Abstract
Abstract This chapter presents the fifth of our seven arguments for concept nativism—the argument from neural wiring. Considerations centred around the brain’s plasticity have been widely taken to argue for empiricist views of conceptual development and against rationalist views. The argument from neural wiring turns this traditional wisdom on its head, arguing that considerations centred around the brain’s plasticity can provide a powerful form of argument for concept nativism and against concept empiricism. As with the previous chapters in Part II, our discussion in this chapter has a dual focus. It aims both to clarify the logic of the argument from neural wiring and to use this argument to continue building the case for our version of concept nativism. The main case studies discussed focus on representations of space and motion, faces and individuals, living and non-living kinds, tools, action categories, and mental states.
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