The Ascendance of Ethno-National Populism in Israel, 1977–2022: An Ethno-Class Analysis

Brief Synopses of New Arabic Language Publications

A PLO state on the West Bank would be like a hand poised to strangle Israel’s vital artery along the sea . – Benjamin Netanyahu, 1993 Who are we, they ask, to resist the entire world? That it is sometimes – and in the case of Israel, often – necessary to dissent from and resist prevailing opinion seldom crosses their minds . – Benjamin Netanyahu, 2000 Jerusalem Isn’t a Settlement, It’s Our Capital – Benjaming Netanyahu, 2011 Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s longest serving prime minister since David Ben-Gurion, has been an enigma to many observers. He was prime minister from 1996 to 1999, from March 2009 to January 2013, and after receiving the most votes in January 2013, formed his third government in March 2013. Some argue that he is a hard-line ideologue representing the Revisionist Zionist roots of the Likud Party who needs to be replaced if peace is to be secured. Others insist that he is an opportunist who has no deeply held beliefs, and therefore will make a peace agreement if he believes it will keep him in office. Netanyahu’s actions over time underscore this enigma, as he has swerved between maintaining hard-line positions and taking small steps toward compromise, negotiation, and peace. He has, on the one hand, vehemently opposed the Oslo Accords since their inception. On the other hand, during the 1996 campaign to become prime minister, he argued that he would abide by the agreements if the Palestinians honored their commitments. After becoming prime minister, though, he undermined the Oslo process by slowing it down and minimizing its effects. Although not ceding territory is a central part of Netanyahu’s ideology, he granted additional land and jurisdiction to the Palestinians in the Hebron and Wye Agreements in order to improve his chances of getting elected again in 1999. Most of the withdrawals agreed to at Wye, however, were not implemented. This pattern continued through Netanyahu’s second term in office: in June 2009, under intense pressure from the United States, Netanyahu publicly agreed in principle to something he had rejected his entire life – the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel under certain conditions.

PurposeTo explore a potential relationship between politicians’ media background and social media success through an analysis of content and engagement strategies adopted by three consecutive Israeli prime ministers on their official Facebook pages.Design/methodology/approachA detailed comparative content analysis of a total of 1,242 posts published by three Israeli prime ministers – Benjamin Netanyahu, Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett – on the same official Facebook account, “the Prime Minister of Israel,” during their respective terms. Metrics like engagement rates, content distribution and media type utilization were considered.FindingsAll analyzed prime ministers exhibited consistent messaging strategies, suggesting a standardized approach to digital political communication. However, we found no correlation between a politician’s media background and their success on social media. Instead, decisive determinants of engagement outcomes were factors like longstanding political exposure and familiarity.Practical implicationsThe observed uniformity in leaders’ messaging strategies indicates a prevalent standardized approach in digital political communication, revealing potential avenues for innovation and diversification.Originality/valueThis research challenges the prevailing notion that background in media inherently benefits digital political engagement, emphasizing the significance of political experience. The results provide new insights into the evolving landscape of political communication. Using signaling theory to evaluate how digital content reveals leaders’ intentions and credibility, our findings provide new insights into political communication in the digital era.

Abstract. Ukrainian-Israeli relations underwent significant structural changes in the wake of russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022. Following the outbreak of russia’s war against Ukraine, the pre-war positive dynamics in Ukrainian-Israeli relations shifted to neutral expressions of support and practical detachment from the war by the Israeli government. Despite undergoing three changes in government during the one-and-a-half years of the war, Israel’s policy of neutrality towards russia’s actions in Ukraine remained consistent, albeit with some differences. This article provides an indepth analysis of Israel’s policies towards Ukraine under the leadership of three Prime Ministers: Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, and Benjamin Netanyahu. This article delves into the complex dynamics of the Israeli government’s stance regarding support for Ukraine, focusing on public reactions, practical steps, and reservations. The political activities of each Israeli Prime Minister, coupled with the domestic context and national interests, provide a compelling insight into Israel’s approach towards crucial geopolitical matters. Among these is Israel’s stance of neutrality towards the ongoing war in Ukraine – a stance that warrants a deeper examination. The article unravels the conceptual framework that underpins the foreign policy positions of three subsequent Prime Ministers of the State of Israel with regard to Ukraine against the context of russia’s full-scale war. The research resulted in the author’s author’s hypothesis regarding the geopolitical priorities of the State of Israel. Keywords: Israeli-Ukrainian relations, russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Middle Eastern Neutrality, geopolitical interests, red lines, Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Benjamin Netanyahu.

As populist campaigns against the media become increasingly common around the world, it is ever more urgent to explore how journalists adopt and respond to them. Which strategies have journalists developed to maintain the public's trust, and what may be the implications for democracy? These questions are addressed using a thematic analysis of forty-five semistructured interviews with leading Israeli journalists who have been publicly targeted by Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The article suggests that while most interviewees asserted that adherence to objective reporting was the best response to antimedia populism, many of them have in fact applied a “strategic bias” to their reporting, intentionally leaning to the Right in an attempt to refute the accusations of media bias to the Left. This strategy was shaped by interviewees' perceived helplessness versus Israel's Prime Minister and his extensive use of social media, a phenomenon called here “the influence of presumed media impotence.” Finally, this article points at the potential ramifications of strategic bias for journalism and democracy. Drawing on Hallin's Spheres theory, it claims that the strategic bias might advance Right-wing populism at present, while also narrowing the sphere of legitimate controversy—thus further restricting press freedom—in the future.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world’s longest-running conflicts that has been continuing for several years. Every Israeli administration since 1967 has poured copious amounts of money into building and expanding settlements in the Occupied Territories, both in terms of the area they occupy and the population they house. Over 380,000 Israeli citizens currently live in West Bank settlements, including those in East Jerusalem, as a result of this policy. Benjamin Netanyahu has heavily influenced Israeli policy on the occupied Palestinian land. He has made several statements regarding the need for increased settlements in the occupied territories. Upon taking office as Prime Minister in 2022, Netanyahu declared that his government's main strategy would be to advance and foster settlement in all parts of Israel. He used various mechanisms to increase the settlements, which included building military outposts and providing high-level amenities to the Israeli people living in the settlements, and he was very keen to create an apartheid system there. His decision on settlements has caused tension with Palestinian leaders and sparked strong international criticism. Many nations and organisations see the spread of settlements as a threat to peace and a breach of international law. A forceful and assertive stance has frequently defined Benjamin Netanyahu's approach to Israeli settlements. Netanyahu’s position reflects larger ideological and strategic considerations inside Israeli politics. Keywords: Israel, Palestine, Settlement, Benjamin Netanyahu, Occupied territories

Hawks’ Beaks, Doves’ FeathersLikud Prime Ministers Between Ideology and Reality Arye Naor (bio) Introduction Since the political upheaval of May 17, 1977, Israel has had four Likud Prime Ministers—Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ariel Sharon. All four had pledged allegiance to the Greater Israel (Eretz Israel Hashlemah) ideology before being elected and during tenure. Different from each other in background, in style, and language as they might have been, all of them were elected on the Greater Israel ticket, having disassociated themselves and their Likud Party from Labor mainly on this issue. Judging by their past positions and their criticism of Labor's "territories for peace" policy, one might have concluded that none of them would relinquish anything in negotiating the future of Eretz Israel; however, the policies they conducted were, indeed, different, resulting in shaking the foundations of Greater Israel ideology. In the end it appears that under Likud leadership the Land of Israel is about to be partitioned—manifesting the antithesis of Revisionist Zionism. Although it is too early to sum up Ariel Sharon's policy and evaluate its results, it is already clear that his initiative for Israeli disengagement from Gaza and his acceptance of President Bush's road map eventually leads to partition. Its parameters, from exact boundaries to time-table are irrelevant from an ideological point of view. However, since this policy is still in the making, this article analyzes the development of the approaches of Begin, Shamir, and Netanyahu. The comparative study shows that Begin, as the main ideology-maker after Jabotinsky, was obliged to consider opportunities and constraints, and as prime minister he also had to acknowledge considerations of Realpolitik. The result was a moderation of his ideological demands; indeed, Begin revised Revisionism. In the transition from Begin to Shamir, the ideological [End Page 154] dimension in policy making was strengthened, leading to the development of a dogmatic approach that rejected any revision of this ideology, which was used to form strict rules for policy; however, he went to Madrid, thus unintentionally paving the way for the Oslo process.1 With the transition from Shamir to Netanyahu, by contrast, the attachment to ideology as the basis for policy making and policy evaluation weakened; policy reasoning gave way to "Hasbarah"—that is to say, propaganda and political manipulation. From the viewpoint of those who remained faithful to the old ideology, this was an extremely worrying development—a grave defect that may only be rectified with considerable effort.2 Equally, however, it should be emphasized that Netanyahu's book, A Place Among the Nations, is based not only on an evaluation of the situation and a neutral discussion of the lessons of history, but also on a profound ideological and emotional commitment to continued Israeli control of all territories under its supervision. As we shall see below, the gap between this commitment and the policy of Netanyahu's government is due to political manipulation, and to an instrumentalist approach which sees ideology as a means for achieving political ends. The relationship of ideology and policy is thus revealed in three different ways. Begin For fifty years, Menachem Begin was a leading ideological and political figure in his movement. Throughout this period, he had an ideological approach to policy and politics. We shall examine his approach to the principle of the "integrity of the homeland," the term he used for the principle of a "Greater Israel," at three critical junctures: shortly before the establishment of the State of Israel (1947/8); immediately after the Six Day War (1967/8); and during term as prime minister (1977–1983). In response to UN General Assembly Decision 181 of November 29, 1947, supporting the division of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, Begin published a statement on behalf of the Irgun (Etzel) underground organization which he commanded. The statement begins, "In the name of the Divine promise given to the nation's forefathers," goes on to speak "in the name of the nation's martyrs in each generation," and "in the name of this people, tortured throughout the generations," and reaches its peak in the underground war—"in the name of those...

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

Correspondence: Secrecy, Civil-Military Relations, and India's Nuclear Weapons Program

This work focuses on the consequences of Covid-19 for the public images of political leaders as they emerge from Twitter discourses in Italy. To that end, the research investigates the tweets of Italian citizens about the pandemic in 2020 to understand whether the messages related to the virus can provide helpful information to track support for politicians. These goals are relevant because we know little about how the images of political leaders change in times of crisis, and Italy has been one of the countries most affected by the pandemic. The threat of the virus and the search for protection should increase confidence in the Prime Minister and foster the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. However, as the debate on the virus dominated posts on Twitter, populist leaders opposing the Government could have taken advantage of the emergency to criticize the Government and thus gain support. Further, there are various political parties in the country, including right-wing mainstream and populist parties. Moreover, populists are both in the opposition and in government. We find that the images of politicians are shaped according to their stances relating to the pandemic and the ideas they promote. As expected, right-wing populists tried to use Twitter to criticize the Government but were often criticized for being ‘political looters’. Fear of the pandemic boosted confidence in the Prime Minister and his coalition. To understand these results, both context and the actor’s position are critical elements when studying public opinion through social media communication.

What the Collapse of the Two-State Solution Means for Palestinian and Israeli Nationalism

Aim: The recent indictments of the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, by the International Criminal Court have been seen by many legal pundits as one of the fallouts of the criticisms and pressure by African states that the Court has been prosecuting only Africans. This paper examines the connection between the recent indictments of Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu by the International Criminal Court and the longstanding criticisms levelled by African states regarding perceived prosecutorial bias. Methods: The paper is essentially qualitative, with the main focus on content analysis of relevant literature. The study employs a qualitative doctrinal methodology, analyzing legal texts, ICC documents, African Union resolutions, and critical commentary to assess the link between African critiques and the Court’s evolving prosecutorial choices. Results: The paper found out that the indictments of powerful nuclear states leaders such as Benjamin Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin are a significant step towards accountability. Recommendation: The paper recommends that the International Criminal Court should continue to prosecute international crimes without bias or influence from powerful states.

Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies

Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies

During the 1990s the israeli political system faced a number of major upheavals on both the macro- and the micro-political levels. As a result many of its basic features changed considerably. Presently, it is more difficult to predict future political behaviour in Israel than ever before.One may point at the only successful no-confidence vote, which took place on 15 March 1990, as an event that symbolically initiated the new era. Yitzhak Shamir, the head of the Likud and the acting prime minister at the time, overcame the crisis, formed a new government, and continued to serve as prime minister. Yitzhak Rabin of the Labour Party took power following the 1992 elections. Shimon Peres of Labour succeeded Rabin as premier following Rabin's assassination in November 1995. Peres lost the 1996 elections to Likud's new leader, Benjamin Netanyahu. In the 1999 elections, Labour returned to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Ehud Barak.