Abstract
In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms’ quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality.
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