Sport w Federacji Rosyjskiej po agresji zbrojnej na Ukrainę

Putting Russia's Ban in Historical Perspective: A Curated Interview

Russia’s attack on Ukraine was a highly unexpected and extremely destructive step that destabilized the international security environment. As a consequence, similarly to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, there was a marked weakening of the sense of security of the small Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In this case, the escalation of Russian military actions resulted in the necessity to take decisive steps. This chapter aims to show the evolution of the perception of the security of the Baltic states in connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The regional security triangle – the Baltic states–Russia–Ukraine – was analyzed in order to examine how the Baltic states combine elements of a security strategy with elements of international security in order to optimize their security situation. The analysis aims to answer the questions of how the war in Ukraine influenced the perception of security in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and what actions were taken at the national and regional level. In addition, the subject of the study is the method of defining security by individual Baltic states and their citizens, and the identification of threats by them, as well as the national multidimensional strategies used, taking into account the dynamics and complexity of the contemporary global security environment.

Who Is to Blame and What Is to Be Done? The Rise and Fall of Russian Authority in the Olympics

The article examines the doctrinal documents of the aggressor country (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation) as discursive events that create the Russian conceptual picture of the world – an alternative pseudo-reality based on simulacra-substitutions and demonstrating false information about the global security situation and the total threat to the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. It is proved that the doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation are based on the conceptual apparatus of information warfare, that is enshrined in the dictionary edited by D. Rogozin "War and Peace in Terms and Definitions". Linguosuggestive technologies are considered in this dictionary as a weapon of information warfare, in particular, the language of war is defined as "a way of manipulating public opinion by linguistic means". It is determined that the texts of doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation use linguistic and suggestive technologies of persuasion without critical analysis of information, simulation and intellectual reception. The technology of persuasion without critical analysis of information is used to create a false image of the Russian Federation as a democratic state that implements traditional values, and therefore must resist the information aggression of Western countries that are in a cultural crisis. With the help of simulacra technology, an alternative reality is being built, in which all Russia's destructive actions are attributed to Western countries and Ukraine. The technology of intellectual reception is used to consolidate generalizations acceptable to the Putin regime, which are then broadcast through all official and media channels and form the position of Russian citizens on the need to protect themselves from the West and Ukraine. These linguistic and suggestive technologies are pragmatically aimed at invading the cognitive space of the addressee – Russian citizens, aggressively imposing a negative attitude towards STRANGERS (Western countries and Ukraine). Military aggression is presented as a defense against Western encroachment on Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity; Russia's invasion of Ukraine is presented as an unresolved regional conflict. As a result, the recipient of the information does not identify the substitution of reality, the pragmatic result of which is the support of Russia's military aggression in Ukraine.

RELEVANCE. The relationship between politics and sports is a pressing issue, since political contradictions between states are reflected in sports. Major sporting events are not just competitions between athletes, but also fierce political struggles. Through professional sports with the help of various media technologies, it is possible to influence global society and achieve geopolitical results. The relationship between elite sports and politics is considered using the example of the exclusion of Russian sports from international competitions and materials about this in the media.MATERIALS AND METHODS. Materials from foreign media have been studied on the topic of removing Russia from big-time sports, depriving it of state symbols, removing Russian athletes from international competitions due to disagreement with the political course of the authorities of the Russian Federation, and the introduction of so-called sanctions in the field of sports. The study was based on a comparative historical method, which helps to consider the dynamics of the development of relations between Russian sports and the political course of Western countries. The theoretical basis was the work of domestic and foreign researchers of the history and theory of sports. Content analysis was also used to study materials from Russian and foreign media with the aim of determining the attitude of foreign states towards Russian sports and its oppression in the international sports arena from 2014 to 2024.RESULT AND DISCUSSION. An analysis of foreign media materials confirms that pressure on Russian sports is being exerted by Western countries due to their disagreement with the political course of the Russian Federation. An analysis of sources showed that Western media agree on the issue of sanctions against Russian sports: they support the introduction of restrictions against Russian sports, but at the same time they call such measures an instrument of geopolitics, an instrument of “containing Russia”. This confirms the politicization of sports through the media.CONCLUSION. Analyzing the content of publications in both foreign and Russian media, we can conclude that pressure on Russian sports and members of the Russian national team began to intensify after the victory of the Russian team in the team event at the Olympic Games in Sochi 2014 and after the Republic of Crimea joined the Russian Federation . After the Russian Armed Forces launched a special military operation in Ukraine, even more sanctions and restrictions were introduced against Russian sports, and Russia was actually excluded from international sports. The author believes that the pressure on Russian sports will only increase.

Introduction:Putin's New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power? Andrew Natsios (bio) Much of the content in this collection of articles in the South Central Review were presented by scholars and journalists at a September 2015 conference and subsequent talks between 2016–2017 on Putin's New Russia at the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University. These articles help to fill a gap in the western understanding of Putin's Russia by examining the structure of its political and economic systems, the motivation of its ruling elite, the threat it poses to its neighbors, and its profound dysfunctions. The authors answer the question: How does Russia's external demonstrations of strength relate to growing evidence of its internal weaknesses? To respond to this question, we must review Russia's foreign and defense policies to understand how they are related to the country's internal challenges. ________ When Boris Yeltsin named Vladimir Putin Acting President in December 1999, many in the western capitals hurriedly attempted to determine who he was and how he rose in three years from being an obscure municipal official to Acting President of Russia. In his earlier career, Putin served 16 years in the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police, as a Lt. Colonel assigned to East Germany. After retiring from the KGB, he went to work in St. Petersburg city government in several posts, including Deputy Mayor. The Yeltsin government then brought him to Moscow where he held several positions before being appointed as the director of the Federal Security Service, the new Russian name for the domestic KGB. He then became Prime Minister and Acting President, and then was elected in his own right in March 26, 2000. Some believe Putin's meteoric rise was a function of his reputation for absolute loyalty to his superiors above all other considerations and his ruthlessness in executing orders. In the most comprehensive research into corruption in [End Page 1] the Russian government to date, Dr. Karen Dawisha argues in her book, Putin's Kleptocracy, that a small group of former KBG agents from St. Petersburg hatched a plan to take over the Russian economy and political system, a plan they had effectively accomplished by the mid-2000's. She argues that Putin pursued successively higher offices in part to protect himself from an ongoing investigation of his corruption while serving in St. Petersburg city government. Much of the initial Western perception of Vladimir Putin was based on his early years as President, when he was thought to be an economic reformer who sought to bring Russia into the liberal international economic order. For the first six years of Putin's Presidency, Russia was treated as a great power and was one of the select countries included in G-8 meetings. Beginning in the mid-2000's, Putin abandoned his economic reform agenda and shifted the direction of his government, ending Russia's integration into the world economy, crushing civil society, gaining virtual control of the Russian electronic news media, and seizing the territory of neighboring states such as Georgia and Ukraine, while aggressively rearming. Russia began its withdrawal from global economic integration well before the invasion of Ukraine, for reasons which remain debated among Russia observers. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was expelled from the G-8 and has been isolated in international bodies. Perhaps the most glaring evidence of this isolation is the vote on resolution 68/262 in the U.N. General Assembly on March 27, 2014. Resolution 68/262 condemned Russian aggression in annexing Crimea, which had been part of Ukraine: 100 nations voted yes, 11 voted no, and 58 nations abstained. European and U.S. policymakers were slow to acknowledge and react to the reality of Putin's Russia, its revisionist policies, and the threat it posed to western democracies and its other neighbors.1 European paralysis in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine was in part a result of multiple, simultaneous other crises distracting it from Putin's military adventures. Since the end of the Cold War, many European countries had virtually unilaterally disarmed by neglecting its military. The financial crisis in Southern Europe caused serious...

In a complex information environment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents major challenges to the communication of the political leader of Ukraine. The objective of this article is to analyze the frames and sentiments used by the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, using a novel data set of his Twitter communication (N = 613) during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine between 24th of February 2022 and 24th of February 2023. The study answers two questions, (1) what the political leader of Ukraine actually talks about when he communicates during the invasion, and (2) how he talks about it. By using a combination of computational text analysis approaches, I analyze the social media framing and whether there is a framing shift during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and try to understand the role of social media in this process. The results of the study revealed the emotions expressed by Zelensky to be mostly positive and focused on dialogue, cooperations, and solidarity frames. This article shows a minor discourse shift during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and thus contributes to a better understanding of the political leader’s social media communication during the crisis.

This article examines the evolution of collective memory and historical narratives in the Baltic states, adopting a diachronic perspective to trace their trajectory from the Soviet era to the present. The Baltic Way, a central moment of anti-Soviet resistance, played a central role in shaping a distinct ethno-national identity, challenging Soviet narrative and fostering national unity. Following EU accession (2004), the Baltic states leveraged their membership to promote these narratives at the European level, influencing memory politics and relations with Russia. However, since 2014, geopolitical shifts –particularly Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine (2022)– have intensified contestation over historical narratives, even leading to a discernible «de-Europeanisation» of collective memory. This process has been exacerbated by the rise of populist movements and the instrumentalization of memory within hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns. The securitisation of narratives, driven by Russian interference, has replaced earlier emphases on European values with national security concerns. This shift fuels exclusivist narratives, often exploited to mobilise support, exacerbating nationalism and xenophobia. Consequently, collective memory has become a battleground in international relations, with significant implications for democratic resilience, European stability, and international order. This study analyses these dynamics, revealing how historical narratives are strategically repurposed to legitimise political agendas and discredit opposition.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which started in February 2022, led to various (often confrontational) reactions of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to Russia. The article measures the variety of responsive foreign and defence policies of CEE countries in the first twelve months of the invasion. Three main domains of activities are examined: first, direct relations with Russia; second, relations with and support for Ukraine; and third, national defence policies and position in NATO. By considering these domains, the paper offers a comprehensive analysis of CEE countries’ positions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, indicates differences among these countries and categorises their attitudes from near-to-neutral to highly confrontational towards Russia. Along with primary intuition, Hungary adopted an attitude closer to neutrality, whereas Lithuania and Poland turned out to be the most confrontational. The analysis reveals minor differences among the Baltic states’ approaches towards Russia. Contrary to expectations, the positions of Bulgaria and Romania differed widely, with the former following a more confrontational stance than the latter.

Advance Online Article published December 16, 2022 The Arctic Council, formed in 1996, is a unique organization, with legitimacy that extends across the entirety of the Circumpolar World, representing a diverse mosaic of states and Indigenous Peoples united in their efforts to protect their fragile ecosystems, environments, and communities. The Council has nurtured an impressive and enduring consensus among its diverse ecosystem of asymmetrical actors for over a quarter century. But all that changed on March 3, 2022, when the Council’s seven democratic member states (the A7) announced an historic “pause” of their Council participation in protest of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This was not the first time tensions over Russian aggression in Ukraine strained the Council’s impressive track record for circumpolar unity; in 2014, after Russia’s first assault upon Ukraine, the United States and Canada jointly boycotted a Moscow-hosted meeting of the Council’s Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM), but soon thereafter rejoined their fellow Council members in the spirit of Arctic cooperation. While Russia’s actions in Ukraine are reprehensible, boycotting the Council while Russia held its rotating chair closed off an important off-ramp to defuse rising international tensions between Russia and NATO. Indeed, Russia’s portion of the Arctic represents fully half the Circumpolar World, and the issues facing the Arctic—of which climate change is perhaps the most pressing for all stakeholders, small and large—cannot be paused. There are no half-way solutions to the future of the Arctic, whether it’s peacetime or wartime—the stakes are simply too high.

This article examines how Belarusian officials reacted to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine after its outbreak in February 2022 to March 2023. Although the Belarusian president initially tried to maintain friendly relations with Kyiv, he later chose to support his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and the invasion of Ukraine. In other words, this paper argues that Aliaksandr Lukašenka’s decision to support pro-Russian narratives about Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine was taken as a result of the pressure that Vladimir Putin exerted on him, as well as the awareness that Russia alone guarantees his political survival. However, during their interactions throughout 2022 and 2023, the Belarusian president made efforts to avoid ‘entrapment’—that is, being dragged into the conflict through the commitments he assumed within the Union State—to demonstrate to the entire international community that he still maintains some room of maneuver in his relationship with Russia.

Two NATO powers have plans to bring Putin to justice over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but a different approach offers a clearer path to prosecution. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine continues to prompt outrage in the international community, but finding a way to hold President Vladimir Putin accountable has proved incredibly challenging. International law has many […]

Armed conflict and military activity can be highly destructive for the environment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has unexpectedly elevated global media attention on the humanitarian, environmental and societal impact of the war, with media reporting on the environmental consequences beyond the scale of other contemporary conflicts.a However, while this attention on the carbon costs of conflict and military actives is welcome, significant data and knowledge gaps remain on the overall contribution that day-to-day military activities make to climate change.b Communicating the issues around military emissions is difficult, given both their complexity and because it is politically sensitive. This is particularly the case around military decarbonisation plans, which some regard as a low priority and a risk to military operational effectiveness or preparedness. This makes geoethics important and communication of the problem especially challenging during a time when military spending is increasing due to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. This perceived political sensitivity has contributed to the exclusion of military emissions from mainstream climate discourse, despite their potential scale. A study - led by Scientists for Global Responsibility - suggests that the world’s militaries are responsible for 5.5% of global emissions.c This is considerable yet many governments do not yet publish or fully understand the contribution that their militaries make to climate change. The significant data gaps mean it is inherently difficult to estimate the emissions of the world’s militaries as a whole. In turn, this makes it challenging to communicate the importance of the topic. This presentation will set out some of the initiatives – such as https://militaryemissions.org - which have been developed by civil society to communicate the problem to the broad range of stakeholders, including the public, the military, civil society organisations and policy makers. Given the diverse audience, a spectrum of communication narratives has been used, including a podcast series with the military think-tank Royal United Services Institute,d policy briefs,e webinars,f blogs, papers, and media articles. Effective, ongoing communication and education is vital to increase awareness around the military’s contribution to climate change and seek to ensure that any emerging climate and decarbonisation plans for the military are properly implemented and their effectiveness scrutinised.a CEOBS, 2022a. Sustainable recovery? First sustain interest in Ukraine’s environment.  https://ceobs.org/sustainable-recovery-first-sustain-interest-in-ukraines-environment/b Rajaeifar, M. et al, 2022.  Decarbonize the military — mandate emissions reporting. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-022-03444-7c SGR/CEOBS, 2022b. Estimating the Military’s Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions. https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SGRCEOBS-Estimating_Global_MIlitary_GHG_Emissions_Nov22_rev.pdfd Greening Defence podcast series, available at https://rusi.org/podcast-series/greening-defence-podcastse CEOBS, 2022c. Policy brief: Military greenhouse gas emissions – transparency, reporting and action. https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/CEOBS_briefing_note_military_GHG_reporting.pdff COP27 virtual panel: Military Emissions Gap annual update 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRi5Apxht5M&t=3621s 

Theoretical background: The crisis situation in the aftermath of the military conflict triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused a significant reaction from financial markets. Not only the Russian RTSI index, but also the stock indexes of neighbouring countries (Poland, Germany), as well as the U.S. indices (NDX, US30, US500), declined in value in the following months of the war, which was a direct result of the declining capitalisation of their component companies. A team of Yale University researchers undertook a classification study on a group of more than 1,000 global companies, grouping them according to the strategy (business model) they adopted in the face of the response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. These groups were, in particular: (1) Grade F – defying Demands for Exit or Reduction of Activities: companies that are just continuing business-as-usual in Russia; (2) Grade D – Holding Off New Investments/Development: companies postponing future planned investment/development/marketing while continuing substantive business; (3) Grade C – Reducing Current Operations: companies that are scaling back some significant business operations but continuing some others; (4) Grade B – Keeping Options Open for Return: companies temporarily curtailing most or nearly all operations while keeping return options open; and (5) Grade A – Clean Break – Surgical Removal, Resection: companies totally halting Russian engagements or completely exiting Russia. This work provided the basis for an in-depth analysis of how financial markets (investors) reacted to companies that used extreme responses (completely breaking business ties with Russia as opposed to maintaining the existing business model and business ties with Russia). Depending on the adopted firm strategy, according to the Yale methodology, it can be observed that the impact of war on value was not uniform, and differences in value migration could be discerned. Purpose of the article: In the article, the authors undertook to evaluate the reaction of financial markets in the period 31 December 2021 – 30 September 2022 on the basis of three stock market indices: (1) the US (Dow Jones Industrial Average); (2) the German (DAX 40 – Deutscher Aktien Index); (3) the Polish (WIG 20 – Warsaw Stock Exchange Index) with a particular focus on the date: February 24, 2022, when Russia’s military aggression in the Ukrainian area began. The authors assessed how the volatility of the shares of selected companies in these indices evolved, and whether it was influenced by the social responsibility of the business conducted, as expressed by the severance of business relations with Russia, their periodic suspension or the lack of any response to the acts of war that began. Furthermore, a significant aim of the study was to assess the phenomenon of value migration in companies based on their business relationship strategies with Russia, classified according to the criteria upon which the Yale list was built. Research methods: Critical analysis of the literature on the subject, statistical analysis, technical analysis of stock index volatility, induction and synthesis. Main findings: In view of the object of research described in this way, in accordance with the idea accompanying the CSR policy, the following research hypothesis was adopted in the study: investment sentiment toward multinational corporations that, as a result of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, ceased business contacts with Russia altogether, differs from investor sentiment toward those organisations that did not take such action and continued business/economic cooperation with Russia.

Sport event tourism destinations hope that their green event operations will encourage event attendees to adopt pro-environmental behaviors. Yet little research has examined whether event attendees have greater awareness of destination environmental responsibility and whether, if so, it improves their environmental behavior. This study aims to examine whether sport event attendees' pro-environmental behavior at home differs from their behavior at sport event tourism destination; and assess whether the difference of pro-environmental behavior between two settings is affected differently depending on sport event attendee' characteristics. Study participants are sport event attendees who were tailgaters in a university campus in the Midwest region of the USA. Onsite systematic sampling was conducted in 2013. After distributing follow-up surveys, a total of 514 surveys were collected. Results of the paired-sample t-tests indicated that study participants' self-reported recycling behavior scores decreased from home to the sport event setting. Furthermore, results of mixed between-within subjects ANOVAs revealed that the degree of decrease in sport event attendees' pro-environmental behavior from home to sport event tourism destination is different depending on event attendees' perception of destination environmental responsibility and event attendee sub-types (i.e., tourist vs. non-tourist). Theoretical discussions and managerial implications are presented.