Standpoint Theory and Foucauldian Genealogical Critique: Two Strategies for Mobilizing Situated Knowledge

Nancy Hartsock's article, standpoint: Towards a specifically historical in Discovering Reality (1983), is often described as the locus classicus of standpoint Although there were other scholars also working on standpoint theory (Jaggar, 1983; Smith, 1974, 1987; Rose, 1983), Hartsock's work is thought of in this way because it is the origin of the term feminist standpoint theory. From the moment Hartsock defined it, standpoint theory has been at the center of highly theoretical discussions, some bordering on contentious. There are, for example, nuanced theoretical discussions/ articles about the empiricism--the view that knowledge depends on experience--and of standpoint theory (Bar On, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Harding, 1991; Hartsock, 1983, 1990a, 1990b; Janack, 1997; Longine, 1993), about its postmodernism or lack thereof (Harding, 1991, 1997; Hartsock, 1997a; Hekman, 1997a; O'Brien Hallstein, 1999), the relationship between identity and politics in standpoint theory (O'Leary, 1997) and about its relationship to materialism (Hirschmann, 1997). Kenny (1997) notes that these nuanced debates are difficult to understand fully, even for the theoretically well educated. Moreover, Kenny explains that her experience teaching it has been complicated because students lacked a basic vocabulary and facility with philosophical concepts. They were interested in feminism but knew little about materialism, liberalism, psychoanalysis, postmodernism, or, most importantly, epistemology (p. 1). This difficulty is complicated by the recent response of several key standpoint theorists to criticism of their work. In response to Hekman's (1997a) recent critique and reconceptualization of key components of standpoint theory, many of the founding theorists (Hartsock, 1997a; Harding, 1997; Collins, 1997; Smith, 1997) claim that much of their work has been misunderstood by Hekman and other scholars. This response prompted Kenny to note, rightfully, that the confusion and disagreement about interpretation and meaning is not confined to novices (p. 1). Thus, it should come as no surprise that standpoint theory has not been used in a great deal of research. Why, then, do a significant number of communication scholars across areas (Allen, 1998; Bullis, 1993; Buzzanell, 1994; Makau, 1997; O'Brien Hallstein, 1999; Pointer and Young, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Wood, 1992, 1997), and as Hirschmann (1997) notes, scholars across disciplines--philosophy, social work, sociology, psychology, history, geography, and the biological and physical sciences--continue to suggest that we ought to use standpoint theory in research? Moreover, Why would Women's Studies in Communication devote this special issue to standpoint theory? The primary answer is that standpoint theory--with all its theoretical complexity and potential for obscurity--is grappling with the controversies that will define the heart and soul of scholarship in the next century. Because they are attempting to use standpoint theory in research, the authors in this special issue are implicitly participating in this history making. Understanding how they are doing so requires some historical background and a discussion of the basic tenets of standpoint This understanding also requires that I situate standpoint theory in both its historical and contexts and that I sketch the core tenets of current versions of standpoint Finally, I comment on the six key insights that emerge from this group's performance of standpoint research. Feminist Standpoint Theory: (1) History and Context As feminists debate issues of epistemology, identity, politics, and postmodernism in standpoint theory, these debates go well beyond the immediate concerns of standpoint theory and, ultimately, are addressing a much broader concern in feminism: whether or not women can and should be viewed as a group, as sharing a common experience of oppression. …

Y PURPOSE IN WRITING Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited (in this issue) was to reopen the debate over feminist standpoint theory and to refocus the discussion of the central issues raised by the theory. The comments in this issue by Patricia Hill Collins, Sandra Harding, Dorothy Smith, and Nancy Hartsock on my article indicate that I have been at least partially successful in that purpose. I welcome the opportunity to further extend this discussion. Patricia Hill Collins, Sandra Harding, and Nancy Hartsock all raise an objection that goes to the heart of the approach that I develop in the article. They argue, although in different ways, that I, as Collins puts it, depoliticize feminist standpoint theory. Claiming that standpoint theory was not designed to be argued as theory of truth and method, Collins asserts that my apolitical discussion of feminist truth and method (375) denies the potentially radical content of standpoint theory. Similarly, Harding argues that I distort the central project of standpoint theorists by characterizing the approach as an attempt to justify the truth of feminist claims to more accurate accounts of reality. Against this she claims that it is relations between power and knowledge that concern these thinkers (382). Finally, Hartsock argues that I read feminist standpoint theory through a kind of American pluralism that prefers to speak not about power or justice but, rather, about knowledge and (367). It is precisely the relation between power and knowledge that concerns me in the article. I begin my analysis of feminist standpoint theory with an assumption that is also the centerpiece of Hartsock's approach: politics and epistemology are inseparable. I argue that the central question of feminist standpoint theory has been how we justify the truth of the feminist claim that women have been and are oppressed. My claim is that women cannot resist oppression and gain political power unless they can legitimate this claim. I further argue that the shift in the theory that occurred in the 1980s had political origin: the demand for recognition of differences among women. Finally, I turn to Weber's ideal type because it is an approach that explains and justifies the necessarily engaged (political) role of the social analyst. I do not think that this approach either distorts or depoliticizes feminist standpoint theory. On the contrary, I think it

Standpoint theory One of the obvious casualties has been feminist standpoint theory (FST). This emerged out of the philosophy of consciousness raising, which held that women had common experiences by virtue of their social positioning, and that the “subjugated knowledge” which came from that perspective was not only different but better. In other words, women were epistemologically privileged. In its more sophisticated versions this became the view that by reflecting on their common women’s perspective through a process of collective intellectual and political work, feminists could reach a more accurate take on reality than was available to those with vested interests in its misrepresentation. By the time black women, lesbians, working class women and others had angrily repudiated the amalgamation of their experiences to those of white, professional, straight women; by the time judgmental relativists had insisted there could be no grounds, other than those of affiliation and preference, for judging between feminist knowledge and other “knowledges”, by the time its Enlightenment heritage had been properly picked over and disparaged, FST’s sun was very low. In an article published last year in Signs, Hekman claims that FST always tried to reconcile the irreconcilable by bringing together a conception of truth as perspectival and an opposing notion of truth as absolute and subject-centred (1997, 356). For her, FST represented a bridge from modernism to postmodernism. She wants us to welcome the demise of the modernist notion of objectivity, which opens the door to a Foucauldian understanding of knowledge — and of power. But what Hekman, and others, see as a contradiction in the heart of FST stems from their own confusion of the transitive and intransitive, of epistemology and ontology. The conceptual and practical means we use to grasp the world are historically relative, but the characteristics and powers of the world they address are independent of our means of knowing. Knowledge is situated and perspectival, but that does not mean all perspectives are equally good, or that there are no good ways of judging between them. While there are no self-evident criteria for making such judgements, the internal coherence of the account, its scope and power to “situate possibilities” (Bhaskar 1989, 46), its implications for other accounts, and its practical effects are all relevant. Certainly, FST needs radical overhauling. It must substitute for the notion of “epistemological privilege” the idea of different opportunities for, and interests in, knowledge afforded by different social positions. But if FST is repudiated rather than developed or replaced, with it goes the aim of a non-sexist, yet fallibilistic, “successor science” which looks to explain the often ignored varied phenomena of women’s lives in order to change their unwanted features.

This PhD aimed to improve awareness of Cultural Safety amongst midwifery academics. The provision of culturally safe educational experiences and learning and teaching practices are key strategies to improving the academic success of First Peoples students. This PhD thesis with publication is presented in nine chapters and consists of six manuscripts which have been published or are under review. The first chapter introduces the background, aim, significance, and an overview of the studies. Chapter two is presented in three parts. Part one explores the intersection between my PhD research program, my position as a non-Indigenous researcher, and my reflexive self. Part two outlines the development of a conceptual framework that underpins this research. A reframed standpoint theory was developed that blends cultural, Indigenous and feminist standpoint theories. This reframed standpoint theory guided the mixed methods used across this PhD program and is described in Part three. Study one was an integrative systematic review of educational strategies to promote academic success and resilience in undergraduate Indigenous students. The included papers were critiqued from a standpoint theory approach that reflected feminism, cultural respect, and humanism. Key strategies for Indigenous student success were found to be multi-faceted and underpinned by principles of respect, relationships, and responsibility. The review identified a relative lack of published research in this field and few validated measures. Study two was an integrative review of the literature on the scope and efficacy of professional development interventions to increase awareness of Cultural Safety by midwifery academics. Papers were assessed using the Critical Appraisals Skills Program (CASP) guidelines. Concepts were mapped thematically. Five broad themes emerged: Cultural Terms, Knowledge of Culture, Cultural Education, Cultural Aspirations/Desire and Culture in Curricula. This study found no agreed best practice framework to support awareness of Cultural Safety for midwifery academics. Cultural Safety needs to be embedded into professional development plans for midwifery academics. Study three aimed to develop a tool measuring awareness of Cultural Safety. A staged model for tool development included; generation of items, content validity testing and expert First Peoples cultural review, administration of items to a convenience sample of academics, and psychometric testing. An online survey was completed by academics (n = 42). The Awareness of Cultural Safety Scale (ACSS) was found to be reliable (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87) and valid. Three factors were generated with sound internal reliability. There was a significant correlation between ACSS and Awareness of Racism scores. Study four implemented and evaluated a continuing professional development intervention to improve midwifery academics’ awareness of Cultural Safety. A prepost intervention mixed methods design was used. The intervention consisted of two workshops and five yarning circles across a semester. Data included responses on the ACSS, self-assessment on cultural knowledge and perceptions of racism, evaluation of the intervention, participants’ journal entries, and researcher’s reflections. Participants awareness of Cultural Safety improved after attending the professional development program. Participants reported a high level of satisfaction with the workshops and yarning circles. Study five explored the impact of yarning circles within a professional development program to enhance midwifery academics’ awareness of Cultural Safety with eight participants. Interviews were analysed using a staged thematic analysis process. Six key themes that centred on participants’ sense of belonging, sense of safety, sense knowing, sense of support, sense of difference, and sense of challenge were identified. These concepts were supportive of participants’ developing awareness of Cultural Safety. Study Six examined awareness of Cultural Safety within the broader midwifery profession. An online survey design included the Awareness of Cultural Safety Scale – Revised (ACSS-R), Self-assessment of Cultural Knowledge and Perceptions of Racism scales. Members of the Australian College of Midwives or the Congress of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Nurses and Midwives were invited to participate. The ACSS-R was found to be reliable and valid, but the low response rate (n=92) may reflect implicit bias in the workforce towards Cultural Safety. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the overall findings and conclusions. The limitations of the program of work are outlined. Implications and recommendations for further research, education and practice are outlined.

I argue, In opposition to recent criticism by Helen Longino and Richmond Campbell, that standpoint theory is needed for a feminist account of knowledge. Its recently emerging empiricist tendencies do not make it redundant and unnecessarily confrontational. Feminist empiricism directs us to seek out different perspectives, and standpoint theory enhances empirical resources by increasing the variety of available perspectives through redressing political marginalization. Standpoint theory aims to counteract the deleterious affects of oppression on the availability of unique resources for knowledge, which cannot be achieved on a strictly empiricist account. Nancy Hartsock's article “The Feminist Standpoint: Towards a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,” from the first collection of feminist epistemology, Discovering Reality (1983a), is the locus classicus of standpoint theory. Since then, however, standpoint theory has metamorphosed such that it is in many ways unrecognizable as Hartsock's approach, and its similarity to the theories known as “feminist empiricism9' is increasingly apparent. Standpoint theory is grounded in the materialism of its Marxian origins and so is committed in its inception to a version of empiricism: knowledge depends on experience. More specifically, standpoint theory is increasingly like feminist empiricism in viewing greater experience as enhancing the quality of knowledge.

Feminist standpoint theory was developed in the 1970s and 1980s. It served as the epistemological backbone of women's studies. In fact, the theory soon became prescriptive in women's studies circles. Feminist standpoint theory prioritizes thinking from women's or marginalized lives. The theory considers these lives as privileged sites of knowledge production. Hence, feminist standpoint theory focuses on the intersection of everyday practices of exercising power and the production of knowledge. The working hypothesis of feminist standpoint theory can be summarized as follows: a social disadvantage implies an epistemological advantage. Standpoint theory has been the motor behind the feminist attempt at making the relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge horizontal. This aspect of the theory is particularly important in the human sciences because these sciences work with people or people's products (cultural artifacts). When marginalized people are privileged producers of knowledge, they must also be the ones who ask the questions. As a result, feminist standpoint theorists try to produce socially relevant research. Sandra Harding is the main canonizing force behind feminist standpoint theory.

The article applies feminist standpoint theory to the content and style of Nella Larsen's novels to show the literary critic and student the potential benefits of using standpoint theory in interpreting literature. In particular, it examines the concept of achieving a standpoint, and analyzes why Larsen's protagonists fail to achieve a standpoint. Its reading of Larsen's novels in light of standpoint theory demonstrates that Larsen conveyed knowledge of her world different from that of the dominant white culture and the male-centered, black middle-class culture of 1920s America and Harlem, knowledge that has yet to be fully examined. Further, the application of standpoint theory to literary texts provides refinements of particular concepts within standpoint theory, as the article demonstrates.

I HAVE WRITTEN THIS grudgingly. Susan Hekman's (in this issue) interpretation of my work is so systematically out to lunch that it is difficult to write a response that does not involve a replication of what I have already said, at length and in various versions, elsewhere. But that would interest neither me nor readers. So I have asked myself: Apart from lack of care and thought, what is she doing that leads to her systematic misreading? And what might be systematic about other mistakes such as the chronology of "standpoint theory"'s development (a work published in 1979 is attributed to the decade following, 1983), or that its roots were in Marxism (Where's the women's movement?), or that it is less used and interesting currently (speak for your own discipline, Susan; in sociology it flourishes), or that feminist standpoint theory has become identified with "object-relations" theory (news to me). A major problem is the reification of "feminist standpoint theory." Feminist standpoint theory, as a general class of theory in feminism, was brought into being by Sandra Harding (1986), not to create a new theoretical enclave but to analyze the merits and problems of feminist theoretical work that sought a radical break with existing disciplines through locating knowledge or inquiry in women's standpoint or in women's experience. Those she identified had been working independently of one another and have continued to do so. In a sense, Harding created us. I do not think there was much interchange among us. As standpoint theorists, we became identifiable as a group through Harding's study. And as a construct of Harding's text, we appeared as isolated from the intellectual and political discourses with which our work was in active dialogue. I cannot speak here for Nancy Hartsock, Patricia Hill Collins, or others mentioned in Hekman's article, but, for myself, I am very much aware of being engaged with the debates and innovations of the many feminist experiments in sociology that, like mine, were exploring experience as a method of discovering the social from the standpoint of women's experience. But Hekman goes beyond Harding to constitute us as a common theoretical position, indeed as a foundationalist theory justifying feminist theory as knowledge. A coherence is invented for us: "Despite their significant differences, all of these accounts share the conviction that the feminist standpoint is rooted in a 'reality' that is the opposite of the ab-

Much has been written by non-Indigenous Australians in the wake of the 1992 Mabo case following its rejection of terra nullius in Australia. What is surprising about this literature is the lack of discussion about sovereignty, which is a logical consequence of the Mabo decision’s conclusion that the basis for Crown sovereignty was incorrect. What little has been said about sovereignty since Mabo can be placed into two broad groups. The first calls for various forms of First Peoples’ sovereignties, and is made up almost exclusively of First Peoples scholars. The other group is dominated by non-Indigenous people who speak instead of citizenship, shared responsibility, native title, reconciliation, rights, self-management, multiculturalism, colonisation and postcolonial theory. This article is directed to non-Indigenous scholars who write on these topics. It is a critique of their scholarship, notwithstanding its merit to the extent that literature questions injustice, dispossession, genocide, discrimination and colonial policy. The basis for this critique is that this scholarship fails to bring First Peoples’ sovereignties to the fore, and for this reason persists as colonial knowledge. To make this argument, the article identifies with feminist standpoint theory and Indigenous standpoint theory to contend that First Peoples’ sovereignties must be embraced by non-Indigenous scholars.

Feminist standpoint theory has important implications for science education. The paper focuses on difficulties in standpoint theory, mostly regarding the assumptions that different social positions produce different types of knowledge, and that epistemic advantages that women might enjoy are always effective and significant. I conclude that the difficulties in standpoint theory render it too problematic to accept. Various implications for science education are indicated: we should return to the kind of science education that instructs students to examine whether arguments, experiments, etc. are successful, rather than ask who presented them; when considering researchers and students for science education programs we should examine their scholarly achievements, rather than the group to which they belong; women should not be discouraged from engaging in “mainstream” science research and education (or other spheres of knowledge considered as “men’s topics”) and men should not be discouraged from engaging in what are considered “women’s topics” in science (or outside it); we should not assume that there are different types of science for women and for men, nor different ways for women and men to study science or conduct scientific research.

This article presents feminist standpoint theory as an epistemology to move social work research and practice toward a synthesis of relevance and rigor. Feminist standpoint theory provides an alternative approach to knowledge justification and “good science.” The article discusses three assumptions of positivist approaches to science and research and highlights some of the conflicts between those assumptions and the professional commitments of social work. The specific areas of conflict identified include claims of value-free scientific activity, subject-object separation, and scientific objectivity. Feminist standpoint theory is an approach to research that is more consonant with the professional values and goals of social work. The theory places the life experiences of marginalized groups at the center of the research project. It then directs the view of the researcher toward the social structures that shape the lives of the group members. The advantages of standpoint theory for social work practice and research are highlighted.

This paper examines the relation between situated cognition theory in science education, and feminist standpoint theory in philosophy of science. It shows that situated cognition is an idea borrowed from a long since discredited philosophy of science. It argues that feminist standpoint theory ought not be indulged as it is a failed challenge to traditional philosophy of science. Standpoint theory diverts attention away from the abiding educational and career needs of women in science. In the interest of women in science, and in the interest of science, science educators would do best for their constituencies by a return to feminist philosophy understood as the demand for equal access and a level playing field for women in science and society.

Professional pride, including self-reflection and attitude toward one’s own occupational group, induces individuals to behave in socially appropriate ways, and uniforms can encourage wearers to have this pride. This study was to elucidate the working pattern of professional pride by exploring neural responses when wearing uniforms and being conscious of a third-person’s perspective. Twenty healthy adults who had an occupation requiring uniforms were scanned using functional MRI with a self-evaluation task consisting of 2 [uniform versus casual wear] × 2 [first-person perspective versus third-person perspective] conditions. The neural effects of clothing and perspective were analyzed and post-hoc tests were followed. The interaction effect was displayed in the bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, where uniform led to higher activity in third-person perspective than in first-person perspective, whereas casual wear led to the opposite pattern, suggesting this region may be involved in the awareness of third-person’s perspective to uniform-wearing. The right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex showed functional connectivity with the right posterior superior temporal sulcus in uniform-third-person perspective compared to uniform-first-person perspective, suggesting this connection may work for processing information from third-person perspective in a uniform-wearing state. Professional pride may prioritize social information processing in third-person perspective rather than self-referential processing in first-person perspective.

Feminist standpoint theory has served as both a potent critique of mainstream methods of knowledge creation and a method of analyzing cases where feminist epistemologies are practically applied. Both of these aspects of standpoint theory can be seen in Everywhere She Maps (ESM), a global initiative helping women apply cutting-edge mapping tools; ESM evinces many important standpoint principles in its organization, operations, and impacts. This paper critically analyzes ESM by bringing together four strands of standpoint theory via the work of Donna Haraway, Mary Hawkesworth, Uma Narayan, and Joni Seager. Through this lens, it becomes clear that ESM presents an important case of feminist knowledge creation, empowering women to gather spatial data that challenges patriarchal structures and improves the lives of women and children, whether they are within refugee camps in Uganda or responding to natural disasters in Bangladesh. Across five key areas of impact (security improves, lives are saved, power is generated, prosperity rises, and innovation happens), ESM contributes to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals by improving gender equity, women’s participation in scientific inquiry, and spatial justice. ESM is thus a vital case linking feminist theory and real-world development. Standpoint theory provides the key to understanding how ESM is unlocking women’s unique local knowledge-gathering and mapping skills, creating a female-centric form of “situated knowledge” that empowers women—and carries the potential to reshape male-dominated science.

As participatory research practices are increasingly taken up in health research, claims related to experiential authority and expertise are frequently made. Here, in an exploration of what grounds such claims, we consider how feminist standpoint theory might apply to the psy sciences (psychiatry, psychology, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, and so on). Standpoint theory claims that experiences of marginalization and critical engagement can lead to a standpoint that offers an epistemic advantage within a domain of knowledge. We examine experiences of marginalization and critical engagement in the mental health system, as well as evidence for epistemic advantages resulting from these experiences. This evidence, found in the identification of problematic assumptions and the development of new tools and theories in the field, grounds our argument that standpoint theory is indeed relevant to the psy sciences and that many of those who have experienced marginalization and have engaged critically have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowledge-production. The implications of this argument are significant: those who have attained a standpoint within the psy sciences ought to be included in research and given both tools and funding to develop research programs. However, we must be wary of the risks of tokenization, cooptation, and essentialization that are likely to accompany such a transformation.