Standard for Asset Impairment Change, Independent Audit Supervision and Strategy Choice of Earnings Manipulation

Abstract

In the moment of China's new Standard for Asset Impairment change of no permission for the reversal of four items of impairment provisions, this paper studies that in the transitional years of 2005 and 2006, how loss and profit-turning listed companies choose their earnings manipulation strategies according to the Standard change and independent audit supervision intensity. The results show that in year 2005, due to the insufficiency of independent audit supervision, loss companies changed their prior two-year (year 2003 and 2004) habit of not over-withdrawing these four items of impairment provisions, and succeeded in doing so to take a big bath. At the same time, profit-turning companies not only successfully over-reversed these four items to achieve profit-turning, but also over-reversed to a greater extent than they did in general years (year 2003 and 2004). However, in year 2006, due to CPAs' intensive care about the over-reversal of impairment provisions, profit-turning companies failed to make use of over-reversing these four items to achieve profit-turning. Nevertheless, due to CPAs' comparatively insufficient care about companies' withdrawing behavior, loss companies act in a very tactful, but possibly beating-all way that they over-withdrew these four provision items so that they can under-withdraw them and improve such financial indexes as ROA and ROE in the future. However, because the over-withdrawn part can't be reversed in next years, and because CPAs pay a little more, though insufficient, attention to over-withdrawal behaviors in 2006 than in 2005, loss companies over-withdrew them to a smaller extent than they did in year 2005. The study results imply that the accounting standard change and independent audit supervision intensity have a co-influence on companies' manipulation strategy choice. During the transitional years of accounting standard change, companies usually try to grasp the last chance to intensify earnings manipulation. But if the independent audit supervision is forceful enough, it can effectively prevent companies from doing so. The study also indicates that if CPAs lay particular stress on some usual manipulation tactics and neglect other possibilities, companies will take advantage of this neglecting to choose some more artful and more covert manipulation strategies.