Speaking Freely and Freedom of Speech: Feminists Navigating the "New" Right

Attempts to equate freedom of speech with other rights, such as freedom of expression or freedom of opinion, are wrong. Because these rights already have their respective territories, both in efforts to promote them and in terms of settling legal violations. However, in practice in Indonesia, this error still occurs, the indications are that there is still no law that specifically regulates freedom of speech. On that basis, this article wants to look at the factors that lead to a legal vacuum for freedom of speech, and solutions to overcome this vacuum. This article uses a normative juridical approach to inventory various legal products and practices for making decisions or policies regarding the promotion of freedom of speech after the 1998 Reform Era in Indonesia. In the end, this article finds that the legal vacuum in efforts to promote the right to freedom of speech is caused still there the tug-of-war between the importance of promoting human rights, and the ambiguity of the understanding of freedom of expression. Therefore, it is important to synchronize laws and regulations regarding the rights belonging to freedom of expression, and strengthen regulations on freedom of speech that specifically contain definitions, limitations, and ways of resolving violations of the law. Specifically strengthening regulations, is formed in the form of statutory regulations which are under the constitution, so that there is a detailed legal direction or umbrella for efforts to promote freedom of speech.

Introduction This article is concerned with the relationship between freedom of expression and copyright law and, more fundamentally, with what this relationship – its conflicts, tensions, and attempted resolutions – can reveal to us about the nature of the copyright interest. Freedom of expression protects an individual's right to express herself without limitations imposed upon the content of her speech, while copyright law prevents an individual from expressing herself through another's copyrightable expression. In the American context, this apparent inconsonance led Melville Nimmer to ask, 'Is not [the Copyright Act] precisely a "law" … which abridges the 'freedom of speech' and 'of the press' in that it punishes expressions by speech and press when such expression consists of the unauthorized use of material protected by copyright?'1 With this question in mind, it would not seem far-fetched to suggest that an absolutist conception of the right of free expression could render the Copyright Act unconstitutional. But then, as Nimmer takes care to point out, the 'reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses … are the great problems of the law.'2 When irreconcilable assertions are embodied in competing individual rights, reconciliation tends to be proffered in the language of 'balance,' 'compromise,' or 'trump.' These words embody the analytic tools by which the interface between copyright protection and the right of freedom expression has typically been shaped and defined. In the discussion that follows, I hope to show that these words are inadequate tools for the task. Having locked potentially antagonistic rights into 'logic-tight compartments,'3 Canadian courts have been surprisingly successful at maintaining [End Page 75] the separation of freedom of expression considerations and copyright law. However, given the nature of the copyright interest, there are necessarily moments where both copyright and the right of free expression are irrefutably at play, and apparently in conflict. In such instances, this neatly compartmentalized understanding leads to an overly simplistic resolution: one concern is temporarily given precedence over the other (balance), forced to give up ground (compromise), or made to give way completely (trump). The characterization of copyright as a species of private property entitlement tends to afford it moral and legal primacy. This causes free expression concerns to give way to private copyright control and, I will argue, thereby shifts copyright law further from the justificatory foundations upon which it stands. My purpose in this article is to show that the characterization of copyright and freedom of expression as individual rights vested in the liberal subject undermines the importance of both sets of interests and ultimately restricts the communicative activity that both copyright and freedom of expression are intended to further. The social values that lie at the core of the copyright system are the same as those affirmed by our belief in the guarantee of freedom of expression: the value that we attach to communication, to interaction between members of society, and to participation in a social dialogue. The key to understanding the relationship between freedom of expression and copyright is to see them both in light of their mutual goal: that of maximizing cultural flows and channels of communication between members of society. To ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of copyright, it must therefore embrace the values of freedom of expression, for these values are its own. Premised upon this assertion, my argument will be that a vision of copyright as a private, proprietary entitlement capable of trumping free expression interests disrupts the internal coherence of the copyright system. Rather than purporting to reconcile the irreconcilable, then, copyright policy should concern itself with fostering the human, creative capacities that it is intended to encourage. To the extent that it does so, no antitheses require resolution. In Part II of this article, I describe the conflict that exists at the level of individual rights between...

Plato and Aristotle place opinion intermediate between knowledge and ignorance with all opinions under the suspicion of error. Kant summarized that opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement, subjectively and objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Only knowledge is subjectively and objectively sufficient. Despite this philosophically doubtful value of opinions, thinkers such as Milton, Locke, Montesquieu and Mill maintain that the freedom of opinion and speech are the basis of open societies but find limits when it represents a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public. Also the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaims the right to hold opinions without interference provided that it respects the rights or reputations of others and does not interfere with the protection of public health. Hate speech and propaganda for war are expressively prohibited. Postwar US politicians formulated the position that every man has a right to his own opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts. The impact of this discussion on opinions about control measures of the COVID‐19 pandemic is explored in this editorial.

Preface List of Court Cases 1. Introduction to Freedom of Expression and the American Legal System The Nature of Freedom of Speech How Free Expression Rights Are Determined Justifications and Critiques of Freedom of Expression Conclusion 2. Historical Perspectives on Freedom of Expression Free Expression in World Cultures Freedom of Expression in America: 1600-1917 Conclusion 3. Incitement to Illegal Conduct and True Threats The Clear and Present Danger Test The Gitlow Decision Protects Freedom of Speech From State Abridgement Freedom of Speech for Communists: Clear and Present Danger? Brandenburg v. Ohio: Strengthening Protection of Speech The Brandenburg Rule and Contemporary Communication Distinguishing Incitement From True Threats Conclusion 4. National Security and Freedom of Expression A National Security Exception to the Constitution? Government Efforts to Limit Free Expression in Wartime Government Practices That Keep Information Secret Government Surveillance of Its Citizens Conclusion 5. Fighting Words and the Categorical Exceptions Doctrines The Categorical Exceptions and Fighting Words Doctrines Are Announced in Chaplinsky The Fighting Words Definition is Refined in Terminiello The Definition of Fighting Words is Narrowed R.A.V. v. City of St.Paul: Fighting Words and Categorical Exceptions Doctrines Live On Conclusion 6. Hate Speech The Problem of Hate Speech Do Speech Codes Violate the First Amendment? Thinking Critically About Hate Speech Regulation Conclusion 7. Defamation: First Amendment Issues New York Times v. Sullivan: The Actual Malice Rule The New York Times Rule: Application of the Actual Malice Test The New York Times Rule: Proof of Actual Malice Beyond New York Times v. Sullivan: Additional First Amendment Protections Has the Actual Malice Rule Served Its Purpose? Conclusion 8. Obscenity and Child Pornography Obscenity Not Protected by the First Amendment 1957-1973: The Supreme Court Struggles With Meaning of Obscenity Court Majority Agrees on Obscenity Does Context Influence Constitutional Protection? Critical Thinking About Obscenity Distinguishing Obscenity From Child Pornography Conclusion 9. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions Historical Developments The Modern Time, Place, and Manner Test The Forums Held in Trust for Public Expression Time, Place, or Manner Rules: Noteworthy Controversies Conclusion 10. Symbolic Expression The Benefits of Symbolic Expression The Definitions of Symbolic Expression The Test for Constitutional Protection of Symbolic Expression Restrictions Related to Suppression: The Flag Burning Issue Conclusion 11. Technology and the First Amendment Medium-Specific Restrictions on Expression: Early History Theories Used to Justify Broadcast Regulation Regulation of Internet Communication Conclusion 12. Privacy and Free Speech Privacy and the Search for Penumbral Rights The Right to Privacy in One's Self The Right to Privacy Within the Home Balancing a Right to Persuade With a Right to Privacy in Public Spaces Outside the Home The Right to Informational Privacy Conclusion 13. Access to Information A Right of Access to Government Information Journalists' Privilege Access to Judicial Proceedings Conclusion 14. Copyright and the First Amendment Copyright Law in the United States Copyright Law and the First Amendment Copyright and New Technology Conclusion 15. International and Comparative Perspectives on Freedom of Expression The Global Freedom of Expression Landscape Cultural Values and Free Expression Rights Judicial Decisions on Freedom of Expression Twenty-First Century Technology and International Freedom of Expression Conclusion Index About the Authors

Religious Liberty: The Next Big Thing? Patrick Riordan SJ Pope Francis’s timely letter Laudato Si’, on care for our common home, coincided with a general awakening of awareness of the crisis posed by climate change and the degradation of the natural environment. The Amazon Synod of Bishops has reinforced concern for our common home in the same year that saw not only extensive fires in the rainforests of Brazil but Siberia also in flame. The teenage Greta Thunberg and the protest movement of Extinction Rebellion have claimed the headlines and brought the issue to wider public awareness. What is the next big issue for the pope and the church that may evoke another prophetic statement comparable to Laudato Si’? In the spirit in which Francis insists on integral ecology, including the flourishing of humankind, I suggest that the next big thing already looms over us. It is the widespread and growing violation of the right to religious liberty. Ancient Christian communities in Syria and Iraq, dating back to the time of Christ, have been destroyed or decimated in the violence of the recent years; Yazidis and other minorities have experienced extreme persecution by Islamic extremists. Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern Islamic states continue to deny religious liberty to their non-Muslim inhabitants, and to their own citizens they deny the freedom to leave their ancestral religion. Resurgent religious nationalism is found not only among Islamic states: Hindu revivalism in India is accompanied by the persecution of Muslims as well as Christians, and Buddhism in Myanmar asserts itself by expelling to Bangladesh the Rohingya minority. Sri Lanka has also seen a bloody conflict in which a Buddhist majority has succeeded in asserting a form of religious nationalism. The status of the Uighurs in China points to another context in which a dominant cultural population is unable to accept the presence of a large minority religious group. Freedom of religion, although prominent in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the subsequent Conventions, is not functioning to protect the vulnerable members of persecuted religions. Apart from the actual violations of religious liberty across the world, there is also a threat to the very idea of religious liberty posed by developments Studies • volume 109 • number 433 31 Studies_layout_SPRING-2020.indd 31 Studies_layout_SPRING-2020.indd 31 27/02/2020 13:59 27/02/2020 13:59 in the philosophical language used to discuss rights and specifically human rights. The question is being raised, whether there is anything distinctive about religion that would warrant the inclusion of a right to religious liberty in the international lists of human rights and in national Bills of Rights. Since freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom from arbitrary discrimination on grounds including religion, are normally protected, why should religious liberty be included? Does it not reduce to the other rights? In what follows I will first recall what is asserted about religious liberty; second I will review philosophical trends that tend to question the need for a distinctive right; and third, I will summarise the arguments that are required to explain and uphold the right to religious liberty. Religious liberty TheAmerican Constitution’s FirstAmendment combines in a single sentence the non-establishment clause and the free exercise clause: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’. It is a simplification to describe the free exercise provision as protecting religion from politics although that is its main effect, denying the US Congress the power to make laws restricting the exercise of religion. Here the free exercise of religion is linked with other freedoms, viz., the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly and the right to petition the government. Is the freedom of religion an additional freedom to those listed as the freedoms of speech, of the press and of assembly? If the state is obliged to respect and protect those rights of free expression, of publication and of assembly...

With technological developments, there are now many media available that can be used to convey opinions. X (Twitter) is a social media that accommodates freedom of speech or freedom of opinion. Freedom of speech in X, often deviates from what should be understood, especially for K-Pop fans. Many K-Pop fans use X as a way to voice an opinion or criticize something. This research uses a qualitative approach with data collection techniques through in-depth interviews, documentation and literature study. The theory used is new media theory with a social integration approach, namely that media use is considered a shared ritual that has become a habit, something that is formal and has greater value. The research results show that the application of freedom of speech on social media X to K-Pop fans has not been implemented well. Because the opinion expressed is not yet complete, it does not lead to opinions conveying hate speech or spreading hoaxes.

Freedom of opinion and expression is essential for the entire development of a person. They are the foundation of any free and democratic society. Because it gives meaning to life, freedom of speech and expression is the first and basic human right, the basic condition of freedom, and the mother of all rights. However, when exercising freedom of speech, questions often arise, such as how far the state can regulate individual behavior. Personal autonomy is the cornerstone of basic freedom; therefore, every constraint is strictly evaluated. However, this right can always be appropriately restricted to ensure that it is used correctly and that all people have equal access to it. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 defines sedition as a criminal offence. The importance of this part in an independent and democratic country is a hotly debated topic. This article looks at sedition and why it cannot be compared with Article 19 (Right of Freedom of Speech and Expression) of the Indian Constitution. It also raises the issue of application in a democratic world where freedom of speech and expression is regarded as the mother of all rights, and compares India’s sedition legislation with those of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, as India’s sedition law viewpoint Different from other countries.

From the 1798 Sedition Act to the war on terror, numerous presidents, members of Congress, Supreme Court justices, and local officials have endorsed the silencing of free expression. If the connection between democracy and the freedom of speech is such a vital one, why would so many governmental leaders seek to quiet their citizens? Free Expression and Democracy in America traces two rival traditions in American culture - suppression of speech and dissent as a form of speech - to provide an unparalleled overview of the law, history, and politics of individual rights in the United States.Charting the course of free expression alongside the nation's political evolution, from the birth of the Constitution to the quagmire of the Vietnam War, Stephen M. Feldman argues that our level of freedom is determined not only by the Supreme Court, but also by cultural, social, and economic forces. Along the way, he pinpoints the struggles of excluded groups - women, African Americans, and laborers - to participate in democratic government as pivotal to the development of free expression. In an age when our freedom of speech is once again at risk, this momentous book will be essential reading for legal historians, political scientists, and history buffs alike.

This experiment found exposure study of expression increases news seeking and newspaper readership. Since 1973, confidence in major institutions -- except mass media -- has declined only slightly. A special report from Roper Center for Public Opinion Research challenges notion of declining social capital in America and suggests that confidence in press alone has shown a consistent decline since early 1970s.(1) Given this disparity, perhaps newspapers are suffering not from generalized civic disengagement but from citizen disgust at free expression that too often is filled with hate, racism and indecency.(2) Declining confidence in press is most noticeable among those who are more educated, more conservative and more Republican, who also are more likely be disillusioned by and disenfranchised from press. At same time, editors' concern with declining newspaper penetration has become virtually a commonplace.(3) Abundant academic and industry research into declining newspaper circulation has found that newspapers disproportionately fail attract people who are low in education or income, rural, non-white, uninvolved, younger than 35, recently relocated and female.(4) Nonreaders also are more likely be less interested in political and civic affairs than readers.(5) Because industry sins of omission and commission play a major role in distancing readers, industry actions may attract new and returning readers. For example, when Jeremy Lipschultz examined reasons for nonreadership, he found nonreaders questioned newspaper readability, credibility and utility.(6) Ethicist and media critic Sissela Bok has said press faces a crisis of credibility.(7) In response, American Society of Newspaper Editors sponsored a 1998 study examining erosion of newspaper credibility as a primary source of declining readership.(8) But according Stephan Russ-Wohl, proper response such concerns is to strengthen and diversify existing network of institutions and initiatives that help maintain and improve journalistic standards. Such institutions and initiatives [should] sustain discourse regarding journalism and media.(9) This study, however, seeks determine whether discourse designed improve newspaper circulation also should encompass discussion of value of free expression. The underlying thesis is that if non-readership is a symptom of disillusionment with free expression, then readership might be improved by increasing understanding of and interest in First Amendment values. This thesis rests on assumption that support of free speech and free press can be increased through education about free-expression issues and values. For, as ACLU President Nadine Strossen has said, biggest threat civil liberties is apathy and ignorance. Strossen further said: Ultimately, if people are not concerned and committed about their rights, we're going have elected officials who trample over those rights, with nobody stand up and defend them when they appoint judges who will not enforce Constitution and other legal guarantees of rights.(10) Indeed, a 1997 Freedom Forum survey found that most Americans do not believe in freedom of speech.(11) According survey, people from all points on political and religious spectrum embrace a flaccid and utterly meaningless definition of ... expressive freedom [as] support [for] freedom of speech for only speech that I agree deserves freedom.(12) Attempts find source of this disaffection often lead media blaming.(13) A 1997 report by media critic Stephen Bates found that the strained bond between press and public is a modern media crisis.(14) In his exploration of media, power and entitlement in America, David Protess found that media rarely and only peripherally involve or affect public. …

Perhaps no judicial decision affecting nation's scholastic press has received more attention from researchers than Supreme Court's 1988 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier ruling, which allowed school administrators to censor school publications are not public forums if censorship is pedagogically related. Same researchers and commentators have stated ruling was a major change in status of freedom of high school press and has led to increased censorship and self-censorship (Student Press Law Center, 1994; Hernandez, 1995). Other researchers and commentators have contended ruling did nothing to change administrators' authority over ability of students to send and receive information through school publications and has had minimal effect on student press (Salomone, 1992; Click, Kopenhaver and Hatcher,1993; Dvorak, Lain and Dickson, 1994; Dickson and Paxton 1997). In wake of Hazelwood ruling and outcry over censorship of student press, four states enacted state freedom of expression laws covering high school journalists: Arkansas (Arkansas Student Publications Act, 1995), Colorado (Rights of Free Expression for Public School Students, 1990), Iowa (Student Exercise of Free Expression, 1989), and Kansas (Student Publications,1992]. A fifth state, Massachusetts, amended its freedom of expression law (Right of Students to Freedom of Expression, 1974), following Hazelwood. A sixth state, California, already had a freedom of expression law covering high school journalists when Hazelwood was decided (Student Exercise of Freedom of Speech and Press, 1983). A 1997 attempt to enact a similar law in Illinois failed when state Senate failed to override a veto by Gov. Jim Edgar (Illinois Lawmakers, 1997). This study, based on a national random-sample survey of high school newspaper advisors, is first attempt to determine on a nationwide basis whether amount of press freedom at public high schools differs in states with scholastic freedom of press laws and states without such laws. Hazelwood While not directly involving freedom of press issues, a 1969 U.S. Supreme Court decision appeared to solidify fundamental First Amendment rights of free expression for students in public schools. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, Supreme Court overturned suspension of teen-aged students for wearing black armbands to class to demonstrate their opposition to Vietnam war. The Court's decision, while noting student expression disrupting classroom activity still could be banned, stated expression did not cause a disruption was protected by First Amendment. It can hardly be argued, Court said, that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at schoolhouse gate (p. 507). An indication Supreme Court was willing to differentiate between personal speech and school-sponsored speech came in 1986 when Supreme Court in Bethel School District v. Fraser ruled a high school student's free speech rights were not violated when he was punfished for making a speech filled with sexual innuendoes at a student assembly. As Court said, in its opinion, the freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against society's countervailing interest in teaching students boundaries of socially appropriate behavior (p. 681). In well-publicized and much discussed 1988 Hazelwood decision, Supreme Court for first time addressed question of whether censorship of student expression in school newspaper was unconstitutional. In Hazelwood case, students enrolled in Journalism II at Hazelwood East High School in Missouri attempted to publish an edition of school newspaper containing two stories principal disliked. One was based on interviews with students (identified with pseudonyms) who had become pregnant. …

This note, written to accompany NBA, China, and Social Media: What Are the Rules of the Game? (UVA-E-0459) but useful in tandem with other cases, charts the history of freedom of speech in the United States. The US Constitution did not originally include the Bill of Rights (which contains the 1st through 10th Amendments), but after more than 200 years of legal and philosophical shifts, expression rights receive legal protection on a tiered system, with political speech enjoying the least abridgment, commercial and sexually explicit expression subject to some government censorship, and obscenity and fighting words enjoying no protection. This note focuses on political speech, summed up in the 1st Amendment: Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This protection had its challenges over the years, with the most notable blow being the 1798 Sedition Act, which criminalized any questioning of the authority or laws of the US President or Congress. (Congress eventually allowed this act to expire), as well as some 20th century cases (for example, Schenck v. United States, 1919). The note touches on John Stuart Mill's 1859 On Liberty, which made philosophical arguments for the value of free expression that would come to undergird liberal legal interpretations of the 1st Amendment some hundred years later, as well as the repeated infringements of constitutional rights, including free expression during the US Civil War, the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918, and other attempts to suppress free speech. Also referenced is theorist Alexander Meiklejohn, who, in 1949, outlined a highly influential philosophy on the limits of free expression. Excerpt UVA-E-0460 Feb. 16, 2021 The Constitutional Roots of Freedom of Speech In the discourse of American law and society, few individual rights hold as sacred a place in the nation's collective consciousness as the right to freedom of speech. While the framers of the Constitution did not originally think to include the Bill of Rights, in which the First through Tenth Amendments are found, it has become the bedrock of individual liberties in the United States. Today, after over two hundred years of legal and philosophical shifts, expression rights receive legal protection on a tiered system, with political speech enjoying the least abridgment, commercial and sexually explicit expression subject to some government censorship, and obscenity and fighting words enjoying no protection. Each category of speech has a unique sociological and jurisprudential background, but for the purposes of this note, we shall focus on political speech. The text of the First Amendment reads Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. While the text on its face seems to provide absolute protection, the government and courts have never treated it as such. Indeed, in 1798, President John Adams oversaw passage of the Sedition Act, which prescribed criminal penalties for any individuals questioning the authority or laws of the President or Congress. The Act remained in effect until 1801, when Congress allowed it to expire and President Thomas Jefferson pardoned those convicted as a result of the act. . . .

Volume 1: Part 1 Overview: freedom of speech, Larry Alexander. Part 2 Justificatory theories: a theory of freedom of expression, Thomas Scanlon persuasion, autonomy and freedom of expression, David Strauss scope of the first amendment, Edwin C. Baker the value of free speech, Martin H. Redish neutral principles and some first amendment problems, Robert H. Bork free speech justifications, Kent Greenawalt epistemic paternalism -communication control in law, Alvin I. Goldman review essay - the impossibility of a free speech principle, Larry Alexander and Paul Horton must speech be special?, Frederick Schauer. Part 3 Focus - action regulated or government reason: flag desecration -a case study in the roles of categorizing and balancing in the first amendment analysis, John Hart Ely trouble on tract two -incidental regulations of speech and free speech theory, Larry Alexander legal, theory, low value speech, Larry Alexander free speech and speaker's intent, Larry Alexander. Volume 2: Part 1 Content and categories: restrictions of speech because of its content - the peculiar case of subject matter, Geoffrey R. Stone content regulation and the first amendment, Geoffrey R. Stone categories and the first amendment - a play in three acts, Frederick Schauer uncoupling free speech, Frederick Schauer. Part 2 The concepts of the public forum and public discourse: between governance and management - the history and theory of the public forum, Robert C. Post constitutional concept of public discourse - outrageous opinion, democratic deliberation and Hustler Magazine-v-Falwell, Robert C. Post. Part 3 Insults and incitements: insults and epithets - are they protected speech?, Kent Greenawalt racist speech, democracy and the first amendment, Robert C. Post banning hate speech and the sticks and stones defence, Larry Alexander incitement and freedom of speech, Larry Alexander. Part 4 Speech and the affirmative state: government subsidies and free expression, Martin H. Redish and Daryl I. Kessler the Supreme Court comment - principles, institutions and the first amendment, Frederick Schauer.

While Islam emphasizes conformity to the directives of the Qur’an andSunnah, one finds in the same sources a parallel emphasis on rational inquiry,exercise of personal opinion, and judgment. This essay looks into the evidencein support of this statement and the extent to which Islam validates the freedomto formulate and express an opinioq. It also examines the methodology andcriteria that ascertain the validity of personal opinion and distinguishs theacceptable ra’y from that which is not tolerated. This essay also highlightshow the detailed classification of ra’y by the ‘Ulama reflects a concern forlatitude and tolerance on the one hand, balanced on the other by respectfor recognized authority and values which are deemed essential to Islam.Freedom to express an opinion is probably the most important aspectof the freedom of speech, which also comprises such other varieties of speechas a simple narration of facts, comedy, and fiction. To express an opinionon a matter implies a level of involvement, commitment, and competencewhich may or may not be present in the factual narration of an event. Thismay partly explain why the phrase hurriyah al-ra'y), (literally, freedom ofopinion) is used in the Islamic scholastic tradition for freedom of speech,in preference to hurriyah al-qawl, the more precise equivalent of “freedomof speech.” That scholars and jurists have consistently used hurriyah al-ra'yfor freedom of speech perhaps signifies that ra'y, or personal opinion, isthe most important aspect of this freedom.Ra ’y has three main classifications -praiseworthy, blameworthy, anddoubtful personal opinion-which are further subdivided. The main varietiesof praiseworthy opinion to be discussed here are ra'y, that elaborates the Qur‘anand Sunnah, the opinions of the Companions, ra'y that consists of ijtihad,and ra’y that is arrived at as a result of consultation. Blameworthy opinionis also divided into three types, namely bid‘ah (pernicious innovation), hawa(caprice), and baghy (transgression). And, lastly, ra'y, that is the subject ofdoubt (ra'y fi mawdi‘ al-ishtibah) does not lend itself to classification or ...

Copyright is not the first so-called private law right governing speech or expression to be touched by the accusation that its operation may, in some respects, constitute a limit on freedom of speech. There is a relatively well-developed jurisprudence in which concepts of freedom of speech have operated in order to limit, for example, the rights to sue for defamation and breach of confidence. Freedom of speech issues have intruded into these areas as the result of a collision between these ‘private rights’ and matters of ‘public interest or concern’. So in US defamation law, for example, the Constitutional protection of free speech has been invoked to limit the ability of ‘public’ figures to sue for defamation, on the basis that free expression on matters of public concern should not be chilled. Similar considerations.

Due to Pakistan's diverse cultural and political landscape, essential democratic pillars like freedom of speech and expression remain challenging. This study investigates the status of free expression in Pakistan by qualitatively analyzing scholarly literature, legal papers, news stories, and interviews. In this study, we have discussed the fundamental right pertaining to free speech which is guaranteed in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. We also have Examined that how religious beliefs and political unrest are sociocultural elements affecting self-censorship. Online censorship regulations and surveillance provide additional issues in the digital world, which are explored in the paper. Critics of the have endured threats, harassment, and job losses, according to primary evidence gathered from interviews with journalists and legal experts. Although the Constitution of Pakistan promises the right to free expression, the results show that open debate and dissent have been severely limited over the years due to practical restrictions, and even more limits have just come into effect.