The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors

Many observers view the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, as the event that heralded the active involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international policy making. In the intervening years, NGO participation in international policy making has grown exponentially, as has the number of multilateral environmental conventions, global environmental conferences and other efforts to facilitate a global governance of the human environment. The increasing numbers of NGOs with a stake in global environmental politics has been well documented, as has the presence at multilateral negotiations and their influence on negotiation outcomes (Betsill and Corell 2008). This paper examines the role and influence of non-state actors (NSAs) in multinational, supranational and transnational policy making. We have selected three models of rulemaking to help explain the role and influence of NSAs in different governance systems, reflecting developments within global environmental governance over the past three decades. Whereas multinational cooperation remained the model of choice whenever international environmental rules were created until the 1980s, the model has been joined in recent years by supranational and transnational rulemaking models. We begin by briefly reviewing the three models before presenting three case studies. In the first we examine how NSAs brought their influence to bear in a particular case of multinational environmental negotiations: the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This should shed light on some of the conditions that allow NGOs to exert such a high degree of influence in multinational policy-making processes. Next we explore the role and influence of NSAs in the making of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS). This is a prime example of supranational policy making, and serves to demonstrate the complexity of assessing the influence of NSAs in a dense institutional context. Focusing on social and environmental certification programs, the third case examines a growing tendency for NSAs to act as transnational rule makers in policy areas where states have been unwilling or unable to provide governance. Three Models of Rule Making and the Role of Non-State Actors In multinational cooperation, here represented by the IWC, member states enjoy in principle full authority. The legitimacy of rule-making is ensured by consent between sovereign states based on international law. In this liberal intergovernmental rule-making model, NSAs belong to the set of domestic special interest organizations with sufficient clout to influence negotiating positions. Of course, their efforts to influence negotiation positions meet with varying success; nation-states always have the final word. In supranational cooperation, in this paper represented by the EU ETS scheme, nationstates have transferred some of their sovereignty to other actors. In the EU case, this is most visible is the rules on qualified majority voting, co-decision making by the European Parliament and the policy-initiating role of the Commission. In short, as the consent of a state in itself is sometimes wanting in terms of legitimacy, there need additional sources of

This chapter engages the key legal debates surrounding the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in climate law. NSAs—a wide category that reflects the expansion of international climate governance beyond the state—include entities as diverse as individuals, companies, international organizations, industry associations, cities, indigenous peoples, and civil-society organizations. Over the past decades, and especially since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the many roles of NSAs in addressing climate change have attracted significant interest from treaty negotiators, business man-agers, environmental activists, policymakers, and researchers. Seen as performing vital functions ranging from innovation and agenda-setting to implementation, monitoring, and enforcement, NSAs are widely considered as bringing about dynamic forms of climate governance. The potential of direct mitigation effort by NSAs, such as voluntary emission-reduction commitments by companies and cities, is similarly highlighted as a key component in any future solution to climate change. The growing climate action by NSAs forces a rethink of the legal underpinnings of the climate regime and opens new perspectives on the logic of NSA-driven climate governance. This chapter discusses the legal dynamics of non-state climate governance. Using three archetypical NSAs—companies, cities, and civil-society organizations—as proxies, the chapter isolates three primary debates that frame the interactions between NSAs and climate law. These debates focus on the responsibility of NSAs for causing climate change, the legal techniques of NSA governance, and the role of NSAs as agents of legal change and they reflect the rise of polycentric climate governance and illustrate the expansion of climate law beyond its original emphasis on states. However, the discussion also exposes the difficulties that emerge when embedding different NSAs in a single conceptual frame, as well as the limits of NSA-driven governance more broadly.

Introduction: Non-state Actors in Mediterranean Politics

Contents: Introduction: relativizing the subjects or subjectivizing the actors: is that the question? Part I Non-State Actors in the Theory of International Law: The subjects of international law, Hersch Lauterpacht Critical reflections on the Westphalian assumptions of international law and organization: a crisis of legitimacy, A. Claire Cutler (I can't get no) recognition: subjects doctrine and the emergence of non-state actors, Jan Klabbers The emergence of non-governmental organizations and transnational enterprises in international law and the changing role of the state, Daniel ThA rer Paul Ricoeur and international law: beyond 'the end of the subject', Janne E. Nijman. Part II The Empirical Approach: Selected Non-State Actors: The individual and the international legal system, Robert McCorquodale Nongovernmental organizations and international law, Steve Charnovitz The invisible college of international lawyers, Oscar Schachter. Part III Participation by Non-State Actors in International Legal Processes: Law Making: NGOs, the International Criminal Court and the politics of writing international law, Michael J. Struett The Ottawa Convention banning landmines, the role of international non-governmental organizations and the idea of international civil society, Kenneth Anderson Law Adjudication: The amicis curiae before international courts and tribunals, Lance Bartholomeusz Law Enforcement: The environmental accountability of the World Bank to non-state actors: insights from the inspection panel, Alix Gowlland Gualtieri Globalization of human rights: the role of non-state actors, Andrea Bianchi. Part IV Non-State Actors' Accountability: the Quest for New Paradigms: The changing international legal framework for dealing with non-state actors, August Reinisch Punishment of non-state actors in non-international armed conflict, William A. Schabas Torture committed by non-state actors: the developing jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals, Jill Marshall Responsibility beyond borders: state responsibility for extraterritorial violations by corporations of international human rights law, Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons Overcoming NGO accountability concerns in international governance, Erik B. Bluemel Name index.

This volume recognizes three types of non-state actor: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational corporations (TNCs), which all play roles alongside nation-states (represented by governments) and which are interrelated in matters of international regulation and coordination. Although IGOs are created and controlled by states, their role and status have developed beyond that of being their ‘agents’. Having an agency of its own may result from the activities and authority of the IGO’s secretariat and the roles within the organization played by representatives of NGOs and private business as well as experts. After an overview of this volume, the remainder of this chapter puts the three types of non-state actor in a long-term time perspective by tracing their origin, evolution and interplay as parts of what international relations scholars call the international system of states. It looks upon the territorial state as a historical process, in which non-state actors have achieved their place as well, even if nation-states remain internationally dominant actors.

This study examined the role of Non State Actors (NSAs) in strengthening the developmental capacity of the state, using a case study of Cross River State, Nigeria. Primary and secondary data on selected constituents of NSAs including Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Privately Owned Companies, Banks, Private Hospitals and Private Schools were analyzed using tables and charts. The results revealed that activities of NSAs significantly enhance the developmental capacity of Cross River State especially in the areas of provision of public services, knowledge and skill acquisition, infrastructural development and employment generation. Besides other recommendations, it was recommended that NSAs and the government should perform complementary roles in enhancing developmental capacity and that the establishment of more NSAs in the rural areas should be encouraged through the provision of special funding and other incentives for NSAs that have their offices in the rural areas.

This chapter analyzes the different roles of non-state actors in global crime governance. The chapter starts by elaborating on the complexity of global crime governance, which makes the involvement of non-state actors in governance efforts more likely. In a second step, different categories of non-state contributions are presented, showing that the different attempts of global crime governance presented in the book vary significantly in how far they involve non-state actors. In the following section, the role of non-state actors in the global policy process is presented, showing that moral entrepreneurship at the beginning of a norm life cycle is only one among other crucial roles non-state actors play. In sum, the chapter shows that world society formation in global crime governance is accompanied by various and different contributions of non-state actors.

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) has accomplished much in advancing tobacco control. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were critical to the development of the Convention, who aided in mobilising stakeholders and advocated for core provisions of the treaty. NGOs and intergovernmental organisation are well recognised within the Convention and deemed essential to its continued implementation and evolution. Further, the treaty has been understood to be multidisciplinary in its aspiration to improve public health, and the role of both health sector and non-health sector stakeholders is an important component for describing the reach and potential for the Convention. In 15 years, however, non-state actors’ participation in the WHO FCTC Conference of the Parties (COP) – where Parties to the treaty engage in discussions that shape the treaty’s implementation and evolution – has been underrepresented in terms of sectoral diversity. We reviewed COP documents and assessed non-state actors’ participation in the COPs since the Convention's entry into force. We conclude that greater inclusion in COPs from health and non-health sector NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and UN Special Agencies would strengthen the global reach and full implementation of the WHO FCTC.

This article: Shows the variance of non-state actors in global crime governance and transnational governance in general, and shows that existent accounts fail to explain this variance. Proposes a model of how we can understand the different roles of non-state actors, distinguishing normative from rationalist reasons for non-state actor involvement. Compares different forms of current global crime governance (human trafficking, conflict diamonds, money laundering, cybercrime) to explore the validity of the model. Shows that non-state activism and public debate are usually only related to a specific type of crime, turning a ‘blind eye’ to other forms of crime and their governance. Argues that this creates problems with regard to oversight and discussion of global crime governance, exemplified with regard to intelligence surveillance via internet traffic. Global crime governance has become a major area of international activity, including a growing number of public and private regulatory efforts. Yet it is puzzling that a considerable variance exists in how state and non-state actors interact: non-state actors have been important agenda-setters in some issue areas, while they have been absent in others. Sometimes they are implementation bodies, sometimes they set regulations themselves. I argue that this variance is caused by issue characteristics: If an issue area is framed in a highly moralised way, it is likely that resulting non-governmental activity can be explained by normative convictions, and in particular advocacy occurs frequently. If an issue area is framed in a technical way, resource exchange is central, and delegation to non-state actors becomes more prominent. A comparison of human trafficking, conflict diamonds, money laundering and cybercrime shows that this relation can be found on the global and national level.

In this chapter, we explore how non-state and sub-state actors, such as civil society organizations, cities, indigenous groups, or the business sector, shape the democratic legitimacy of intergovernmental climate politics. The Paris Agreement revolves around states’ voluntary climate plans expressed in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Analyzing the NDC’s various entry points for non-state engagement, this chapter asks if and how non-state actors can enhance the democratic legitimacy of climate politics in a multi-level governance setting. To do so, we first revisit the post-Paris climate governance landscape and the different roles associated with non-state actors. Based on earlier work dealing with the legitimacy of non-state actors in climate governance, we conceptualize democratic legitimacy through the five values of participation, representation, accountability, transparency, and deliberation. We examine how non-state actors succeed or fail to secure these democratic norms. In conclusion, climate governance in the post-Paris era holds the potential to enhance but also undermine the democratic legitimacy of political decisions through involvement of non-state actors which can be cooperative, confrontational, or co-opted by state-driven agendas.

The emerging global governance of artificial intelligence (AI) is shaped by numerous political actors. Inviting non-state actors into such processes is typically assumed to address a perceived democratic deficit, by promoting increased representation, transparency, and openness. In the AI sphere, however, non-state actors include the same multinational companies that develop the technology to be regulated. Surprisingly, the task of normatively theorizing the democratic role of non-state actors in global AI governance has nevertheless been largely ignored. This paper addresses this by specifying, first, under what conditions non-state actors contribute to the actual democratization of global AI governance, as ‘democratic agents’, and second, under what conditions they instead contribute to the strengthening of the prerequisites for future democratization, as ‘agents of democracy’. We conclude that, although few non-state actors are authorized to act as ‘democratic agents’, their exercise of ‘moral’, ‘epistemic’, and ‘market authority’ could make them legitimate ‘agents of democracy’.

PART I: INTRODUCTION 1. The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors? 2. The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors PART II: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS NON-STATE ACTORS 3. The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System? 4. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund PART III: CORPORATIONS 5. Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International Stage 6. Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria 7. The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law 8. Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses as None-State Actors Bibliography on Non-State Actors in International Law

Cyberwarfare has become one of the most prominent aspects of global geopolitical competition, introducing a new dimension of conflict involving states and non-state actors. Although research on the role of states in cyber warfare has been amplacious, research on the role of non-state actors is still limited. This study aims to analyze the role and impact of non-state actors in global cyber warfare. In cyber warfare, non-state actors can exploit the vulnerabilities of security systems to achieve their political or ideological goals, changing geopolitical dynamics in unexpected ways. Case studies raised in this study include cyber attacks by Anonymous groups against governments and companies, cyber acts of terrorism by ISIS, manipulation of information by extremist groups to achieve their political goals, and the use of digital propaganda in regional conflicts. By paying attention to the concept of force and security in the perspective of realism, this research is expected to provide a better understanding of how non-state actors influence global geopolitical dynamics through cyber warfare. The implication of this research is the importance of strengthening national cyber defense and international cooperation in the face of threats presented by non-state actors in the cyber domain.

Following the Beslan2 school hostage crisis in September 2004, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a Public Chamber, which was intended to function as a public oversight committee with consultation powers. This body, which was established in 2005 with 126 members, analyses draft legis lation and monitors the activities of parliament, government and other governmental bodies of Russia and its Federal Subjects. At the same time new laws on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been adopted on the federal3 and regional level,4 in order to restructure the interaction between state and nonstate actors. According to the government, the new NGO legislation created the legal basis for NGOs as a new type of actor in the policy arena, enabling them to participate in politics.5 The Public Chamber, in addition, provides a negotiation platform that involves NGOs in problem solving and in bargaining compromises with state actors. Many observers, however, criticized the legislation as it seemed to tighten the control of the state over NGOs and to create obstacles for negotiations between the state and NGOs (Nusberger and Schmidt 2007). These controversial interpretations raise the question whether state actors really involve NGOs in problem solving and bargaining compromises and why state actors negotiate with NGOs. Analyses of authoritarian corporatism showed that economically and socially complex states cannot be governed only by technocratic-authoritarian means (Stepan 1978) and that under these conditions authoritarian regimes negotiate politics with societal actors. The literature on governance explains in detail that hierarchical steering causes information problems. This means that decision makers often do not have the required information about the object of theirdecision. Thus, the capacity of the state to effectively steer and coordinate society is seriously challenged. Negotiations between stakeholders can provide information and knowledge and can thus enhance the state capacity to solve problems (Scharpf 2000). Nowadays the combination of traditional hierarchical governance and network governance with non-state actors becomes ever more necessary in order to provide state functions, because in modern societies the need for sophisticated information and knowledge is growing constantly (Mayntz 1993). According to Linz, relations between state and non-state actors in authoritarian states differ, however, from those in democratic ones in that they are limited pluralistic (Linz 2000). Thus, the existence and the leeway of political and societal actors in authoritarian states depend on the authoritarian regime. The state dictates the institutions and procedures for negotiations with non-state actors. This forced institutionalized model of solving conflicts allows for the representation of societal interests while at the same time limiting conflicts. Although the theory of authoritarian corporatism seems to be of great use in understanding why and how state actors involve non-state actors in negotiations in Russian politics, we propose that it does not sufficiently correspond to and explain reality. We claim that NGOs in Russia are nowadays sufficiently powerful to influence whether and how state actors involve them in negotiations. In order to address the question why and how state actors in Russia involve non-state actors in negotiated governance, we analyse and compare interactions between state and non-state actors in five regions and three policy fields. The chosen cases differ in two ways. First, the interest of state actors to cooperate with NGOs differs depending on the policy field. Second, each policy field is analysed in two regions with different resource distributions among involved actors. The cases are ethnic policy in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, social policy in the Perm and Nižnij Novgorod regions and environmental policy in the Krasnodar and Irkutsk regions. The cases were chosen in a way that allows for testing whether the theory of authoritarian corporatism sufficiently explains why and how state actors negotiate with NGOs or whether the resources of NGOs to force the state to involve them in negotiations is a necessary additional contributing cause. The non-state actors we consider are private business actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The term ‘non-governmental organization’ describes organizations, linked to civil society. The crucial characteristic is that they are independent of the government, which means autonomous from the state and not oriented to profit-making. They can be differentiated from citizen initiatives and social movements, which often follow close or similar interests by their concrete organizational structure (Nohlen 2002: 324ff.). In our analyses we include NGOs that have an independent articulation of interests, possess differentiated financing, are not profit oriented and have concrete organizational structures. The following section of the chapter will first introduce the issues at stake in the various cases as well as the interests and resources of the main actors. In thesecond section the interactions between state and non-state actors will be analysed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

World politics is no longer about states interacting alone in a state of anarchy, but entails a complexity of interactions between states and a myriad of actors collectively referred to as non-state actors. Unlike non-state actors like multinational corporations (MNCs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs and other civil society groups and organizations do not enjoy full legal status and are often seen as anomalies in world politics. Yet, despite their alleged anomalous status, non-state actors like NGOs, not only outnumber states, MNCs and IGOs combined, but also are increasingly becoming almost indispensable players in global agenda setting, and in promulgating and enforcing global norms. Using NGOs as an example of non-state actors, this paper argues that NGOs have become or are increasingly becoming legitimate actors contrary to traditional theories of international law and international relations. First, it is argued the ontology of world politics has changed giving rise to multiple sites of authority (MSOA) and multiple sources of legitimacy (MSOL) rendering state consent less relevant as a source of legitimization. Second, NGOs may be deemed to be acquiring legitimacy or international legal personality implicitly. Specifically, recognition of NGOs in international legal instruments, their participation in the creation and enforcement of international law particularly in the environment, human rights, humanitarian areas, and increasing cooptation by states as agents through which to channel development funds are all evidence of NGOs' growing legitimacy in the system consistent with customary international law.