Speech Acts in Strategic Diplomacy: An Analysis of Joe Biden’s Address on the Israel–Hamas Conflict

This study investigates the use of speech acts in Joe Biden’s 2023 speeches concerning the Hamas and Israel conflict, with a focus on identifying and interpreting the pragmatic functions of his language. Drawing on Austin’s and Searle’s framework of speech acts, the analysis categorizes utterances into locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, with particular emphasis on illocutionary functions. The data were collected from Biden’s public addresses and analyzed qualitatively to determine the frequency and communicative purpose of each speech act category. The findings reveal that assertive speech acts dominate the discourse (64%), followed by directives (24%), declaratives (9%), and expressives (3%), with no commissive identified. This indicates Biden’s preference for asserting information and guiding responses rather than expressing emotions or making binding commitments. Comparative analysis with previous studies such as research on Netanyahu’s crisis rhetoric, Hamas representatives’ accusatory strategies, and speech acts in films shows both similarities and differences. While assertives consistently dominate across contexts, Biden’s avoidance of commissives and limited use of expressives distinguishes his rhetoric as cautious and diplomatic. The study concludes that speech act patterns in political discourse are strongly shaped by the speaker’s role, political stance, and global positioning, offering new insights into the intersection of pragmatics and international political communication.

THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATE BUILDING is one in which crisis, once episodic, has become a routine feature of American politics. At the heart of this development is the modern executive: emergency powers are presidential powers. The principal objective of this article is to highlight institutional developments since the late 1960s that framed the Donald Trump administration's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and currently roil the American state: the expansion of administrative power in the White House, which is largely unconstrained by the institutional imperatives of the bureaucracy, Congress, or state governments, and the emergence of the modern executive as the repository of party responsibility, with both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents for messaging, fundraising, mobilization, and programmatic action. Together, these developments form a dynamic of executive-centered partisanship—a merging of partisanship and executive prerogative characterized by presidential unilateralism, social activism, and polarizing struggles about national identity that divide the nation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Our account of executive-centered partisanship and how it affected the Trump administration's response to COVID-19 sheds new light on contemporary crisis management and the political nature of administrative power. Other presidents would have responded differently, perhaps with greater success in stemming the spread of the virus; other presidents might have attempted to centralize administrative power more aggressively in fighting the pandemic, rather than deflecting responsibility to states and private entities. Nevertheless, Trump's actions were not irresolute. They were defined by a purposeful pursuit of partisan objectives: a denigration of bureaucratic expertise and an attack on the “deep state”; the politicization and racialization of federal administrative procedures to crack down on legal and undocumented immigration; a campaign of “law and order” to quell civil rights demonstrations; and a punitive form of federalism, defined by partisan retaliation against “blue states.” Contrary to dominant analyses that paint an administration in disarray, we argue that the Trump administration responded to the crisis through a tactical redeployment of national administrative power to fulfill partisan goals, within a party system beholden to executive power.11 Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis, “Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power,” Perspectives on Politics, 17 (June 2019): 453–469. As such, we conclude that given the current political and institutional context, American presidents are less likely to offer unifying leadership during national crises, or to suffer the political consequences for failing to do so. Instead of subjecting his party to the “blue wave” many Democrats hoped for, Trump's polarizing leadership agitated a highly mobilized and fiercely contested election that sharpened, rather than ameliorated, partisan conflict. Republicans did better than pre-election prognostications implied down ballot, where they gained 11 seats in the House and maintained control of most state legislatures. Moreover, Trump's term in office enabled Republicans to solidify a conservative majority in the courts. As a result, his successor, Joe Biden, came into office having to navigate public health and economic crisis with a bare majority in the Senate, statehouses and governors more deeply divided than Congress, and a judiciary in which 28 percent of all sitting judges were appointed by Trump, including three new justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Most tellingly, despite his personal defeat, Trump reigned over his party and reveled in the adulation of its base supporters. In short, the American state offers modern presidents not only the opportunity to strengthen their commitment to partisan tactics under the cover of national emergencies, but also the power to do so without the traditional constraints of party, Congress, and the states. That this strategy mobilized the Republican base and did not arouse a national repudiation of the president's leadership is evidence of the power bestowed on the modern presidency to advance partisan objectives in a deeply divided nation. The article proceeds as follows: First, we argue that while the government's response to COVID-19 is an exceptional case, scholars often learn much about the operating dynamics of the American state by exploring how crises shape and transform certain governing commitments. Students of American politics have long argued that national crises have been central to major political developments. Therefore, the absence of transformative change in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis—the stubborn persistence of the polarizing struggles over American identity that have intensified since the late 1960s—poses hard challenges to this prevailing perspective. Second, we argue that executive-centered partisanship explains the discrepancy between received wisdom and the contemporary battle for the services of the administrative state. We identify three ways in which the Trump administration's actions revealed and reinforced the dysfunctionalism of executive-centered partisanship during COVID-19: the delegitimization of bureaucratic expertise in partisan politics; the decay of constitutional forms that sustain the division and separation of powers; and the politicization of administrative procedures and policy implementation, now central to the partisan struggle to contend with a diversifying and politically fragmented America. Each of these factors, we argue, is symptomatic of the political pathologies that fester under executive-centered partisanship. We conclude with an analysis of Trump's legacy and its effect on the first few months of Biden's presidency. We do not mean to suggest that Biden's leadership is equivalent to Trump's, or that the Democratic and Republican Parties share equal blame for routinizing presidential partisanship. Not only does the base of the Republican Party not apologize for violent insurrection and embrace conspiratorial tales about election fraud, Republican Party leaders in Congress and the states openly question foundational rules and precedent for short-term advantage. Nevertheless, from the early days of his presidency, Biden has struggled to escape from the cultural and institutional forces embedding executive-centered partisanship in American democracy. Despite claims to the contrary, Biden's early performance in office, especially with respect to the COVID-19 crisis, has reinforced the essential features of presidential partisanship.22 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, “Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship during the President's First Year in Office,” The Forum 19, no. 4 (2021): 709–744. Trump's presidency, therefore, has further fused partisanship and executive administration, fanning, rather than dousing, the flames of social discord, all while testing the “resilience” of American democracy.33 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2019). Emergencies have routinely engaged the potential power of the American state and served as a rallying cry to unify the nation. Yet the public health and economic crises wrought by COVID-19 revealed how the worst emergency since the Great Depression failed to free American politics and government from the conditions that deeply divided the nation. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish COVID-19 from previous crises in American political development, and to reconsider the ways in which earlier emergency responses have affected the development of the American state. To do so, we place the emergence of COVID-19 as a national crisis within a richer historical context, one that accounts for the secular development of a politicized administrative state and the deterioration of partisan organizations. Likewise, although the COVID-19 pandemic has been unique in many ways, it is a telling case for understanding the underlying factors that influence the partisan imperatives to use public crises and the authority they confer for partisan advantage. Indeed, unlike other crises fabricated for partisan objectives—for example, the “war on drugs” that Richard Nixon declared in 1971—COVID-19 posed and proved a dire threat to public health. Paradoxically, the Trump administration sought to exploit the public health emergency, even as it denied its severity. As a result, COVID-19 deepened a political crisis that for decades had politicized the administrative state, subjecting it to a contest between liberals and conservatives for its services. Our analysis takes a broader understanding of the American state. The idea of a “state” cannot be encompassed by Max Weber's definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”44 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128 (originally published 1919). Especially in the United States, with its fragmentation of power, the state should be understood as “negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units, patterns of competition and contestation among political parties, and relations among ‘public’ and ‘private’ providers of social welfare.”55 Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Review: Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State,” World Politics 61 (July 2009): 547–588, at 549. The American state is not easily characterized as weak or strong—its power derives from a centralizing ambition amid a complex system of institutions that seeks to cultivate or impose a specific type of American community. This American state is a legacy of unintended consequences, historical contingency, and the unique position of the presidency in the constitutional order. In particular, the rise of the modern state, especially in a political culture that presumes to proscribe centralized power, is inextricably connected to American wars and domestic emergencies, which are frequently characterized as the moral equivalent of wars. Unlike some other republican charters, the U.S. Constitution does not have formal provisions that establish prerogative executive power in times of emergency.66 For example, Article 16 of the French Constitution explicitly allows the president to take exceptional measures “where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat” (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008). This provision was an important template of the Fifth Republic, formed in 1958, which transformed a parliamentary into a presidential system. However, crises have created opportunities for presidents to cut through the normal working arrangements of American politics. The central role of the presidency as a vanguard of institutional change has long been understood by scholars; furthermore, territorial expansion, globalization, and the nationalization of American political culture have encouraged the consolidation of an executive-centered state. The imperative to act—especially when confronted with the existential possibility of the state's destruction—leads to creative extensions of existing administrative power and social policy.77 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizen: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William J. Barber, Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter, 1998): 689–702; and Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building; Financing the Development of the American State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). Emergencies are not only instrumental in episodic bouts of executive aggrandizement; crises and presidential emergency powers have also entrenched the American state's more permanent features.88 Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Especially during major episodes of bellicosity, the terms of political conflict are redefined, and wartime presidents are central actors in defining these terms. Indeed, David Mayhew has written that wars “seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes.”99 David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 473–493, at 473. All-consuming emergencies open up space for presidents to act unilaterally, permitting political outcomes in both foreign and domestic policy that are largely inconceivable absent the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of national crises.1010 William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). As John Lapinski demonstrates, “crises often delegitimize existing government policies that are directly and, in some cases, indirectly linked to the event.”1111 John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877–1994,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 235–251, at 238. Although Congress and the courts do not vanish during protracted states of crisis or war, “modern presidents are undoubtedly the preeminent actors.”1212 Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). “Reconstructive presidents,” Stephen Skowronek argues, can bring about new political orders, but they typically do so only when the prevailing regime is in disarray—after the extant regime's internal weaknesses are exposed, often because it cannot contend with governing exigencies.1313 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Therefore, for liberals and conservatives alike, the grandeur of an energetic executive has been forged during the country's most perilous, unpredictable moments in history. More often than not, war and crisis are understood to be central to the development of foreign policy institutions within the presidency, such as the National Security Council.1414 Bryan Mabee, “Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Origins of the National Security Council Revisited,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (January 2011): 27–44. However, the fact that foreign crises are so central to redefining domestic priorities for presidential administrations suggests that emergency powers cut more deeply into the fabric of the modern political system. Presidential state building is nurtured by large-scale, national crises, but the modern executive, dependent on loyal partisans, is not an institution that works on behalf of the “whole people” or rallies the country to tackle national crises through enduring reforms. Even in the work of administering less politically charged programs, such as disaster funding or decisions to close military bases, the modern presidency is electorally motivated and often acts to serve its core constituency.1515 Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). During emergencies, well-organized and highly motivated factions within a single party can leverage the institution to enact unpopular and divisive schemes.1616 Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Moreover, the reliance on unilateral administrative measures to advance party objectives—disingenuously justified in the name of the “national interest”—further enfeebles legislative institutions during moments of crisis.1717 Neomi Rao, “Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,” New York University Law Review 90 (November 2015): 1463–1526. With the country sharply divided by deep cultural rifts, such presidential unilateralism arouses fundamental struggles over inclusion. For a time, the executive-centered administrative state was sustained by a fragile consensus that obscured partisan conflict over national administrative power. The extraordinary crises of the Great Depression and World War II led to institutional changes and policies that subordinated partisanship to administration, consolidating a New Deal state committed to a “coalition” between partisans of executive power and the proponents of expertise, or “neutral competence.”1818 Herbert Kaufman identifies the “quest for neutral competence” and the “quest for executive leadership” as core commitments in the development of the administrative state. See Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” American Political Science Review 50 (December 1956): 1057–1073. Politics was then a search for pragmatic solutions to the challenging responsibilities that America had to assume, at home and abroad, to secure economic and national security. However, public support for the New Deal state fractured in the wake of the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s.1919 Hugh Heclo, “Sixties Civics,” in Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 53–82. The attempt to realize the Great Society exposed the liberal state's central fault lines (notably racial inequalities), and with violent upheaval in Vietnam and in the nation's urban core, the pragmatic center that buttressed the New Deal disintegrated. Once contested by conservative Democrats and Republicans as a threat to constitutional government, national administrative power gained acceptance on the right as liberalism expanded throughout the 1960s. In the wake of the cultural revolution of that decade, Republicans built a conservative base whose foot soldiers, most notably the Christian Right, rallied around the belief that liberalism had so corrupted the country that the national government had a responsibility to aggressively protect “traditional values” and uphold “law and order.”2020 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt and the Fracturing of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 4 and 5. As presidents have the of partisan leadership and as partisans their political to the president's personal it has become more to national from the president's In the institutional of the presidency with the of the American emergencies offer even greater opportunity for presidents to they act on behalf of their partisan As a partisanship in the United is a struggle over the of the state. has become an executive-centered struggle for the services of national administrative power. The of executive has been deepened by partisan in which Democrats and Republicans not only on of and policy but also their as existential to the American of J. H. C. David G. J. J. S. and in Science no. of this party conflict it First, since the struggles over and have partisan fundamental about it to be an have been further by the expansion of presidential power, executive to partisan conflict. As party wars have Congress, the legislative have become more dependent on presidents to cut through the and advance through executive action. During the and both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents to their and advance partisan through unilateral Sidney M. Milkis, H. and J. Happened to and the New American Party Perspectives on Politics Indeed, Republican presidents have the development of executive-centered partisanship. to the of social in the Richard Nixon was the first conservative president to the of national emergency with a partisan of American With a rallying cry of and Nixon new in the urban core, and abroad, in the of an presidential administration and a conservative modern Richard P. The Administrative (New York: As of the National at the time, conservatives only the work of the New Deal and Great Society the of a powerful president is to to war within his executive in to his Conservative National in in The New Republic, that the politicization of emergency powers did not at the the unilateralism in foreign had been a since the of the threat of an was to its partisan Andrew The New Presidential University of Press, the one foreign the funding of the in is an of that is in the of the American The President: (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, the other the administration's and use of presidential power a deeply partisan commitment to the and to the Republican Party with a of American power A the War on in an by modern embrace of a state. Not only did legal a of legal support for the constitutional independence under the of the in by Donald Trump's Supreme M. of during the and Law Review the White House also to centralize the Republican to transform the and into on the president's leadership in the War against Sidney M. Milkis and H. the Republican and the American Party Perspectives on Politics (September Democratic presidents have also the that crises in to their partisan dynamics are not dependent on the of the White they are to executive-centered partisanship. was on the of the economic that the country had in a presidency, it would be by the of the country of an economic despite and from partisans, the administration its partisan to health the most divisive and partisan policy with perhaps the of The consequences are Democrats in Congress from an with the legislative of his the and of crisis the president's governing strategy long the worst of the Great had As the president in the to the and Sidney Milkis, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative The Forum no. built the centralizing of his conservative and liberal to advance through executive the of a powerful but of the the and especially The 17 at 16 The of and of the to control the federal bureaucracy, and the of Richard its into the administrative presidential powers over and to management strategy directly to his for example, J. and L. and the Administration,” The Journal of 2011): and R. The of in Press, In political crises often leadership and we the for to around the political upheavals also in the community and should in the current of American presidents are to power for partisan are that presidents the were Donald Trump's of the worst national crisis since the Great Depression should have to the of “a late regime Herbert or in a political repudiation of a conservative political and the rise of a new Richard about Trump's and Biden's The Nation, at 16 The Trump presidency at of the At the Trump's about the spread of the his that the president has to battle the pandemic, Trump responsibility to state and governments, and, when for racial and in the of of for the and sought to the of public and for as the president's public amid the of the and did his months a of these only how the Trump administration failed to the threat that COVID-19 posed to public health and the D. and David Trump's The to Leadership on the New York at 16 and C. and Trump from the Trump the of partisan than attempt to the modern executive as the of the public as many and public had been to during a national crisis of the Trump further fused executive prerogative and partisanship. This was not a of Trump's many was to executive

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 2020 US presidential election is worth watching. Also, who wins the US presidential election will influence US foreign and international policy. This research aims to examine the 2020 US Presidential Election, focusing on Joe Biden’s victory. The author uses Scopus sources, which are analyzed using VOS viewer, NVivo, SWOT, Literature Review, and political communication theory, resulting in the peak of Joe Biden’s research in Scopus in 2023 experiencing a decline. The author also finds the involvement of Russian researchers who analyze Joe Biden, where these two countries have been rivals for a long time. Joe Biden and his vice president are political actors who have successfully delivered their political campaigns against Donald Trump and his vice president, Mike Pence. Joe Biden overcame the threat during his campaign by maximizing his power using persuasive speeches, social media, in-person campaigning, and powerful appeals to influence and persuade audiences.

In an era of ongoing strategic confrontation between the world's major powers, the security and foreign policy of the United States, the still dominant global superpower, is also undergoing constant and turbulent changes personified particularly by the arrival of new presidential administrations. In this regard, the ascension of the administration of current President Joe Biden in January 2021 is another milestone for the analysis of U.S. security policy. The presented article thus analyses the foreign and security policy of the United States of America in the January 2021-January 2023 period, that is, in the first half of the Joe Biden administration's term. The authors use the foreign policy analysis method to critically analyse Biden's foreign and security policy in three distinctive geopolitical regions: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. The authors utilise Biden's policy in these regions as a case study to test Pavel Hlaváček's theory from 2018, according to which the national mood of the U.S. foreign currently finds itself in an introverted phase. The authors conclude that the theory remains valid by analysing Biden's foreign and security policy. Based on the 2022 midterm elections result, they also support Hlaváček's assumption that another alteration in the national mood in the U.S. foreign policy should not be expected sooner than in the mid-2030s. Nonetheless, the validity of the applied theory and the conclusions we have drawn from it will be conclusively tested by all upcoming presidential or midterm elections, with the nearest ones as early as November 2024.

Presidential Power, the Panay Incident, and the Defeat of the Ludlow Amendment

Politic is a struggle for power to gain attention and persuade the audience. This study attempts to describe the political discourse on Joe Biden’s Speech. The data were taken from Joe Biden’s acceptance speech at the 2020 Democratic National Convention. The analysis of the data was conducted by a descriptive qualitative method. The writers tried to find the structure of political discourse in Joe Biden’s speech. The result of this study shows there are 8 topics found in Joe Biden’s speech, namely (1) Crises, (2) the country that everyone wishes to live, (3) missions of Joe Biden, (4) Joe Biden and Kamala Harris’s life story and family, (5) the campaign and election’s value, (6) Joe Biden’s reason for running as president, (7) Joe Biden’s opinion of his opponent, and (8) Joe Biden’s perspective about America. Each topic consists of some elements of political discourse structures: local semantic, lexicon, syntax, rhetoric, expression structure, and speech act and interaction. Therefore by considering the use of political discourse structure, the speaker able to persuade the audience.

This article aims to show to what extent the speech acts theory can be useful for text analysis and meaning deciphering. It further seeks to unveil, beyond what is literally said in President Joe Biden’s opening and closing remarks, the underlying meanings subtly encoded via the different speech acts embedded therein to help grasp the ins and outs of the first summit for democracy. The study employs the mixed method to attain its objectives. The investigation has disclosed that representative speech acts have been used to describe the state of democracy worldwide today. They further reveal that the statistical data presented in the opening remarks as regards democracy is real and trustworthy. Democracy is therefore in trouble in virtually all countries in the world, even those held up or taken as models in this matter. Commissive speech acts have been used to reveal the plans President Biden has in mind for the re-establishment of democracy all over the world. Despite his rank, Joe Biden’s special language use via the directive speech and the social power he embodies shows that he is not an autocratic president. It also evokes the notion of politeness. In fact, he has been tactful, modest and very nice in his address to his audience. He has by so doing shown awareness and consideration of the face of the people attending the summit. The felicity, Sincerity and essential conditions testify to the validity of the direct speech acts recorded in the remarks. These felicity conditions indicate that the plans made and decisions reached at the summit as encoded via the commissive speech acts are going to be enforced for a better democratic world to live in. Achievement reports at the second upcoming summit for democracy will unquestionably help assess this accurately.

The purpose of this study is to examine the foreign policy of the Joe Biden era in dealing with China. The authors use qualitative research, data sources from Web, Scopus, Taylor, and documents from the United States Department of State. The author uses a supporting application, namely, VOS Viewer. After that, it is analyzed using the theory of liberalism in tracing Joe Biden's foreign policy. Therefore, this article resulted in Joe Biden implementing his "Foreign Policy for the Middle Class" strategy. Joe Biden has revived EU-US dialog and coordinated sanctions against Chinese officials in response to human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The US uses a strategic approach in industrial planning to maintain competitiveness with China. Biden's first trade policy action involved an executive order regarding government procurement. Its military policy focuses on multilateral action to limit Chinese operations and reduce their impact on collaboration with allies.

A Decade of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy∗

There is no capitalist conspiracy and the rich are not all‐powerful

The speech of participants in any discourse, particularly political discourse, contains both explicit and implicit meanings. Political discourse is characterized by its ambiguity, making the correct interpretation of the messages conveyed by politicians — implicatures (“what is left unsaid”) — a challenging task. This requires the establishment of unwritten communicative rules according to which the speaker must avoid both excessive brevity and unnecessary verbosity. Still, politicians use implicatures as a strategy to influence the electorate, deliberately resorting to ambiguity in their speeches. However, this strategy does not always yield desired results, as the reactions within the discourse, particularly from the media and political circles, may distort the original meaning of what was said. This highlights the relevance of analyzing the implicit information derived from the political discourses of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris at various stages of their careers. The study examines quotations from their political speeches, addresses, and interviews, as well as the editorial content from the New York Times, The Washington Post, The Economist, and other leading American publications from 1987 to 2024. The theoretical foundation for the practical implementation of the research area is the theory of implicature proposed by English philosopher Herbert Paul Grice, who also formulated the principles of effective communication within the framework of the so-called Cooperative Principle. A harmonious synthesis of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle with implicit meanings is necessary for reaching mutual understanding between the speaker and the listener, which is particularly relevant for political discourse. As a result of the study, based on Grice’s theory of implicatures, violations of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle were analyzed in the political discourses of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris. It was found that such violations, identified through stylistic devices (euphemisms, metaphors, allusions, hints, etc.), generate implicit meanings that influence the audience’s perception. The study demonstrated how Grice’s theory of implicatures is applied in real political communication contexts, based on context, background knowledge, and historical background, which contributes to the development of discourse analysis, pragmatics, and political linguistics, while also potentially finding practical applications in media analysis, critical thinking. and rhetoric.

This study focuses on the phenomenon of speech acts in Joe Biden’s victory speech in the US presidential election 2020. There are 30 selected utterances taken from Joe Biden’s victory speech. This study applies a qualitative method. Moreover, the data in this study are in the form of utterances which contain speech acts. The analysis begins by classifying the types of speech acts used by Joe Biden in his victory speech using Searle’s theory of speech acts (1976), and the theory of context by Brown and Yule (1983). In total there are 30 utterances; 11 utterances are representative, 7 utterances are directive, 6 utterances are commissive, 5 utterances are expressive, and 1 utterance is declarative. The second research question is to reveal the implied meanings of the speech acts used by Joe Biden in his victory speech. The results of this study show that the implied meanings from Joe Biden’s utterances in his victory speech are about the commitments he will carry out in the future and to convince the audience of his sincerity in running for president of the United States of America by presenting the great programs he will run when in office and stresses the importance of unity in building and moving the nation forward.

At the 42nd New York Film Festival in 2004, an enthusiastic audience viewed a selection of propaganda films rarely seen in the USA. The exhibit, ‘Selling Democracy—Welcome Mr. Marshall. Films of th...

The change in leadership from Donald Trump to Joe Biden brought a new policy direction for the United States. One of them is the Paris Agreement. Biden's concern for the issue of climate change led the United States to change its foreign policy in the Paris Agreement, namely ratification after it was previously issued during the Trump administration. This study presents the formulation of the problem "How can changes in US foreign policy in the Paris Agreement in the era of Joe Biden be seen through green theory?". Through the formulation of the problem, this study explains how green theory sees changes in US foreign policy in the Paris Agreement during the reign of Joe Biden. This research is a qualitative type with explanatory data analysis techniques. In conducting research, green theory and the Holsti foreign policy analysis model are used to explain how the role of the leader as the main actor influences the making of a country's foreign policy. This research found that the difference in policy focus between Trump and Biden was a factor in the change in US foreign policy in the Paris Agreement during the reign of Joe Biden.

Scholarly attention to oil reached its zenith in the late 1980s. Spirited debates on regime theory, neorealism and American hegemony dovetailed with the aftermath of the oil shocks, the ongoing Ira...