Abstract
The aims of this article are, first, to describe the Swedish authorities’ strategy for dealing with the sudden onset of novel coronavirus in early 2020 and, second, to explain why that strategy differed markedly from those in nearly all other European countries. From an early stage, the Swedish government delegated decision making to the Public Health Agency, and its goal was to mitigate the effects of the virus rather than to suppress its spread. Society was never closed down in the same way as elsewhere. Using data from media reports and other publications, we argue that the agency was insulated from pressure to change course, even as the number of deaths associated with covid-19 rose far above those in Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, by four conditions: (1) the structure of national public administration; (2) an outburst of nationalism in parts of the media; (3) the uneven impact of the virus; and (4) a political leadership that was willing to delegate responsibility for policy almost entirely. We conclude by briefly comparing the coronavirus strategy to previous episodes of Swedish policy exceptionalism. This emerging pattern, we suggest, raises normative questions about the functioning of Swedish democracy.
Highlights
Sweden stood out from the mainstream as coronavirus swept into Europe in early 2020
We suggest four conditions that insulated the Swedish strategy from pressure to change: the structure of national public administration; the nature of public debate; the uneven impact of the virus; and the prevailing party system and political leadership
A government-appointed national testing co-ordinator declared, as she resigned after just three weeks in the job, that “in the early phase of the pandemic, Sweden chose a strategy in which testing was not an important part of the battle against the virus”
Summary
Sweden stood out from the mainstream as coronavirus swept into Europe in early 2020. Some countries initially planned to contain or mitigate the disease, rather than suppress it. The effectiveness or otherwise of the Swedish strategy is, not the main subject of this article. Is to describe and explain Swedish exceptionalism in respect to coronavirus policy. It can be compared with numerous other examples of Sweden’s historical deviation from norms. Coronavirus induced the second crisis in less than five years, and arguably the third in 11 years, in which Sweden deviated markedly from European policy norms. We suggest four conditions that insulated the Swedish strategy from pressure to change: the structure of national public administration; the nature of public debate; the uneven impact of the virus; and the prevailing party system and political leadership
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