The Art of Subtle Influence: Russian Soft Power and Georgia’s Conservative Turn

In this article, we aim to analyse the research discourse in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as regards Russian soft power, which is considered as hard power, and to compare the theses that dominate this discourse with the actual interactions between Russia and the three states in media, education, and culture. Each Baltic country has built a system of political and legal restrictions to diminish the effect of Russian soft power, which is considered in terms of hard power, i.e. as a threat to national security. The current forms of Russian soft power are becoming less productive in the region and their use in the negative political context of bilateral relations has the opposite effect for Russia – the country loses in reputation and image. The main factor at play is the information content of the Russian-language media space. At odds with the historical and political views of a significant part of the Baltic States’ ruling class, it is becoming the target of counteraction. At the same time, Russian high and mass culture and, partly, educational services are in demand from both Baltic Russian speakers and ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Our analysis shows that the views of Baltic researchers that Russian soft power is politics-driven and foreign to the region are exaggerated and biased. In its turn, Russian soft power in the Baltics retains the potential to aid the country’s foreign policy, being a complement to the latter rather than its direct tool.

The aim of this study is to discuss how the concept of "soft power" is perceived by Russian policymakers and how it is used in the Middle East geography, which is one of its application areas. In the existing academic literature, studies on Russian soft power have mainly focused on the former Soviet domain, including Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe. However, when Russia's foreign policy towards the Middle East is evaluated, it is observed to have a multi-dimensional approach, which includes soft power instruments in addition to hard power elements such as military intervention, use of force, threat, political manipulation, and proxy wars. From this point of view, this study aims to fill the literature gap by revealing the effects and limitations of Russian soft power in the region. The statements and discourses of decision-makers as well as official documents, institutional reports, statistics, and surveys were also considered while examining the soft power projection of Russia in the Middle East, and the change of the Russian soft power in discourse and practice in the Middle East was analyzed by the process tracing method. In the study, it is revealed that the Russian soft power in the Middle East differs from the concept of soft power introduced by Nye in both understanding and application and had a flexible and pragmatic understanding. Although this flexibility has provided advantages to Russia in the short term, they have limitations with regard to their sustainability in the long term.

This work is devoted to conceptualization of «soft power» concept in academic science, studying Russia as a particular case of a hard country with an alternative approach to soft power. The COVID out­ break provides another strong argument in favor of changing nature of power in international relations in the 21st century. By another words, the coronavirus revealed the main normative nature of the soft power paradigm, which works well enough in theory but is mostly unproven in the real world. Applying the theory of neoclassical realism to explain the logic of employing Russian soft power, this research is aimed to revealing the effectiveness of the Russian strategy in the Central Asian region, as well as the reasons and factors that determine the advantages of Russian soft power in such weak and at the same time authoritarian countries as Central Asian, where leaders, in their turns, show different external orien­ tation toward integrational process led by Kremlin. Therefore, personal transnational or «Trans imperial» communications serve as the main transmission mechanism of Moscow. Key words: «soft power», «Russian soft power», neoclassical realism, Central Asia.  

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated Russia’s incapacity to implement a foreign policy strategy without resorting to hard power means, exposing the limits in its soft power capacity to ‘attract’ and ‘persuade’. Specifically, Russian soft power in Ukraine built around the model of the ‘Russian world’ (Russkiy Mir) was unable to persuade Kyiv to align with Moscow through peaceable means. Simultaneously, EU-inspired soft power based on the idea of ‘Greater Europe’ and Ukrainian ‘Europeanness’ conceived through the normative prism of liberal-democratic values and the potential of higher levels of economic development, limited the impact of Russia’s soft power in Ukraine. Russian soft power in Ukraine was not inspired by the idea of attraction but conceived as a propagandistic means to justify expansionist policies, merging de facto with hard power. After the 2022 invasion, in the occupied regions, Moscow’s influence could only be imposed coercively as an ancillary tool of hard power through a unique combination of smart and sharp power. Overall, a comparison of the influence of Russian and EU soft power in Ukraine highlights that the latter proved to be generally more persuasive, leading Moscow to resort to military force.

Part I. The search for Russian -- Russian soft power : hard power in a velvet glove -- The three components of the Russian soft power offensive : mimesis, roll back, and invention -- Reputation laundering : how Western PR firms help improve the Kremlin's image -- The propaganda offensive in the Western media, part I : the creation of Russia today (RT), Russia beyond the headlines, and Rossiya segodnya -- The propaganda offensive in the Western media, part II : buying Western newspapers, the increasing grip on the social media, the Kremlin School of Bloggers -- Financing politicians and political parties -- Spies and spooks as soft power instruments -- Part II. Creating a new missionary ideology : the role of the Russian Orthodox Church -- The Russian Orthodox Church : the Kremlin's secret weapon? -- Attacking universal human rights in the international fora -- A global church for the Kremlin? -- The Russian Orthodox Church : a pillar of Russian neo-imperialism? -- Part III. Undermining Atlanticism : building a strategic triangle Moscow-Berlin-Paris -- An emerging Moscow-Berlin axis? -- Germany's Kremlin-friendly political class -- Russian-German Verflechtung : creating mutual economic interdependence -- The Kremlin's conquest of France -- Conclusions -- Glossary/list of abbreviations.

Decolonising the museum?

We argue for analytically separating women’s and LGBTQ+ rights and differentiating the degrees of sexism and LGBTQ-phobia in Russia to better understand its conservative turn in the 2010s. Comparing Putin’s speeches to domestic audiences (1999–2020) with public opinion, we identify a somewhat conservative trend regarding women’s rights and a far more conservative one on LGBTQ+ rights. While Russia made a sharper conservative turn in summer 2021, we find that until 2020, state discourse and public opinion on these topics mostly echoed Soviet approaches, suggesting that the conservative ‘turn’ amounted more to a ‘return’ than to a novel development.

The end of the Cold War heralded a new era as Western soft power was at its zenith in Eastern Europe and regional states accepted and institutionalized a new EuroAmerican ethos. In contrast, Russian soft power was at its lowest point as the Soviet Union imploded, leaving fi fteen newly independent states. While Russia was still the most powerful nation in the region, it lacked competence to deploy soft power and was unable to culturally infl uence its neighbors. Russia had to regain its footing and sought to redefi ne its own national identity prior to being able to build and project its soft power. Thus, Russia turned inward to nineteenth century works in philosophy and literature while Western soft power and expansionism continued to draw closer to Russia’s borders. As Moscow regrouped, it created institutions to spread its message both regionally and globally and expanded its communication prowess. Russia realized that while its national identity might be grounded within its Slavic roots and Russian exceptionalism, the only way it could effectively counter Western soft power was to point out the hypocrisy of American and European governmental policies. Rather than generating a positive projection of cultural and political attractiveness, Russia fought the spread Euro-American soft power by directly challenging it and showed that the Western political ethos ultimately was selfcontradictory and also worked to destroy traditional values.

The paper aims to study the changes to Russia’s soft power inside the Eurasian Economic Union. The Union has been considered a tool of Russian soft power aiming to establish a common market combined with common information space. The paper examines the consequences of the “Special military operation”, started in 2022, to the Russian soft power resources in international news reporting and public discussions in the mass media of the member-states. To achieve this goal the foreign policy analysis method has been applied. It has been found that Russia has put extensive efforts into building a prominent country image and promoting strong leadership in global politics. The Eurasian Economic Union is one of the successful integration projects for Russia, which combines both soft and hard power. However, recently more and more countries in the Union prefer exclusive cooperation with Russia to a multi-vector policy. The process gradually gathers momentum in the Eurasian Economic Union, especially in Armenia. It has been found that many points of disagreement provoke further decline of the symbolic leadership of Russia. The paper reports recent challenges to Russia’s soft power, which have been provoked by the changes in the international journalism and media policy in the member-states.

The paper aims to study the changes to Russia’s soft power inside the Eurasian Economic Union. The Union has been considered a tool of Russian soft power aiming to establish a common market combined with common information space. The paper examines the consequences of the “Special military operation”, started in 2022, to the Russian soft power resources in international news reporting and public discussions in the mass media of the member-states. To achieve this goal the foreign policy analysis method has been applied. It has been found that Russia has put extensive efforts into building a prominent country image and promoting strong leadership in global politics. The Eurasian Economic Union is one of the successful integration projects for Russia, which combines both soft and hard power. However, recently more and more countries in the Union prefer exclusive cooperation with Russia to a multi-vector policy. The process gradually gathers momentum in the Eurasian Economic Union, especially in Armenia. It has been found that many points of disagreement provoke further decline of the symbolic leadership of Russia. The paper reports recent challenges to Russia’s soft power, which have been provoked by the changes in the international journalism and media policy in the member-states.

An important component of bilateral Kazakh-Russian relations is the cultural, humanitarian and educational sphere. In foreign policy, these directions are traditionally classified as "soft power". In this sense, the research question aimed at considering one of the modern trends of Russia's "soft power" in relation to neighboring countries and its interpretation in the studies of scientists is relevant. The authors consider some of the views of the academic community on Russian “soft power” with the aim of a general understanding of how Russian soft power has prospects for spreading its influence in Kazakhstan. This article aims to analyze some opposing academic views and show their strength and limitations. A critical analysis of the strategic documents of the Russian Federation points to repeated references to the importance of soft power in the description of Russia's foreign policy priorities. Using the example of Kazakhstan, the article discusses the main strengths and weaknesses of Russian “soft power” and its effectiveness. It is important to note that this paper is not aimed at reconstructing the general theoretical idea of «soft power». The authors strive to show different approaches and assessments of researchers about Russian «soft power» policy using the example of Kazakhstan as a country where Russian «soft influence» prevails the most.

An important component of bilateral Kazakh-Russian relations is the cultural, humanitarian and educational sphere. In foreign policy, these directions are traditionally classified as "soft power". In this sense, the research question aimed at considering one of the modern trends of Russia's "soft power" in relation to neighboring countries and its interpretation in the studies of scientists is relevant. The authors consider some of the views of the academic community on Russian “soft power” with the aim of a general understanding of how Russian soft power has prospects for spreading its influence in Kazakhstan. This article aims to analyze some opposing academic views and show their strength and limitations. A critical analysis of the strategic documents of the Russian Federation points to repeated references to the importance of soft power in the description of Russia's foreign policy priorities. Using the example of Kazakhstan, the article discusses the main strengths and weaknesses of Russian “soft power” and its effectiveness. It is important to note that this paper is not aimed at reconstructing the general theoretical idea of «soft power». The authors strive to show different approaches and assessments of researchers about Russian «soft power» policy using the example of Kazakhstan as a country where Russian «soft influence» prevails the most.

Through an analysis of government documents regulating the film industry, I examine the structure and reach of Russian soft power in relation to BRICS and the West. I introduce the concept of ‘manipulative soft power’ to account for Russia’s re-orientation politically and also cinematically. The article explores a number of theoretical concerns including soft power and agency in the era of social media, soft power and the ‘attention economy’ where ‘attention currency’ is valued more than the product to which it is attached, and soft power and controversy and notoriety. I focus on a particular event: the release of Zviagintsev’s Leviathan, its nomination for the 2015 Oscars, and the associated controversy that engulfed Russia and the Russian speaking world in 2014–15 and that bled into international media, especially Anglophone media, thus re-focusing global attention on Russia. I analyse the government and media discourse surrounding the release of Leviathan, and I conclude by reflecting on Russian soft power and the country’s role in the process of globalization.

Recent research on the conservative turn of post-Soviet Russia has paid attention to the revival of the so-called ‘traditional values’ promoted through the government’s pro-natalist family policy. A patriarchal view of women, and their roles in society, is nothing new: pre-revolutionary Russia was a patriarchal society, where women were considered first of all as wives and mothers; even the Soviet society was patriarchal in its attitude towards women, with the burdens of both paid work, outside the home, and domestic responsibilities. The chapter introduces the mnemonic actors, the mnemonic signifiers, and their connections to the history of female participation in revolutionary struggle and to the post-Soviet female political activism. According to the Soviet mnemonic pattern, the revolutionaries, regardless of sex, were driven by the political beliefs that they cherished. All female revolutionaries are represented as women with ‘natural’ female desires, who ended up in the wrong place because of personal circumstances.

Soft power is about forming the preferences of other actors on the international scene so that they want what the dominant actor wants. The essential aspect is related to the culture of the country, its language, arts, science and educational systems, as well as the attractiveness of its socio-economic model as a whole. The instrumental aspect of soft power comprises the institutions through which the essential aspect can be manifested – various governmental and non-governmental organizations and charitable foundations, including the media, cultural, scientific and educational institutions, etc. In Russian discourse the term ‘soft power’ was first mentioned in an interview given by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the problems of interaction with foreign Russian-speaking communities in Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2008. The most important for promoting the image of Russia is its classical culture, developed during the Russian Empire, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.