Strategies of compliance with the European Court of Human Rights: rational choice within normative constraints

Abstract

Liberal democracies can reasonably be expected to comply with international norms—but they have different options for compliance. How they choose among and navigate between those options, and why, is the question which motivates Andreas von Staden's book. Merging the rational choice and constructivist paradigms, the author formulates a ‘hybrid … theory of compliance’ (p. 27), in which constructivism explains compliance motives and rationalism explains compliance patterns. This theory stipulates that international norms will indeed have a causal impact on the behaviour of actors in the form of normative constraints, which induce and increase compliance by eliminating non-compliance as an option. However, actors will comply in a minimalist manner, seeking to reduce the costs of compliance and to limit the scope of legal and policy changes required to achieve compliance. Instances of compliance beyond the minimum will reflect actors' (altered) preferences (e.g. following a change of government), may indicate a two-level game, or result from domestic enforcement by societal interest groups.