Split Between the North and the South: Political Institutions During the Period of Internal Dissensions

Actions by Egyptian Defense Minister on July 3rd, 2013 raised a question on what sort of means secure democratic military control and whether a democratic state can limit and control the use of force in a democratic manner. For this reason, in comparison with constitutional provisions of other states that embody different forms of government, this article analyses the constitutional status of a state leader as a head of military forces that was infixed in the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of December 26th, 2012, and also what constitutional fundamentals existed for Egyptian Defense Minister to perform actions on July 3rd, 2013, or to prevent these actions from materializing.The process that at the moment is in action in Egypt is an important test for democracy, which up until now the state has been having trouble to pass. When looking at the state government system provisioned by the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of December 26th, 2012, it becomes clear that the Constitution lacks more visible balance of power, which in turn creates the lack of democracy. Various military councils and military forces are equal to other three state powers (legislative, executive and judicial), but in a democratic country, military institutions of the state cannot be ascribed to state government institutions and furthermore have a priority over them. On the contrary, military state institutions must be liable to civil state institutions and must be controlled by them, and their decisions must be based on decisions by civil state institutions.Actions by Egyptian Defense Minister on July 3rd, 2013 were performed in breach of constitutional provisions that were set by the nation to live in accordance with, and this Constitution was validated in a referendum. According to the Constitution, Defense Minister is not the Protector of the Constitution; furthermore, no right is provisioned for him to terminate the validity of the Constitution. The Egyptian Constitution does not provide the Defense Minister with a right to dismiss the President of the Republic from the office and to appoint a constitutional jurisdiction judge to a temporary President office. What is more, it was possible to solve a political crisis apparent in a country and to avoid breaches of the Constitution by implementing other constitutional means (noconfidence, impeachment or election institutions).

The Republic of Vietnam is currently engaged in another major effort at governmental reconstruction designed to endow that beleaguered state with national governmental institutions claiming legitimacy on the basis of a popular mandate. On March 27, 1967, The Armed Forces Council of the Republic of Vietnam put its stamp of approval on a new constitution, to take effect on April 1, 1967, that had been presented to it by the Constituent Assembly elected in September 1966. The military council further announced that in line with the new constitution's provisions, national elections for a President, a Vice-President, and the Upper House or Senate of the new bicameral National Assembly would be held on September 1, 1967 (now scheduled for September 3, 1967). Thereafter, members of the Lower House or House of Representatives of the new National Assembly would be elected on October 1, 1967.1 In addition, these national elections were preceded by local elections held during ten Sundays between April 2, 1967 and June 11, 1967 and designed to provide self-administration at the village and hamlet levels in denoted areas, i.e., those under government control and considered pacified. Thus, in the midst of a major war with all its attendant difficulties and crises, South Vietnam is attempting to make a transition from the unstable rule of self-appointed shifting military-dominated governmental coalitions that have ruled since November 1, 1963 to a hopefully stable elected government. How are we to account for this process of constitution-building and what are the prospects for its success in South Vietnam? What kind of rule is likely to emerge? Recourse to elections as well as the attempt to create a new constitutional framework under such adverse conditions as obtain in South Vietnam bear eloquent testimony to underlying continuing disunity in the Vietnamese body politic, military as well as civilian. The simple truth is that there was an inherent instability in the coalition of officers of the Republic's Armed Forces which overthrew the Ngo Dinh Diem regime on November 1, 1963, and in the ranks of the civilian leaders who, reflecting widespread public discontent, supported them. There were deep-seated divisions among

THE STATE OF FRANKLIN: CLERGY, CONTROVERSY AND CONSTITUTIONS By Richard Alan Humphrey Between the years 1784 and 1788 there existed a state in the Southern Appalachian Mountains in what is now known as Upper East Tennessee. Some called it Frankland but officially it became Franklin in 1785 in honor of Benjamin Franklin, the illustrious member of the Continental Congress, from Philadelphia. The settlers of the area hoped for their own independence from North Carolina. It must be remembered that the State of Franklin was a forerunner of the State of Tennessee. Tennessee, in fact, did not receive statehood until 1796. These earlier settlers were dissatisfied with North Carolina because North Carolina did not have sufficient wealth to support armed forces against Indians and outlaws and thus protect their western frontier in the Appalachian mountains. North Carolina claimed lands as far west as the Mississippi River. 35 From its beginnings in the summer of 1784, the state of Franklin was to suffer tumultuous shocks until its collapse in 1788. Continual controversy among Presbyterian clergy who were deeply involved in the constitutional conventions, split the people into two factions. Scotch-Irish Presbyterians were able to fill the political needs present in this frontier area for five reasons: first, they considerably outnumbered the Methodists and Baptists; second, they had most of the educated clergy; third, they had 23 well established churches while the Baptists had 10 small churches and the Methodists, while having a circuit rider, had no churches; fourth, they established 2 academies for educating the citizens of the new state; and finally, they were the only religious group which took an active interest in the political establishment of the state of Franklin. 1 The first constitutional convention was held on August 23, 1784 when it was seriously considered by the delegates whether they should seek permission from Congress to form a separate state. The second convention met at the Presbyterian Church in Jonesboro, on December 14, 1784. After all the delegates were seated, the Reverend Samuel Houston addressed the convention on the importance of meeting not only for their own welfare, but for their posterity for ages to come. Then Rev. Houston led the convention in prayer. This convention established a temporary constitution modeled after North Carolina's, to be seriously studied for six months and then after that period to be voted upon at another constitutional convention before another year passed. It was on November 14, 1785 that the constitutional convention for the ratification of a state constitution was held in the Greeneville Presbyterian Church. The Presbyterian minister, William Graham, President of Liberty Hall College of Lexington , Virginia, was the chief architect of "the Provisional Constitution of Frankland." This provisional constitution was presented to the convention by one of Graham's former students, Samuel Houston, pastor of the Providence Presbyterian Church. Both Graham and Houston were shocked and very upset by another Presbyterian minister, The Reverend Hezekiah Balch. Balch attacked the Provisional Constitution on the grounds that it did not safeguard the state from undue religious influence. Accordingly Balch was instrumental in moving the Convention to defeat the Provisional Constitution. After a quick reading of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, the Convention ratified it. This Constitution was ratified over the protest of the Graham-Houston Committee. This committee was further rebuffed when they tried to reintroduce what they considered to be important parts of their proposed constitution to the convention. They were conceded only the right to enter into the records their dissent. Thus nineteen men signed a dissenters report.2 Even with the adjournment of the constitutional convention the controversy continued between the Graham-Houston faction and the faction lead by Balch. Graham and Houston defended the Provisional Constitution of The State of Frankland. Balch and his followers attacked the Provisional Constitution and defended the Constitution of Franklin. This controversy led to a bitter pamphlet war. The Franklin 36 Commonwealth Society published a pamphlet in support of Graham and Houston entitled "Principles of Republican Government by a Citizen of Frankland." Houston was probably the author of this pamphlet. Then William Graham wrote his own defense of the Provisional Constitution entitled "An Essay On Government." Hezekiah Balch attacked the...

The declining trust in political institutions, decreasing voter turnout, and the escalation of peaceful protests into violent actions in France make it necessary to closely examine not only the ruling party but also the political opposition, which is a key stakeholder in the democratic regime. This study addresses the competitive capacity of political opposition under the Fifth Republic through an integrated framework combining neo-institutionalism and political culture theory. While the institutional analysis focuses on constitutional provisions, electoral law, party legislation, and parliamentary procedures, the cultural analysis considers citizens’ attitudes toward authority, participation, and pluralism, drawing on Almond and Verba’s concept of political culture and Dahl’s notion of polyarchy as normative benchmarks. As a single-case study, this research provides a holistic perspective by incorporating both institutional and political culture factors to analyze the conditions that enable or constrain opposition. The study claims that the opposition's capacity to compete effectively depends not only on the nature of legal regulations but also on the strength of the country's democratic political culture. In this context, it is argued that during the Fifth Republic in France, the opposition's competitive power was guaranteed by an institutional framework, but the erosion of democratic political culture created a socio-political environment that limited this power.

In this presentation essential criteria that delineate issues of politics and the political process and constitution as a means of restriction of power are revealed. These issues are resolved in constitutional law in the sphere of restriction of power, it is political in nature, and its freedom is the freedom of development of the individual as a integrate personality. The interaction between political institutions and public authorities is carried out in terms of human dignity, in particular the identity of the individual. This determines the constitutional construction of relations between parliament and constitutional justice, between individuals, the community and the government. Based on the evolution of the constitution as a social phenomenon, within the scope of the political lawyers are restraint is always based on legal continuity. The formation, reproduction and multiplication of legal inheritance in the form of certain legal documents is the product of politics as a certain process of communication between interested political actors, who are bound by law in the future, in particular acts of interpretation of law and legal doctrine. Democracy is based on the balance of interests of the majority and the minority. Differentiation in society is the basis for the principle of the majority, because it expresses its essence. The balance of interests in a democratic society must satisfy the criteria of public consensus: the majority cannot dictate its will to the minority, and the minority cannot impose its will on the majority. Interaction between political institutions and public authorities is carried out in terms of human dignity, in particular the identity of the individual. Implementation of the constitution's provisions in the course of socio-political debate, which is implemented through the formulation of legislation and the formation of a political agenda, which defines both the program of government activity and the implementation of various national and regional development programs. An important role here is to ensure a balance of interests and fundamental rights. Constitutional courts' self-restraint in dealing with issues of correlation of law and policy is a cautious approach to resolving issues of a political nature and political process. The issue of having the constitutional courts the power to review the constitutionality of constitutional laws becomes more acute. From the point of view of the entry into force of constitutional laws, their review by the constitutional courts is carried out in order to comply with the fundamental values and principles of law and the requirements of due constituent procedure.

Hungary and Poland have started their illiberal remodelling in 2010 and 2015 respectively. Both governments routinely apply the illiberal version of the Rule of Law (illiberal legality), which involves that every situation has the potential to be exploited for political gain. Both states opportunistically apply their constitutions and selectively invoke favourable constitutional provisions. And yet, this paper claims that the Hungarian Fundamental Law and the Polish Constitution are equipped with adequate emergency measures to provide for a proper framework for emergency legislation. In illiberal emergency constitutionalism, Hungary uses and abuses its Fundamental Law, while Poland is disregarding its binding 1997 Constitution and, at the same time, creates its new invisible illiberal constitution. This paper explores how it is done during the current human pandemic crisis by focusing on, first, the emergency regimes the constitutions provide for and their (non-)application. Second, it compares the operation of the parliaments as the Sejm chaotically passes crisis management related omnibus legislation and amendments on the presidential election during the extra-constitutional ‘state of epidemic’. The Hungarian Parliament operates under the ‘danger of crisis’. Yet, it still delivers regular legislative activities, as the emergency ‘legislation’ is done through governmental decree as per the Coronavirus Act 2020, which is unconstitutional. These phenomena necessitate an in-depth inquiry about the nature, form, and content of the Hungarian and Polish emergency legislation and governmental decrees. It is concluded that, under normal circumstances, the Hungarian and Polish constitutional measures set for guiding the authorities in emergencies are adequate. In the current political and constitutional setting and COVID-19 crisis, the form and the content of some essential Hungarian and Polish emergency measures stay below standards. It is a further warning sign for the European community to take Hungarian and Poland illiberal constitutionalism seriously. Their pushing the envelope will not end by itself.

India is a democratic nation. It is considered as the world’s largest democracy. Participation of people in working of government is the basic necessity for the success of democracy. It is significant that the extent of participation of individual and various groups in politics depends upon the level of their ‘awareness’. Thus the awareness about politics is the prerequisite of participation. Political awareness broadly defined as a knowledge and information that a person possesses about the nature, structures, functions, activities and problems of the political system in which an individual lives. In spite of constitutional provisions of gender equality and other political rights, only a small number of women have been able to make room for themselves in decision making process due to the lack of political consciousness. Many steps have been taken for the women empowerment as so far. There are many constitutional provisions about equal political participation of women. The 73^rd and 74^th amendment of the Indian constitution ensured the reservation of one third of Panchayats seats for women. These amendments brought about significant changes in the political scenario of the country with regard to women's participation in politics. But over the years, many researchers reveal that these amendments have had little effect on women's lives at the grassroots level. While political indicators reflects an increasing number of women contesting elections and holding offices in villages, study suggests that in most of the cases women's political participation gets reduced to tokenism and rubber stamp. Women empowerment is incomplete without the political awareness and their participation in the social, economic and political institutions. The aim of this paper is to analyze the pattern of political awareness among women with special reference to their knowledge about the political institutions of the country as well as their participation in the local self government and other decisions making structures. This paper also examines the role of political awareness in strengthening the political participation in politics and empowerment of rural women. It also analyzes the impact of social institutions like marriage, family etc. on the level of political awareness among rural women. This study is specifically confined to the four villages of Sangrur District of Punjab.

Our chapter traces the history of arguments about women’s representation in Indian politics. These range from the debates within the Congress Party as it sketched out its political philosophy and agenda during its struggle against British rule; the discussions that continued in the Constituent Assembly of India, and then later through various commissions set up by the government of the newly independent India to assess women’s social status. In particular we map out the debates on quotas for women in political institutions. These address the difficult issues of reforming and reconfiguring ancient cultures and a multi-religious society to conform to political agendas of its elites, and focus on the problems of individual reparations for social wrongs, as well as of free India’s view of itself in the community of nations. We argue that the debates on the question of women’s political representation in India were influenced by the trajectory of the Indian national movement, and the debates on the new citizenship in the Constituent Assembly which wrote the Indian Constitution. We analyse why the expansion of the role of women in politics was a patchy affair until recently when a combination of the strength of the women’s movement, sectional party interests and the changing nature of the Indian political system has politicised this issue and has given it great visibility. We also trace the battles for incorporating this concern about women’s inclusion in politics through institutional design — the introduction of new constitutional provisions. We suggest that while the political ground in India is shifting with regard to women’s participation in politics, this is a slow and difficult process, which needs constant vigilance by women’s movements and groups both within and outside of state institutions.

The inclination and imposition of non-elected local government council impoverished the political institutional structure of local government while many state governors have trampled upon the constitutional provision which vindicate and established democratically elected local council. Therefore, this study carefully examines budding appointed caretaker committee in Nigerian local government which has become a quagmire to survival of grassroots democracy. This study employs qualitative source of data, samples are drawn from the states operating appointed caretaker committee system in Nigeria. The study concludes that out of 36 states, 14 states comprising six geo-political zones are operating appointed caretaker committee local government council in Nigeria. The subject of non-conduct of elections at the third tier of government has become a common trait within the political spheres of most states. The tier of government which is closest to the grassroots is thus hijacked, prevented from meeting up with its primary and major obligations; the citizens have been denied fair representation with feelings of alienation and disillusionment. Therefore, the study recommends constitutional review and its strict compliance in order to democratize political institution of local government whilst the lacunas and loopholes entrenched in the 1999 constitution should be amended to stem the proliferation of appointed local government executive councils in Nigeria. Key words: Local Government, Caretaker Committee, Democracy, Grassroots, Governance, election.

The constitution of India is not merely a law prescribing a division of power and limits to power, but contains a bill of rights and positive directions to the State to establish a just social order. It incorporates the essential aspects of parliamentary democracy, federalism, provisions regarding inter-state trade, and commerce, among other features. This chapter discusses the salient features of the Indian constitution, directive principles, separation of powers, constitutional amendment, judicial review, problems and methods of constitutional interpretation, positivist and structuralist interpretation, constituent assembly and the role of the judiciary, legal positivism of the early years, external aids to interpretation, resolution of conflicts between constitutional provisions, freedom of religion, powers and privileges of legislatures, affirmative action for the weaker sections of society, freedom of speech, property rights, post-emergency judicial activism, independence of the judiciary, the court as a political institution, and institutional and cultural factors underlying constitutional interpretation.

Government subsidization of public higher education primarily is a function of the states. Even today, with budgets emerging from crisis, the states provide over four dollars of support for higher education expenses for every dollar of federal subsidy. Yet public effort in support of higher education--measured as state funding per $1,000 of personal income--has been in decline for the last quarter century. The magnitude of this decline has been quite significant. Aggregate state effort has fallen by 30% since the late 1970s. In this article, we evaluate the connection between state higher education effort and the tax revolt that began in the 1970s. The tax revolt gave birth to a set of laws and constitutional provisions that have dramatically changed taxing and spending policies in many states. The tax revolt is based on the notion that government is too large, and that the appropriate strategy is to starve the beast. The most prominent legal change resulting from the tax revolt is the Tax and Expenditure Limitation (TEL), which limits the growth of state revenue or expenditures to some outside indicator, most commonly the growth of state personal income. Starting in the late 1970s, 23 states adopted a TEL. In addition, though this happened more slowly and less often, states added supermajority requirements (SMRs), typically two-thirds, for the legislature to approve tax increases. Thirteen states have an SMR. We use a 41-year panel of state data from 1961 to 2001 to investigate the importance of these tax revolt institutions for state effort on higher education. Both TELs and SMRs prove to be very robust predictors of the time series and cross-sectional variation in state funding effort. Together with rising costs, this retreat of public effort is a major component of the financial difficulties faced by state-supported colleges and universities. One measure of the consequences of this financial crisis at public institutions is the ratio of spending per full-time student at public institutions relative to private institutions. In 1980, public institutions spent 70 cents for every $1 spent at private colleges and universities. By the late 1990s that figure had fallen to 55 cents (see Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003). Understanding the causes of this retreat is crucial if there is any chance of reversing it. Changing the political climate is never easy, but our results suggest that the task ahead is even more difficult. All of the SMRs and a majority of the TELs are amendments to state constitutions. They are firmly in place. The questions that motivate our article arise at three distinct levels of generality. At the highest level, the issue is whether institutions actually affect policy outcomes. At the next, more specific level, the question is whether the particular institutions spawned by the tax revolt affect policy. There is an extensive literature, both theoretical and empirical, on these two questions. Our contribution comes from extending the discussion to the third and most specific question: Have the tax revolt institutions had a meaningful effect on higher education effort in particular? In this introduction, we briefly review the literature on the highest-level question. We discuss the more specific implications of the tax revolt institutions in separate sections of the paper. That political institutions should matter for policy outcomes is not self-evident. In much of the political economy literature as it has evolved since the work of Anthony Downs (1957), policy outcomes are driven by the preferences of the median voter. This is true if politicians know voter preferences and can align their proposals accordingly. In this case, there is little scope for the institutional structure of decision making to exert an independent effect on policy outcomes. Institutions become important again whenever any of the assumptions of the Downsian paradigm are removed. In particular, political parties may care about policy as well as winning elections. …

The female population of Sri Lanka is 51.6%. Women are well represented in a variety of sectors, such as education, health, etc. Women's presence in political institutions is low, despite the fact that it is considerable in grassroot level political activities. In light of the rising female population, it is by no means adequate. To address this issue, Sri Lanka's local government entities now have a mixed election system and a 25% female quota system under the Local Government Election (Amendment) Act No. 01 of 2016 and No. 16 of 2017. It was first put into practice in the 2018 local elections. The goal of this study was to determine whether the aforementioned constitutional provisions have resulted in a numerical increase of 25% in the representation of women in local government, whether the quality of participation has increased as a result, and whether these provisions will result in the creation of a new, promising women's representation in the future national politics. It is important to examine whether the 25% women's representation quota system introduced by the aforementioned constitutional provision has grown numerically and whether the stated goals have been achieved in practice with regard to women's representation. For this study, both primary and secondary data were used. A questionnaire based on 60 selected delegates from 12 local governing bodies was used to gather primary data in the Kalutara district. Simple statistical techniques were used to analyze quantitative data and information, and descriptive techniques were used to analyze quantitative data and information. MS Excel program was used to analyze the primary data. New constitutional provisions have resulted in a numerical increase of 25% for women's representation in local government bodies. It evolved from elected officials. Although the number of women in leadership positions has increased, their qualitative participation has not. It is observed that the level of quality participation has been hampered. The development of a women's representation that can inspire fresh optimism for tomorrow's politics on the national level, is not at a satisfactory level. Therefore, the constitutional measures that were enacted to promote women's representation have not actually achieved their intended goals.

Analysis of the main models of Western European parliamentarism and the practice of their development shows that the structure of power in them has its own characteristics, since it is adapted to the socio-political conditions in each specific case. At the same time, it should be noted that parliamentarism is universally based on those constitutional provisions that enshrine the principle of separation of powers, mechanisms of checks and balances, freedom of activity of various political parties. At the same time, this political institution cannot function effectively if a social structure and civil society characterized by a high legal and political culture of the population are not formed. The parliament symbolizes and implements the political representation of the national state or, what is the same, the nation-state, accepts the oath of the head of state, expresses confidence in the government on behalf of the sovereign people and transfers powers to it; makes statements on international and domestic political issues; etc. The author of the article believes that it is the specifics of the relationship between the representative and executive powers that form the basis of the classification of parliaments (chambers) presented in this article: dominant, autonomous, with limited jurisdiction, and subordinate.

Catholic Theology In Croatian Universities: Between The Constitution And The Treaty — A Policy-Oriented Inquiry

The inauguration of the President and Vice President is a crucial moment in the Indonesian state system that must be carried out in accordance with constitutional legitimacy. Legality and legal certainty are the foundation for inaugurated officials to have legitimate authority and be widely accepted. This study analyzes inaugurations conducted by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) without constitutional legitimacy, focusing on procedures, formal requirements, and the MPR's compliance with the 1945 Constitution, the Election Law, and related MPR regulations. The method used is a normative juridical and conceptual approach, through a review of legislation, constitutional law literature, and analysis of hypothetical cases. The results show that inaugurations without constitutional legitimacy do not meet the formal or substantive requirements stipulated in the law. It creates legal uncertainty and can weaken the principle of checks and balances, the stability of government institutions, and political legitimacy. Officials inaugurated under these conditions face legal and political challenges that can affect government effectiveness. This research emphasizes the importance of strengthening procedural mechanisms, the role of oversight bodies such as the Constitutional Court and the House of Representatives (DPR), and public legal education to ensure that the inauguration of state officials consistently complies with constitutional provisions. Recommendations include reforming inauguration regulations to clarify the authority of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), increasing the transparency of the process, and strengthening public understanding of constitutional principles. Implementing these measures will strengthen the legitimacy of state officials, maintain legal certainty, and support democratic stability in Indonesia.