`Structure' and `Agent' in Institutional Bargaining

Abstract

Oran Young has argued that political leadership constitutes a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for regime formation. The aim of this article is to elaborate in some detail the institutional and individual conditions bearing on leadership performance. Different forms of political leadership play different roles in international regime formation and may constitute a necessary condition for succeeding in efforts at developing joint solutions to collective problems. Thus, individual actor behaviour does hold independent explanatory power for negotiation outcome. Actor behaviour, however, has to be analysed in relation to the structural context within which the actions take place, i.e. the institutional setting of the negotiations: if attempts to perform the role of a political leader are to succeed, the institutional setting must `permit' leadership performance. The Law of the Sea Conference is characterized by the unusual influence of individuals. This fact has to be seen in relation to the procedural innovations developed through the organizational negotiation process, which provided the necessary institutional basis for the performance of both formal and informal leadership roles. Performance of political leadership is not a guarantee of success. One factor representing a possible hindrance to the successful performance of political leadership is the structure of the issues at stake. In this respect, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea demonstrates not only the potentials of political leadership, but its limitations as well.