Testing the Challenger’s Winning Coalition Hypothesis on Mobilization of Religion in Ethnic Civil War

This paper looks at how violent ethnic conflicts are managed. The paper separates ethnic civil wars from the more general class of ethnic conflicts. More specifically, we examine these conflicts, and seek to understand the extent to which mediation can play an effective role in managing such conflicts, and which factors have the most impact on its performance and effectiveness. We set up a theoretical framework from which we derive several propositions on mediation effectiveness. These are analyzed using an original data set of over 900 mediation cases in ethnic civil wars. The analysis suggests that the use of a neutral mediation site and initiation by both parties in the war each enhance the likelihood of mediation success. Conflict intensity, third-party initiation and superpower mediation all decrease the likelihood of success. Ethnic civil wars over issues of secessionism and autonomy are also found to be more difficult to mediate than ethnic civil wars over issues of religion.

When is shared religion mobilized in ethnic civil war? Most civil wars are fought between distinct ethnic groups, but in the last half century mobilization of religion is increasingly common, mostly in conflicts between ethnic groups that share religion. While the literature explains the role of religion in conflict onset—especially between groups segmented by religion—the reason why religion becomes an organizing principle in an ongoing violent conflict between ethnic groups that share a religion is understudied. We argue that in response to competition for followers in civil war, ethnic minority leaders sharing religion with majorities are increasingly likely to mobilize the religious identity through an oversized challenger’s winning coalition as the demographic balance of the ethnic groups evens out. We test this conjecture using the new A-Religion data on the religion, religious overlap, and relative sizes of all ethnic groups in civil wars from 1975 to 2015.

Many scholars have detected a decrease of political violence, but the causes of this decline remain unclear. As a contribution to this debate, we revisit the controversy over trends in conflict after the end of the Cold War. While many made ominous predictions of surging ethnic warfare, Gurr presented evidence of a pacifying trend since the mid-1990s and predicted a further decline in ethnic conflict in an article on ‘the waning of ethnic war’. Leveraging more recent data on ethnic groups and their participation in ethnic civil wars, this study evaluates if Gurr was right about the decline of ethnic conflict, and if he was right for the right reasons. We assess whether an increase in governments’ accommodative policies toward ethnic groups can plausibly account for a decline in ethnic civil war. Our findings lend considerable support to an account of the pacifying trend that stresses the granting of group rights, regional autonomy, and inclusion in power-sharing, as well as democratization and peacekeeping.

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict.

The European Union and China have established a deep relationship and the de- mand to expand the cooperation has been felt more strongly. To establish cooperation at a worldwide level will be a good choice. Under this condition, Sri Lanka will be the next place to be the new engine of the Sino-European Union cooperation. Sri Lanka was colonized successively by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British and during this period the plantation economy developed which has occupied the most important position in the national economy of Sri Lanka for a long time. After independence, Sri Lanka was seeking a driver for its development, thus its attention gradually moved to the textile industry. Its economy still relies heavily on exports which provides for China and the EU the opportunity to develop further their trade with Sri Lanka and to enhance their reciprocal cooperation. After Sri Lanka’s independence, China traded with Sri Lanka and provided assistance while Sri Lanka gave political support to China. Thus, China has the experience to work with Sri Lanka. During the colonial era, European countries had a large effect on the culture of Sri Lanka. Until now many tourist cities are still famous for the fortifications built by the colonial powers and the percentage of English speakers is higher than in many other countries in Asia. Then we have not to forget the chapter of the long ethnic civil war with its high cost in terms of human life and de facto a transfer of resources from development to military expenditure. While in the past the main products exported to the EU were gems and tea, Sri Lanka now has switched to the garment trade, which leads to a sense of closeness not only in culture but also in economy. In the future, if the EU and China could take advantages of each other, Sri Lanka could be the next point of cooperation.

At the beginning of 21st century (ethnic) civil wars have been proliferate all over the world. Many ethnic conflicts – for example the conflict in Sri Lankan between the Sinhalese majority government and the guerrilla fighters of the Tamil minority – are characterized by constant efforts for conflict resolution interspersed with renewed violence, with cycles of military escalation and de-escalation. Also, they are marked by the helplessness of the international actors, who profess their interest in a resolution and try to mediate between the contending parties. But they are rarely successful – why? I assume that the most important question in war and peacetime is whether security is possible to achieve to prevent the security dilemma escalating. In many Asian and African countries people perceive politics and security in ethnic terms. Thus how a party defines security is of decisive importance concerning whether a conflict can end in peace or will be solved militarily. Within an exclusive security concept, security can only persist if the other is annihilated or oppressed by military means, while inclusive security concepts can achieve security by special arrangements, peace agreements or security guarantees. Third parties, who are engaged in mediating violent conflicts, have to keep in mind that it is the elusive balance of these security schemes which determine successful negotiations and at least a permanent solution. To reach a lasting peace it is not sufficient for external actors to provide security; in the long run, they must transform exclusive into inclusive security concepts.

In the wake of the Cold War political and economic forces were unleashed that culminated in a wave of ethnic conflict and civil wars on multiple continents. Yet prior to any ethnic conflict or civil war are potentially violent precursors, namely protest. This work examines the link between globalization and ethnic protest. Specifically, we identify socioeconomic factors that lead to ethnic protest. Protest represents the first stage of the process that leads to ethnic conflict, civil war, insurgence, and revolution. Each of these forms of political violence has at its base some sort of grievance. Governments are not willing or able to address these grievances thus protest can be seen as the precursor to greater conflict. In this work we examine a period of time where various forms of conflict peaked in terms of number of active conflicts: 1990-1995. A multiple regression model is constructed that tests the various factors of globalization. Robust findings point to aspects of globalization that increase protest and some that may decrease protest. The paper concludes with potential avenues for policy reform that may help to alleviate the root causes of ethnic protest.

The article discusses two competing understandings of the relationship between ethnic group identities and civil war. The first one stresses the differences between ethnic group identities and proposes that religious and racial boundaries are particularly conflict-prone. According to the other understanding, ethnic groups generally have dense social networks, and their incentives and opportunities for fighting are associated with their political status and resources rather than their specific identity types. The article finds no statistical evidence that the probability of civil war onset is affected by whether ethnic groups primarily are mobilized around religious, linguistic, racial, or regional boundaries. The analysis thus suggests that different ethnic group identities are alike in terms of conflict escalation.

Ethnicity and the spread of civil war

Ethnic and religious identities are often seen as drivers of conflict, and thus are important issues to consider within the broader international conflict management field. While ethnic civil wars are in decline, it is generally true that they are still more common than other types of civil conflicts. This chapter considers the causes of ethnic and religious conflicts and discusses the theories and practices that help in preventing ethnic conflicts from beginning or recurring and help manage and mitigate these conflicts when they are underway. The chapter includes cases studies on the Uighurs in China, as well as the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar to illustrate the theories and discussions of the chapter. The chapter further explores some of the key challenges in dealing with ethnic and religious conflicts and areas for optimism moving forward.

Safe areas established by powerful states can improve short-term civilian protection during ethnic civil wars. Paradoxically, however, they may worsen the plight of vulnerable civilians over the medium term. This can occur in three ways. First, when safe areas encompass sizeable territories within a broader conflict zone, they may reduce incentives for protected groups to compromise during peace negotiations, thus prolonging hostilities. Second, there is a nontrivial possibility that protected groups will use the safe areas as a base for launching high-risk offensives, deliberately putting civilians at risk in the hope of drawing the protection forces more deeply into the war. Third, safe areas may embolden protected groups to seek unilateral secession, further increasing the risk of conflict escalation. By elucidating the causal mechanisms involved, this article helps us assess the probability of these outcomes occurring. States that consider intervening militarily to establish safe areas in ethnic civil wars need to weigh the short-term benefits against these possible longer-term downsides.

��� The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers opposes solving ethnic conflicts by drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed because the process of fighting civil wars imbues the belligerents with a deep sense of mistrust that makes sharing power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in ethnic civil wars, in which negotiated power-sharing agreements run a high risk of failing and leading to renewed warfare. In light of these problems, this article argues that partition should be considered as an option for ending severe ethnic conflicts. The article shows how failure to adopt parti tion in Kosovo has left that province in a semi-permanent state of limbo that only increases the majority Albanian population’s desire for independence. The only route to long-term stability in the region—and an exit for international forces—is through partition. Moreover, the article suggests that the United States should recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing the futile endeavor of implementing power-sharing among Iraq’s Shi’ites, Kurds, and Sunnis.

Why do states target some civilians with collective punishment while coopting others with material goods during an ethnic civil war? This article examines how the Turkish government calibrated its repression and cooptation policies towards the Kurdish population during the counterinsurgency of the 1990s. In contrast to the situational conflict dynamics emphasized by the civil war literature, we explain the distribution of cooptation and repression with the state's identity policy: government policies were more punitive in areas that displayed strong Kurdish linguistic/political identity, or high tribal concentration, while they were more cooptative where the government had fostered a Sunni-Muslim Kurdish identity. The study is based on a novel dataset that includes information about displacement, tribal concentration, and violent events from archival sources.

Existing approaches to resolving civil wars are based primarily on the assumption that these wars result from conflicts of interest among rational individuals. However, peacebuilding efforts based on this approach usually fail in cases of ethnic civil war, leading sooner or later to renewed fighting. Symbolic politics theory suggests the problem with these peace efforts is that they pay insufficient attention to ameliorating the emotional and symbolic roots of extremist ethnic politics. The theory suggests that resolving ethnic war requires reconciliation–changing hostile attitudes to more moderate ones, assuaging ethnic fears, and replacing the intragroup symbolic politics of ethnic chauvinism with a politics that rewards moderation. The only policy tools for promoting such attitudinal and social changes are reconciliation initiatives such as leaders’ acknowledgement of their sides’ misdeeds, public education efforts such as media campaigns, and problem-solving workshops. Integrating such reconciliation initiatives into a comprehensive conflict resolution strategy, it is argued, is necessary for conflict resolution efforts to be more effective in ending ethnic civil wars.

Chaim Kaufmann's “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars” 1 makes the strongest case available that the best cure for ethnic war is viable territorial defense through partition or s...