Survival by Design: The BWC's Autopoietic Response at Fifty to a Disaggregated Biosecurity Ecosystem.

Facing the biological weapons threat

Rapid developments in biotechnology, genetics and genomics are undoubtedly creating a variety of environmental, ethical, political and social challenges for advanced societies. But they also have severe implications for international peace and security because they open up tremendous avenues for the creation of new biological weapons. The genetically engineered ‘superbug’—highly lethal and resistant to environmental influence or any medical treatment—is only a small part of this story. Much more alarming, from an arms‐control perspective, are the possibilities of developing completely novel weapons on the basis of knowledge provided by biomedical research—developments that are already taking place. Such weapons, designed for new types of conflicts and warfare scenarios, secret operations or sabotage activities, are not mere science fiction, but are increasingly becoming a reality that we have to face. Here, we provide a systematic overview of the possible impact of biotechnology on the development of biological weapons. The history of biological warfare is nearly as old as the history of warfare itself. In ancient times, warring parties poisoned wells or used arrowheads with natural toxins. Mongol invaders catapulted plague victims into besieged cities, probably causing the first great plague epidemic in Europe, and British settlers distributed smallpox‐infected blankets to native Americans. Indeed, the insights into the nature of infectious diseases gained by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch in the nineteenth century did not actually represent a great breakthrough in the use of infectious organisms as biological weapons. Similarly, the development of a bioweapon does not necessarily require genetic engineering—smallpox, plague and anthrax are deadly enough in their natural states. But the revolution in biotechnology, namely the new tools for analysing and specifically changing an organism's genetic material, has led to an increased risk of biowarfare due to several factors. First, the expansion of modern biotechnology in medical and pharmaceutical research and …

Strengthening the BTWC: The role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in combating natural and deliberate disease outbreaks

Treaties are more than just pieces of paper. In order to fulfill the obligations set forth on paper, a vitalized process is created that can be affected both positively and negatively by the actions of those who are members and by the geopolitical context in which the treaty resides. It is the actions of those who are party to a treaty that largely determine the success or failure, as each member periodically examines whether the benefits of being part of the treaty outweigh any negative obligations and other costs. In 2001, the members of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) decided upon a series of intersessional meetings which, although instigated as a rescue operation from a series of major internal and external shocks, were judged as useful, and a second series was approved. In December, States Parties to the BWC will gather for a seventh time to review the operation of the treaty and make decisions about the next five years, including whether to approve a third series of annual meetings. But would a third series in its current format be for the good of the BWC? Would a third intersessional process support States Parties in their evaluation that they are better off as members of the BWC? By reviewing the origins of the intersessional process and providing an analysis of activities thus far, the author offers suggestions to be considered for organizing a third intersessional review process.

Preface. The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the BTWC G.S. Pearson. I:- The Requirement to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention T. Toth. A Short History of Biological Warfare and Weapons M. Wheelis. Critical Aspects of Biotechnology in Relation to Proliferation K. Nixdorff, et al. II:- The Key Elements of a Legally Binding Instrument to Strengthen the Biological and Toxins Weapon Convention G.S. Pearson. The Chemical Weapons Convention Regime and its Evolution A, Kelle, P. Mills. The Experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons M. Berdennikov. The Experience of a Chemical Weapons Convention National Authority M. Rudduck. Provisions for declarations and for declaration Follow-up Procedures in a Legally Binding Instrument T. Chomicki, J. Winkler. Implications for Biological Defence of a Legally Binding Declarations V. Beck. Implications for Industrial Facilities of Declarations and Declaration Follow-up Procedures M.V. Dorigo. Declaration Clarification Procedures - Randomly Selected Visits: UK Experience from Practice Visits J.R. Walker. Provisions for Field and Facility Investigations B.P. Steyn. Investigation of Outbreaks of Disease M. Wheelis. Implications for Governments of Field and Facility Investigations J. Kocik. Implications for Industry of Field and Facility Investigations J. Oddou. Provisions for International Cooperation and Assistance J. Littlewood. Provisions for International Cooperation and Assistance R. Monteleone-Neto. Implications for Governments of International Cooperation and Assistance Provisions O. Kervers. Implications for Research and Development of InternationalCooperation and Assistance Provisions T. Twardowski. Implications for Production Facilities of International Cooperation and Assistance Provisions M. Negut. Provisions for Incentives and Safeguards S. Moal. An Industry Organization Perspective on Incentives and Safeguards R. van Sloten. An Industry Perspective: Issues and Concerns J. Melling. Global Outreach and Education S.M. Whitby, C. Rhodes. The Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention G.S. Pearson. Index.

Preface. Achieving Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention G.S. Pearson. Part I: Outbreaks of Disease. Reporting Outbreaks of Human Diseases J. Woodhall. Reporting Outbreaks of Animal Diseases M. Hugh-Jones. Reporting Outbreaks of Plant Diseases P. Rogers. Epidemiological Data and Reporting: South American Realities, Problems and Perspectives R. Monteleone-Neto. Outbreaks of Disease: Current European Reporting P. van Dalen. Surveillance and Monitoring of Infectious Disease in the Slovak Republic M. Avdicona, F. Hruba. Investigation of Outbreaks of Disease Under a Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention M. Wheelis. Investigations of Suspicious Outbreaks B.P. Steyn. Molecular Biological Techniques for Subspecies Identification: An Overview D. Sourvide, H. Garrigue. Molecular Biological Techniques for Subspecies Identification: Immunological Techniques A Comparison K. Nixdorff. An Unusual Outbreak of West Nile Fever in Romania M. Negut. WHO Contribution to Global Surveillance of Microbial Threats O. Cosivi. Part II: International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology. Maximizing the Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology K. Mossenlechner. Maximizing Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology: Infrastructure, Regulations and Procedures J.P.P. Robinson, G.S. Pearson. Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology: An Overview K. Nixdorff. Benefits from Cooperation in Biotechnology: The Experience of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology A. Falaschi, D. Ripandelli. Benefits from International Cooperation in Biosafety in Central and Eastern Europe P. van der Meer, G.S. Pearson. Measures to Provide Biosafety at the Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology 'Vector' E.N. Starkov. Slovakia: Biotechnology Transfer under BTWC Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity D. Toth. The US Select Agent and Laboratory Registration Program J.R. Richmond. The Development of Biotechnology in Poland T. Twardowski. Czech Republic: The Development of Microbiology and Biotechnology in the Czech Republic During the Past 20 Years and Prospects for the Future J. Spi ek. Prospects of the SRC VB Vector International Collaboration in the Field of Emerging Infections and Biotechnology L.S. Sandakhchiev. Good Manufacturing Practice and Licensed Products M. Negut. Approaches to the Introduction of the Quality System into the SRC VB 'Vector' V.I. Masycheva. Industrial Aspects of Technical Co-Operation in Microbiology and Biotechnology K. Simpson. Databases, Networks and Clearing Houses M. Wheelis, G.S. Pearson. Increasing Transparency and Building Confidence: The OPCW Experience M. Bauta. Building Peaceful Co-Operation into the BTWC Verification Protocol M. Dando. Part III: Concluding Remarks. Maximizing the Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation Under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention G.S. Pearson. Index.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire weapons category, is based on a solid and widely accepted norm against the use of disease as weapon. The prohibition of biological weapons is comprehensive and covers all scientific developments through the 'general purpose criterion' contained in BWC Article I. Current political debates can be clustered in three interrelated issue areas: disarmament and non-proliferation; international cooperation and assistance; biosafety, biosecurity and health preparedness. Scientific and technological developments, a widened range of stakeholders, and a broadening perspective on the whole spectrum of biological risks are posing challenges to the BWC and its regime. Negotiations have been cumbersome and protracted, however, and while some progress has been made in the latter two clusters, in its core arms control and disarmament functions the BWC regime remains underdeveloped. Risks stemming from potential proliferation and, more acutely, from misperceptions and misinformation in the biological realm, render the BWC still relevant.

Effective national implementation, including the adoption of domestic legislation and the creation of a domestic enforcement mechanism, is a key element for the enhancement of the compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Its Article IV contains the explicit obligation for a State Party to take any necessary measures to proscribe and prevent the activities already prohibited under Article I, “in accordance with its constitutional processes” and “within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere”. National implementation is not simply a goal to be achieved once and for all but should be better understood as an evolutionary process that takes into account science and technology developments as well as in best practices. For that reason, the EU and its member States remain committed not only in providing assistance to third countries but also in enhancing their own implementation measures. The point is made that what States should do in order to implement the BTWC is more than simply legislate appropriately: both, the administrative practice and the work of national institutions need to be considered, in terms of financial, administrative, human resources

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti‐material agents.

The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) gave the future of biological disarmament new hope. It brought the BWC back closer to the core of multilateral efforts to combat the weaponization of disease, agreed to an intersessional work program for 2007–2010, created an implementation support unit, and revived the interrupted process of BWC evolution through extended understandings agreed at review conferences. However, its aims were deliberately modest. Having set their sights realistically low, delegations did not have to lower them much further. What was most important was to prevent U.S.-Iranian acrimony from paralyzing the conference. With deadlock once again narrowly averted, the conference had to clear away the debris left from past dissensions in order to open the way to constructive evolution for the treaty. In particular the conference avoided contentious subjects such as permanent organization and verification measures for the BWC; its institutional deficit and compliance problems remain. Successes and limitations of the conference are analyzed, as is its equivocal outcome on confidence-building measures. Developing on the endogenous principle, the BWC will continue to need constant attention. At the center of a complex edifice, the BWC must be kept sound, strong, and solid.

Development of and prospects for the biological weapons convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance of the treaty and to grapple with its weaknesses. This was the third such conference convened since the treaty went into force in 1975. The relatively low level of participation in the Third Review Conference was not the result of any protest, but most likely a reflection of disinterest or neglect.

The scope of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is sufficiently broad to deal with new threats emerging from developments in the life sciences; however, more thought still needs to be given to updating and improving measures to encourage biodefense-related information sharing and transparency between states. Biodefense is and has been at the core of the BWC, but the threat of bioterrorism should not distract BWC state parties or cause them to disregard the risk that illicit state-run bioweapons programs will utilize new advances in the life sciences. More states are pursuing biodefense programs—and spending more on such programs. The BWC community must address the issue of how states and civil society observers can determine the point at which a biodefense program, or parts of it, could be secretly transformed into an offensive bioweapons program. The authors propose several measures for increasing the transparency of biodefense programs, including: national oversight, confidence-building measures, mandatory codes of practice, confidence-building visits, and an international mechanism to encourage and protect whistleblowers. The authors conclude that unless accountability and transparency in biodefense programs can be attained within the next five years, the BWC will lose its relevance.

There are three types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—nuclear, chemical, and biological. Of the three WMDs, biological weapons are arguably the most dangerous as they are the most indiscriminate, the least controllable, and the least expensive to create. The seminal treaty for establishing legal constraints on this vital issue is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).2 Article I of the BWC specifically outlaws State acquisition of “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes . . .”3The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties4 (VCLT) provides the general rule for how to interpret treaty language: “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”5 Problematically, by reading the BWC in light of this general rule, because the BWC only prohibits acquisitions that have “no justification,” the ordinary meaning of the text creates a wide loophole through which States may argue the acquisition of a potentially prohibited material has some justification, however minor, and therefore is not prohibited.The Comment first reviews the background of biological weapons and regulation of their use. In this section, the Comment also describes the VCLT requirements for treaty interpretation and the evolutive approach to interpretation. Next, the Comment conducts a global analysis of State practice in regards to biosafety and biosecurity regulatory measures. It then analyzes the BWC using the various treaty interpretation methods—including addressing how subsequent state practice has affected this interpretation, and how an evolutive approach to interpretation changes the meaning of Article I of the BWC. Lastly, in recognition of this evolution in the law, this Comment recommends how to update enforcement mechanisms to accurately reflect the new state of the law.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first international disarmament treaty to eliminate an entire class of weapons. As it celebrates its semicentennial, the BWC is recognized for enshrining norms against the misuse of biology, even during the height of the Cold War: norms that encapsulated humanity's repugnance of bioweapons. Nevertheless, the BWC faces unique challenges compared to other disarmament treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention. These include debates around verification, sociopolitical friction across the states parties, and even accusations that states parties have maintained biological weapons programs despite their treaty obligations. Many experts note difficulties in strengthening the BWC, particularly in a multipolar, competitive geopolitical environment. One potential pathway to support the BWC is using open-source information collection, analysis, and methods applied toward a "layered approach to verification [which] could help build confidence in compliance and potentially verify the BWC." Colloquially known as open-source intelligence (OSINT), this intelligence-gathering discipline uses publicly available information and signals sources for fact-checking, investigating suspicious occurrences, and examining items of interest. This approach has shown promise in other weapons of mass destruction applications, from tracking and tracing Syrian and Russian use of chemical weapons to uncovering nuclear weapons arsenals. Further, as stakeholders generate and retain more biological data from multisource samples, now is an opportune time to examine how open-source information and methods might mitigate bioweapons risks. This is particularly germane to the present, as people explore OSINT information and methods as 1 tool to both help strengthen the BWC architecture and support transparency and norm-setting efforts outside of the treaty.