Abstract
Real-world bargainings often proceed step-by-step: the agents make intermediate agreements today and continue to negotiate tomorrow to reach a final agreement. We consider two natural properties of the bargaining solutions in such step-by-step negotiations and show that the Nash solution is the only solution that satisfies either of them, a very weak axiom of individual rationality, and Nash’s axioms except for Pareto optimality.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
