has become particularly poignant with the conflagration of violent conflict and incidents of genocide, presenting States with a moral and legal dilemma. While not addressing the issue of humanitarian intervention, this study argues that the international legal order imposes upon States not only a right but a duty to see to it that other States party to conflict abide by their legal and humanitarian obligations as members of the international community. The duty, argues the study, is imposed by several factors. Article~1 common to the Geneva Conventions and additional Protocol I imposes upon signatories the duty to ``respect and ensure respect for the Convention[s] ...'' The universal acceptance of the Conventions as well as the customary law nature and objective character of several of the Conventions' provisions and general principles of international law further make for an erga omnes responsibility, not only a contractual one between States, thus not subject to the principle of reciprocity. The paper shows that this obligation to act to ensure compliance with humanitarian law further arises from the United Nations Charter as well. The study goes on to discuss the scope of the duty to act, arguing that the Draft Articles on State Responsibility and a number of decisions by the International Court of Justice have gone beyond defining a State's right to act and beyond the duty not to assist the commission of violations, the omission of which constitute wrongful acts by States. It is further shown that the aforementioned is an obligation of result; States must continue to take measures to bring parties to a conflict to compliance with international humanitarian commitments until the desired result is achieved. Finally, the study concludes that the lack of enforcement of humanitarian law is a result of States' unwillingness to subject themselves to judicial machinery, which ``while cognizant of the hornets' nests of political entanglements, have the potential to struggle free of them.''

The policy to increase the Value Added Tax (VAT) rate to 12%, as stipulated in Law Number 7 of 2021 on the Harmonization of Tax Regulations, has generated diverse public responses, particularly regarding its impact on purchasing power, fiscal fairness, and policy legitimacy. This study aims to analyze public perceptions of the 12% VAT policy and assess the formation of public value using the Public Value framework. The research employs a mixed-methods approach with concurrent triangulation, combining quantitative sentiment analysis with qualitative content analysis of secondary data derived from public comments on Instagram. The findings indicate that public perception is predominantly negative, reflecting a low level of perceived policy value. Qualitative analysis further reveals that the VAT 12% policy is perceived as weak across the three dimensions of Public Value: policy benefits (value), legitimacy and public support (legitimacy and support), and governmental operational capacity (operational capabilities). The study concludes that the success of fiscal policy depends not only on legal validity and revenue objectives but also on the government’s ability to deliver tangible benefits, secure social legitimacy, and ensure effective implementation. Accordingly, this research recommends strengthening policy communication strategies, enhancing transparency and public participation, and improving economic mitigation mechanisms to increase public value and societal acceptance of the VAT 12% policy

Can we put labels on states due to their history of conflict involvement? Popular folklore as well as the rhetoric of politicians suggests that we can. Germany up to the end of World War II and Japan in the same period were labeled “revisionist” or “aggressive” states. President Reagan called the Soviet Union “the Evil Empire,” due to its seemingly expansionist ideology, but also due to its presumably aggressive behavior. Israel is often depicted by many of its neighbors and other countries in and outside the Middle East as “inherently expansionist.” These examples suggest a notion that states can somehow be structurally characterized, independently of specific policies, leaders, political parties or regimes in power, economic and social conditions. If we can label states in structural terms, we can also label pairs or groups of states. For example, President George W. Bush branded North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the “Axis of Evil,” due to these countries' pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration identified Syria, Iran, and Iraq as a destabilizing axis in the Middle East, confronting the latter two through a policy of dual containment. The scholarly literature on international politics has identified structural patterns of warring or conflicting dyads through such concepts as protracted conflict, intractable conflicts, and—more analytically defined—the concept of enduring rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Maoz and Mor 2002). How scientifically sound are such labels? More importantly, are such labels helpful in understanding the causes, courses, and consequences of international conflicts? In other areas of human and social inquiry, structural characterization of units is of immense importance. Genetic research clearly indicates that certain people are far more prone to some diseases than others. Research on addiction attempts to identify structural propensities of drug or alcohol abuse. Research on recidivism in criminology …

The Cameroon Anglophone crisis which began as a protest by Teachers and Lawyers trade unions toward the end of 2016 has evolved into an intractable conflict that threatens to dismember the West African nation. Most scholarly literature on the conflict so far has been focused on the origins, causes and possible remedies. Very few have touched on its theoretical underpinnings. This paper explores the theoretical foundation one which both parties in the conflict have premised their struggle or counter-struggle. It examines the Cameroon Anglophone crisis through the lenses of a conflict between “Remedial secession” on the one hand and “Territorial sovereignty” on the other. Both of the aforementioned concepts are fundamental to understanding the context and motivation of both sides and the main bone of contention that animates this conflict. The paper argues both international law and empirical evidences in their current form lend more credence to claims of territorial sovereignty than remedial secession. It lays out conditions under which the threshold for remedial secession can be attained.

Human rights are available to everyone on the basis of humanity. Universality, non-discrimination, equality and inalienability are core principles governing International Human rights Law (IHRL). The law governing armed conflict or war is known as International humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case of armed conflict, IHRL poses certain obligations on states along with humanitarian obligations. In this context, this article identifies the international human rights obligations of States in armed conflict. It argues that States must respect, promote, protect and fulfill human rights obligations of individuals, in the case of armed conflict, with increasing and serious concern, by analyzing the applicable legal framework under IHRL. It also addresses the extraterritorial application of IHRL and its limitations and derogations in armed conflict. Further, it discusses contemporary challenges for States in jurisdictional applicability and implementation of IHRL. To that extent, the argument developed throughout this article is that States have obligations under IHRL, irrespective of humanitarian obligations, not only in peace situations but also in the case of war or armed conflict.