Abstract

Experimental work in economics has long focussed attention on strategic interaction amongst individuals. A robust result is that a large fraction of participants in public goods experiments act cooperatively. This paper tests for the extent of strategic behavior in a non-laboratory setting. These data were generated when representatives from eight southeastern states voted to identify one state as host for a regional disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste. We find that no state plays its dominant (free-riding) strategy, but none plays in a completely cooperative fashion either. This result is similar to that found in laboratory public goods experiments.

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