Terminologically obscured, politically empowered: a typology of state-aligned violent non-state actors

Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and progovernment militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states’ selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, whereas PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal–agent framework, we argue that a state’s investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis from 1981 to 2007 find that (a) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs; (b) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict; and (c) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.

Exploring the role of foreign-sponsored pro-government militias in counter-insurgency efforts, this article shows how the proxy war concept maps onto the Syrian conflict as we demonstrate both its contributions and limitations. Drawing on rare access to Syrian and foreign security actors inside Syria, we argue that the Syrian war, while rightly labelled a proxy war, sits uneasily with and at times even contradicts a set of scholarly assumptions and emphases on proxy wars when looked at from a counter-insurgency perspective. Accordingly, proxies were relevant not just as rebels but also as counter-insurgents. Sponsors included state and non-state actors alike, were manifold, and did not necessarily have exclusive relations to their proxies. They were also much more intensely involved with their proxies than generally expected from a war at arm’s length. Principal–agent relations this way ceased to be dyadic and hierarchical. What emerged was a heterarchical order, with parallel hierarchies tying proxies to their sponsors fiercely in competition with one another. This allowed and encouraged proxies to carve out leverage and agency of their own just as it fed into the Syrian regime’s resilience in averting a ‘double crisis of sovereignty’. Given the scale and success of its counter-insurgency efforts, the Syrian case calls for reconsidering proxy wars of the past while it may constitute a watershed development for how proxy wars are to be waged in the future.

With the killing by the United States of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani, the war on terror crossed a new frontier in the use of extra-judicial lethal operations outside of armed conflict. As a state actor, Soleimani would once have been entirely off-limits as a target outside the context of a formal armed conflict between the U.S. and Iran, despite his leadership of the Quds force, an organization that lends support to violent nonstate actor groups across the Middle East. Nevertheless, the fact that the Trump Administration felt entitled to conduct a one-off strike on a state military leader using drone technology underscores the degree to which conflicts among state adversaries are increasingly fought using the hybridized tools of the war on terror. This chapter will argue that the rise in the use of such techniques, and the perceived relaxation of the constraints of international law in conflicts among states, is a regrettable, but foreseeable, result of a certain way of conceiving of violent nonstate actors that started immediately after the attacks on 9/11. Greater clarity about the legal boundaries governing the use of Bush-era interrogation methods as well as Obama’s dramatic increase in the use of extrajudicial killing against nonstate actors might have forestalled this development and ensured that the techniques of the war on terror were constrained to their original context. This chapter first addresses the legal ambiguity of targeted killing as it devolved from the Bush and Obama Administrations in the aftermath of 9/11 with respect to nonstate actors, particularly the decision to predicate the legality of targeted killings on the status of terror groups as “unlawful combatants.” This framework meant that the detainees captured in the war on terror lacked the traditional protections of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), at the same time that they were deprived of the protections ordinarily extended to criminal defendants. Leaving detainees between two legal regimes provided license for their abuse as well as an uncertain legal basis for those who were targeted rather than captured in the next phase of the war. This chapter will argue that greater clarity would have resulted from considering violent non-state actors as civilians rather than combatants, an approach that is wholly in appropriate for state actors like Soleimani, whose status as a state actor should leave little doubt as to his legal status outside the context of armed conflict..

The authors' data reveal variation in how local civilian populations perceive the behaviour of different violent non-state actors that operate in the same context. The chapter explores the reasons for this perception. It provides an intriguing entry point for recognition-based analyses of violent non-state actors. The authors highlight that a successful transition, aiming to construct effective (civilian) state institutions in marginalised regions, requires understanding pre-peace accord relations between armed actors and local communities. They ponder whether the different experiences of guerrilla and paramilitary order in Colombia are indicative of differing effects of vertical and horizontal organisational structures and behavioural patterns of the armed group on the ability to recognise and be recognised. It is argued that in the context of non-state order during armed conflict (particularly when the line between crime and conflict is blurred), recognition is contingent on the existence of institutions. The organisational structure and behavioural patterns that are held responsible for enabling a degree of mutual recognition between armed actor and local community are of two types: the coherence of the internal organisational structure of the armed actor enables procedures for recognition by the community (they know who to talk to); and the space the armed actor allows for local communities to express their grievances indicates recognition of the community by the armed actor (providing space for input). Hence, post-conflict institutions should fulfil those two conditions: coherent, enduring structures (organisation) and space for voicing grievances that results in action (input and responsiveness).

This study analyzes the correlations of three Hungarian right-wing organizations between 1938 and 1945 focusing on a political party (Arrow Cross Party), a paramilitary unit ("Ragged Guard") and a military auxiliary force (KISKA). After clarifying the meaning of key-word racialism, the paper aims to show the origins, the similarities, the differences, and the transitions of these organizations interpreting their connections to political violence and their different approaches to the German-led "New Europe".

Author's Response:Reconsidering How We Think about Proxies Yelena Biberman (bio) I am thankful to Asia Policy for inviting Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India to be the focus of this book review roundtable and to the reviewers for their deep engagement with the ideas and evidence presented in my work. As Tamanna Salikuddin astutely observes, proxies are all the rage in academic and policy circles. The book's publication coincides with the release of several works exploring how states can effectively manage their local partners and the complications that invariably arise in proxy warfare.1 Much of the fascination stems from questions and anxieties surrounding the United States' global decline. Proxy warfare is widely viewed as one of the key instruments through which powerful states will either try to maintain or achieve great-power status in a new era of geopolitical competition.2 New ideas about state-proxy relations are in high demand, but we must keep in mind that history, and certainly South Asian history, has much to teach us. As Samir Puri points out, novel-sounding ideas like "hybrid war" would be deeply familiar to military philosophers as diverse as Leo Tolstoy and Kautilya. Rashmi Singh identifies as an "enormous contribution" that my new framework "refuses to privilege the interests and power of one side over the other in the process of alliance formation." A pattern that continues to strike me in the literature and policy conversations about proxies is the state-centric orientation, which implicitly privileges the state's dominant narrative. This may in part stem from the relationship between one's level [End Page 193] of education and attitude toward state violence.3 Drawing on U.S. data from the World Values Survey and the General Social Survey, sociologist Landon Schnabel found that those with more education are more likely to consider state-sanctioned violence (specifically, war and police violence) justifiable. He posits that "schooling socializes people to establishment culture, identity, and interests, thereby legitimating ruling authority and its actions." 4 We tend to see things from the perspective of the state because we are more likely to identify with the state than with those it is most likely to abuse—marginalized groups and foreign actors. While much of the existing scholarship is methodologically meticulous, the "problems" it seeks to solve seem to privilege powerful states and their needs. This was the point I emphasized in the policy recommendations section in my book's concluding chapter, and one that the reviewers welcomed. The Machiavellian impulse to advise and give the benefit of doubt to those with the most power—be it the prince or the state—can not only weaken scholarly impartiality but also, especially in times of conflict, blunt our humanist instincts. Take some of the news coming out of Afghanistan in late 2020. It includes atrocities carried out not just by the Taliban, but also by state actors and state-backed proxies. In November 2020 the New York Times described how "the elite of the elite among Australian soldiers" in the Australian Defence Force had carried out "a methodical campaign to kill helpless Afghans and cover it up."5 In December 2020, the Intercept made public the atrocities committed by U.S.-backed Afghan "death squads," paramilitary units (known as 01 and 02) outside the control of the Afghan government.6 What problems or puzzles do these events raise for scholars? We should reflect on the questions that are often asked in scholarly research and the underlying assumptions that motivate them. My book brings into the limelight the nonstate actors—their interests, agency, and experiences—by making them central to its theoretical framework and empirical inquiry. Singh is correct to remind us that state actors are no less diverse and interesting, and I interviewed dozens of government, military, and intelligence officials for their sides of the story. [End Page 194] Their accounts were certainly vital and complex, and often quoted in the book. But the existing accounts of the counterinsurgency operations detailed in the book have, I would argue, already done justice to the conflicting motives and predicaments of these individuals, who are typically quite accessible for...

Along with Iraqi security forces, pro-government militias, known as Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF, also “Hashd al-Shaabi” in Arabic), played a significant role in defeating ISIS. Iraq's engagement with these armed groups during the fight against ISIS empowered and legitimised them within the country. Yet, they often committed human rights violations and were involved in violent activities against the United States embassy, personnel, and military bases. However, since 2014, these groups have been acting as pro-government militias and are legally part of the Iraqi security forces. Yet, some of them have declared loyalty to Iran and act as proxy forces for Tehran. This article argues that pro-government militias in post-ISIS Iraq have negative impacts on security and human rights in the country because most of these groups were previously established based on sectarian factors and proximity to Iran. It also argues that while they are largely regarded as having had an essential role in defeating ISIS, their presence in a post-ISIS Iraq will threaten Iraq's stability.

A growing line of research examines causes and consequences of militant group competition. However, empirical work on these topics has limitations. Most quantitative research uses relatively rough proxies for competition, such as counts of groups in a country. Other work uses dichotomous indicators, ignoring the intensity or degree of rivalries. Additionally, many studies examine either terrorist organizations or rebel groups, overlooking cross-type rivalry (e.g., terrorist vs. rebel). We address these issues by introducing time-varying dyadic rivalry data on hundreds of groups – rebels, terrorists, and pro-government militias – in Africa and Asia, 1990-2015. Rivalry levels include denouncements, threats, and violence. After presenting the data, we test the “outbidding” hypothesis: the notion that inter-organizational competition leads to more terrorism. This argument has found support in qualitative analyses, but quantitative tests using rivalry proxies show mixed results. Using our data we find support for the hypothesis. We conclude with research questions that could be addressed with the data.

The objective of the study is to carry out a meaningful comparison that demonstrates the similarities and differences of various conflict theatres where proxy forces were employed. The analyses of the discussed cases focused on different aspects of the conflict and nature of the proxy use. The analyses presented on the following pages were conducted on the basis of the literature on the subject, governmental research and reports, and supporting sources reporting recent developments that complemented academic sources. Various non-state actors such as ethnic militias, paramilitary units, and private military companies have become more and more visible on contemporary battlegrounds. Modern states employ those actors to further their objectives, as this limits their own political and financial costs. This increasingly visible phenomenon points to an emerging new model of warfare where state actors are relying ever more on proxies of various character and nature. It is highly likely that any future conflict will be characterised by a proxy-based model of warfare, which will consist of a limited footprint made by regular forces (or none at all) and, consequently, the extended use of proxies supported by special forces. Because such an approach is less costly, proxies will be more often employed by low-budget states, previously reluctant to carry out such costly military endeavours. Denying the actions and affiliations of these proxies will inevitably follow and, in turn, a lack of political accountability and responsibility for the conflict’s outcome.

This article interrogates the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian civil conflict. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to identify the differences between the patterns of military intervention in Crimea (direct, covert intervention), and those in the South-East (mixed direct and indirect – proxy – intervention). It does so by assessing the extent of Russian troop involvement and that of external sponsorship to non-state actors. Second, it puts forward a tentative theoretical framework that allows distinguishing between the different outcomes the two patterns of intervention generate. Here, the focus is on the role of non-state actors in the two interventionist scenarios. The core argument is that the use of non-state actors is aimed at sovereign defection. The article introduces the concept of sovereign defection and defines it as a break-away from an existing state. To capture the differences between the outcomes of the interventions in Crimea and South-East, sovereign defection is classified into two categories: inward and outward. Outward sovereign defection is equated to the territorial seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Special Forces, aided by existing criminal gangs acting in an auxiliary capacity. Inward sovereign defection refers to the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in South-East Ukraine and their use as proxy forces with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of a frozen conflict. To demonstrate these claims, the article analyses the configuration of the dynamics of violence in both regions. It effectively argues that, in pursuing sovereign defection, the auxiliary and proxy forces operate under two competing dynamics of violence, delegative and non-delegative, with distinct implications to the course and future of the conflict.

Companies listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange are faced with difficulties in adopting flexible and effective organizational structures that are capable of realigning the business processes/operations in change management processes for a more efficient, effective response to the turbulent and changing business environment. This study sought to determine the extent to which organizational structure in the context of change management affects performance of companies listed in NSE in Kenya. This study anchored on pragmatism philosophy, adopted a cross sectional survey and correlational research designs. A quantitative research approach to collecting and analyzing data was used. The target population was 64 companies listed in NSE and met the condition of having traded for five years from 2013 to June 2017.The study used Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) sample determination proposition that a sample size of 10% to 30% was a good representation of the target population. Multistage sampling techniques was used, at the first stage stratified random sampling technique was used since the population was subdivided into groups, six were in agricultural sector, two were in automobiles and accessories, ten were in banking sector, thirteen were in commercial and services, five were in construction and allied, five were in energy and petroleum, six were in insurance, three were in investment, one was in investment services, nine were in manufacturing and allied, one was in telecommunications and technology and lastly, one was in real estate investment trust (NSE Handbook, 2015).At the second stage, purposive sampling was used and was confined to specific types of people who can provide the desired information namely; chief executive officers, heads of human resources, finance and marketing since they deal much with policy formulations. The number of companies sampled was 38 4 senior managers = 152 senior managers. The study used semi-structured questionnaire to collect data. The split-half reliability test showed a Cronbach's Alpha of r=0.704, this was above 0.7, hence the tool was reliable. Data analysis was done through descriptive and inferential statistics such as correlation, hypothesis testing, and linear regression model. The findings showed that all the elements were effective in contributing to adaptive organizational structures with the most effective to the least effective in this order: centralization of decision making, formalization of change process, Specialization of managers and configuration of change Process. The study revealed that there was a significant strong positive correlation between organizational structure and performance of companies listed in NSE, r= 0.723**,p<0.001,CL=95%. The ANOVA F-statistic p-value being < 0.001 which is less than 0.05 hence, the study rejected the null hypothesis that organizational structure does not significantly affect performance of companies listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange. It was recommended that companies listed in NSE should seek to strengthen specialization of managers and configuration of change process which are the elements of organizational structure that contributed the least to more flexible and effective organizational structures, this will ensure better performance outcomes. The study showed that organizational structure positively affects performance of firms listed in NSE, therefore managers of these firms should adopt an organizational structure that is efficient, flexible and innovative in order to be able to achieve better performance.

Introduction. After the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, the revolutionary policy of the Soviet state began to determine the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet state. This circumstance not only violated the stability of the entire international system, but also created significant difficulties for Soviet Russia. After the adoption of the Decree on Peace and the attempt to implement it during the separate peace negotiations with Germany, the Soviet state found itself in complete political and economic isolation. The conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the former allies. In the conditions of the beginning of the civil war and foreign intervention, the Bolsheviks were forced to look for any possibilities of establishing international contacts and connections. The most important role in the revitalization of this type of activity during the first two decades of the Soviet government was played by the trade missions, which in a diplomatic vacuum performed certain functions of the official representative offices of the Soviet government abroad. The legal status of the Soviet trade missions from the moment of their formation until the beginning of the Second World War, their powers to protect the political, economic and legal interests of the state are explored in this article. Materials and methods . The methodological basis of the study is the dialectical method of cognition of phenomena in their relationship and mutual conditionality, general and particular scientific methods of cognition, including the historical and legal method; the method of system structural analy­sis; the method of actualization; formal-logical and other methods. Results. The author analyzed the legal aspects of the establishment, organizational structure and activities of trade missions. It was found that trade missions in foreign countries were established on the basis of the relevant regulatory acts of the So­viet government, and at the initial stage of their activities had a wide range of powers: the right to conclude civil transactions, the issuance of various guarantees to ensure their implementation, procedural functions relating to arbitration and judicial review of disputes, including the conclusion of settlement agreements, etc., which clearly demonstrates that trade missions performed diplomatic, trade and legal functions. Discussion and Conclusions. The evolution of the legal nature of Soviet trade missions abroad up to the beginning of the Second World War is described. It is argued that the process of forming and developing the powers of trade missions to protect the interests of the Soviet state in the international arena in the economic and legal sphere was shaped by the political situation at the time. The formation and development of the powers of trade missions to protect the interests of the Soviet state in the international arena in the economic and legal sphere is researched. The role and importance of the history of trade missions for the development of the modern system of foreign missions of the Russian Federation, designed to carry out economic cooperation is shown.

The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive examination of the different types of armed non-state proxy groups. It discusses their characteristics and sponsorship and how they are employed by states in pursuit of their security and foreign policy objectives. The article also analyses the reasons for the recent increase in the use of proxy forces, including the benefits and risks for states that employ them, as well as the broader impact of proxy forces on the international security environment, including great power competition. Data was collected and analysed from a wide range of secondary source documents. A descriptive, qualitative research methodology was applied to print and on-line publications available from governmental, institutional and academic sources. This involved literature reviews and case studies to provide an in-depth understanding of current thinking on the topic, while also identifying potential areas for further research. The article provides a comprehensive, qualitative analysis of the existing literature and case studies on the topic of proxy forces, which due to the research methodology applied, also relies on the researcher’s judgement, choices and assumptions. Proxy wars will remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Two strategic developments drive this conclusion. Firstly, there is the renewal of great power competition for influence, resources and security, and secondly, the imperative for states to achieve these objectives without employing their military forces in a manner that could cause a major war.

Violence Assessment and Intervention: The Practitioner's Handbook

The organisational structure of voluntary associations has usually been described as ‘unbureaucratic’, and accordingly the managerial advice has been to bureaucratise. However, the following questions arise: What are the functional substitutes for the weak bureaucratic elements that structure work in voluntary associations and what dysfunctions might be connected with bureaucratisation? This article captures the characteristics of voluntary associations in the ‘voluntary, democratic, independent, volunteer association’ ideal type. These characteristics indicate the structural prerequisites needed to support this ideal type and the consequences they have for the organisational structure. Most important is that organisational structure has to provide ‘direct incentives’, which are connected with the purpose and work of the voluntary association and its members. The organisational structure of voluntary associations is characterised as intermediary between small groups and organisations. Interaction crystallisation and personalisation are identified as functional substitutes for formalisation and specialisation. The key problem is to find a balance between these group-like and organisation-like features.