Abstract
What are thepatterns ofadoption ofNAIC model insurance acts among the states, and what explains the diferences in state response? This article provides an empirical analysis of these questions. State responses are analyzed comprehensively and functionally; two core regulatory functions-financial regulation and consumer protection-receive specific attention. The article then examines three types of explanations suggested by the literature on model-code adoption: broad socioeconomic forces, narrow interest-group pressures, and the nature ofpublic institutions (specifically the legislature and the state insurance department). The interest-group model is the most powerful, but the results it produces challenge the traditional view of the politics of insurance regulation.
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