The Ambivalence of Consent

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article explores the ambivalence of consent presented by Vanessa Springora’s recent memoir, Consent (2020). It argues that current notions of affirmative consent are inadequate for understanding the role of autonomy in scenarios characterised by inequality or injustice. Building on the insights of Quill R. Kukla, Emily Owens, and Carole Pateman, the article demonstrates that current concepts of consent are insufficient to address situations of deep structural inequalities, such as those foundational to Springora’s relationship with the writer Gabriel Matzneff. It argues that Matzneff's exploitation of Springora challenges two commonplace beliefs about consent that are nonetheless in tension with one another: the first, about the efficacy and desirability of a standard of affirmative consent, and the second, the belief that adolescents cannot act agentically and do not possess sexual autonomy. Reading these two claims with and against each other points toward the need for a new framework for consent grounded in the concept of relational autonomy. Ultimately, drawing on recent feminist theory, as well as the relational autonomy literature, I suggest that relational autonomy establishes the conditions of possibility under which consent can be established, debated, and refused.