Teaching evolution in schools: a thin comprehensive liberal approach

John Rawls claims that the kind of citizenship education required by political liberalism demands ‘far less’ than that required by comprehensive liberalism. Many educational and political theorists who have explored the implications of political liberalism for education policy have disputed Rawls's claim. Writing from a comprehensive liberal perspective, Amy Gutmann contends that the justificatory differences between political and comprehensive liberalism generally have no practical significance for citizenship education. Political liberals such as Stephen Macedo and Victoria Costa maintain that political liberalism requires a form of citizenship education that is far more demanding than that suggested by Rawls. Gordon Davis and Blain Neufeld, in contrast, defend Rawls's position. These different views have implications for the content of mandatory citizenship education, understanding of the ‘common school ideal,’ and the scope for educational choice within the framework of political liberalism. However, the differences between Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa, on the one hand, and Davis and Neufeld, on the other, might be attributable, at least in part, to their different foci. Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa focus on non‐ideal theory, specifically the contemporary American context, whereas Davis and Neufeld begin, as does Rawls, within ideal theory, and consider non‐ideal circumstances from that perspective.

How can civic education in a liberal democracy give social diversity its due? Two complementary concerns have informed a lot of liberal thinking on this subject. Liberals like John Stuart Mill worry that "the plea of liberty" by parents not block "the fulfillment by the State of its duties" to children. They also worry that civic education not be conceived or conducted in such a way as to stifle "diversity in opinions and modes of conduct."' Some prominent contemporary theorists add a new and interesting twist to these common--concerns. They criticize liberals like Mill and Kant for contributing to one of the central problems, the stifling of social diversity, that they are trying to resolve.2 The comprehensive liberal aim of educating children not only for citizenship but also for individuality or autonomy, these political liberals argue, does not leave enough room for social diversity. Would a civic educational program consistent with political liberalism accommodate significantly more social diversity than one guided by comprehensive liberalism?3 Political liberals claim that it would, and some recommend political liberalism to us largely on this basis. This article shows that political liberalism need not, and often does not, accommodate more social diversity through its civic educational program than comprehensive liberalism. Section I examines the defining difference between political and comprehensive liberalism and suggests why we might expect to find a significant difference in the accommodation of social diversity by political and comprehensive liberalism through civic education.

In 1977, Jane English pointed out that "by making the parties in the original position heads of families rather than individuals, Rawls makes the family opaque to claims of justice." Since then, a number of feminists have written on issues having to do with gender and the family in Rawls's A Theory ofJustice. 1 I argued in two earlier articles, and then in Justice, Gender, and the Family, that the absence of a discussion of justice in families and justice and gender was a significant problem, for reasons both internal and external to the theory.' I also argued, however, that Rawls's theory of justice had very great potential to address these issues. And I have tried to make some suggestions as to what a feminist extension of Rawls's ideas might include. I shall turn to these later in this article. In the introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls mentions, as one of a number of "major matters" omitted from Theory, "the justice of and in the family." He reminds us that he did, however, "assume that in some form the family is just."3 It is not at all clear that, in Political Liberalism, he still holds to this assumption, or even to the requirement that families ought to be thought of in terms ofjustice. In publications

This article examines John Rawls's turn toward a purely political liberalism by comparing and contrasting it with the comprehensive liberalism he imputes to John Stuart Mill. We argue that Mill and Rawls have similar views about individual autonomy, despite Rawls's insistence to the contrary. We contend that Rawls accords a much larger role to the state in enforcing justice than does Mill. Whereas Rawls's view of justice rests ultimately on state enforcement, Mill sees justice reaching into many institutions, but accords the state a lesser role in this. Mill's view of justice rests on a view of progress and moral psychology not shared by Rawls. In the service of stability, Rawls demands more agreement from citizens about justice than does Mill, but these demands undermine the stability that Rawls so desires. The differences between Rawls and Mill discussed here are not elucidated by the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalisms.

This chapter explains that there are two main variants of anti-perfectionist liberalism: ‘comprehensive liberalism’ and ‘political liberalism’. It characterizes the distinction between these two kinds of liberal theory by explaining that comprehensive liberals tend to be concerned with the normative implications of autonomy, whereas political liberals tend to be concerned with the normative implications of reasonable disagreement. The chapter goes on to outline some of the most prominent versions of comprehensive liberalism, namely Kantian liberalism, Millian liberalism and Ronald Dworkin’s ‘challenge model of ethics’, in a way that brings to the fore the anti-perfectionist implications of these conceptions of liberalism.

Diversity and Distrust is part of Stephen Macedo's ongoing project of describing and defending a robust “transformative” liberalism. One of its chief purposes is to demonstrate the harmony between John Rawls's political liberalism (free of commitment to any “comprehensive” philosophical or theological views) and a liberalism with a strong commitment to shape its citizens' moral character, that is, to shape them into (political) liberals. In other words, liberalism can be both “neutral,” with respect to substantive comprehensive philosophical and theological views, and also deeply committed to encouraging the formation of civic virtues essential to this “political liberalism.” Diversity and Distrust is the part of the project that defends public education as an essential element in that transformative undertaking and that makes an argument for limiting parental rights to control education, especially the rights of those parents who do not fully embrace liberalism, such as fundamentalists – all of this, without committing itself to any particular comprehensive views.

Henrik Ibsen and Conspiracy Thinking: The Case of <i>Peer Gynt</i>

John Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice that “justice as fairness…is likely to have greater stability than the traditional alternatives since it is more in line with the principles of moral psychology” (TJ 399). In support, he presented a psychology of moral development that was informed by a comprehensive liberalism. In Political Liberalism, Rawls confessed that the argument was “unrealistic and must be recast” (PL xix). Rawls, however, never provided a psychology of moral development informed by a specifically political liberalism, leaving it at a disadvantage with respect to comprehensive liberalism itself. I argue that no coherent account is available. But, because Rawls’s Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, along with its implied stricture against “indoctrination in the pejorative sense,” is a creature of ideal rather than non-ideal theory, the deficiency is far less significant than many would assume. In non-ideal circumstances -- such as ours -- political liberalism does not disallow, and in fact requires, compulsory, free early education informed by the best available comprehensive liberal philosophy.

Education has become one of the foremost arenas in which political liberals attempt to differentiate their account from that of comprehensive liberals. Rawls posits that the requirements of his theory, as laid out in Political Liberalism, will be far less stringent than those of liberals such as Kant, Mill or Joseph Raz. However, a number of influential theorists, most notably Amy Gutmann and Eamonn Callan, have argued that this divergence occurs only at the level of theoretical justification, and does not imply that the two varieties of liberalism will prescribe significantly different educational policies. This article refutes this argument and shows that a more detailed focus on the civic aims of political liberals will reveal significant differences in their position on educational questions from those of their comprehensive rivals.

The cardinal idea in Rawls's political liberalism is that a better conception of liberal justice is available to us once we ground principles of justice in an ‘overlapping consensus’ among the many reasonable doctrines that abound in a free society instead of any of the comprehensive liberal doctrines that liberal philosophers have traditionally championed. Rawls's contrast between the political and comprehensive liberalism is specious, though his political conception of the person and his related conception of ‘reasonable pluralism’ are shown to provide a compelling perspective on the proper scope of diversity and the conduct of political education in a liberal society.

Liberal attempts to defend faith schooling have been conditional on the ability of faith schools to serve as a context for individual choice. A recent critique of these attempts claims that religious parents would find such moderate faith schooling unacceptable. This article sets forth a new liberal defence of faith schools drawing heavily on the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism. Since political liberalism's understanding of personal autonomy does not include the ability to make choices, the political liberal defence of faith schools can accommodate denominational schools that limit the ability of students to choose or change their religion.

For many liberals, the value of individual autonomy is the foundation of Uberai political morality; it underwrites individuals' rights and liberties and liberal notions of justice, marks the limits of liberal toleration, and sets the terms on which a liberal society can also be a multicultural society (e.g., Raz 1986; Kymlicka 1989; 1995; Rawls 1993; Tamir 1993; Habermas 1994). Yet, for many multiculturalists, the liberal value of individual autonomy is an obstacle to building a multicultural democracy; it is seen as too 'sectarian', demanding, or intolerant a value on which to base political morality for a culturally diverse society (e.g., Young 1990; Margalit and Halbertal 1994; Parekh 2000; Galston 2002; Kukathas 2003; Modood 2007). In this essay, I want to argue that autonomy is a much more 'open', democratic, and accommodating value than both these liberal and multiculturalist accounts suggest.Of course, one might reasonably ask why persevere with liberal autonomy at all. As the multiculturalism literature now abundantly attests, there are, after all, other theoretical and even liberal approaches available that promise to be far more accommodating of cultural difference than any autonomy-based approach is likely to be. If autonomy commands attention, it is because of its pervasive place as a governing value in liberal democracies today. Part of the new thinking associated with the Enlightenment, autonomy's influence as a public value largely emerged in the twentieth century. That influence has only continued to grow. While never reaching the ubiquity prescribed by so-called 'comprehensive liberals', the valorisation of autonomy has increasingly come to inform - or be reflected in - the law, public policy, and even interpersonal relations in liberal democracies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Indeed, it is fair to say that the rise of autonomy as a governing value constitutes something of a world historical transformation. But this is also why it is important to scrutinize what is claimed in the name of respecting autonomy. As we will see, though often deployed as a blunt instrument and argument stopper, the liberal value of autonomy in fact offers a platform for democratic contestation and intercultural dialogue about the permissible limits of liberal toleration. My point of departure, then, is that autonomy also speaks to the interests of cultural minorities negotiating life today in liberal societies, and that they would do well also to speak the language of autonomy.I will begin (part 1) by canvassing the concept of autonomy relevant to this discussion. Autonomy is a notoriously slippery concept to pin down, so it is essential to clarify the dimensions of the concept that are implicitly appealed to in law and public policy. I will suggest a framework for operationalizing autonomy as a multidimensional political value, and which allows mainstream and minority practices to be assessed and compared on their 'autonomy credentials'. Thereafter, I will consider, in turn, three areas where the value of autonomy lends itself to considerable interpretive and practical latitude. The first (part 2) concerns the applicability of autonomy; that is, whether specific practices can be said to satisfy or violate the dimensions of autonomy. The second area (part 3) involves the issue ?? prioritization. This aspect occurs implicitly inasmuch as the dimensions of autonomy have differential political force in liberal practice, and arises circumstantially where cases pit the autonomy of different parties against each other or where other compelling public interests are at stake. In each case, judgments need to be made regarding how best to honor the value of autonomy in the circumstances. The final substantive part (4) argues that judgments concerning the applicability and prioritization of the dimensions of autonomy in relation to minority cultural practices should be informed by how a society treats mainstream practices and cases. …

The best-known version of liberalism today – indeed, the version that is often equated with liberalism simply – is John Rawls's antiperfectionist liberalism, developed in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1992). Rawls's theory of “justice as fairness” was a response to the perceived inadequacies of the previously dominant utilitarian theory, especially the insecurity of rights and instability of politics in a utilitarian system. In its final form, Rawls's philosophy claimed to be, not a neo-Kantian comprehensive liberalism – a specific “comprehensive” theological/philosophical position – but rather a “political liberalism” that was “neutral” with respect to fundamental comprehensive views. In the final analysis, however, it appears that Rawls was unable to vindicate this claim. Political liberalism is a form of comprehensive liberalism in the name of which a significant range of comprehensive views – especially traditional religious and moral views – are excluded from political life. In this chapter, I begin with a summary of Rawls's political liberalism, which tries to identify what it seeks to achieve, and then explain why I think it is unsuccessful. Rawls's Political Liberalism Rawls begins with conceptions he considers implicit in our political culture. The first is that of citizens as free and equal persons, who have a capacity to understand and act on principles regulating a scheme of social cooperation and a capacity to develop, revise, and pursue rationally a conception of the good.

Soulevant le paradoxe de l'obligation de l'education civique des enfants et de l'apprentissage des valeurs fondamentales du liberalisme telle que l'autonomie de l'individu, l'A. montre que la permissibilite de l'education civique pose probleme, tant du point de vue de l'autorite de l'ecole en matiere d'enseignement et de l'autorite des parents en matiere d'education, que du point de vue de la legitimite de l'etat liberal au regard du consentement hypothetique des citoyens. Examinant les arguments en faveur de l'education civique developpes par W. Galston et A. Gutmann, ainsi que l'argument instrumental en faveur de l'education falicitant l'autonomie, l'A. montre que le debat souleve la question de la place de la famille religieuse de l'enfant et la question des programmes scolaires dans le cadre limite de la doctrine liberale

This chapter considers liberal objections to marriage. Perfectionist or comprehensive liberals should reject state-recognized marriage as limiting autonomy in the service of an unappealing and restrictive model of human perfection. But political liberals should go further, and reject state-recognized marriage as prima facie incompatible with neutrality. The chapter clarifies the nature of political liberal neutrality. Political liberalism is ambiguous between two forms of neutrality: strict and lax. Strict neutrality allows state action only if sufficiently weighty public reasons can be adduced in favour of a policy; lax neutrality permits the state to act just as long as some public reason can be given. If political liberalism is to be an interesting philosophical approach it will defend strict neutrality, so any public reasons offered in support of state-recognized marriage must be weighty enough to overcome the non-neutrality of that institution.