Strategies for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation: A Managerial Approach

IntroductionThe North-South Korean economic cooperation has been expanding since it was made official in 1988. The amount of trade between the two Koreas has increased from $18,724 in 1989 to $190 million in 2009. The sustained development of the two Koreas' economic cooperation is a result of efforts by not only the private sector but also the public sector, academia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Korean public. This cooperation represents more than just practical results from economic cooperation between the two Koreas; it is a barometer by which the possibility of Korean unification may be gauged.The North-South Korean economic cooperation started off by trading restricted items and by the consignment processing of manufacturing industries, and in 2002, a joint Korean industrial park, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, was established in North Korea. For South Korea, Gaeseong is an opportunity to utilize North Korea's low-wage workers, which would enhance the competitiveness of South Korean companies. On the other hand, North Korea could achieve much-needed economic growth by attracting South Korea's investment in the North's special economic zones (SEZs). At present, 116 companies have moved to the Gaeseong SEZ, employing 40,000 North Korean workers. The accumulated production volume between January 2005 and November 2009 was $729 million, and the exports were $120 million. The Gaeseong SEZ is planning to include 2,000 companies with 350,000 workers and is targeting an annual production volume of $16 billion.Previous studies on the North-South Korean economic cooperation have approached the topic mainly in the context of domestic and foreign policies, not in the business context.1 That is, previous studies have generally regarded well-organized business models and management ability as exogenous variables. Based on this assumption, an examination of the North-South Korean economic cooperation in the business context should yield a deeper understanding of the project's sustainability. Further, such an approach may induce higher levels of participation in the project by all sectors of Korean society.This paper examines how the North-South Korean economic cooperation and firms in North Korea could achieve success. In addition, the paper illustrates a profitdriven North-South business model and provides applicable cases for each model. The paper also determines the types of firms that would most likely succeed for each of the four SEZs and discusses the practical implications.North-South Korean Economic Cooperation Business ModelsThis paper classifies the business types of the two Koreas by using productive combinations of economic resources. The neoclassical school looks at labor, capital, and natural resources, among others, as main economic resources.2 Today, such resources also include production and technology/management know-how. These added factors are essential in explaining not only the issue of trade but also the phenomenon of foreign direct investment.3 As stated above, the North-South Korean economic cooperation has developed from consignment processing to direct investment, which would be difficult to explain only through the natural resources indicated by the neoclassical school.4In this regard, this paper assumes four economic resources-natural resources, labor, technology/management know-how, and capital-as the factors in the classification of North and South Korea's business types and stages of business development. Although hundreds of combinations could be made from the four economic resources because of duplicate use, classifying every possible model is not practical in the real-world context. Therefore, only seven types of businesses are discussed.The first business type is the Indirect Manufacturing Model, which combines North Korean labor with South Korean capital. The second type is the Direct Manufacturing Model, which combines North Korean labor with South Korean technology/management know-how. …

IntroductionNorth Korea has recently begun to develop two new projects: the Gaeseong Industrial project (hereafter Gaeseong SEZ) and the Mt. Kumgang tourism project (hereafter Mt. Kumgang SEZ). In terms of their levels of cooperation, partners and functions, these new projects were distinguished from the two earlier SEZs. The Rajin-Sunbong SEZ is a trade-oriented center that includes China, Russia and Japan. The Sinuiju SEZ has focused on the trade-oriented function in order to cooperate with countries in the Yellow Sea rim area including China. In contrast, Gaeseong is envisaged as a production-centered SEZ to attract small and medium-sized South Korean businesses. The Mt. Kumgang SEZ is also cooperating with the Hyundai Asan Corporation of South Korea in the development of an international tourism course.These two new projects were apparently an advanced step toward economic cooperation when compared with the previous level and form of interaction between the two Koreas. The projects have not only contributed to economic exchange, but also have demonstrated the possibility of advancing the two Koreas' political relations. South-North Korean economic cooperation is important in aiding the recovery of cultural and emotional homogeneity as well as promoting reciprocal economic development, development of infrastructure and building a harmonized structure between the two Koreas. Furthermore, such changes in the economic sector could lead to the political stability of North Korea, which, in turn, would contribute to the political and military stability of the entire Korean peninsula.Table 1 summarizes the economical and political effects of two new North Korean SEZs on both North and South Koreas. The effects of the success or failure of the North Korean SEZs will not be confined to the North Korean government; the result will affect the economic and political atmosphere of the entire Korean peninsula and all Northeast Asian countries.Therefore, this paper will address possible routes to success for the North Korean SEZs. The first section provides an analysis of the complicated features of North Korean SEZs. The second section offers an examination of a short-term and longterm development strategy of North Korean SEZs. The concluding section contains a discussion of the most appropriate way to achieve success for the SEZs through close economic cooperation between the two Koreas, with consideration of the eventual establishment of a future commonwealth.The Concept, Developmental Logic, and Type of a North Korean SEZThe Concept of the SEZ in North KoreaAccording to the Dictionary of Economics of North Korea, the Special Economic Zone (Open Zone for Foreigners) is defined as follows (p. 116):China, in 1979, announced some parts of four cities as the special economic zone. The purpose of establishing special economic zones was inducing foreign capital, technology, and management skills as well as increasing foreign trade and foreign currency holdings, accelerating economic development. The Chinese special economic zone is different from the industrial district in capitalist countries. While capitalist countries develop capitalist economies by inducing foreign capital in the industrial district, in the Chinese special economic zone, various economic systems coexist on condition that a socialist economy predominates. Foreign capitalists have the right to possess the means of production, a part of or whole rights of management, the right to employ and discharge workers, and particular privileges and special favors regulated by the Chinese government. However, foreign capitalists have to undertake economic activity in the special economic zone under the supervision and direction of the socialist country.In the same Dictionary of Economics, the so-called industrial district in capitalist countries is defined as follows (p. 176):The origin of the industrial district was the Manchester Industrial District in Britain in the late 19th century and this model has been diffused all around the world after World War I. …

OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the Policy. Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North KoreaIn June 2000, Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il of North Korea met for the first time to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since this meeting, the two Koreas have expanded the scope of reconciliation and economic cooperation. The two countries agreed on the reunion of separated families, the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, and the joint exploration of Kumgang Mountain as a means of promoting tourism. This honeymoon abruptly ended when North Korea fired two nuclear missiles on October 9, 2006. During the period 2000-06, President Kim Dae-jung and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun implemented the engagement policy of reconciliation toward North Korea. With generous economic aid from South Korea, North Korea was able to overcome severe food and energy shortages. In return, North Korea opened Kumgang Mountain to South Koreans, and allowed South Korean businesses to hire lower-wage workers in the Kaesong industrial complex. …

Last orders in Pyongyang

IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between two Koreas. This paper reviews history and scope of economic cooperation between two Koreas, leading to conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The SouthNorth Joint Communique states that reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means; that the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes; and that the two sides shall institute various exchanges in economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.Regardless of cooperative spirit expressed in 1972 communique, economic cooperation between two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: lack of progress on political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, focus of North Korean issues shifted to development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting Framework in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with United States, South Korea, and Japan as organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to continued and extended failure of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under 1994 Agreed Framework. KEDO was more a political arrangement than an act of economic cooperation. We thus turn our attention to economic cooperation.Dawn of Economic CooperationAlthough trade between two Koreas began in late 1980s, first meaningful event in inter-Korean economic cooperation occurred on January 13, 1998, when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai chaebol, traveled to North Korea through China and signed an agreement with North Korea on what would later be known as Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Chung's visit to North Korea was made possible by election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea in December 1997.During his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung announced his Sunshine Policy for dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, which led to President Kim winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. …

2016년 대북제재 이후 북한경제 변화와 신남북협력 방향 (Changes in the North Korean Economy and Guidelines to New Strategies of Inter-Korean Cooperation after UNSCR since 2016)

IntroductionUntil recently, discussions about the reunification of the Korean Peninsula have been primarily centered on the political process that leads to unification (Shuja, 2003). But lately much emphasis has been placed on creating conditions favourable to unification by improving domestic economic development in North Korea and cooperation with relevant parties. In hopes that economic leverage would help to facilitate future unification efforts, the South Korean government began to allow trade and cooperation with North Korea in October 1988; these interactions accelerated rapidly during the early 1990s and thereafter.The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, which came into effect in February 1992, has been the guiding principle for the new unification paradigm. The Sunshine Policy initiated by Kim Dae Jung's government formed a propitious atmosphere for economic cooperation, and the North exploited the opportunity by showing signs of having an open door policy. While the Kim Dae Jung government put stress on Mount Geumgang tours, the present Rho Moo-Hyun government gave priority to the Gaesung Industrial Complex (GIC), which is the flagship of inter Korean business cooperation.In this paper, the author assesses the development of the new economic approach launched recently in the GIC, in the context of other economic measures initiated by Kim Jong Il after the Improvement of Economic Management in 2002. A detailed analysis of the GIC project will help further understanding of related projects and policies. The implications of these policies in relation to unification will be discussed, and discrepancies between the and the actual development of the project will be presented.A New BirdcageChinese economist Chen Yun (1905-95), who was the economic realist in Mao's circle and later emphasized the importance of consumer goods, services, and housing in the planning system, advocated the birdcage economy model. In the birdcage economy, which is a modified version of the USSR style central planning economic system, the bird is the economy, the cage is the central plan, and the size of cage is the market. One cannot hold a bird tightly in one's hand without killing it. It must be allowed to fly, but only within its cage. Without its cage, it would fly away and become lost. Of course, the cage must be of appropriate dimensions.... That is to say, one may readjust the size of the cage ... but regulation of economic activity by the market must not entail abandonment of the orientation provided by the plan (Chen, 2005, p. 280).North Korea seemed to enlarge its cage and even attempted to introduce a very small blue cage, a capitalist enclave in which the bird could fly much more freely, as it might in China or even South Korea. In 2002, North Korea instituted an eco- nomic management reform that included a rather bold experiment to cooperate with South Korean business partners in Chinese style special economic zones (SEZs). SEZs are an approach to enlarging the legal and geographic areas in which manufacturing, commercial, and financial activities take place under special conditions that are quite different from those of the central economy. The investment environment in an SEZ is therefore considerably more liberal than elsewhere in North Korea. Foreign firms are given a high level of autonomy and freedom in doing business. Because the SEZ is within the cage, North Korea is free to experiment while holding the cage in the palm of its hand. If there is a problem with the SEZ, it can be easily identified and effectively treated with minimal damage to the larger system. Encouraged by the success of Chinese SEZs, the North Korean regime seems confident of managing the process and conditions to maximize its political and social goals.A New Venture: Gaesung Industrial ComplexRecent DevelopmentConstruction of Stage 1 of the GIC began in June 2003 on a 28,000 pyung (9. …

IntroductionThe KIC is emerging as a matter of interest both domestically and internationally-displaying characteristics of being North Korea's national development project to resolve its economic troubles after the Rajin-Sunbong and Sinuiju special economic zone projects fell through. North Korea can use the KIC as a testing ground for possible economic reform that could eventually lead to the complete liberalization of North Korea's economy, and also as a strategic means of easing military tensions between the two Koreas.It is essential for North Korea to open up its doors for its long-term survival. Leaders in Pyongyang deem that a limited opening of the North Korean economy through the establishment of special economic zones is the best plan of action for regime preservation and economic rehabilitation. However, the KIC's potential for success has to be assessed in a more prudent manner. First, North Korea is unable to procure enough funds to autonomously establish the infrastructure necessary to maintain foreign capital in the special economic zone. Second, the country's limited domestic market provides very few incentives to attract foreign investors. Third, the related industries are underdeveloped, making production costs relatively high for potential investors. Fourth, there is a lack of skilled workers who understand the market economy and who are equipped with the latest technology. Finally, there is not enough confidence that North Korea will be able to make the wholesale changes needed or to establish the legal and institutional infrastructure that conforms to international standards. This paper focuses on the issues of attracting foreign investment to the KIC and building a legal and systematic infrastructure that will help maintain this investment. These key indicators can predict the stability and sustainability of the KIC's development henceforth.The North Korean authorities' attitude toward the KIC is very favorable, regardless of how slowly they have met various demands made by South Korea. Most transitional states have been able to experiment with flexible institutional incentives in SEZs, where possible political and economic side effects could be contained within the zones. For example, China's experimentation with liberal market reform was too politically dangerous on a national level, but was possible in SEZs. Based on experience, China began to reform its laws and institutions, creating more diverse SEZs nationwide, such as the Shanghai-Podong Development District, the Weihai Torch High-Tech Industries Development Zone, and free trade zones (Ministry of Justice, 2005).North Korea has also shown deep interest in learning market economics and capitalism from China's model of SEZs. Frequent visits to China's most successful SEZs by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the North Korean elite are a good indication that North Korea is benchmarking China. The KIC is a melting pot of capitalism and socialism.The Current State of DevelopmentLaunched full-scale in 2004, the KIC consists of 6,535 acres of land in Kaesong, Panmun-gun, and Jangdan-gun, and 9,803 acres of land in nearby areas. Currently in the first stage, 817 acres of land are being developed for small- to medium-sized labor-intensive businesses. Despite a variety of unfavorable conditions, such as the North Korean nuclear test in 2006 and the subsequent rise of negative public opinion within South Korea, the KIC has been developing steadily as an economic enterprise for the co-prosperity of the two Koreas, grounded on the principle of keeping politics and economics separate. The KIC is expected to gain all the more momentum from two major events. On October 4, 2007, South Korean leader Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il signed the eight-point Joint Declaration for Advancing Inter-Korean Relations and Peace and Prosperity, after a three-day summit from October 2 to October 4, 2007. The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, amongst China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, from September 27 to September 30, 2007. …

This paper raises the necessity and utility of environmental cooperation in the context of the climate change crisis caused by environmental pollution and the strained North-South relations influenced by the US-China rivalry. It presents a plan for the domestic legal revision needed to facilitate this. Particularly, in the case of North and South Korea, where land and sea are interconnected, a joint response to climate change is necessary, and such cooperation can be mutually beneficial. Additionally, environmental improvement projects in North Korea can enhance the quality of life of its residents, offering a humanitarian aspect and potentially not conflicting with international sanctions against North Korea. In this regard, efforts for environmental cooperation are necessary for both Koreas, and there is a considerable possibility that North Korea will respond to these efforts. According to reports submitted to the UN and others, environmental pollution in North Korea is at a serious level, and there is observed intent to seek international support for its resolution. This situation implies that the resolution of environmental issues between North and South Korea can at least be achieved within the framework of multilateral international cooperation. The South Korean government has proposed the “Green Detente” policy as part of its North Korea policy to address the problems arising from climate change in North and South Korea and East Asia. The Green Detente can be understood as a process that aims for unification through reconciliation and cooperation by enhancing mutual benefits through cooperation in the environmental sector, which is a non-political field. In a situation where political exchanges are difficult, environmental cooperation has the advantage of being less burdensome as it can be conducted through local governments, private sector, or so-called 1.5 track exchanges. However, when examining the current state of domestic legislation for promoting the Green Detente as part of this policy, several limitations and problems have been identified. Firstly, our laws do not anticipate the divided situation and are not formulated to be applicable to North Korean areas. Nor is there a special law for the promotion of Green Detente. Even if there were such a law, it would not be simple to pre-emptively legislate for various unpredictable situations. Therefore, the most useful approach currently available is to create a legislative environment for the implementation of the Green Detente policy by revising laws, particularly those governing North-South relations and laws addressing environmental pollution and disaster preparedness. A brief examination reveals that the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which regulates all areas of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, needs revision due to unnecessary and complex regulatory elements concerning environmental exchange and cooperation. Individual environmental laws lack the foundation for research and study on North Korean areas and nearly lack provisions considering the possibility of cooperation with North Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to legislate including plans for cooperation, investigation, and research on North Korean areas in the provisions for establishing basic plans in individual environmental laws. Additionally, provisions related to international cooperation may be difficult to apply to bilateral cooperation issues between North and South Korea. The revision of domestic laws should be done in a way that respects the basic principles of unification under the constitution, does not harm North-South relations, prepares for unification, and complies with international standards on environmental issues.

Already in 1998 then South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung had articulated the new “Sunshine Policy ” calling for peaceful coexistence of the two nations, including the prospect of aid and bilateral economic cooperation as well as a long-term unification proposal (Ahrens, 2003, p. 53). The historic summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in June 2000 gave additional hope for a gradual and peaceful integration of both the Koreas (Kim, 2003, p. 118). Consequently, political contact between the two Koreas evolved and various cooperative projects were initiated. Two Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been established in North Korea close to the border with the South: the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and the Mt. Kumgang Resort. These SEZs have to be mentioned as the core of the current Korean economic cooperation (Lim and Lim, 2006, pp. 48–49). In contrast to the two other SEZs in North Korea, the Rajin-Sonbong and the Sinuiju SEZ, these two were quite successful during the “Sunshine” period (2000–2007) and hope is still high. But since the 2008 inauguration of the new administration in South Korea, North–South relations have deteriorated dramatically. The Lee Myung-Bak government tied further cooperation to demonstrable steps toward ending the North’s nuclear weapons program . Previous progress made began to unravel further when the Mount Kumgang Special Tourism Zone was closed in the summer of 2008 after North Korean guards shot and killed a South Korean tourist and after the imprisonment of a South Korean staff member in the Kaesong Industrial Complex by North Korea in the spring of 2009.

executive summary: This article examines the debate between two schools of thought on why North Korea has developed and maintained a nuclear arsenal, considers the evidence, and argues that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons with ambitions to pursue a hostile reunification with South Korea. main argumentThere has been a continuous debate in South Korea, and in the U.S. as well, between the following two perspectives: that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons (1) for the reunification of the whole of Korea or (2) for the North Korean regime’s safety. South Korea’s North Korea policies have depended on the perspective of each of its successive political leaders. Based on three areas of evidence, however—North Korea’s excessive nuclear buildup, behavior in denuclearization negotiations with the U.S., and, most of all, recent blatant threats to attack and annex South Korea—it is time to conclude that the goal of North Korea’s nuclear armament is not regime safety. South Korea should prepare for worst-case scenarios based upon the premise that North Korea seeks hostile reunification. policy implications• The U.S. should demonstrate its strong resolve and nuclear deterrence capabilities to convince North Korean leaders that its nuclear umbrella over South Korea will not be subject to intimidation. • The U.S. should consider increasing a more tangible nuclear presence around the Korean Peninsula, for example, by consistently and frequently deploying its ballistic missile submarines near South Korea, as it has already started to do. • If the situation worsens and North Korea becomes more assertive, Washington may want to consider the deployment of a few tactical nuclear bombs to Guam to demonstrate its speedy and assured retaliation capability. • Washington should review the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of its redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea if a North Korean nuclear attack were to become imminent. • The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command should consider stepping up nuclear deterrence and defense actions to dissuade or deny potential provocations by North Korea. • Washington and Seoul may want to discuss how to increase the potential for emergency nuclear armament without violating South Korea’s nonproliferation policies.

본 연구는 남한의 2015 개정 음악과 교육과정과 북한의 2013 개정 음악과 교육과정을 비교 분석하여 통일을 대비하여 남북한 음악과 교육과정 통합을 위해 해결해야 할 시사점을 도출함을 목적으로 한다. 남북한 음악과 교육과정 구성, 문서 체제, 항목별 내용(성격, 목표, 내용, 교수․학습 방향, 평가 방향, 교과서 집필 방향)을 비교한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 음악과의 정의와 역할의 진술 내용, 표현과 감상 영역을 주요한 내용 영역으로 설정하고 있는 점은 남북한 음악과 교육과정의 공통점이라고 할 수 있다. 이는 교육과정을 구성하는 기본적인 항목에서 공통점을 가지고 있는 것이기 때문에 지속시켜 나갈 필요가 있다. 둘째, 북한 음악과 교육과정의 ‘음악무용’ 과목 제시, 애국주의와 사상의 강조, 성취기준의 구체적 제시, 교과서 집필 방향의 상세한 제시 등은 남한 교육과정과의 차이점이다. 교육과정과 교과서의 역할에 대한 시각 차이와 사상적 측면은 앞으로 좁혀나가야 할 중요한 쟁점이다. 이러한 남북한 음악과 교육과정에서의 차이를 줄여 나가기 위해서는 총론과 연계한 남북한 음악과 교육과정 연구, 남북한 음악 용어 차이 극복을 위한 기초 연구, 남북한 공통 음악과 교육과정의 개발 및 적합성 검토가 후속 연구로 수행되어야 한다.This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the revised music curriculum of North and South and draw implications associated with curriculum integration between the two countries. This study set out to compare North and South Korean music curriculums in organization, document system, and content by the item(character, goal, content, teaching and learning direction, evaluation direction, and writing direction for textbooks). The comparison results were as follows: First, both the North and South Korean music curriculums set the definitions and roles of the music subject and its expression and appreciation domains as major areas, which suggests that both of them need to continue these basic items since they are common between their curriculums. Secondly, the North Korean music curriculum was different from its South Korean counterpart in offering the Music and Dance”subject, putting an emphasis on patriotism and ideology, providing specific achievement criteria, and setting directions for textbook writing in details. North and South Korea need to narrow a gap in important issues such as different views of roles of curriculums and textbooks and ideological aspects. These differences between North and South Korean music curriculums can be resolved by doing research on North and South Korean music curriculums associated with the general introduction, basic research to overcome differences in musical terms between North and South Korea, and follow-up research on the development of common music curriculums between North and South Korea and the review of their fitness.

In 2010, with the implementation of the May 24th measures, inter-Korean economic cooperation was suspended in all areas except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Then, in 2016, with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, all inter-Korean economic cooperation came to a halt. The joint venture enterprises in inter-Korean economic cooperation were mainly concentrated in the Pyongyang region. However, there was a case of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the form of a joint venture enterprise outside the Kaesong Industrial Complex that could be accessed using the entry and exit procedures of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South-North Equity Joint Venture Enterprise in Kaesong can utilize the industrial, transportation, and transit facilities of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and has the advantage of active participation by North Korea, which holds shares. In the Equity Joint Venture Act, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for setting land usage fees, ease the all-out agreement system, and ensure education for workers. In addition, it is necessary to fairly define subsequent procedures in cases where consultation is impossible. Under the North-South Economic Cooperation Act, it is necessary to simplify the North's project approval process and stipulate that the North should manage its property in good faith, at least to a minimum extent, in special circumstances. The law on the development of inter-Korean relations needs to clearly define the special relationship between North and South Korea and elevate the legal status of the inter-Korean agreements to the level of general treaties. The law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should clearly stipulate in writing the procedures for obtaining North Korean visit approvals and for importing and exporting goods, and should minimize the time required for these processes. The agreement on investment protection between North and South Korea should specify in detail the abnormal issues that impede economic cooperation and provide for step-by-step investment protection accordingly. Regarding the agreement on the resolution of commercial disputes between North and South Korea, the follow-up procedures of the agreement should be promptly carried out, and the establishment of a governing law that applies to both North and South Korea is necessary. The inter-Korean agreement went through the legislative approval process outlined in Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thereby establishing its legal validity. However, due to North Korea's non-compliance, it has become practically ineffective. However, as North Korea has not explicitly rejected the validity of the agreement, it is not advisable to disregard the agreement and its provisions in preparation for future inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea has been attempting to improve its external economy through scientific and technological exchanges, economic development zones, and other means since the 2010s. However, the situation has worsened due to North Korea's nuclear tests leading to U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19. Due to COVID-19, there have been zero exchanges of people between North and South Korea for a period of two years starting from 2021. In the current tense situation of strained inter-Korean relations, inter-Korean economic cooperation should be carried out flexibly and adaptively, taking into account the interests of both North and South Korea and contributing to their reunification, in accordance with the dynamics of inter-Korean and international relations.

Changzoo Song (bio) Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration, edited by Young Back Choi, Yesook Merrill, Yung Y. Yang, and Semoon Chang. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2001. 193 pp. $85.00 cloth. The collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the consequent unification of Germany in 1990 opened new prospects for Korea's reunification. Especially with the grim economic situation in North Korea, German-style "absorption" unification seemed a natural course for the two Koreas. Nonetheless, the difficulties experienced by Germany after the unification called for more practical assessments of the costs and benefits of Korea's unification. This was the background when unification discussions in Korea actively began to embrace economic, cultural, and social considerations in the 1990s. In the past, the discussions had been very much dominated by political discourse. The book under review reflects such a change in unification discussion. Composed of twelve articles, the book can be roughly divided into three parts: the first three articles examine security issues of the Korean peninsula; the next six articles deal with economic integration and cooperation between North and South Korea; and the last three articles analyze the costs and benefits of unification. While the book covers several different issues from different angles, the contributors have a relatively unified view. This is that an abrupt collapse of North Korea will result in huge costs. They therefore advocate gradual integration. In this respect, the book supports the "Sunshine Policy" of South Korea's former president Kim Dae-Jung. Such a view is well represented in Tony Hall's introduction, in which he observes that North Korean people's perception of foreigners (especially Americans) became much more favourable in the late 1990s after food aid programs. Such changes in "ordinary people's thinking can play an important role in its leaders' reaching out," he states (p. XV). In a similar vein, Young-Sun Lee argues that gradual unification would cost less (chapter 10), and Young-Back Choi suggests immediate unification would not bring any good either to North or South Korea (chapter 12). One of the most controversial articles in the book is "Cost and Benefits of Unification" by Choi. This article argues that, contrary to the belief of Korean nationalists, South Korea would not benefit from unification in terms of natural resources, cheap labor, bargaining power, or defense budget reduction. Choi estimates that South Korea will have to assume all the costs to develop North Korea, to produce welfare provisions, and to solve social conflicts if the two countries are unified. Based on this assessment, Choi carefully, but confidently, contends "no unification" is a "superior alternative" for both Koreas (p. 175). While the idea that unification would be too chaotic and costly is not totally [End Page 140] new, it is rare to see such a daring view openly declared. As most Koreans believe that unification is an absolute necessity, Choi's argument is innovative and makes this book rather special. A further important article is "Can Reindustrialization of North Korea Support a Sustainable Food Supply?" This article maintains that North Korea, in its comparative disadvantage in agricultural production, would be able to import grains if it hosted labor-intensive light industry such as textiles and footwear manufacturing from South Korea (p. 83). By so doing, this article directly supports the Sunshine Policy and South Korea's project to build industrial complexes in North Korea. While the book poses good arguments for a functionalist approach to national integration, it suffers from some defects. Although the book focuses on economic cooperation between the two Koreas, including telecommunication cooperation, the possible benefit of the Trans-Korean Railway if connected to the Chinese and Russian railway systems is not covered. In addition, some of the articles in the book are too short to be able to offer a sustained argument. For example, chapters 3 and 2 are only four and six pages each. In chapter 12 some footnotes are numbered incorrectly. A more serious problem, however, lies in the volume's heavily economic orientation. While this is understandable if we consider that most of the contributors to the book are economists, some readers may find this volume's orientation...

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.