Abstract
SummaryKitcher’s philosophy of mathematics rests on the idea that a philosopher who tries to understand mathematical knowledge ought to take its historical development into consideration. In this paper, I take a closer look at Kitcher’s reasons for proposing such a historical turn. I argue that, whereas a historical account is indeed an essential part of the standpoint advanced in The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, this is no longer the case for the position defended in the manuscript Mathematical Truth? The Wittgensteinian account of mathematics advocated in that manuscript does not force us to take a historical turn.
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