Technological Developments and Change in Armed Forces Recruitment Systems

The object of this research is the impact of technological changes on the dynamics of economic development of enterprises. The main hypothesis is the assumption of the presence of such an impact for a significant number of companies. The implementation of this research made it possible to make a certain contribution to the process of solving the problem of finding ways to accelerate the economic development of business entities. At the same time, technological changes were divided into three groups, namely: resource-saving; changes that ensure the improvement of the quality of the enterprise's products; changes that ensure the improvement of management, sales and other processes at enterprises. A methodological approach to assessing the impact of technological changes on the dynamics of economic development of companies was also developed. This approach involves the implementation of two main methods of assessment, namely: establishing the presence or absence of such an impact and determining the magnitude of the impact of technological changes on the dynamics of economic development of enterprises. The testing of the developed tool on a sample of industrial enterprises showed that the impact of technological changes on the dynamics of their economic development exists and is statistically significant. At the same time, the average impact of technological changes on the growth of financial results of enterprises is quite high. In particular, the average values of the indicator of the impact of technological changes on the net profit of those enterprises that have undergone at least two types of such changes, by type of economic activity, range from 11.25% to 13.32%. Since a significant number of the enterprises studied have not carried out technological changes in recent years, at least some of these enterprises may have significant potential to accelerate their economic development. The developed toolkit for assessing the impact of technological changes on the dynamics of economic development of enterprises can be used to establish the presence and extent of such an impact both at the level of an individual company and at the industry level. This will allow owners and managers of enterprises to increase the validity of the strategies for technological renewal of these enterprises.

'Fields of Battle' as 'Fields of Perception': Examining Technological Speed and Public Opinion During the Persian Gulf War

Paul Hirst Oxford: Polity, 2001, vi + 170pp., 11.99 [pounds sterling] (paperback). This is a comparatively slight book that attempts the daunting task of predicting the major developments in war, armed conflict and international relations in the 21st century. In particular it explores the potential impact of changes in military technology; information and communications technology; economic and environmental conditions; demography; international relations and trade; and political regimes and systems of governance. Despite its brevity it seeks to provide some historical depth to its analysis by reviewing major changes in warfare since the 1500s, pointing out that the present revolution in military affairs is but one in a series of similar events over the past 400 years. Central to this analysis is the role of the state and of the international system of states. The author rejects the notion that we are witnessing the terminal decline of the nation-state--quite the contrary in fact, as he foresees the status of the state as the principal political actor in international affairs being enhanced by the imperatives of a globalized system based on economic liberalism. He also argues that the present concern with human rights was presaged by earlier campaigns to abolish the slave trade and establish rights of national self-determination. Similarly, he points out that globalization has its roots in the expansion of the international economy prior to World War One and should not be considered as a unique contemporary phenomenon. Overall, Hirst's prognosis is rather bleak, with future conflict being seen as inherent in the present global system of inequality of wealth and power, while the chances of conflict will increase if the global system of economic liberalism breaks down. This book might have been regarded as a good primer on its subject matter prior to 11 September 2001. Indeed, Hirst was prescient enough to remark that terrorist groups are highly likely to carry out major attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the advanced countries, and that `one such action may lead to a campaign of extermination against such groups sanctioned by the major powers' (p. 98). This prediction has largely come true. Unfortunately, Hirst did not foresee that it would be highjacked aircraft full of aviation gasoline and suicide squads of prospective martyrs rather than WMD, as such, that would accomplish the outrage on such a scale. What 9/11 has revealed is the potentially catastrophic vulnerability of advanced societies to attacks on infrastructure and civilian targets utilizing non-military and opportunistic means of assault. …

MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, like other social institutions, organize major areas of values, attitudes, and interests in the service of critical social needs. Unlike most social institutions, however, military institutions appear only in state or near-state societies. They are closely linked with the origin of civilization, may in fact be a necessary if not sufficient cause for the transition to state organization and civilized life. Whatever their causal role, military institutions lie very close to the core of civilizations as they have developed, both the armature around which complex societies have shaped themselves and the model they have often followed in organizing social action.1 Institutions of such importance deserve a good deal more study than they have usually received. Relationships between military institutions and technological change have also regularly made history. Understanding technological change requires paying attention to interactions between technology and social institutions, because social change impacts technology no less than technological change impacts society. And just as military institutions are but varieties of social institutions, so too military-technological change is but a variety of social change. Technological innovation of almost every kind has historically answered more to military purpose than commonly allowed. This is not simply a matter of technological change fostered by

ThisDictionarycovers the period from the emergence of the Egyptian state around 3000 BC to the Arab conquest in the mid-7th century AD. The book is divided into three main sections. An introductory section includes a chronology of Egypt, with all known military actions, and an essay highlighting the problems of the surviving evidence and its interpretation, and the major changes in military technology and organization over the period involved. The central section covers a wide range of issues including, pharaohs for whom military activities are documented; foreign rulers and countries against whom the Egyptians fought, or who invaded Egypt; weapons and military technology; major archaeological sites; gods and goddesses associated with warfare; arms trade; literature; and social advancement. The third section is a detailed bibliography of the historical phases and archaeological sites, and the broader subject areas covered by the dictionary. There is a series of maps of Egypt and the surrounding regions, and a kinglist with rulers and their dates, and the dynasties and kingdoms to which they are assigned by Egyptologists. This reference is aimed primarily at students and the interested reader. It presumes no detailed knowledge of ancient Egypt. The arrangement of the book as a dictionary means that it can be used on its own as a research tool, or in conjunction with other works, such as histories, or translations of Egyptian texts. The user can find concise definitions and descriptions, and brief accounts of military actions. Through the cross-referencing of each entry, and in conjunction with the bibliography, the user can pursue the wider issues and find more detailed studies.

This dissertation focuses on the impact of technological changes on workers based onthe task-based model. In the first chapter, I first investigate the impacts of two types of technologies on employment and job choices in the directed search model. The relationship between technology and labor with respect to complementarity and substitutability defines technology as labor-augmenting and labor-saving. Progress of labor-augmenting technology mainly works in jobs hiring highly-skilled workers in positive ways while labor-saving technological development affects jobs with middle-skilled workers in destructive ways during the last two decades in KLIPS data. The consequence of technological advances intensifies the advantage of highly skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. Then, the second part examines how employment and the adoption of new technology are affected if workers raise their skill level in response to technological changes. Two possible scenarios predict the results of an increasing supply of high-skilled workers. When firms voluntarily control the skill requirements, it causes the incidence of overqualification that increases the earning inequality, and labor-saving technologies worsen the problem in routine task jobs. However, technology innovation is accelerated. The price adjustment can naturally correct the oversupply of the highly skilled by changing the incentive to move up the job ladder. It is carried out through the reduced dispersion of technical developments and therefore decreased earning gap across tasks. In the second chapter, I examine how differently routine-biased technological changes affect unskilled workers by their innate ability and work experience. This chapter answers why some workers keep their jobs and others do not when labor-saving technologies take the worker’s role over. To focus on routine-biased technological changes, it covers high school graduates who might have either routine or manual tasks in the United States. In a random search model, workers follow the Nash bargaining wage to choose where to apply. Since the wage depends on productivity that varies by their innate ability and work experience, workers’ job search is delimited by their characteristics. The model simulates the impact of routine-biased technological changes with falling labor productivity in routine tasks, leading to wages dropping and routine jobs decreasing. From the lowest ability, those who were in the routine task sector are crowded out. The unemployment rate of unskilled workers increases even though more manual jobs are created due to lower wages. Work experience makes those who are exposed to a risk of separation survive. It distinguishes the high unemployment rate of

This study deals with the job satisfaction of women workers and managerial policies of garment companies in Bangladesh. The garment industry is the fast growing export sector of Bangladesh. More than three fourths of total foreign earnings of the country come from this sector. This sector has a low labor cost advantage in producing garments. The manufacturing technology of garment production has been changing from labor-intensive to more sophisticated and capital-intensive production. This change creates dissatisfaction for the lower skilled workers because of their inability to adapt to the new manufacturing process. Work dissatisfaction reduces the performance of workers and, in turn, company performance is negatively affected. Hence, the strategies related to the use of sophisticated technology and to manage human resources for the production of garments for the international markets are crucial. Therefore, this study evaluates the impact of technological change on job satisfaction of women garment workers in Bangladesh. It also explores the strategies for decreasing dissatisfaction of lower skilled workers. The study identifies the relationship between job satisfaction and the overall impact of the change. A set of job satisfaction variables was developed from the Technological Change Survey (Slem and Levi, 1995). The overall impact is defined as how workers see the impact of change on income and benefits to the family, and the identity they have as a wage earner. The specific relationship between job satisfaction and the overall impact shows that fair pay, task significance, bureaucracy, conflicts, and sharing information are significantly related. Task significance and information sharing are positively related to the overall impact. Fair pay, bureaucracy, and conflicts are negatively and significantly related to the overall impact. Less fair pay, high bureaucracy, and more conflicts cause a limited positive overall impact on women workers. The positive relationships to technological change include improvement of task significance, salary increase, improvement of the quality of supervision, improved co-workers relations and increase benefits. The negative consequences are unfair pay, work dissatisfaction, bureaucracy, conflicts between management and workers, decreased information sharing, and decreased promotions for workers. Managers, in such a situation, may not be able to resist the increasing change required because of the new technologies but they can do more to manage the change through reducing the level of unfairness in all respects, the level of bureaucracy, the level of conflicts between workers and management, and increasing information sharing with workers. This could be achieved through appropriate human resource policies such as, fair pay, rewards for work, attention to the subordinates' feelings, work redesign, communicating company goals to workers, sharing information, increasing benefits, increasing promotions, and above all providing more skill training to women garment workers.

IntroductionDeveloping higher military education (HME) is embedded in the overall development of modern armed forces. This development normally reflects adaptation to changes in the external strategic environment, changes in military technology and doctrine, and changes in the societal environment of the armed forces.While this is true for armed forces with an unbroken tradition, the pattern differs when a given military's development had been interrupted by historical events. This article will focus on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), which constitutes a unique case in itself. The particular political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the break-up of Yugoslavia, the ensuing war of 1992-95 and the Framework Agreement on (Dayton Agreement) of December 1995 had led to a rather de-centralized state structure, with two largely autonomous political Entities that each kept the armed forces they had established during the war, leading to the de facto military division of BiH. Thus, when the West initiated a defense reform process in BiH in 2002, it aimed first at establishing state-level control over these armed forces (2003), and then at merging them into one single military force for the nation (2005), with other issues mostly put on the back burner.1This was also the case with regard to military education. While a coherent system for the training and education of the now joint state-level armed forces of BiH would have been a key element for completing defense reform, it has not yet been established. There have been serious attempts, but up to this point they have failed. Thus, this article will:\* Briefly outline the political and military situation in BiH, including the lack of a coherent system of military education* Present early initiatives within the context of defense reform as well as parallel to it* Describe the initiatives undertaken in establishing higher military education as well as the resistance they met* Assess the process with respect to its impact, including the causes of its failure.The Situation in Bosnia-HerzegovinaThe break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) also meant the break-up of the former Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, or JNA)2 and the establishment of national armed forces by the successor states. While Serbia inherited the mostly intact military system of the JNA (including its high-quality military academy), the seceding states 3 in most cases achieved their statehood through wars of independence,4 with forces mostly derived from the JNA's territorial defense system, but at least in a coherent structure.In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the war following the declaration of independence in April 1992 was both a war of secession from Yugoslavia but also between the three major ethnic groups in BiH (Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims; Serbs; and Croats),with ongoing intervention by neighboring Serbia and Croatia.5Fighting between Bosniaks and Croats ended when the United States brokered a between them in 1994. After Western intervention in 1995, the Serbs also accepted a cease-fire, which then led all parties involved to agree on the General Framework Agreement on Peace (the Dayton Agreement, or DPA) in late 1995. The DPA established a rather decentralized state structure,6 with two highly autonomous political entities, the (Muslim-Croat) Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the (Serbdominated) Republika Srpska.7 Furthermore, the DPA allowed the two entities to maintain their wartime forces. Thus, for ten years there were two separate armies within one state, implicitly pitched against each other, but also following different models of doctrines and education. Only in 2002 was a reform process initiated that led in stages to the creation of unified armed forces in 2006.The Lack of a Coherent System of Military Education and its Impact on the Military SituationDuring the armed conflict that lasted from 1992 to 1995, the various armies had almost no training and education systems of their own. …

The nineteenth century saw dramatic changes in military technology that profoundly changed the nature of warfare, and integrating the performance of that new technology into the existing operational and tactical thinking became hugely important. In Prussia, from 1824 onwards, the Kriegsspiel, the world’s first professional conflict simulation in official use, became a key element for learning how to make best use of the new technology. Between 1824 and 1871, the rules went through several different editions, each one revised according to the latest technological and tactical developments. The paper will provide a brief historical introduction, then concentrate on the impact of technological innovations on the rules, and finally show that the Kriegsspiel and its non-Prussian counterparts are essential for understanding how military establishments in and beyond Europe reacted to the impact of technology on war.

This research examines the implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept in the Russian-Ukrainian War, focusing on its impact on military strategies and operational tactics. RMA involves transformative changes in military technology, doctrine, and organization, reshaping modern warfare. In this conflict, elements such as drone technology, cyber warfare, and network-based weapon systems have been pivotal. Using a descriptive analysis method, the study collected data from military reports, journal articles, and news sources to identify how RMA was applied by both sides and evaluate the influence of modern technology on the conflict's outcomes. The analysis focused on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare systems, and network-based defenses, which intensified the complexity and pace of operations. The findings reveal that both Russia and Ukraine adopted RMA elements, albeit with varying capabilities and effectiveness.

The role of war in the development of later medieval and early-modern western European states has been hotly debated and yet remains curiously out of focus. At one extreme stand those historians and historical sociologists who have argued that military competition between states was the main driver of state development. At the other stand those who think war hindered or perverted processes of state formation based on the rule of law, the realisation of an ideal model of sovereignty, or the construction of social coalitions based on religious or moral interests. Yet neither group has found the means to engage very directly with the other's arguments, proceeding mostly by assertion and counter-assertion. What measurable evidence has been produced for the importance of one force or another has tended to be of the sort that can only be weighed on one side of the argument or the other, such as the increasing size of armed forces or the increasing volume of litigation. Detailed study of the impact of war on individual countries, meanwhile, has served to demonstrate the immense variety of experience between and even within different polities. This has tended to make historians sceptical of the models built by sociologists to classify polities by social structure, political tradition, and military engagement, and thus explain their different constitutional trajectories. Michael Roberts' ‘military revolution’, once a convenient link between changes in military technology and organisation and the changes in government needed to sustain and exploit them, has mutated under intensive scrutiny either into a series of smaller military revolutions or into one so long-lasting and multi-faceted that it is hard to link to specific political changes.

<b>This is an Active Citation data project. Active Citation is a precursor approach to<br/><a href="https://qdr.syr.edu/ati">Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI)</a>. It has now been converted to the ATI format. The assembled project can be viewed at:</b> <h3><a href="https://qdr.syr.edu/atipaper/ideology-of-the-offensive#annotations:group:2Nopp9mx" >https://qdr.syr.edu/atipaper/ideology-of-the-offensive</a> <h3/> <h3>Project Summary</h3> <p>Data for Chapter 7 in "The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914" (Cornell University Press, 1984) The book from which this chapter is taken asks why the major European continental powers all began the First World War with offensive military strategies that failed to accomplish their political or military objectives and that helped to cause the war by increasing the insecurity of all these states. The author argues that the offensive bias in 1914 mainly stemmed from the preference of professional military organizations. Offensive strategies and doctrines enhanced their prestige and autonomy by purporting to create decisive military solutions to the paramount political problems of the state. The weakness of civilian oversight of professional militaries before 1914 unleashed this bias. The larger conceptual purpose of the book was to explore how strategists in any era might come to believe that security could be best achieved by destabilizing offensive means, including striking first. Chapters on Germany and France illustrate these main arguments of the book very directly. The Russian case manifests less of a systematic, long-term bias for the offensive. It explores the causes of a shift in Russian military strategy between 1910 and 1914 from a cautious, largely defensive war plan to a highly overcommitted plan for simultaneous offensives on three fronts. Two background factors – the growing strength of the Russian army and the tightening of the Russo-French alliance in response to Germany’s offensive war plan – help to explain the evolution of Russia’s strategy in a more offensive direction, but these considerations do not account for the disastrously overcommitted excesses of this move. The author emphasizes three explanations for the overcommitted offensives: (1) bureaucratic compromises in which different military bureaucratic factions each got the offensive that it wanted, (2) oversimplified decision processes that paid insufficient attention to logistical feasibility, and (3) a psychological bias for seeing the necessary as possible. Chapter 7 on Russia was chosen for active citation because the research for it added considerable information not widely available in the West, and because the footnotes take considerable pains to explain the connection between details of evidence and the arguments of the chapter.</p> <h3>Data Abstract</h3> <p>The evidence for the chapter comprises many primary sources and several Soviet scholars’ archival research. At the time of the data collection (in the 1980s), however, the author was denied access to the Soviet military history archive, which some Western scholars have subsequently been able to exploit in the post-Soviet period. One qualification the author makes concerns the general insufficiency of data in the Russian case at the time of his writing (as compared to the German and French). Although the chronology of the Russian planning process is well documented, the motivations for some of the changes in the war plan are not. The explanations presented in memoirs and published documents tend to be superficial. Soviet historiography had not been particularly incisive, and Western scholars at the time (like Snyder himself) did not have access to archival material on military planning. Consequently, the interpretations of Russian decision making are not definitive. Nonetheless, he considered using evidence from a past but critical period to be the major advantage of using historical rather than contemporary cases to study the sources of bias in strategic policy making, which remain similar in the present despite changes in military technology. FILES DESCRIPTION: The key documents used for citation activation come from published collections of diplomatic materials of WWI and Soviet historiography from the early part of the 20th century. For example, a critical source used on numerous occasions is a 1926 study by Andrei M. Zaionchkovskii, a general and military historian, who commanded the Russian 30th Army Corps during WWI, of the Russian planning for the war. The memoirs of Yuri Danilov, chief of operations of the Russian Imperial Army general-headquarters during the period, serve as another key source of evidence. Additional important sources used contain Soviet army publications of archival maps and plans and studies conducted by Soviet military academies’ scholars. Where possible, the author cites the English-language versions of books (e.g., the reminiscences of Russian foreign minister Sergey Sazonov, published in London in 1928), but many of the source materials are in Russian, German and French, and the author provides translations for many relevant excerpts. The source files are scanned versions of relevant pages cited from close to 80 individual publications.</p> <h3>Logic of Annotation and Activation</h3> <p>The author’s criteria for activating citations were whether the source material had a bearing on key arguments or historical interpretations, and whether the rarity or intrinsic interest of the materials warranted making them more easily accessible to researchers – even in cases where the materials might have played a relatively smaller role in the argument. As in the footnotes of the book itself, the author sometimes included English-language material for general background, even when it was not as directly on point as the Russian sources. Additionally, a few of the original sources used for this research conducted in the mid-1980s could not be tracked down for logistical reasons.</p>

Since the 1930s there has been much focusing in research on the effects of technological change in industry and the wider economy. This paper aims to analyze the impact of radical technological change, that is drawn sheet glass and float glass, on the peripheral Scandinavian flat glass industry over the twentieth century. We focus on technological change from the viewpoint of the emergence of a dominant design and its diffusion, and we will apply in our analysis a modified version of the dominant design model proposed by organizational scientists. This model is useful in this case since it includes also the dimension of time. We will make the analysis more comprehensive by taking into account also the markets outside Scandinavia, i.e. in the rest of Europe and North America. This research therefore aims to increase our understanding ofthe impact on industry ofradical technological change.

This study aims to analyze the impacts of natural disasters (total affected and total damages), technological change and education on poverty rates using 38 selected developing countries over the period of 1984-2013. A panel regression method is used in estimating the model. The results show that more impactful natural calamities will increase the poverty rate (positive relationships), while the impact of technological change has brought the poverty rate down to the lowest level (negative relationships). However, this study finds positive relationships between technological change and poverty, with an increase in technology causing a rise in poverty. The study also reveals a negative relationship between education on poverty. This implies that improvements in education can play an important role in increasing welfare and reducing poverty in developing countries. The results of this study suggest that education might be the best solution for minimizing the impact of natural disaster and poverty avoidance.

Whereas the long-running Military Revolution debate has focused primarily on changes in military technology and the growth of states in early modern Europe, the example of King Frederick ii (“the Great”) of Prussia highlights how changes in the character of war were perceived by contemporaries, and how they used narratives of change for rhetorical purposes. Frederick and his contemporaries saw their own time as more intellectually advanced than any previous age, and this narrative of intellectual progress existed alongside a narrative of states bringing order. Frederick articulated largely consistent ideas about military history, but also used concepts of the superiority of “our age” to extoll the virtues of his own oblique order of battle, and manipulated narratives of technological change to apologise for his own mistakes. Frederick also turned to an idealised classical world – particularly Julius Caesar – to envisage conquests that went beyond the limits of his own day.