Abstract
We prove a new theorem for the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games in which the players’ preferences are neither complete nor transitive. Our result is an alternative version of Shafer and Sonnenschein ([1975] J. Math. Econ. 2, 345–348), He and Yannelis ([2016] Econ. Theory 61, 497–513), Reny ([2016] Econ. Theory Bull.) and Carmona and Prodczeck ([2016] Econ. Theory 61, 457–478).
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