Technocratic Turn: Authoritarianism, Global Capitalism, and Cambodia’s State Transformation since 2013

This study examines the administrative role played by the state of North Carolina in the provision of welfare. A survey of county professionals was conducted in April 2000 assessing perceptions of how well the state was performing its administrative functions. Fifty-three survey items composed ten indices that were grouped into three categories of resources, leadership and accountability. Logistic regression analyses examined perceptions of the state's Resources, Leadership, and Accountability administrative capacity in relationship to the four Work First Report Card measures of (1) putting people to work, (2) having them stay off of welfare, (3) reducing the number on welfare, and (4) collecting child support. Findings indicate that the state's efforts are not perceived as contributing to the success of welfare reform. Administrative capacity perceptions account for little of the variation explained by the logistic regressions. The state is not perceived as contributing to putting people to work or helping them to stay off of welfare subsequently. It actually is seen as slightly hindering efforts at reducing the welfare rolls. Only in the area of child support collection does state administrative capacity (in leadership and budgeting) improve the odds for success.

Under the leadership of the governing African National Congress, the South African government has long touted the idea of becoming a developmental state as the country's ultimate response to rising unemployment, poverty and inequality. This idea aligns with the rapid economic growth and industrialization experienced by the East Asian developmental states through directing the state's administrative capacities, resources and policies towards attaining national developmental goals. Similarly, the National Development Plan pins South Africa's developmental state ambition on creating a capable developmental state and the formation of dynamic institutions capable of utilizing the state's administrative powers, resources and policies to pursue developmental goals. However, the country's state institutions, administrative capacities and resources have been challenged by the state capture debacle that shed light on the corrupt relationship between the political elite and the business elite. This article explores civil society's response to state capture and analyzes the impact of civil society's responses on South Africa's developmental state ambition. The article reveals that the state‐society relations had a significant effect on fighting the state‐business corrupt arrangement by mobilizing nationwide protests that solidified South Africa's emerging democratic developmental state framework embedded in state‐society relations.

This chapter examines the pressures faced by Cambodia's regime since the introduction of elections during the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) period, as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) transitioned into the State of Cambodia (SOC), and its party was rebranded as the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The chapter explores how the regime's coercive foundations were entrenched through the CPP's reliance on security forces and the state apparatus. Despite the CPP's lack of electoral legitimacy, factional conflicts within the party were resolved under Hun Sen's leadership. The chapter highlights the intertwining of political competition with Cambodia's reintroduction into global capitalism, where new wealth accumulation opportunities benefited the CPP and its economic dependents. It underscores the lasting legacy of coercion in shaping Cambodia's political and economic trajectory, as the regime relies on repression rather than electoral victories or co-option to maintain power.

This essay examines certain epistemic problems facing administrative states’ efforts to draft efficient regulations for their societies. I argue that a basic feature of the administrative state’s authority, namely its monopoly over the production of legally binding rules for all members of a geographically defined society, creates epistemic problems that impede efficient rule-making. Specifically, the administrative state’s monopoly over the production of legally binding rules prevents multiple public policies from being simultaneously implemented and compared. The resulting singularity of administrative states’ regulatory decisions prevents observation of the counterfactual effects of policies that were possible but which were not implemented. The absence of observable policy counterfactuals frustrates efforts to assess the efficiency of administrative states’ decisions, as it is impossible to determine whether different policies would have generated greater benefits at lower cost than the policy the state implemented. As these epistemic problems are derived from the singularity of administrative states’ decisions, they exist independently of principal agent problems, suboptimal incentives, or the preferences and capabilities of administrative personnel.

This research examines conditions under which environmental regulatory disclosure is more versus less likely to work, with focus on the case of thePhilippines. Two major findings arise out of a case study. First, we observe a mismatch between the nature of information and the main addressees of the disclosed information, which led the operation of the subject disclosure program to deviate from its targets. Second, this institutional deficiency has to do with the organizational culture and routine practice of the implementing agency. The second finding challenges a major justification of information‐based environmental regulation (IBER) administered in weak states and underscores the role that administrative capacity plays in making novel regulations come into effect. Contrary to the popular belief thatIBERcreates non‐governmental forces that offset a limited statehood, it may be less likely to work where state administrative capacity is weak.

Drawing data from multiple sources, Un argues that following the 1993 United Nations intervention to promote democracy, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) perpetuated a patronage state weak in administrative capacity but strong in coercive capacity. This enabled them to maintain the presence of electoral authoritarianism, but increased political awareness among the public, the rise in political activism among community-based organizations and a united opposition led to the emergence of a counter-movement. Sensing that this counter-movement might be unstoppable, the CPP has returned Cambodia to authoritarianism, a move made possible in part by China's pivot to Cambodia.

Drawing data from multiple sources, Un argues that following the 1993 United Nations intervention to promote democracy, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) perpetuated a patronage state weak in administrative capacity but strong in coercive capacity. This enabled them to maintain the presence of electoral authoritarianism, but increased political awareness among the public, the rise in political activism among community-based organizations and a united opposition led to the emergence of a counter-movement. Sensing that this counter-movement might be unstoppable, the CPP has returned Cambodia to authoritarianism, a move made possible in part by China's pivot to Cambodia.

This article offers a historical analysis of Cambodia's recent three-year crisis of international legitimacy, provoked by the brief civil war in July 1997, and finally settled between November 1998 and mid-2000. Overwhelming international condemnation of Hun Sen's government after the July 1997 fighting seriously delayed national reconciliation and a return to stable government. However, the origins of Cambodia's complex 1997 crisis go back to UNTAC and before. This article argues that from 1993 onwards and especially during the 1997-98 crisis, Cambodia's national sovereignty came under serious challenge from increasingly powerful ideas about international peace enforcement and the imposition of international norms of behaviour on small or weak states. Cambodia fought off such pressures: it found a new domestic political equilibrium, and in so doing succeeded in reclaiming its sovereignty and international legitimacy. Introduction For some sixteen months, from the outbreak of military conflict in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, between the two coalition parties sharing government (the CPP and Funcinpec) on 5 July 1997 until a new coalition government was formed in November 1998, Cambodia's international legitimacy was suspended. Cambodia's leading politician, Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), was comprehensively and routinely condemned in the world's press. [1] The credentials of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)) to occupy its United Nations seat were rejected by the latter in August 1997 (even though these credentials were co-signed by Hun Sen and his then co-Prime Minister, Funcinpec's Ung Huot, and endorsed by King Sihanouk). Cambodia was not able to resume its seat in the United Nations until December 1998, following the formation of a new CPP-Funcinpec coalition government. Cambodia's bid for ASEAN membership, which had been within a few days of taking effect in July 1997, was suspended by ASEAN, pending normalization of Cambodia's political crisis. Ironically, Myanmar, led by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime was admitted into ASEAN in 1997 along with Vietnam and Laos, while a disgraced Cambodia had to wait another year-and-a-half, until early 1999. [2] The restoration of the U.N. seat and the acceptance into ASEAN were the key markers in rebuilding Cambodia's international legitimacy. A third key marker -- annual aid consultations with major donors, which provide about half of Cambodia's annual government budgetary revenue -- also resumed in April 1999, after a 22-month gap. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank resumed their normal programme relationships with Cambodia in early 1999. Since then, there has been a progressive and now virtually complete restoration of Cambodia's international standing. The legitimacy of Cambodia's government is still being contested, but by a shrinking band of opponents (and not by any government). One outstanding issue still in contention until recently -- agreement on procedures for the United Nations and the RGC to jointly conduct Khmer Rouge trials -- continued to sour Cambodia's international image throughout 1999 and the first half of 2000; but finally, with the help of constructive mediation by the United States, it now seems to be on the point of implementation. [3] The past three years have been a hard road for the RGC. The immediate and blanket condemnation by virtually the entire international community of the July 1997 conflict as a Hun Sen-led coup precipitated a three-year political crisis that carried serious costs for all Cambodians. [4] The first cost was in the quality of governance. Much of the RGC's political energy and leadership focus, from the fighting in July 1997 till the settlement with the United Nations in July 2000 on the issue of the Khmer Rouge trials, needed to be directed to the search for political solutions and to the defence of Cambodia's national sovereignty and international standing under hostile international pressure. …

The implementation of Covid-19 mitigation policies has hindered the effective functioning of public services. During the Covid-19 pandemic, domestic violence cases remained hidden due to victims' limited access to reporting channels, despite the government's efforts in establishing P2TP2A and SEJIWA psychological services. The persistently high incidence of domestic violence prompted Farazmand (2009) to advocate for increasing the state's administrative capacity to confront unforeseen challenges. This article examines Indonesia's approach to addressing domestic violence during the pandemic through Farazmand's Administrative Capacity Building recipe, utilizing a descriptive qualitative methodology with a literature study. The analysis reveals a pressing need for preventive services in Indonesia, such as social marketing and the implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) technology in creating applications that can proactively combat domestic violence, aligning with Farazmand's notion of "anticipatory" administrative capacity.

Cambodia stands encapsulated within two dominant, and somewhat contradictory, narratives. On the one hand, it is commonly suggested that an era of civil war and genocide inflicted irrevocable damage and that Pol Pot’s attempt to return to “year zero” annihilated, even erased, the country’s culture, whereas for others, Cambodian culture is being successfully restored, rejuvenated and, perhaps, even enjoying a renaissance. For those with an unshakeable investment in Cambodian culture, such as our three speakers above, the coexistence of these two narratives has paired feelings3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3some insights into the needs and wishes of the Cambodian people, and highlighted pressing issues confronting a nation still recovering from years of civil war and the devastating regime of the Khmer Rouge. As with other post-conflict, developing countries, economic progress was high on the agenda, but equally important for some was the rehabilitation of a national identity and culture based on the ideals of “peace, independence [and] freedom.” Held three years after the first internationally validated multi-party election in Cambodian history, the conference rightly captured all the hope, concern, and differences in opinion in terms of the priorities to be set inherent in a nascent “democracy.” However, after spending in excess of two billion dollars on the 1993 elections, an unprecedented amount for a peacetime operation, the United Nations (UN) would see their efforts at establishing a compromise dual government unravel in 1997 with Hun Sen of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) staging a coup de force to oust his co-prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh of the Royalist FUNCINPEC Party (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif). Hun Sen’s seizure of control over the military forces, police, and civil administration signaled Cambodia’s return to a more familiar model of “Strongman” authoritarian politics.2

The jury is out and the verdict is in, according to most leftist commentators on the African National Congress (ANC) government. The South African political leadership has forgotten its institution...

This article explores the concept and specialties of the administrative and legal status of women who suffered as a consequence of armed conflict in Ukraine. The analysis confirms that the administrative and legal status of women, who have suffered as a result of an armed conflict, safeguards their legal position in relations to the executive bodies, promotes their rights, and ensures that their interests are protected by law when appealed to the certain administrative bodies. Women who have been affected by an armed conflict have a general administrative legal status, as do other citizens. Their legal capacity shall not be different from any other person. At the same time, their administrative capacity may be of limited or broader nature due to the acquisition of additional statuses, such as internally displaced persons (referred to as IDPs), single mothers, participants in hostilities due to the armed aggression of the Russian Federation. Administrative legal status assumes the presence of an administrative legal personality, that consists of an administrative capacity, dispositive capacity, and delictual dispositive capacity. On the basis of this analysis, the following categories of women who suffered as a consequence of armed conflict were identified: women who left the temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and acquired IDP status; single mothers; women participating in an anti-terrorist operation to ensure national security and defense, to repel and deter the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions; women who remained in the occupied territory. Victims of an armed conflict may acquire both general and special administrative legal status. At the same time, the acquisition of a special administrative legal status (for example, IDPs) creates certain restrictions in the implementation of certain social and suffrage rights of women who have been affected by the armed conflict. The administrative capacity of such women shall be no different from the general capacity of any other citizens, but in fact, the legal capacity of women who have been granted IDP status (right to freedom of movement, right to vote in local elections) is limited, even despite the fact that these rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and other laws. Special status for persons who remain in the occupied territory also implies limitations to their legal capacities. The state has established a special system for the movement of persons and goods through the line of demarcation. Ukraine cannot guarantee the majority of constitutional rights and freedoms due to certain parts of its territories being occupied by a country-aggressor. Further research requires a distinct analysis of the issue of reintegration of the occupied territories of Ukraine. Keywords: administrative legal status, general administrative legal status, special administrative legal status, internally displaced person, administrative capacity, dispositive capacity.

governments are the keystones of the federal system. This assertive metaphor takes on added significance as the states are increasingly challenged by Supreme Court decisions, fiscal pressures, federal mandates, selective devolution, and policy implementation complexities. The political challenges must be addressed in the broad arena of electoral politics by governors, legislators, courts, and other constitutional or institutional actors. But few, if any, political problems do not translate into policy issues that pose questions of administrative organization and implementation. It is therefore appropriate to focus on administrative structures and leaders in the American states. Governors may set the tone and the temper of major issues on a state's agenda. Legislators and courts regularly address a panoply of particular problems. Most of what state government does from the standpoint of public policy and problem resolution, however, passes through the operational structures of state administrative agencies. The number, variety, and significance of these agencies, and especially their leadership, deserve greater attention. The quantitative and qualitative growth of state government has been visible but largely neglected in the administrative arena. We argue for enhanced attention to administration in the states. Our point about the neglect and inattention to state administration should be placed in proper context. The Public Administration Review (and many other journals of the same kind) reflect an increased awareness of state policy issues and functions. State finances have gained a deserved share of visibility, including borrowing (Hildreth, 1993), debt (Bahl and Duncombe, 1993; Regans and Lauth, 1992), fiscal stress and financial crises (Bahl and Duncombe, 1992; Cahill and James, 1992; Kee and Shannon, 1992; Joyce and Mullins, 1991), and budgeting (Lee, 1991, 1997; Rodgers and Joyce, 1996; Stanford, 1992, 1993; White, 1993). Major domestic policy issues have likewise been addressed from a state-level orientation. These issues include health care policy (Jones and Johnson, 1995; Leichter, 1992; Shumaker, 1995), Medicaid (Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt, 1991; Schneider, 1988; Schneider, Jacoby, and Coggburn, 1997), and economic development (Burnier, 1991; Reed, 1994; Waits, Kahalley, and Heffermon 1992;). The states have also been the focus of an array of particular cross cutting issues that are common or longstanding administrative questions. Included in this category are issues such as strategic planning (Berry, 1994; Berry and Wechsler, 1995), gender (Bullard and Wright, 1993; Guy, 1993; Kelly, et al., 1991; Riccucci, 1994), and personnel practices (Hays and Kearney, 1992; Jaegal and Cayer, 1991). Despite the range and relevance of the above issues to state government and administration, there are significant gaps in this literature. Limited focus on state administration exists from two standpoints: (1) the overall structure(s) for administration in the states, and (2) the characteristics or attributes of administrative leadership in the states. Also missing is a long-term perspective on state administration. Recently, selective attention has been devoted to short- and long-term shifts in state administrative structural and organizational features (Bowling and Wright, 1998; Cox, 1994; Elling, 1992; National Commission, 1993; Thompson, 1993). Changes in those structural features form the context for this micro-level analysis of administrative leaders in the American states. We document trends, features, and qualities of top-level state executives (agency heads). Prior to presenting findings and interpretations about state administrators we offer brief observations about the general significance of public administration in state government. The Significance of State Administration There are multiple reasons why the administrative status and capacity of the states are of major significance. …

We examine the development ofde jureproperty rights to land by assessing how accurately governments recorded borders of property. We use surveys of farm parcels from two historical states, the Republic of the Orange Free State (OFS) and the South African Republic (ZAR), which are in modern-day South Africa, and employ a descriptive analysis to infer how accurately maps represent parcels of property. We argue that differences in state administrative capacity explains differences in map accuracy and therefore the provision ofde jureproperty rights to land. We find that maps of farms in the ZAR, which had lower administrative capacity, tend to be less accurate than maps of farms in the OFS. Comparisons with military maps compiled under a different administration provide evidence that the costs incurred from previous administrations can limit future attempts to accurately record property. The analysis shows how state administrative capacity can facilitate (or hinder) the provision of property rights to land.

This study examines the implications of growing legal complexity in climate policy on the implementation of climate legislation, focusing on the European Union (EU). While complex legal frameworks may be necessary to address the multifaceted challenges of climate change and to accommodate diverse stakeholder interests, this complexity can undermine policy implementation. The analysis highlights that EU climate laws have become increasingly intricate over the past decades, characterized by longer texts, greater detail, conceptual diversity, and extensive cross-referencing. Using a complexity score derived from structural, linguistic, and relational indicators, the study demonstrates that higher levels of legal complexity correlate with greater implementation deficits. The findings reveal that these challenges persist irrespective of a state's administrative capacity. Although higher administrative capacity slightly improves compliance, it cannot fully mitigate the negative effects of complex legislation. The study underscores the importance of striking a balance between legal complexity and feasibility during policy formulation. While complexity may enhance precision, inclusivity, and public support, it also raises transaction costs for policymakers and administrators, reducing the overall effectiveness of climate action. Policymakers are urged to ensure that implementation capacities are aligned with the demands of complex legislation. As the EU continues to lead global climate efforts, addressing the balance between necessary complexity and implementation feasibility is critical to ensuring the success of its climate policies, with implications for other regions adopting similar legal frameworks.