Abstract
A definition of grey preference, based on grey numbers, is incorporated into a multiple decision-maker graph model for conflict resolution, to model human behaviour in a strategic conflict featuring uncertainty—in this case, a dispute arising over brownfield redevelopment. To analyse a strategic conflict, the relative preferences of each decision maker over all feasible states are required for a stability analysis. However, because of incomplete information, cognitive limitations of decision makers, the interplay of stakeholders and sheer complexity, it can be hard to capture accurately the preferences of all decision makers across all possible scenarios or states. Moreover, analysis is difficult when more than two decision makers are involved, as coordinated moves against a focal decision maker must be taken into account when identifying stable states. In this paper, a grey preference structure is used to represent decision makers’ uncertain preferences in a graph model. Then two types of grey stability (grey Nash stability and grey sequential stability) and corresponding equilibria are calculated for a model of a brownfield redevelopment conflict that occurred in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada.
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