Abstract
This studyexamines the choice between specific and ad valorem taxes when the production of a good, produced under imperfect competition, creates harmful externalities. The optimal tax system is shown to rely on wholly ad valorem (specific) taxation if the valuation of the distortion arising from the harmful externalityis smaller (larger) than that of the imperfect competition
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