TEMPORAL LIMITS OF THE REALIZATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHT OF A PERSON

Abstract

This scientific work is devoted to the study of the topical issue of the temporal limits of subjective civil law. The main thesis is argued that the exercise of the right is possible only during its existence. At the same time, it should be noted that the exercise or non-exercise of one's civil right depends entirely on the will of the authorized person. Such implementation of the powers laid down in the law can take place through the active action of the managed person, or by requiring him to perform an action from the debtor. But the corresponding act should be carried out within the limits of the existence of the right. It is necessary to distinguish between the period of existence of the material right itself and the period of its belonging to a certain person. For example, ownership of a certain thing will exist as long as the thing itself exists. However, during this time, the owner of this property may change several times. But the change of specific owners does not affect the period of existence of civil law. Thus, it is emphasized that the time factor is necessarily part of civil relations. The work analyzes the protection of the interests of legal subjects by establishing certain limits of the exercise of subjective rights and establishing the duty of each authorized person to exercise their rights properly. The determination of the limits of the exercise of subjective rights is not considered as a limitation of these rights, but as a legal expression of the already existing equal position of people in the system of social relations. The article critically evaluates the outdated classic thesis, according to which going beyond the limits of legal equilibrium by carrying out an "untimely" civil action is an abuse of law, a special type of misconduct aimed at the realization by the subject of legal relations of his subjective interest with a negative content, which manifests itself in violation of the subjective rights of other persons. It turns out that in a temporal sense such a qualification is simply impossible. Exercising a subjective right outside the limits of its existence cannot be qualified as an abuse of the right, because the right, in fact, does not yet exist or no longer exists. Actions by a person outside the limits of permitted conduct or the validity period of the right will be considered as the actions of a person to whom the right does not belong at all. Therefore, abusing the right through "untimely" application of it during its validity is impossible, exercising the powers that were part of the right outside its time limits will be a common offense.