Strategic Applications of Just War Theory in Cyberspace: Navigating Challenges and Expectations for Responsible State Behavior

This article evaluates Israel’s military operations in Gaza from 2023 to 2024 through the lens of Just War Theory (JWT), focusing on both the justification for war (jus ad bellum) and conduct in war (jus in bello). Although Israel invokes Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify its actions as self-defense, the analysis reveals ethical and legal concerns regarding Just War principles, particularly proportionality, discrimination, and military necessity. A qualitative case study approach is employed, drawing on primary and secondary sources, including Israeli government declarations, international human rights reports, and civilian casualty data. The data is analyzed using thematic analysis, structured around the principles of Just War Theory. The study finds that while Israel’s self-defense rationale may fulfill some jus ad bellum criteria, its military actions raise ethical and legal concerns under jus in bello. Evidence points to disproportionate force, inadequate distinction between combatants and civilians, and questionable military necessity in several operations conducted in Gaza. International reactions are divided, with some countries, like the United States, supporting Israel’s right to self-defense, while others, like South Africa, condemn its actions as potential violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This study makes a unique contribution to the literature by applying classical JWT to a contemporary asymmetric conflict complicated by technological warfare. It advances academic discourse on the ethics of state conduct in irregular wars and offers practical insights on aligning military necessity with moral responsibility in future conflicts.

As wars today involve the use of sophisticated weapons such as autonomous ones, this paper aims to address the moral permissibility of using autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in wars. In the debate on autonomous weapons, advocates argue based on AWS’s precision of targets (Arkin 2018) and it not being clouded by emotional judgments (Marchant, et.al 2011) and prohibitors who comment on the ethical and legal implications of autonomous weapons (A. Sharkey 2019; Blanchard 2022). However, there has been relatively little development of compliance of the autonomous weapons with all the principles of jus in bello, amongst the scholarship as well as its engagement with the just war framework broadly. To assess the moral compliance of AWS, the paper focuses on just conduct or the jus in bello principles. It closely examines all the three principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality that makeup just conduct as well as the legal body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Through a close analysis of all the principles of jus in bello against the use of autonomous weapons, this paper will result in the incompatibility of such weapons with the ethical framework of just war theory that gives out the norms for just and fair conduct during wars. It will thereby lead to a further reflection on the compliance of autonomous weapons as per jus in bello and the IHL to have greater restrain and ethical conduct during wars.

Cyberwarfare is a warfare with information technology that has developed. It has not been regulated in humanitarian law. Cyber attacks have been carried out by several countries by ignoring the Just War Theory. This article aims to analyze the implementation of the Just War theory in cyber warfare according to international humanitarian law in the case of conflict between the Russian and Georgia in 2008. The research method use the normative juridical and using secondary data sources. Qualitative data using deductive conclusion method. Based on the research results, it is known that the just war theory including jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum is not applied in cyberwarfare. The Russian’s cyber attack against Georgia violates the distiction principle , the principle of proportionality and the principles of proportionality. The losses incurred as a result of cyberattacks are not compensated by Russia.Keywords: just war, cyber attack, Russia, Humanitarian law.

In response to contemporary forms of armed conflict, including genocidal civil wars and global terrorism, this book engages in a project of rethinking or revising just war principles. A main thesis is that received just war principles should be generalised, so that they are applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict. Consequently, they would be applicable not only to interstate wars but also to civil wars, armed humanitarian interventions, armed revolutions, counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism operations, military operations by UN peacekeeping missions, and so forth. Another main thesis is that the just cause, last resort, proportionality, and noncombatant immunity principles are the ‘core just war principles’. Roughly, each core just war principle is a necessary moral criterion for determining whether a proposed military action would be just. This introductory chapter cites five epochal events that have been pivotal for just war theory – namely, the framing of the UN Charter and the founding of the United Nations, the Cold War practise of military deterrence, the post-Cold War recognition of the responsibility to protect, the advent of the US global war on terror, and a cluster of recent targeted military operations.

INTRODUCTIONMichael Walzer begins his seminal Just and Unjust Wars with a linguistic claim: ordinary language use provides evidence about the nature of war.1 This paper explores this claim and the linguistic method as applied to just war theory.I begin with Walzer's central thesis about the language of war, which I call the Adjectival-Adverbial Distinction or the A-A Distinction. This is a two-part claim. Roughly, Walzer first claims that ordinary language distinguishes between adjectival and adverbial claims about just war. Specifically, adjectival uses indicate jus ad bellum considerations, while adverbial uses indicate jus in bello considerations: for instance, ?that was a just declaration of war' versus ?that war was fought justly.' The second part of Walzer's claim is that this language use indicates a deep distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.In the first section of the paper I attack Walzer's A-A distinction; I argue there is no tight or deep connection between adjectival usage and jus ad bellum considerations and adverbial usage and jus in bello considerations. I begin by arguing that Walzer's own use of war language does not indicate any rigid connection between adjectival jus ad bellum and adverbial jus in bello. I then argue that any adjectival jus ad bellum claim can be redescribed as adverbial and any adverbial jus in bello claim can be redescribed as adjectival.From this first section I conclude that ordinary language use does not support the A-A distinction; as an empirical fact about language use, it appears adjectival and adverbial use does not track a distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In the second section of the paper, I argue for a different usage pattern that tracks the seeming distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello: the former involves primarily considerations about the decisions and actions of groups or individuals of greater status (e.g., President, Legislature, Country), while the latter involves primarily considerations about decisions and actions of groups or individuals of lesser status (e.g., soldiers). I argue ordinary language use provides evidence for this ?Hierarchical Distinction.'In the third section I argue that the Hierarchical Distinction suggests a theoretical distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. On this account, jus ad bellum acts and decisions have a positive role; they change the sociopolitical status from peace to war (and perhaps into even more finely individuated event types). Jus in bello acts and decisions, on the other hand, are framed by the event status that is first determined by jus ad bellum acts and decisions. I also argue that although the A-A Distinction is false in practice (actual language use does not support it), this proposed conception of just war theory makes sense of why some think the A-A Distinction should apply: we tend to think of jus ad bellum in static terms, best described adjectivally, while we tend to think of jus in bello in dynamic terms, best described adverbially.These conclusions imply that the positive power of jus ad bellum acts is fundamental to the ethics of war, and I conclude by arguing for a jus ad bellum requirement of declaration of war. The results of the previous sections imply that jus ad bellum involves an implicit or explicit status-articulation. I argue that declaring war is a paradigm performative speech act: one which itself can change the social-political landscape and ethical considerations of war and one that ought to accompany any jus ad bellum decision to enter war.I. THE ADJECTIVAL-ADVERBIAL (A-A) DISTINCTIONEarly in Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer claims that a feature of ordinary language use maps onto a deep distinction about the nature of war. Specifically, Walzer claims that our linguistic expressions of jus ad bellum (right of war) principles are adjectival in character. On the other hand, our linguistic expressions of jus in bello (right in war) principles are adverbial in character:The first kind of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. …

This article tries to examine John Rawls’ theories of war and nuclear weapons especially from the perspective of international law. Rawls's theory of war is based on the just war theory of Western tradition. It rejects realism and does not adopt pacifism. Rawls's theory of jus ad bellum is similar to the position of current international law in that it recognizes a war of self-defense and exceptionally a war of humanitarian intervention. HIs theory of jus in bello largely reflects the principles of existing International Humanitarian Law(IHL), such as the distinction between combatants and civilians, protection of human rights, and restrictions on military necessity. However, Rawls deviates from international humanitarian law in that it permits military action against civilians in the case of the so-called supreme emergency. Regarding nuclear weapons, it differs from the existing International Court of Justice (ICJ) theory of nuclear permitting by permitting nuclear weapons only to well-ordered peoples and presenting human rights standards for nuclear use. In addition, by evaluating the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings as great wrongs, it presents a precedent in international humanitarian law for the use of nuclear weapons. The official position of the United States regarding the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings was that it was a justifiable measure to end the war early. However, Rawls rejects the U.S. government's arguments and says that the atomic bombing was a representative case of the failure of so-called 'statesmanship'. This article attempted to support Rawls's perspective from the perspective of international humanitarian law. The claim that the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings were intended to reduce the casualties of U.S. soldiers does not comply with the principle of military necessity under international humanitarian law. Additionally, the claim that it was an inevitable choice to reduce the damage to Japanese civilians that would result from a prolonged war is not valid in that there was room for a third option to end the war. The dropping of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombs reflected America's political interest for the victory of unconditional surrender and ending the war before Russia (the former Soviet Union) entered the war. This did not comply with the principles of military necessity or humanitarian necessity of international humanitarian law.

It is becoming ever more apparent how quickly and dramatically our environment is changing. That changing environment must, in turn, change the way we think about just war theory. When examining jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and a novel set of considerations referred to as jus para bellum, it becomes apparent that there exists an urgent need for changes not only to the content of just war principles, but also to the principles themselves.

ST. ANSELM IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE REMARKED, vel malitia, a wonderful quip that loses in translation: militia or rather the malicious. While this remark is certainly right about the military in many times and places, it is worth pointing out that were it true always and everywhere, the project of building a just society, which is likely to entail some degree of military protection, would face a serious stumbling block. This problem is all the more urgent if we hope that a just society would be grounded in the culture of life. The professions are quite central to culture, shaping the lives of millions and largely defining the contours and feel of public space. Along with medicine, law, and the ministry, the military is one of the traditional professions, and one that employs millions of Americans. Despite its illiberal, hierarchical, meritocratic tendencies, it has a cultural gravitas and prestige that has been able to withstand various scandals. And in the current climate (involving two ongoing wars, increased security measures, and so forth), the military is only likely to increase in cultural importance. Yet how could the military contribute to a just society? Negatively, it can fend off extinction (a negative but not negligible contribution, it should be noted), but can it make any positive contribution? Or we might ask: If the military is necessarily endowed with both the force and the right to kill, how could it be a part of a culture of life? Many occupations will have no place in such a culture: executioner, torturer, mercenary, gladiator, and so on. Should we add soldier to this list? The primary mission of the military is, or at least can and should be, to protect--to provide, as our Constitution has it, for the common defense. The principles of just war endorsed, at least nominally, by most professional militaries today, and certainly by the U.S. military, place a premium on the protection of innocent life even in the midst of hostilities. Although the U.S. military has certainly committed its share of atrocities, recent wars have been marked by serious attempts to live, and fight, by these principles. In the war in Iraq, our military has shown an unprecedented, although still very imperfect, commitment to the jus in bello (justice in war) principles of discrimination and proportionality. While other features of the military, notably its commitment to excellence and tradition, are also salient (and I will touch on some of them), it is this commitment to life even while holding the power of deadly force--a commitment that is not just official but often real--on which I wish to focus in this paper. It is at the core of what the military can contribute to a just society and a culture of life. After contending that it can do this, I will argue that the military could do it much better if it reconceptualized some aspects of its ethic and ethos. I close with some suggestions concerning how it might do so. I. Examples Toward the end of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams considers a business leader who says in a meeting of his competitors, Of course, we could have them killed, but we should lay that [option] aside right from the beginning. Lay it aside? It should never, Williams says, have come into his train of thought as an option in the first place. (1) Williams's remark is right on target--at least in business and most other human contexts. But war does put this option into our hands, and can even seem to force us to use it. Here are two real examples, which are particularly acute as they involve children. First: In the recent war in Iraq, in the middle of a firefight with Fedayeen troops (paramilitary), a U.S. Marine sergeant on a rooftop spotted a boy about twelve years old running out into the street, where he gathered rocket-propelled grenade launchers from fallen men and carried them back to active fighters. In other words, he was rearming the enemy. …

Reviewed by: Justifying Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War of Independence ed. Glenn A. Moots and Philip Hamilton Zara Anishanslin (bio) Keywords Just war theory, Warfare, American Revolutionary War, Military history Justifying Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War of Independence. Edited by Glenn A. Moots and Philip Hamilton. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018. Pp. 392. Cloth, $45.00.) The organizers of the edited volume Justifying Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War of Independence have a simple yet potent justification for their work: It is the first book to examine the American Revolution within the context of just-war theory. The editors, Glenn Moots and Philip Hamilton, rightly point out that such a theoretical application is overdue. They also argue that the fact the American Revolution was "hard, bloody, and destructive" (3) makes it particularly fruitful for such analysis. For these reasons, the volume is a welcome contribution to the historiography of the American Revolution writ large. Co-edited by a professor of history and a professor of political science and philosophy, the book offers a laudably interdisciplinary spectrum of scholars who, at times, contradict one another, most notably around the central question of whether or not the American Revolution was a "just war." This leaves the reader wishing the editors had included a "Conclusion" to tie the volume together. Aside from that omission, the book's structure is logical. After the editors' "Introduction," it moves from a section on "Jus ad Bellum" (justifi-cations for waging rebellion or starting war), to one on "Jus in Bello" (the ethics of wartime conduct toward civilians and military both), before a concluding section, "Jus post Bellum" (the morality of post-war diplomacy and peace). This structure moves the reader from thinking—as those who lived through the revolutionary era would have done—about legal and ethical applications of just-war theory before, during, and after the beginning and end of armed conflict. Although the editors frame the [End Page 117] volume as one engaging just-war theory writ large, this is, as they term it, "western" just-war theory. In fact, the book's focus is overwhelmingly Euro- and Euro American-centric. Fans of Swiss legal theorist Emer de Vattel, author of Law of Nations (1758), will find much to enjoy here. Norwegian law professor Andreas Aure walks the reader through an intellectual genealogy explaining why Vattel was the "most influential voice concerning just war theory" among revolutionary era leaders (22), while international affairs professor Theodore Christov examines the fondness that George Washington and other Americans such as James Otis had for Vattel. Moots and Valerie Ona Morkeviĉius, both political scientists, consider Vattel alongside other Protestant thinkers such as John Calvin, as their focus is Protestant ideas about justifications for war and rebellion over two centuries, a welcome look at religion and war. However, despite admitting that, "historians disagree about the precise role of Protestant religion in the Revolution" (48), they do not really address this historiography, instead presenting us with a Revolution almost uniformly peopled by Reformed Protestants. Jack P. Greene also takes us back and forth across the Atlantic to look at this "fratricidal war." Relying upon pamphlet literature, Greene looks at "coercionists" and "conciliationists" in both Britain and America, tracing the arguments of those in favor of using force against rebel colonists and those against. As he pithily notes, "British coercionists should be accorded a place among the founders of the nation that came into being as an unintended consequence of their resort to military measures" (97–98). Greene's point that both British and American public opinion should be studied is a crucial yet too often underemphasized one—though he, like other authors in the book, neglects the importance of visual culture in transatlantic propaganda. Greene's chapter finds a useful companion in historian William Anthony Hay's edifying look at shifting British strategies and claims of sovereignty jus post bellum. Chapters by Philip Hamilton and Jonathan Den Hartog also form useful companion pieces for different chronological stages, in this case through biopic analyses. Hamilton's focus on Henry Knox's gentlemanly ideals about jus in bello and...

The Arab Spring is a term for the revolutions of countries in the Middle East. The Arab Spring has a purpose to overthrow a dictatorial government. The series of Arab Spring began with protest in Tunisia on December 18, 2010. This protest started with Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, who set himself on fire as a protest against corruption. The success of the protest in Tunisia gave a domino effect to the surrounding countries. The impact of the Arab Spring also occurred in Libya in 2011. Libyan leader, Muhammar al-Gaddafi who has been in power for 42 years, refused to resign. This triggered protest from the Libyan people. Civil war happened in Libya between the pro-Gaddafi group and the opposition. NATO conducted humanitarian intervention in Libya under the official UN mandate. This article provides a humanitarian intervention analysis conducted by NATO using just war theory, especially the principle of jus in bello. The purpose of this article is to find out whether the intervention was in accordance with the jus in bello principle or not. This article used the literature study method by collecting data related to NATO intervention in Libya. This article shows that there are crimes against humanity committed by NATO in Libya. But, NATO intervention in Libya can reach the goal if viewed with proportionality principle in jus in bello. Keywords: Libyan conflict, humanitarian intervention, jus in bello.

This research focuses on the October 2023 conflict between Israel and Hamas, analyzing violations of international law committed by both parties under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Using a qualitative document-based approach, the study investigates actions taken by Israel and Hamas during the first ten days of the conflict. It examines the jus ad bellum and jus in bello violations, such as Hamas's unprovoked attacks on Israeli civilians and Israel's disproportionate retaliatory strikes in Gaza. Both parties violated the Geneva Conventions: Hamas breached Article 51 by launching attacks without declaring war and targeting civilians. In contrast, Israel's retaliations violated the principle of proportionality by causing excessive civilian harm. Israel's blockade of Gaza also violated humanitarian law, as it denied civilians access to essential goods. The research identifies legal obligations under international law, noting that while Israel is a state party to the Geneva Conventions, Hamas, as a non-state actor, is bound by customary international law. The study concludes that both sides committed war crimes, requiring legal accountability through international mechanisms. The findings contribute to ongoing discussions about the challenges of enforcing international law in asymmetrical conflicts involving state and non-state actors.KEYWORDS: International law, Justice of war, Israel-Palestine dispute, Use of force.

Hamas's use of armed force against Israel precipitated a large-scale war. Both Israel and Palestine suffered significant losses, including civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Given these events, it is crucial to assess the violations committed by both sides to offer recommendations for international alignment and post-conflict resolution efforts. This research examines visual and written online news coverage of war events during the conflict's first ten days, along with international responses. The study aims to evaluate potential violations committed by Israel and Hamas according to jus in bello principles, drawing from both international agreements and customary international law. Furthermore, this research will assess the international community's legitimacy regarding parties perpetuating the destruction. This research found that both Hamas and Israel have violated international law. Specifically, they violated jus in bello (humanitarian law), and Hamas additionally violated jus ad bellum (the law of aggression). Conversely, Israel's actions in self-defense are considered illegal. As a result of these violations, both Hamas and Israel could potentially be held accountable before the International Criminal Court.KEYWORDS: International law, Justice of war, Israel-Palestine dispute, Use of force.

Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing Through Drone Warfare

The just war tradition, with its twin focus on jus ad bellum and jus in bello, attempts to mitigate against the indiscriminate use of force. As noted in the introductory chapter to this volume, this tradition provides the moral underpinning and ethical parameters for the means and ends of the use of force by international actors. It is reflected in religious writings, ancient civilizational laws, international treaty law, and international and regional organizational charters. However, just war principles also exhibit a forward-looking perspective, prompting states to assess their actions consistently to ensure that war does not become an end in and of itself. By logical extension, wars should be fought for a higher normative purpose well beyond the use of force—and beyond the end of war itself. Indeed, few would disagree with St. Augustine's admonition that [w]e do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against and bring them to the prosperity of peace. Echoing St. Augustine, B.H. Liddell-Hart argued that "the object of war is a better state of peace."2 Scholars increasingly recognize that discerning the justness of war cannot solely be based on what happens as the fighting begins. In the words of one commentator, if we "assume for the moment—as [many] do—that the rubrics of the just war theory are morally tenable, … then such post-war behavior must come under moral scrutiny."3

This article examined Augustine’s just war theory through René Girard’s scapegoat mechanism, as posited in his theory of mimetic desire. Augustine, in his development of just war theory, adopted a realist approach to justify the ethical criteria for judging the morality of conflict. Just war theory, in its historical form, interpreted as a positive rule of action based on just war principles that were developed over time. Therefore, through a comparative approach, this article argued the rationality of modern warfare and violence on the notion of the surrogate victim, which is necessary for social order and the formulation of cultures, as posited by Girard. In his corpus, Girard highlights the role of scapegoating and victimisation in the process of unifying a community. Thus, a comparative analysis of just war theory and the scapegoat mechanism can be developed to study the conditions for peace, religious liberty and social cohesion. This article discusses the following points: (1) the modern relevance of just war principles; (2) the effects of scapegoat mechanisms in modern societies and their impact on social order and political discourse; and (3) the role of missio Dei in the context of warfare and violence.Contribution: This article contributes to a comprehensive study of moral philosophy through the thoughts of Augustine and Girard. The convergence between violence, war, peace and justice is studied through anthropology and religious cultural lens. Arguably, this process has the potential to develop an empirical framework to study war and violence acts in our modern polarised world. Furthermore, it considers the ideal praxis for missio Dei in the context of social order and the common good in the 21st century.