Strategic Influence in Social Networks

Abstract

We consider a model of influence with a set of nonstrategic agents and two strategic agents. The nonstrategic agents have initial opinions and are linked through a simply connected network. They update their opinions as in the DeGroot model. The two strategic agents have fixed and opposed opinions. They each form a link with a nonstrategic agent in order to influence the average opinion that emerges due to interactions in the network. This procedure defines a zero-sum game whose players are the two strategic agents and whose strategy set is the set of nonstrategic agents. We focus on the existence and the characterization of pure strategy equilibria in this setting. Simple examples show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium does depend on the structure of the network. We characterize equilibrium with two notions: the influenceability of target agents, and their centrality, which in our context we call “intermediacy.” We also show that when the two strategic agents have the same impact, symmetric equilibria emerge as natural solutions. In the case where the impacts are uneven, the game has only equilibria in mixed strategies, the high impact agent focuses on his own centrality/intermediacy and the influenceability of his opponent’s target while the low influence agent focuses on the influenceability of his own target.