Abstract
Abstract The paper discusses a series of new technologies and new strategic factors entering into naval power and their analytical consequences. The argument is made that (1) traditional ways of identifying “naval power”; no longer have any utility or carry real meaning; (2) current high‐value surface naval forces of declining utility are extremely vulnerable to attack, which will force a radical revaluation in the West of “sea control”; and the costs of such control; and (3) the Soviet Union, by virtue of its geography and its capacity to innovate in “sea denial”; naval force, may be better positioned that the West to take advantage of new antinaval technologies. Western countermeasures may be expensive, involve a radical restructuring of naval force, and mean the acceptance of permanent strategic vulnerability at sea. The “new era”; of naval politics cannot be divorced, analytically and operationally, from emergent space systems and from the strategic nuclear balance.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
