Taliban governance and space for dialogue

This article examines the strategic communication of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) between November 2022 and August 2023. Specifically, it focuses on the official spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, whose account is the central node of the IEA's X network. Drawing on Nicole Ball's framework of post‐conflict state reconstruction and utilizing the approach of Teun A. van Dijk's critical‐political discourse analysis, the study analyzes how the IEA constituted its dominant narrative frame of the “Freedom Jihad” and communicated its finalization to various audiences, preparing simultaneously for its transition into a new narrative frame of the “Development Jihad.” The research asks how the IEA used X to disseminate its narratives, what image it sought to construct, and how communication strategies evolved during this period, including the selective strategic use of different languages. Findings demonstrate that the “Freedom Jihad” narrative frame was articulated through three main components: the establishment of Islamic rule, the elimination of “corruptors,” and the forging of national unity. This way, in achieving security and stability, the IEA prepared for the arrival of a new era, one in the name of the “Development Jihad.”

This article argues that the formation of the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is a case of déjà vu for China and that, despite its engagement with the new Taliban-led government, Beijing will be unable to meet its geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and national security goals in the country. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, similarly to the situation under the first IEA, the Taliban are finding it difficult to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The security situation will remain perilous due to persistent attacks by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) group. Secondly, and also just as during the first IEA, the Taliban cannot be relied upon as allies in China’s “war on terror”. This is due to the Taliban’s ideological beliefs, decades of ties with the Uyghur militants in Afghanistan and concerns about reputational damage if it breaks links with Islamist groups or undertakes counterterrorism operations against these groups, damage which may undermine the second IEA.

This survey provides an examination of the legal innovations introduced by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) under the Taliban’s governance since their return to power in August 2021. In the absence of a defined constitutional text or a permanent government, the IEA’s political project centers on the double objectives of implementing classical Hanafi jurisprudence (fiqh) through modern state apparatus and maintaining control over the IEA’s burgeoning state structure. The chapter focuses on three key legal developments: The Procedure of Processing Legislative Documents, the Law on the Duties and Authorities of the High Directorate of Supervision and Prosecution of Decrees and Edicts, and the establishment of provincial Ulama councils. The survey sheds light on the evolving legal landscape in Afghanistan under the IEA’s rule, highlighting the intricate balance between classical Hanafi jurisprudence, modern state governance, and internal control. The legal innovations analyzed provide valuable insights into the ideological and practical considerations shaping the IEA’s approach to governance in post-2021 Afghanistan.

The people of Afghanistan experienced profound transformations across various spheres following the political upheaval of August 15, 2021, wherein the Islamic Republic government was replaced by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The new government has introduced various policies that are impacting people's lives differently from before. One of these policies is placing limitations on the education of women, signaling a significant shift in how educational opportunities are being provided to female students. The study adopted a qualitative case study with a sample of female school students across five provinces of Afghanistan, including Kabul, Herat, Bamiyan, Farah and Jalalabad. Each of the five provinces represented by 10 students, for 50 respondents. The findings of the research highlights that depriving girls of education has had a number of detrimental effects on them, including emotional and psychological issues, forced marriage, migration, a loss of hope for the future, and other long-term effects. The study highlights the value of providing girls with equal educational opportunities and contributes to the creation of more effective policies and methods to guarantee girls' access to education in Afghanistan and other countries facing similar difficulties.

This research explores the role of universities in promoting Afghan fruit exports under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Afghanistan, with its fertile soil and favorable climate, is known for its high-quality fruits, yet significant challenges hinder effective exportation. Political instability, infrastructural deficiencies, and limited marketing strategies have historically affected the agricultural sector. This study aims to evaluate the Islamic Emirate's initiatives to facilitate trade and examine the contributions of researchers and university professors in enhancing the visibility of Afghan fruits in global markets. Using a descriptive and exploratory methodology, secondary data from the Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook and international databases were analyzed, focusing on parameters such as export composition, trends, and market destinations from 2021 to 2023. Results indicate a remarkable increase in fruit exports, with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of approximately 37.8%, rising from around $341.76 million in 2021 to $648.38 million in 2023. Raisins and figs emerged as the leading export items, comprising significant portions of the total export composition. The analysis further reveals the pivotal role of academic research in promoting Afghan fruits, with a notable increase in publications reflecting growing scholarly interest. This study underscores the importance of strategic investment in the agricultural sector and highlights the necessity for enhanced collaboration between academia and industry to maximize the potential of Afghan fruit exports, ultimately contributing to the country’s economic development.

The Bagram Air Base occupies a uniquely strategic position in Afghanistan and has played a central role during both the Soviet and U.S.-led military interventions. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, former U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized the withdrawal process and has emphasized that the United States should have retained control of Bagram Air Base. This study examines the strategic significance of Bagram, the historical purposes it served during foreign invasions, Trump’s renewed interest in regaining the base, and the responses of regional powers, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban), and the Afghan people. The findings of this research indicate that while Bagram Air Base holds considerable strategic value for the United States particularly due to its proximity to China, Central Asia, and major regional rivals the possibility of a renewed U.S. military presence is extremely low. The study finds that regional powers such as China and Russia strongly oppose the establishment of any foreign military base in Afghanistan, citing concerns over regional instability and violations of Afghan sovereignty. Furthermore, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has categorically rejected any foreign military presence, repeatedly emphasizing that no part of Afghan territory, including Bagram, will be ceded under any circumstances. The study also concludes that Afghanistan’s national-historical experience demonstrates a consistent pattern of resistance to foreign military forces, from ancient invasions to modern interventions. This entrenched historical and societal opposition significantly constrains the possibility of foreign re-entry. Overall, the research concludes that despite Bagram’s strategic importance, any attempt by the United States to regain control of the air base would face overwhelming political, regional, and historical resistance, making such a scenario highly improbable. This conclusion reinforces Afghanistan’s enduring national-historical stance against foreign military presence.

This chapter examines musical labour and refugee experiences, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork with Afghans in Vienna, Austria. It presents the study's political environment, shaped by restrictive asylum policies and derogatory media narratives that incite anti-Muslim racism and racialised Othering. In tracing conceptualisations of musical labour in Afghan musical practice, I present historical accounts, then turn to the younger history of Afghan musical labour, discussing musical work on Radio Afghanistan during the 1970s and the harsh caesura in musical life during the Taliban regime. The popular television show Afghan Star and its significance in relation to work in the music entertainment sector gives a more recent perspective on Afghan musical labour. The main section presents ethnographic descriptions of four case studies of musicians living in Vienna and London whose musical labour is connected to their refugee experiences, addressing work conditions, musical spaces and performance occasions. In addition to Vienna-based musicians Bahram Ajezyar and Haroon Andeshwar, I link musical labour to the asylum process through the case of an anonymised musician. I further present London-based singer Elaha Soroor's musical career path, which eludes the mainstream constraints of Afghan pop. The last section examines the affective labour of musicians within the refugee experience, highlighting the evocation of shared narratives of belonging in Afghan music performances as well as the symbolic economy of musical authenticity that the majority society attributes to refugee musicians. This chapter was written before the Taliban seized Kabul in the summer of 2021. Although the text has been roughly adapted to the new political circumstances, it can only deficiently address how musical labour will change under the second Taliban regime.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the Afghan Taliban were obliterated in a lightning war prosecuted by the United States. Their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ceased to exist as a physical entity, and the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, fled to Pakistan. Within five years, however, the Taliban had regrouped and returned in large numbers to southern and eastern Afghanistan. By 2016, they had overrun at least a third of the country. How did the Taliban come back so successfully from utter defeat? This article draws on the literatures on civil wars and on military adaptation to identify and unpack two sets of factors that explain the relative success of insurgencies: the availability of social resources and the elements that drive and enable military adaptation. Using a large number of original interviews with Taliban leaders, cadre, and field commanders, I demonstrate how these factors combined to make the Taliban essentially unbeatable.

In the aftermath of 9/11 scenario, the US and its coalition forces designed a joint strategy to eradicate Al-Qaeda and their supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Being coalition partner against ‘war on terror’ (WoT), Pakistan deployed its military and security agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) in order to ensure and maintain her hold in these areas. Removal of Taliban regime in Afghanistan pushed these terrorists and their supporters to flee away and find out hideouts in bordering areas such as Bajaur Agency. Consequently, the insurgents and terrorists with the support of local tribesmen launched terrorist activities in Afghanistan from the soil of Pakistan and also challenged the writ of the state of Pakistan. Realizing the sensitivity of the situation, terrorist attack on security forces and public places, Pakistan’s armed forces launched considerable military operations and campaigns against the militant groups. The major operations were launched in the course of 2003-2009 in FATA and PATA. This paper attempts to critically analyze these major actions, highlights the pros and cons of these operations and also adequacies and inadequacies of various peace agreements signed with terrorist commanders and tribesmen during that time.

This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.

Authors and publishers who accuse prominent Saudi Arabians of providing funds to al-Qa ida are being sued for their accusations. The most active litigant has been Khaled bin Mahfouz, whom the Forbes Website describes as a citizen of Saudi Arabia worth $3 billion. In March 2005, Bin Mahfouz and his company Nimir Petroleum won a libel case in the High Court in London against the Pluto Press and author Michael Griffin for statements in Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa ida and the Holy War , which was published in a revised edition in 2003. According to the Bin Mahfouz Website, the book wrongly alleged that “Sheikh Khalid funded bin Laden's and al-Qa ida's terrorist activities, [that he] had been dismissed from NCB [National Commercial Bank] because of the funding of terrorism, and as a result had also been stripped of his Saudi passport and confined to a military hospital by the Saudi authorities”; also that “Nimir Petroleum was owned by a funder and supporter of Osama bin Laden and al-Qa ida and was a party to negotiations with the Taliban in connection with an oil pipeline to be built across Afghanistan.” In the court proceedings, the publisher and author “accepted that there was no truth whatsoever in any of these allegations. They acknowledged that Sheikh Khalid had no connection whatsoever with Osama bin Laden or the supporting or funding of terrorist activities, left NCB only for health reasons, and was not stripped of his passport or confined to a military hospital. They also accepted that Nimir Petroleum was not owned by a funder of terrorism and was not involved in any Afghan pipeline project and has never had any dealings with the Taliban regime.” Pluto Press and Griffin agreed to destroy all copies of the book, to desist from repeating these allegations, and “to publish an apology on www.plutobooks.com, in the Bookseller magazine and in the British Institute of Middle East Studies Newsletter .” In August 2005, all signs of a connection with Griffin or the book, which they had published in two editions (2001, 2003), had vanished from the Pluto Press Website.

A Conferência Internacional de Bonn, em dezembro de 2011, concluiu a primeira década do engajamento civil, diplomático e militar da comunidade internacional no Afeganistão pós-Talibã. Esse processo inacabado pode ser dividido em quatro etapas: um momento de ilusória estabilidade (2001-05); uma fase de intensificação da revolta talibã (2006-08); o ápice do conflito, sob o signo da contra-insurgência (2009-11); e os atuais desafios da transição militar e da reconciliação política (2012-14). O artigo também reflete acerca do impacto que a guerra afegã pode surtir sobre futuros exercícios multilaterais de statebuilding.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, marked a pivotal moment in the nation's history and had profound implications for women's labor rights. This policy brief identifies the drastic reduction in women employment as a profound socioeconomic challenge, exacerbated by the de facto authority’s restrictive policies towards women in the workforce. The study uniquely focuses on the intersection of gender and labor rights after regime change, analyzing the growing barriers to women's employment, which not only undermines gender equality but also threatens the broader socioeconomic stability of Afghanistan. This study aims to propose practical policy recommendations that address these inequalities and advocate for international intervention to protect women's labor rights in Afghanistan. Author utilized qualitative analysis, drawing from diverse policy documents and reports, to understand Afghan women's lived experiences under the Taliban regime. Key findings reveal that the Taliban's governance post-2021 has led to significant setbacks in women's employment across various sectors, contributing to economic regression and deepening gender disparities. The brief urges for international financial support to women-led organizations and the promotion of online and home-based employment, alongside relocation programs and rigorous data monitoring for effective policymaking.

After the 2021 US withdrawal, a drastic transition of power coupled with international sanctions and the Islamic State-Taliban conflict led to growing issues of widespread economic hardships, food insecurity, stricter social policies, and changes to daily life. This 2023 study examines the association of diminished quality of life (DQOL) on the psychosocial wellbeing of Afghan adults living in-country under the Taliban- Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Applying Solar & Irwin’s social determinants of health framework, we present the quantitative analysis of data collected from 873 Afghan respondents (ages 18–65) of a digital survey, using snowball sampling over social media. Data analysis examines the association between individual self-reported quality of life hardships and psychosocial stress symptoms (disaggregated and aggregated), disaggregated by demographics. Approximately nine-in-ten Afghans face DQOL correlates related to higher psychosocial stress (PSS). 72.9% (CI95% 69.8–76.0) of respondents self-report suffering food insecurity; 71.6% (CI 95% 68.3–74.8) poor access to needed healthcare. The extent to which Afghan men face limited household healthcare access is linked to higher PSS levels (χ2 = 117.10, p<0.001). A matching analysis of survey data indicates that Marginal Effects that lack of healthcare access increases the probability of stress by approximately 8%; experiencing the loss of loved ones also has a significant effect ranging from 9% to 11%; and experiencing threats of violence leads to a substantial increase in the probability of PSS, ranging from 34% to 36%. Qualitative data triangulate the statistical findings, provides intrinsic insight into Afghans’ daily experiences, and inform causal mechanisms related to share trauma experiences. The 2021 US withdrawal marked a turbulent political shift in Afghanistan that disrupted previous structural determinants of health, like gender and age. The political shift, international sanctions, and internal crises have worsened the humanitarian conditions affecting most Afghans, negatively impacting their physical and psychosocial wellbeing.

Abstract: Water is a precious commodity in Central Asia—perhaps the most precious—as the climate warms and severe droughts are ever-present in this part of the world. The stage for conflict seems set between Iran and Afghanistan as historical tensions and current climate realities converge in one of the driest parts of the world. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Afghanistan) is currently experiencing widespread food insecurity. Twenty million Afghans do not have sufficient food supplies (a conservative estimate) and six million are (according to the UN) thought to be at risk of famine. Poor water governance, incapacity to respond to climate events, and increasing populations in Central Asia demanding ever more water are exacerbating tensions. But natural resources can also be an impetus for peacebuilding, especially because neither Iran nor Afghanistan can afford a wide-spread conflict. This article will explore the water-based issues between the two nations, the relative successes and failures of the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty (Helmand Treaty), and the challenges to maintaining peace in the region. Afghanistan’s right to develop has been stymied by more than four decades of near-continuous armed conflict. But its hydropower development must be tempered by Iran’s right not to be harmed by Afghanistan’s development of water infrastructure. Tensions are high. “Water diplomacy” and other peacebuilding measures are key to avoiding further armed conflict.