Abstract
Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the definition and motivation for surface semantics. Truth-definitions can have a mathematical bite, however, when entities of a higher logical type are involved—for instance, when functions and perhaps even functionals are being quantified over in them. There is more philosophical and methodological interest in this direction than philosophers of language have so far spelled out. The chapter also discusses surface models, surface models as representations of reality, surface models versus ordinary models, further restraints on surface models, the definition of a surface model, the intuitive meaning of the restraints, the reality of non-extendible surface models, the notion of truth in a surface model, and further semantical concepts. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the objectivity of surface semantics.
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