The Agreed Framework With the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

IntroductionGiven the gravity and urgency of North Korean issues, the U.S. cannot avoid addressing highly uncertain prospects in the North. Although Korea is a middle-sized country-the North and South Koreas together are roughly the same size as Britain and have a combined population of 70 million, Koreans feel small because they live amid giants. Their geopolitical neighbors are China, Japan, Russia, and America, whose spheres of influence overlap in Korea. As a result, the peninsula has been over the past 50 years the site of recurrent collisions between great power interests.Ever since the Korean War, two rival governments, communist in the North and capitalist in the South, have been locked in mortal combat. Half a century later, there is still no peace on the horizon. By American estimates, North Korea has i.i million troops; South Korea has 700,000, which, however, are augmented by 37,000 American armed forces. All men have military experience, and millions (the number of reserve troops is 4.7 million in North Korea and 4.5 million in South Korea) are eligible for call-up in case of war (Kim, 2003, pp. 8-9). Since Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack on July 8, 1994, the future of North Korea became the core of Northeast Asian security issues. Arguments focus on North Korea's current situation, policy directions, and the results of its policies.The U.S. has recently questioned how to confront sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. Policymakers face two choices: engagement or confrontation. In the past, the Clinton administration had engaged with North Korea to prevent its development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Bush administration quickly put North Korean relations on hold until a policy review was conducted. By early July 200i, the new administration's policy, under the influence of Colin Powell, validated a continuation of the U.S.-North Korean dialogue. However, North Korea expressed strong concern through other channels that the Bush administration operated under a di∂erent and more di[double dagger]cult set of principles than the Clinton administration. North Korea's view of the Bush administration's tougher line on relations was validated in 2002. In the past, the U.S. State Department had labeled North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as rogue states whose military policy and support of other groups threatened Washington's security. In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, however, Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an axis of evil, thus extending his war on terrorism. A series of one-sided hard-line actions taken by both sides since then has caused their relationship to deteriorate along the following pathway: engagement [arrow right] containment [arrow right] confrontation [arrow right] regional crisis [arrow right] international crisis. Consequently, daily headlines about this newly strained relationship between the two old enemies filled the news media around the world though this stando∂ has been somewhat overshadowed by the Iraq war since March 2003.In our dialogue, we will first discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Second, we will analyze four ways of dealing with the nuclear deadlock, backing our views with a survey of MBA students. Third, we will argue why the U.S. should publicly announce its clear-cut position on North Korea's nuclear program once and for all. Finally, we will argue why engagement is the only viable option to resolve the latest altercation between the U.S and North Korea on nuclear weapons.North Korean Nuclear Weapons ProgramIn i989, it became undeniably obvious that North Korea was assembling the elements of a nuclear weapons program. However, its nuclear technology emerged as early as the late i950s; the program gained momentum in the i960s and again in the mid-i980s. North Korea initially obtained a small research reactor from the Soviet Union and later began construction on a larger reactor at the Yongbyon site. …

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.1 Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.2 Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have bought the same horse three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the leap day agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea-involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States-have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea's nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang's inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community's efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea's current trajectory through increased engagement.North Korea's Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of DenuclearizationNorth Korea's actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea's nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heav y-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 When North Korea's uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program's existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country's development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.4 As North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.The key to understanding North Korea's changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. …

Russia has had a consistent policy of promoting a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, opposing resolution of the nuclear issue through pressure or sanction, supporting a multilateral process and solution, promoting adherence to Non-Proliferation Treaty rules, and expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Moscow suggested initiating a six-party process regarding a solution to the divided Korean peninsula in 1994. North Korea is generally positive about Russia's suggestions. The United States has belatedly and reluctantly recognized Russia's positive role in the process. Russia hopes the Six Party Talks (6PT) will gradually evolve into a multiparty security and cooperation system including a peaceful DPRK. This will be facilitated by international economic assistance to the DPRK and institutionalization of the 6PT. Successful Russia-U.S. cooperation may have much wider implications. Key words: Russian foreign policy in Korea, North Korea, multilateral security - East Asia, nuclear weapons Early Russian Efforts to Promote Collective Security in Korea On March 24, 1994 the Russian foreign ministry made public a suggestion for a six-party involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also supposed to join the discussion on Korea for finding a compromise solution to the first North Korean nuclear crisis. That crisis began in March 1993 when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), suspected of nuclear-weapon development, left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 The proposed comprehensive solution in Korea was meant to include: * promoting nuclear nonproliferation in Korea; * guarantees of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two Korean states; * military confidence-building measures; * replacement of the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a new peace treaty; and * normalization of bilateral relations between certain members of the talks (U.S.-DPRK, DPRK-Japan).2 The idea itself was not new. After the end of the Korean War the armistice agreement of 1953 recommended that the governments of the countries concerned hold a to solve the problem of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and reach a peace agreement. The idea of a six-party consultative conference raised during the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly was proposed by South Korea and was supported by Japan.3 Russia's support for the process was based on the presumption that the Korean security issue (including the nuclear problem) was rooted in the long history of relations between the four powers (Japan, USSR, United States, and China) on the Korean issue. Historically, imperial Japan was the colonial master of Korea and only its defeat in World War II by the United States and the USSR brought about Korean independence. The United States and the USSR agreed on the division of Korea at Yalta in 1945. Soon after, however, they became adversaries in the course of the Korean War, which also involved China. The cold-war confrontation was the product of the global competition between two systems: the USSR and China, both of which, although at odds with each other, had alliance treaties with the DPRK and supported Pyongyang, versus the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc. This system provided the security balance on the peninsula. Thus, the 1994 Russian suggestion was not spontaneous and was prompted by Russia's attempt to protect its national interests. However, at that time it was ignored. As Samuel Kim puts it: Being left out of the Chinese bilateral approach and marginalized by US hegemonic sanctions, Russia was attempting to get back into the game. . . . Washington dismissed the Russian proposal as a harmful distraction while Beijing scuttled it as deviating from its declared party line.4 Instead, a 2+2 formula (the two Koreas, the United States, and China) formula was implemented, in 1996, rebuffing Russian attempts to be involved. …

How Did North Korea Develop the Bomb?The promise and peril of nuclear energy share a common technological foundation. Pursuit of a civilian fuel cycle-making fuel, building reactors to burn the fuel, and maintaining the back-end to deal with nuclear waste, including the option of extracting some of the valuable by-products from burning reactor fuel-enables nations to develop the capability to make bomb fuel, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. North Korea mastered the plutonium fuel cycle ostensibly for nuclear power and then used it to build the bomb.This brief review of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear capabilities will only touch on the important political milestones that helped to shape it; a more complete discussion will be presented in the next section. Kim Il-sung, the country's founding father, laid the foundation for nuclear technology development in the early 1950s. The Soviet "Atoms for Peace" initiative, modeled after President Eisenhower's initiative of the same name, enabled several hundred North Korean students and researchers to be educated and trained in Soviet universities and nuclear research centers. The Soviets built a research re-actor, the ITR-2000, and associated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in the 1960s. North Korean specialists trained at these facilities and by the 1970s were prepared to launch a nuclear program without external assistance.North Korea's decision to build gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors was a logical choice at the time for an indigenous North Korean energy program because gas-graphite reactors can operate with natural uranium fuel and, hence, do not require enrichment of uranium.3 Although North Korea may have experimented with enrichment technologies, commercial enrichment capabilities were beyond its reach and difficult to acquire.4 North Korea's ambitious program began with an experimental 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor, which became operational in 1986. Construction of that reactor was followed by a scaled-up 50 MWe reactor and a 200 MWe power reactor, although neither was ever completed.North Korea quickly mastered all aspects of the gas-graphite reactor fuel cycle. It built fuel fabrication facilities and a large-scale reprocessing facility, which enabled extraction of plutonium from spent fuel.5 Unlike the Soviet built research facilities, the new facilities were built and operated without being declared to or inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pyongyang had no legal obligation to declare these facilities because it was not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). American reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of the reactor construction in the early 1980s and the reprocessing facility in the late 1980s. It was not until 1989, when South Korea leaked American satellite data of the reprocessing facility that the international community first became aware of and concerned about North Korea's indigenous nuclear program. The concern stems from the fact that gas-graphite reactors are capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium while generating electrical power and heat. So, whereas Pyongyang's choice of gas-graphite reactors for its energy program was logical, it was also the best choice to develop a nuclear weapons option.In parallel, North Korea asked the Soviets to build light water reactors (LWRs) to help meet North Korea's energy demands. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 because the Soviets made consideration of LWRs contingent upon joining the Treaty. These reactors, though, never materialized because of the demise of the Soviet Union. Pyongyang kept inspectors out of its new facilities until 1992, by which time it had all of the pieces in place for the plutonium fuel cycle. This move coincided with several diplomatic initiatives and President George H.W. Bush's decision to withdraw all American nuclear weapons from South Korea. By this time, the 5 MWe experimental reactor produced electricity and heat for the local town, as well as approximately 6 kilograms (roughly one bomb's worth) of weapons-grade plutonium per year. …

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was the focus of international attention in 1993 because of the controversy over its nuclear weapons program. A series of developments that included collapse of inter-Korean dialogue, the resumption of the U.S.-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise, and unprecedented pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (TAEA) to open two undeclared sites to special inspections prompted Pyongyang to take the extreme step on March 12 of giving notice that it intended to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The North claimed that the two suspect nuclear waste sites were military facilities unrelated to its nuclear program and that the agency's request was improperly based on third party intelligence information. Although suggesting a worst-case nuclear breakout scenario, the withdrawal announcement was couched in conditional language, calling for an end to the U.S. threat and restoration of IAEA impartiality, that suggested Pyongyang might reconsider. Even though Pyongyang had not yet suspended its NPT withdrawal, it allowed an IAEA visit in May on the eve of talks with the United States on the nuclear issue. Similarly, its declaration on March 8 of a semi-war alert in response to Team Spirit in fact gave great prominence to stepping up socialist construction. Two rounds of high-level U.S.-DPRK talks were held on the nuclear issue in 1993 between delegations headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci. The first round in New York on June 2-11 resulted in a joint statement that laid out the principles underpinning the talks and announced the DPRK's suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT. The second round of talks in Geneva on July 14-19 was noteworthy for the DPRK's proposal to

Despite harsh statements by some U.S. congressional critics and initial concerns voiced by many South Korean observers, the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) reached in Geneva on October 21, 1994, successfully survived the scrutiny of at least seven congressional hearings through March of 1995. A January 30 editorial in the usually critical Wall Street Journal concluded that despite the generosity shown to an undeserving regime, the deal with the DPRK offers important advantages by capping and promising eventually to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An agreement on June 12 in Kuala Lumpur between the U.S. and the DPRK and a letter from President Clinton to ROK President Kim Young Sam clarified questions about whether the DPRK would accept South Korea's central role in providing light water reactors as specified under the Agreed Framework. The impetus for the success or failure of the agreement now lies in whether the parties involved can agree on the details of implementation. By choosing not to challenge the Geneva Agreed Framework, the Journal and some members of Congress have accepted the prospect that the agreement's implementation may halt and eventually dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The DPRK has agreed not to refuel the 5 MW experimental reactor at Yongbyon and not to reprocess over 8,000 fuel rods removed from the reactor in May 1994, which contain enough plutonium to make up to six nuclear weapons. In addition, the North Koreans have halted the construction of two larger reactors that might have produced enough plu-

This article explains that key to understanding North Korean nuclear weapons motivations is the application of the explanatory frameworks of constructivism, liberalism, and realism to different time periods in North Korea: 1964 to 1994 (realism), 1991 to 2007 (liberalism), and 1991, 1994, and 2011 (constructivism). Notably, these periods coincide with the perceived security threat from South Korean-based U.S. nuclear arms until the erosion of Soviet support, the North Korean economic crisis and the value of nuclear weapons as an international-aid bargaining chip, and the expedience of nuclear disarmament. A realist approach toward North Korea from the 1990s to the present would be counterproductive, as the state has hardened itself against its adversaries and simultaneously needs economic and civil aid.

IntroductionObservers tend to label Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a bizarre political system that can only be understood on its own terms. One respected analyst suggests that DPRK might just be the strangest political system in existence.1 Some observers argue that North Korea is a dangerous rogue state that is heavily armed, unpredictable and dangerous.2 Others argue that North Korea, while strange at first glance, becomes more comprehensible and less threatening in context of Korean history and culture.3 An analysis of nature and evolution of DPRK's political system may provide important clues as to motivations, policy preferences, and Pyongyang regime's potential for conflict management.At outset it is important to ask: what is nature and scope of conflict? According to Niklas Swanstrom, Mikael Weissmann and Emma Bjornehed, a conflict entails perceived differences in positions between two or more parties at same moment in time.4 The conflict on Korean Peninsula is complex, multifaceted, concerns a number of different issue positions, and at least six parties. For purposes of this article, however, I will just identify what appears to have become critical in recent years: disposition of North Korea's nuclear program. While ongoing six-party talks involve North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and United States, of North Korea's nuclear program boils down to a deep-seated conflict between Pyongyang and Washington. Baldly put, on one hand, United States has adamantly insisted that Pyongyang's nuclear program be completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantled while on other hand North Korea has been just as adamant in insisting that it has right to a nuclear program.5According to C.R. Mitchell, a conflict involves at least three aspects: attitudes, situation, and behaviors.6 This paper focuses on change and continuity in Pyongyang's political system rather than directly on conflict prevention or conflict management because author believes that this potential will not be tapped without major changes in North Korea's political system. The primary attitude of North Korean regime is one of hard-core indoctrination and absolute information control, primary situation in North Korea is extreme militarization, and primary behavior of Pyongyang regime is mobilization. The persistence of this attitude, this situation, and this behavior appears to seriously hinder prospects for any meaningful conflict management and certainly precludes possibility of conflict resolution.Totalitarianism and Post-TotalitarianismThis paper argues that North Korea's political system is best understood as an eroding totalitarian regime of communist variety.7 The DPRK appears to meet basic criteria for an orthodox communist regime: it has a Leninist party that monopolizes political power while espousing a Marxist ideology (socialism), administers a centrally planned economy, and means of production are publicly owned.8 Although some scholars consider North Korea to be something other than communist,9 closer examination reveals that DPRK is not radically different from other communist party-states.10North Korea also appears to meet following six defining characteristics of a totalitarian regime as identified by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski: (1) an absolute dictator and mass party; (2) an ideology intent on totally transforming society; (3) a condition of terror; (4) a monopoly of coercive instruments; (5) a centrally planned economy; and (6) a monopoly of mass communication.11 A totalitarian regime strives to control every aspect of society. This type of regime requires an enemy to rationalize its perpetual war-footing mode. A clearly identifiable enduring threat is necessary to justify its repressive system of controls, constant effort to mobilize state and society, and regime's militarization. …

North Korea is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear programme because of its importance to the political economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state and the perpetuation of the Kim regime. Two observations give rise to this conclusion: firstly, the development of North Korea's nuclear programme has been a long-term project spanning several decades. At no stage has Pyongyang shown a commitment to its dismantlement. Secondly, denuclearisation negotiations have followed a cyclical pattern in which the North has provoked crises to make new demands and gain leverage in negotiations. By inference, it is clear that the nuclear programme has great intrinsic value to Pyongyang. This paper argues that the nuclear programme has value as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy to extract economic inputs for its moribund economy, in domestic politics as vehicle for bureaucratic interests and as a rallying symbol of the country's hyper-nationalist ideology, as well as its role as a defensive deterrent and important cog in Pyongyang's offensive asymmetric war strategy. For these reasons, the Kim regime is unlikely to seriously entertain nuclear disarmament.

Since the Agreed Framework (AF) was signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, the security situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has changed qualitatively for the worse. The discovery last year of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the August 31 launch of a Taepo Dong missile have combined to raise fundamental questions about Pyongyang's intentions, its commitment to the agreement, and the possibility of North-South reconciliation. These developments also raise profound questions about the sustainability of current U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula. The Agreed Framework successfully addressed a specific security problem--North Korea's plutonium production at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. Under the agreement, operations were frozen at the two facilities and Pyongyang was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel rods of the reactor core for five to six nuclear weapons. Had the program continued unabated, North Korea might have been able to produce enough fissile material for a substantial nuclear arsenal. Arguably, the Agreed Framework was a necessary but not sufficient response to the multiple security challenges posed by North Korea. Indeed, the development of the Taepo Dong missile poses an expanding security threat to Northeast Asia and, increasingly, to the Middle East, Europe, and even the United States itself. Changing Assumptions Experience in dealing with Pyongyang since the Agreed Framework was signed challenges several critical assumptions on which public and Congressional support for U.S. policy has been based. * The first is the assumption made by some senior administration officials that the Agreed Framework had ended North Korea's nuclear program. * The second is that North Korea is a failed state on the verge of collapse and that a landing--collapse perhaps accompanied by aggression--should be avoided. * The third is that the Agreed Framework would induce North Korea to open up to the outside world, initiate a gradual process of North-South reconciliation, and lead to real reform and a soft landing. These assumptions suggested that, even if little progress was made on other political/security issues, the Agreed Framework was an effective, time-buying strategy. At a minimum, North Korea's conventional capabilities would continue to degrade (as they have). Optimally, the North would solve our problems by ultimately reconciling or uniting with the South. These assumptions are now open to question. Reality Check The disclosure of at least one suspect site--on which construction began prior to the agreement--reinforces the possibility that Pyongyang has frozen only a portion of its nuclear program or is seeking to develop a covert nuclear weapons program. The Agreed Framework was structured to become stronger over time in constraining the North's nuclear weapons capability. This meant deferring the requirement for the North Korean nuclear program to come into full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards until roughly 2002-03. In effect, the agreement accepted the possibility that North Korea might have one or two nuclear devices. Since 1994, it is also possible that Pyongyang could have acquired additional nuclear weapons technology and/or fissile material from external sources. Moreover, the core assumption of imminent collapse is seriously flawed. Despite severe hardships, there are no signs of regime-threatening social or political unrest, or military disaffection. As underscored in its 50th anniversary celebration last year, the North Korean regime appears to have consolidated itself under Kim Jong Il. There are also no signs that the regime is contemplating any radical market-oriented reforms. Instead, forced by necessity, it is experimenting at the margins with modest reform to alleviate food shortages at the local level and gain hard currency. …

America's North Korea nuclear policy has been a failure. Instead of achieving its goal of preventing North Korea from possessing and proliferating nuclear weapons, it has had the opposite effect. This failure was a result of the George W. Bush administration's blanket rejection of the previous administration's approach to North Korea, the tendency to ignore the advice of experts, neoconservative influence on foreign policy, and divisions within the administration resulting in an inconsistent approach. This article suggests a bold new approach in which the United States offers North Korea full diplomatic recognition and a formal end to the Korean War as first steps toward the goals established in the 2007 Six Party Talks on North Korea, i.e., that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons programs, and cease its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Taking these moves as a starting point rather than a reward for compliance will deepen North Korea's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation by removing its gravest external security threat—the United States.

The North Korean nuclear issues have exposed the international community to a great proliferation risk for more than ten years. They have grown particularly serious since North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) reportedly admitted in October 2002 that it had clandestinely pursued development of nuclear weapons based on uranium enrichment. Legally speaking, the North Korean proliferation risk reached its worst point in January 2003, when Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) . However, that was not the first instance in which North Korea had declared withdrawal. They had done so in March 1993, but at that time the declared withdrawal was suspended one day before its effectuation (withdrawal takes effect three months after its notification) . Given the complicated nature of the situation, there can be several ways of interpreting the North Korean status under the NPT. This article tries to examine four such interpretations, including those given by North Korea itself and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . It will also give some thought to the North Korean obligation to accept IAEA safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement with the Agency and under other legal and political arrangements.

How Did North Korea Develop the Bomb?The promise and peril of nuclear energy share a common technological foundation. Pursuit of a civilian fuel cycle-making fuel, building reactors to burn the fuel, and maintaining the back-end to deal with nuclear waste, including the option of extracting some of the valuable by-products from burning reactor fuel-enables nations to develop the capability to make bomb fuel, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. North Korea mastered the plutonium fuel cycle ostensibly for nuclear power and then used it to build the bomb.This brief review of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear capabilities will only touch on the important political milestones that helped to shape it; a more complete discussion will be presented in the next section. Kim Il-sung, the country's founding father, laid the foundation for nuclear technology development in the early 1950s. The Soviet Atoms for Peace initiative, modeled after President Eisenhower's initiative of the same name, enabled several hundred North Korean students and researchers to be educated and trained in Soviet universities and nuclear research centers. The Soviets built a research re-actor, the ITR-2000, and associated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in the 1960s. North Korean specialists trained at these facilities and by the 1970s were prepared to launch a nuclear program without external assistance.North Korea's decision to build gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors was a logical choice at the time for an indigenous North Korean energy program because gas-graphite reactors can operate with natural uranium fuel and, hence, do not require enrichment of uranium.3 Although North Korea may have experimented with enrichment technologies, commercial enrichment capabilities were beyond its reach and difficult to acquire.4 North Korea's ambitious program began with an experimental 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor, which became operational in 1986. Construction of that reactor was followed by a scaled-up 50 MWe reactor and a 200 MWe power reactor, although neither was ever completed.North Korea quickly mastered all aspects of the gas-graphite reactor fuel cycle. It built fuel fabrication facilities and a large-scale reprocessing facility, which enabled extraction of plutonium from spent fuel.5 Unlike the Soviet built research facilities, the new facilities were built and operated without being declared to or inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pyongyang had no legal obligation to declare these facilities because it was not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). American reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of the reactor construction in the early 1980s and the reprocessing facility in the late 1980s. It was not until 1989, when South Korea leaked American satellite data of the reprocessing facility that the international community first became aware of and concerned about North Korea's indigenous nuclear program. The concern stems from the fact that gas-graphite reactors are capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium while generating electrical power and heat. So, whereas Pyongyang's choice of gas-graphite reactors for its energy program was logical, it was also the best choice to develop a nuclear weapons option.In parallel, North Korea asked the Soviets to build light water reactors (LWRs) to help meet North Korea's energy demands. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 because the Soviets made consideration of LWRs contingent upon joining the Treaty. These reactors, though, never materialized because of the demise of the Soviet Union. Pyongyang kept inspectors out of its new facilities until 1992, by which time it had all of the pieces in place for the plutonium fuel cycle. This move coincided with several diplomatic initiatives and President George H.W. Bush's decision to withdraw all American nuclear weapons from South Korea. By this time, the 5 MWe experimental reactor produced electricity and heat for the local town, as well as approximately 6 kilograms (roughly one bomb's worth) of weapons-grade plutonium per year. …

International energy assistance needs and options for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Last orders in Pyongyang