Abstract
The problem of anti-terrorism security checks of express transportation becomes more and more severe under the Internet shopping model. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model of anti-terrorism resource allocation in express transportation security checks is built to discuss, in terms of single and multiple routes, the optimal resource allocation of express company (defender) including physical security measures, in-box sensor technology, non-intrusive security measures at terminal distribution sites and handover course. It shows that, for the single route, express company should trade off the security costs among the first, second and third level security measures, and should allocate the same security costs of physical security measures for every distribution site. For the multiple routes, the transportation route that terrorists insert the hazardous materials has the lowest probability of physical security measures, and therefore is utilized by terrorists. Thus, the optimal allocation plan of security resources should be the same security costs of non-intrusive security measures at the final distribution sites (the third level security measure) among each transportation routes.
Highlights
Speaking, terrorism refers to deliberately violent acts that cause panic
Aimed at the current security risks of express transportation in China, this article draws on Niyazi Onur Bakir's maritime or railway container security inspection model, and studies the optimal security inspection resource allocation of express companies and relevant government security departments from the perspective of Stackelberg game, that is, how to allocate the limited security inspection resources more reasonably in each link of defense to reduce the losses caused by the attackers illegally implanting explosive weapons and dangerous chemicals into the express packages
Express parcels need to be transported through different stations through multiple modes of transportation from the sender to the final recipient the so the installation of sensors can screen out the dangerous goods at express transportation sites; the third level of security inspection is non-invasive security inspection when goods arrive at the distribution site of the final delivery city
Summary
Terrorism refers to deliberately violent acts that cause panic. It is aimed at the non-combatants (civilians) or disregarding their safety for religious, political or ideological purposes [1]. The abovementioned incidents had been ruled out the possibility of terrorist acts, security checks have been strengthened to ensure transportation safety during express transportation so as to prevent terrorists from implanting explosive weapons and dangerous chemical weapons by express transportation and from causing great panic and economic losses to the society This issue has attracted great attention from relevant departments. Aimed at the current security risks of express transportation in China, this article draws on Niyazi Onur Bakir's maritime or railway container security inspection model, and studies the optimal security inspection resource allocation of express companies and relevant government security departments from the perspective of Stackelberg game, that is, how to allocate the limited security inspection resources more reasonably in each link of defense to reduce the losses caused by the attackers (terrorists) illegally implanting explosive weapons and dangerous chemicals into the express packages
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