Sustainable closed loop dual channel supply chain with price, circular economic index and advertisement effort dependent demand

The conflict of dual channel has become more and more competitive. In order to alleviate the conflict, the paper studies that the manufacturer not only sells the products through the traditional online retail channel but also the online direct channel. This paper analyzes the product pricing, service level and the profit of the whole supply chain under centralized decision-making, and the product pricing, service level and the maximum profit of the manufacturer and the online retailer under decentralized decision-making. The results show that double marginalization effect exists in the online dual-channel. It concludes the condition of the supply chain coordination through revenue sharing contract model. Finally, it verifies that the revenue sharing contract is effective through the example analysis. The research can enrich the theoretical knowledge of online dual channel.

Due to the advancement of online marketing, many manufacturers have started to provide a return policy with refund agreements. This paper concerns return policy in a dual-channel supply green chain, wherein customers can buy the products through a traditional retail channel or direct online channel. Under sustainable improvement, we have developed the dual-channel supply chain system with a return strategy including refund via direct online channel. Market demand is dependent on product sales price, green label, and refund amount. Firstly, the supply chain members target to optimize their decision variables under a centralized decision model. Secondly, the entire supply chain members make their decision individually to maximize the overall profit using the non-cooperative Stackelberg game approach. The prime objectives of the paper are to find out the optimal sales price, wholesale price, green label, and refund price so that the profit of the supply chain will be maximized. By solving the game model, we compare the optimal decision under both scenarios and implement sensitivity observation, which helps to reflect the influence of critical parameters.

Manufacturers today are increasingly adopting a dual channel to sell their products, i.e., the traditional retail channel and an online direct channel. In the decentralized-dual-channel supply chain, leading-time and price of manufacturer and retailer are essential factor for the performance of this kind of supply chain, In this paper we present an analytical framework for leading-time and price decisions for decentralized-dual-channel supply chain based on game theory, provide a decision making aid for manufacturer and retailer. With this analytical model, manufacturer as leader, determining the delivery leading time, the direct sale price in the direct channel and the wholesale price; then retailer as follower, can determining his own leading time and retail price that guarantee Stackelberg equilibrium. Under this equilibrium condition, the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain.

Retailer's Market Power and the Optimal Channel Strategies of a Manufacturer In Electronic Commerce

By constructing a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier, this paper considers the effect of fresh-keeping level on the freshness of perishable products and constructs a time-varying demand function based on freshness. The operating cost of the internet channel to the supplier has also been considered in the model. Optimal pricing strategy and profits of supply chain members under dual channels are investigated respectively in this paper. Comparing the optimal profit under traditional single-channel and dual-channel supply chain, we obtain the condition that the internet operating cost should satisfy. Given the situation where the supplier obtains profit while the retailer loses after the supplier introduced the internet channel, this paper proposes a revenue-sharing contract to make up for the loss of the retailer and achieves a win–win situation. Research shows that in the numerical analysis the supplier’s and the retailer’s profit can only be improved when the operating cost of the internet channel c0 and revenue-sharing ratio ψ are within a certain range. When ψ ≥ 0.4 and $ 0\le {c}_0\le \sqrt{\frac{2.34{\psi }^2+1.25\psi +7.39}{8.43{\psi }^3+4.62{\psi }^2+5.72\psi +9.05}}+8.64$, Pareto improvement will be attained on both sides in the supply chain.

With the diversity of shopping styles, reference prices have become a consideration in consumers’ purchasing decisions. It is critical to understand how manufacturers and retailers make optimal decisions based on consumer behavior. To this end, we develop a manufacturer-led Stackelberg (M-Stackelberg) game model to investigate the impact of consumer proportion, reference price effect (RPE), and the channel preference coefficient on the decision of the remanufacturing supply chain (RSC) in dual-channel structures. Through comparing different game scenario models, we find that when the reference price coefficient is relatively small, the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer are the same regardless of whether the RPE is considered. The manufacturer and E-tailer always benefit from RPE, while the traditional retailer (T-retailer) is uncertain. The numerical analysis revealed that the profits of supply chain members are inversely proportional to the proportion of consumers. The smaller the proportion of primary consumers, the more favorable the supply chain. In particular, the higher the channel preference coefficient, the higher the profits of the manufacturer and E-tailer, while the lower the benefit of the T-retailer. Further, in the dynamic game, the total supply chain profit is highest when the T-retailer prices earlier than the E-tailer.

A two-tier water supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer under revenue-sharing contract is constructed. And the contribution of the model is that marketing effort and water purity has been considered. First, four models including the centralized model (model B) and decentralized models (models BM, I, and II) are established and analyzed. Second, the Stackelberg game model is used to discuss the pricing strategy of water supply chain members in centralized and decentralized scenarios. The comparison results show that revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to improve the level of product greening, the profit of supply chain members, and the overall profit of the water supply chain compared with model BM. However, it leads to the decrease of retailers’ green marketing efforts and the wholesale price of water. In addition, revenue-sharing contract through bargaining makes bigger influence than revenue-sharing contract. Marketing can stimulate the increase of the green product’s market demand on one hand, and on the other hand, it generates the amount of marketing cost. In this study, the profit is that marketing produces cannot offset the cost that it brings. Thus, it will be important to take some measures to make up the loss that marketing generated.

This paper explores characteristics of three different channel structures of three-echelon supply chain, namely a traditional retail channel; a manufacturer's dual-channel and a retailer's dual-channel. In the dual-channel setting, a manufacturer operates retail channel through a distributor and a retailer while either the manufacturer or the retailer operates the direct e-channel. Mathematical models for both non-cooperative and cooperative decisions are developed. Optimal pricing policies of all the proposed models are analyzed with theory. It has been showed that in three echelon supply chain, introduction of dual channel is not always profitable for the channel members compared to single retail channel. Optimal price of the product is always greater in single retail channel compared to retail prices in both the dual channels. To eliminate channel conflicts of non-cooperative supply chain, a two-way price discount mechanism is used to coordinate both the dual channels. It is analytically found that the retailer has opportunity to gain more profits in own dual-channel and in non-cooperative single retail channel instead of manufacturer dual channel. The distributor also prefers the retailer's dual-channel compared to the manufacturer's dual-channel. All analytical results are illustrated numerically.

The development of the fresh-food e-commerce has led scholars to pay more attention to research on the agricultural product supply chain. This paper analyses the operation mode of the new O2O retail fresh supply chain by constructing the Stackelberg game model, takes the freshness and freshness-keeping efforts of fresh agricultural products as the main considerations, and analyses and compares the overall income of the supply chain under different decision-making modes. The results of the study show that: (1) In a centralized decision-making model, collaboration between suppliers and retailers online and offline can increase their respective revenues, and overall supply chain profits increase as the proportion of collaboration increases; (2) compared to decentralized decision-making, revenue-sharing contracts can increase the overall profitability of supply chain members and the supply chain when the revenue sharing factor is relatively high in the case of online and offline channel collaboration; (3) finally, the impact of revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain profitability is discussed through numerical analysis.

The application of blockchain can effectively improve the efficiency of fresh agricultural product circulation and consumer trust, but it can also increase investment costs. In this context, this paper introduces parameters such as blockchain unit variable cost, the level of blockchain technology investment, and consumer channel preference in two dual-channel supply chain systems dominated by fresh agricultural product manufacturers: online direct sales and distribution. It compares and analyzes pricing and channel selection strategies in both cases of not using and using blockchain. The research shows that when blockchain is used, manufacturer profits are higher in the direct sales model than in the distribution model. Traditional retailers' profits are lower in the direct sales model than in the distribution model. Total supply chain profits are higher in the direct sales model than in the distribution model, and they exhibit an inverted "U" shape as the level of blockchain investment increases. In the online direct sales model, if the blockchain technology unit variable cost is within a certain threshold range, manufacturer profits, traditional retailer profits, and total supply chain profits are all higher than when blockchain technology is not used. In the online distribution model, when the blockchain variable cost and blockchain usage level meet certain conditions, manufacturers, traditional retailers, and online distributors all have higher profits when using blockchain technology than when not using it. This study provides theoretical guidance for the practical application of blockchain technology in dual-channel fresh agricultural product supply chains.

We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of the prices in each channel.We model each channel as a news vendor problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In addition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for each channel and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for the system. We compare this equilibrium solution to the solution for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer owns both the online store and the retailer. To enable supply chain coordination, we propose two contract schemes: a modified revenue-sharing contract and gain/loss sharing contract. We show that, in cases where the retail channel has a larger market than the online channel, such contracts enable the manufacturer to maintain price discrimination, selling the products in different channels at different prices. Finally, we perform a comprehensive numerical study to consider the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium and to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination contracts. We conclude that coordination is most critical for products which are highly price sensitive and for systems in which the online and traditional retail channels are not viewed as close substitutes.

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this article, a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain is considered under sustainability consideration through remanufacturing of waste materials. Depending upon quality, the collector collects the used products and forwards to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. The collector offers a reward or incentive to consumers to influence them to return the used items. The shortfall amount of collected used items, if any, is meet up by the supplier by supplying fresh raw materials. In three separate cases viz centralized, decentralized and revenue-sharing contract, optimal incentives for end-customers and optimal profits of supply chain members are determined. The revenue-sharing contract is implemented in two different settings - one including the supplier and the other one excluding the supplier. The win-win outcome for the supply chain members is investigated and a specific range of the sharing parameter for win-win outcome is obtained. Optimal results are supported by numerical analysis, and sensitivity of the optimal results with respect to key parameters is analyzed.</p>

Purpose This study aims to investigate a cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) supply chain in which a domestic brand manufacturer enters overseas markets through a CBEC platform. Given the coexistence of manufacturer-led and platform-led localized marketing strategies in practice, this study explores which member should lead localized marketing to maximize the profits of both supply chain members. Design/methodology/approach This paper examines a practical scenario where the platform possesses only the mean and variance of market demand. Robust game-theoretic models are developed to analyze the platform's robust order quantity and the profits of supply chain members under three strategies: no localized marketing (BM), manufacturer-led localized marketing (MM) and platform-led localized marketing (EM). Findings The results indicate that the platform's profit decreases with rising demand uncertainty. However, when the price markup coefficient is high and the tariff rate is low, the platform increases its order quantity in response to higher demand uncertainty, leading to higher profits for the manufacturer. The platform-led localized marketing strategy outperforms the manufacturer-led strategy, as the latter reduces the platform's profit. Moreover, when the manufacturer's support factor is low, the platform-led localized marketing strategy can achieve a win–win outcome for both members. Originality/value This study employs robust game-theoretic models to analyze localized marketing strategies, providing practical insights for global brand development and the operational management of CBEC platforms.

Dual-channel supply chain: A strategy to maximize profit

This paper studies the coordination of supply chain in the context of carbon emissions trading mechanism, which considering the competition between retailers. Centralized and decentralized supply chain models were constructed to discuss the price of product, to avoid the losses of profit from the decentralized decision-making, the revenue-sharing contract was introduced to coordinate the supply chain. Research shows that the carbon emissions trading reduce emissions effectively, but the higher price of carbon emissions trading cut down the total profit of supply chain; The competition between retailers upgrades the supply chain members’ profit; Coordination was achieved by introducing the revenue-sharing contract. Finally, numerical example was given to illustrate the validity of the revenue-sharing contract, and the sensitivity analysis of parameters such as the price of the emissions trading and the retailers’ competition were presented.