Abstract

Privacy protection is an essential part of information security. The use of shared resources demands more privacy and security protection, especially in cloud computing environments. Side-channel attacks based on CPU cache utilize shared CPU caches within the same physical device to compromise the system’s privacy (encryption keys, program status, etc.). Information is leaked through channels that are not intended to transmit information, jeopardizing system security. These attacks have the characteristics of both high concealment and high risk. Despite the improvement in architecture, which makes it more difficult to launch system intrusion and privacy leakage through traditional methods, side-channel attacks ignore those defenses because of the shared hardware. Difficult to be detected, they are much more dangerous in modern computer systems. Although some researchers focus on the survey of side-channel attacks, their study is limited to cryptographic modules such as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. All the discussions are based on real-world applications (e.g., Curve25519), and there is no systematic analysis for the related attack and security model. Firstly, this paper compares different types of cache-based side-channel attacks. Based on the comparison, a security model is proposed. The model describes the attacks from four key aspects, namely, vulnerability, cache type, pattern, and range. Through reviewing the corresponding defense methods, it reveals from which perspective defense strategies are effective for side-channel attacks. Finally, the challenges and research trends of CPU cache-based side-channel attacks in both attacking and defending are explored. The systematic analysis of CPU cache-based side-channel attacks highlights the fact that these attacks are more dangerous than expected. We believe our survey would draw developers’ attention to side-channel attacks and help to reduce the attack surface in the future.

Highlights

  • With the development of modern computer systems, more and more attention is paid to the protection of security and privacy

  • We compare the methods and impacts of different side-channel attacks based on CPU cache and summarize the premises and general procedures of such attacks

  • When the CPU tries to give access to data in the cache, it will first search in the L1 cache. If it cannot find it, it will switch to the L2 cache and so on. e hierarchy inheritance structure of the CPU cache has such a characteristic that if a certain data exists in the high-level cache, it must be found in the lower-level cache

Read more

Summary

Introduction

With the development of modern computer systems, more and more attention is paid to the protection of security and privacy. To have a comprehensive understanding of CPU cachebased side-channel attacks and the current research status, this paper discusses the recent research studies of these attacks. We compare the methods and impacts of different side-channel attacks based on CPU cache and summarize the premises and general procedures of such attacks. It extends the attack scenarios and reveals how sensitive data is leaked in side-channel attacks. Rough these strategies, we analyze from which aspect the defense strategies fail the attacks and provide better security It verifies the necessary conditions and inspires a direction for future research studies on mitigating the influences of CPU cache-based side-channel attacks.

CPU Cache
Side-Channel Attacks
Co-resident check
Analysis Model of the Side-Channel Attacks
Analysis of the Defenses
Findings
Challenges and Trends
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.