Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency

Abstract

A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and hills. --W. W. Rostow, US National Security Advisor, 1962 (1) We are without allies amongst the Iraqi populace, including those who have benefited from the ouster of Saddam.... Across Baghdad, Latifiyah, Mahmudiyah, Salman Pak, Baqubah, Balad, Taji, Baiji, Ramadi, and just about everywhere else you can name, the people absolutely hate us.... Iraqi people have not bought into what the Americans are selling, and no amount of military activity is going to change this fact. --Special Forces Veteran in Iraq (2) Operation Iraqi Freedom was predicated partially on a presumption of widespread popular support among the Iraqi people for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. theory held that a relatively small military force could topple the Ba'athist regime with swift attacks aimed at key targets. Then, using momentum secured by liberating an oppressed people, a temporary government comprised of expatriate technocrats could step in to rule the country until a government could be elected. Shortly thereafter, the reasoning held, the country would achieve stability and the United States could dramatically reduce troop levels. This vision was largely deflated shortly after coalition troops dashed north, securing vast swaths of Iraq and quickly destroying remnant military forces. Despite stunning military success, the victory failed to simultaneously produce the anticipated wellspring of Within three months of the fall of Baghdad, this notion was completely discredited as Iraq found itself in the grip of a nationwide wave of violence. violence has continued, remaining remarkably consistent despite periodic surges and depressions of attacks. During this time, the coalition flooded the country with hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of dollars in reconstruction aid. (3) Despite significant troop numbers, large sums of money, and a great deal of personal commitment by all forces over the past two years, one thing has remained predictably constant: the population's neutrality. recent national elections in January present the most marked aberration from the population's general ambivalence; yet it remains to be seen whether this represents the genesis of a paradigm shift. Using Iraq as a model, this article seeks to examine the relationship between the people and the insurgency, with the ultimate questions being: What role does the civilian population play in the insurgency, and how can this situation be influenced to achieve success? article examines the traditional military doctrines of insurgency and finds that: (1) though unique, the Iraqi insurgency is following a predictable pattern of development; (2) the civilian population plays a determinative role in the success or failure of the insurgency; and (3) the civilian population can be more effectively influenced though a more selective and efficient application of civil-military (4) Mao Tse-tung famously noted, Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. (5) Army doctrine reflects this philosophy: The basic factor affecting the birth, survival, and ultimate success of guerrilla movements is the support of an adequate portion of the civilian population in an area of operations. (6) Popular support is equally important in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies: Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support. (7) It is worth highlighting the distinction between insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, as the terms are often used interchangeably. (8) An insurgency is an internal uprising against a ruling power (domestic or foreign) with its foundation rooted in a desire for political or social change. …