Space as the Ultimate Heartland: Mackinder’s Geopolitical Theory in the Age of Orbital Warfare

Struggling for supremacy between great powers and the rise or fall and regime change of great powers are all subject to the Geopolitical Law. Geographers should keep in step with the times, accurately grasp the national interests, and seize the opportunity to contribute to the great rejuvenation of our nation. However, due to lack of criticism on the history and philosophy of geopolitics, we can neither accurately understand the geopolitical theory, nor effectively put the geopolitical theory into practice. This paper introduces the development of critical geopolitics, summarizes the three characteristics of critical geopolitics, and interprets the four classical geopolitical theories accordingly. In order to simplify the interpretation process, this paper firstly presents an analytical framework for interpretation of four classical geopolitical theories; secondly, focuses on interpretation of “The Geographical Pivot of History” put forward by Mackinder according to the analytical framework; finally, critically summarizes the four classical geopolitical theories. Through the critical interpretation, this paper draws a conclusion that there are the scientific, hypothetical and conceptual classical geopolitical theories. The construction of classical geopolitical theories is based on the international geopolitical structure, spatial distribution of national interests and inter-state spatial conflict, in order to show the identity of theoretical constructor, so as to reflect the historicality, sociality, situationality and geographical knowledge–power structure of geopolitical theories.

The functioning of terrestrial critical infrastructures, such as electricity, transportation, and finance depends on critical space infrastructures (CSI). CSI underlie the provision of vital goods and services, economic activities, national and global security. Consequently, securing CSI from cyber-attacks is important to avoid disruptions in the provision of critical goods and services and ensure high levels of security in our societies. Existing cases of cyber-attacks against ground and space components of CSI have proven the consequences of such attacks for domestic and international security, economic, systemic, environmental and social safety and stability. With strategic gains increasingly motivating state and state-sponsored attacks against CSI, the European Union (EU) expanded its resilience and response toolbox to address cyber-threats against CSI. Space has become a highly strategic domain with the EU Strategic Compass, since 2022. Furthermore, in 2023, the High Representative and the Commission put forward an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, presenting the EU’s vision for space security. This programmatic document marks a shift in the EU’s configuration of space, from a domain for scientific and civilian enterprises, to one central to security and defence. This paper examines the quick evolution of the EU’s approach to protecting CSI between 2020 and 2024 against the background of the development of the EU’s approach to CI protection more broadly and the development of its space governance aspirations and capabilities. It examines the EU institutional and legislative frameworks for CSI resilience to assesses how relevant and strategic these are considering new technological developments, in the current global security context.

It is becoming abundantly clear that the militarization of space is occurring. New capabilities and weapons systems are being developed that will apply to Outer Space operations. Military doctrine is simultaneously being developed that will shape the manner in which such military operations will occur. Despite these developments, there is no clarity regarding how and in what manner International Law might apply in those attenuated circumstances to constrain and regulate any developing tension, hostilities or even outright armed conflict. The global community is currently in a precarious place regarding this emerging reality, and it is time that full attention is developed to understanding a normative framework that will inform international decision-making in this realm. This chapter will examine the growing phenomenon of the increasing use of space for military activity and will canvass how International Law may apply to condition behaviour. It will also provide a brief review of informal lawmaking processes that are underway to influence thinking in this area. Such informal lawmaking is principally manifested in the development of an international Manual headed by McGill University and the University of Adelaide to bring together International Government, Military and Humanitarian legal experts to develop a framework on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space. Such a Manual will take its place alongside with others that have been developed in associated theatres of military legal endeavour (naval war, air and missile war and cyber war) and will hopefully shape and condition thinking and decision-making in this emerging and critical field of military operations.

In this paper, the orbits of observable physical quantities of position and momentum operators at the states of quantum Hilbert spaces are created. Also the Hilbert space of finite orbits and the Fréchet–Hilbert space of all orbits are created and the orbital operators corresponding to these observable operators in these spaces of orbits are defined and studied. We call this process the orbitization, and the obtained model the orbital quantum mechanics. The orbitization process is compared with the quantization process. The generalization of well-known canonical commutation relations for orbital operators corresponding to the position and momentum operators is established. Also, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle for the orbital operators is proved and the question of achieving equality in the Heisenberg inequality is considered.

: This monograph examines the effects of changes in the current operating environment and current operations in Iraq on the application of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF). This study identifies the forms and logic behind the function of Nation Assistance (NA), in order to determine if FID operations conducted by SOF and conventionally conducted foreign military advisory efforts should remain separate missions. This study first examines the evolution of FID from its roots in the Nixon Doctrine and inception in military doctrine. Within this analysis, a list of doctrinally based FID prerequisites is presented to use as a common analysis tool for a historical, a contemporary, and any future FID operation. The civil war in El Salvador is used for the historical analysis of FID operations and concluded as an excellent example of a FID operation conducted by SOF. Next, a contemporary FID operation with the 36th Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is analyzed and the consequences of not meeting certain FID prerequisites exposed. Finally, the same prerequisites are presented for a predictive analysis of the future using the Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR) as an impetus behind reviewing current military advisory doctrine. This paper introduces Security Forces Assistance (SFA) as emerging doctrine because of the contemporary requirement for large parts of the U.S. military to conduct military advisement. SFA is presented as an alternate advisory operation that is predicated on a large scale logic, performs the function of such an enterprise endeavor as building an army from virtually nothing, and is totally separate from the FID task.

This chapter addresses the legal framework and role of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), with respect to governmental and commercial activities in space. The ITU is a large, specialised agency of the United Nations with 193 member states and hundreds of other private sector members and associates. ITU regulation involves a licensing and planning scheme for allocation of radio wave frequencies and satellite launch, but also intersects with key legal concerns that do not inherently involve orbital or outer space, such as national security export controls and equitable access to telecommunications for developing nations. As the number of satellites in orbit increases and the commercial satellite industry takes hold, legal challenges arise in how to address satellite congestion and debris hazards, rational competition for launch of new satellites, licensure of higher spectrum levels, the militarisation of space, and ongoing questions of sovereignty relating to resource exploitation and common heritage rights.

Anticipating uncertainty: The security of European critical outer space infrastructures

This chapter provides the basics of space as a critical infrastructure including elements of key resources and assets. Critical space infrastructure (CSI) is presented as a set of interdependent system-of-systems encompassing workforce, environment, facilities and multidirectional interactions essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, whose destruction or disruption would have a significant impact in a given state. Topics of orbits are also discussed in the context of critical infrastructures.

Near-Earth space is becoming increasingly privatized and industrialized, with many consequences for science and humanity. In particular, the number of satellites in low-Earth orbit is predicted to grow dramatically from a couple of thousands at present to many tens of thousands in the near future due to the launch of satellite constellations planned by public and private entities. Large satellite constellations may create new legal and security challenges. Efforts to reduce satellite constellations risks, especially those emanating from natural hazards or intentional attacks, requires an adaptation in both critical infrastructures and space policies. Therefore, in order to realise the full potential of investments in space, critical systems need to be adequately protected and the space environment properly managed. In terms of security of critical space infrastructures past approaches have been largely oriented towards protection. However, there is evidence to suggest a transition promoting the resilience of critical space infrastructures, including those with space segments such as satellites.

The recent Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict, particularly the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, highlighted the transformative role of advanced military technologies, notably unmanned systems with varying degrees of automation and autonomy. This conflict represents a pivotal case study in the evolution of military doctrine, as Azerbaijan’s effective use of drones, loitering munitions, and other autonomous systems significantly shaped its military strategy and outcomes. The war showcased the effectiveness of these technologies in gaining tactical and operational superiority, prompting a re-evaluation of traditional military doctrines that rely heavily on manpower and conventional hardware. This paper explores how Azerbaijan integrated these technologies into its military operations and examines the resulting shifts in military doctrine. The focus is on the interplay between technology and strategy, investigating whether AI/autonomy-based systems fostered new forms of military doctrine and, crucially, whether these doctrines proved effective in the context of modern warfare. The analysis also delves into Armenia’s contrasting reliance on more traditional military systems, revealing a stark doctrinal mismatch that contributed to its operational vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the paper addresses broader implications for future conflicts, asking whether this localized war signals a broader trend in military strategy, where autonomous technologies will continue to redefine the modern system of warfare.

This chapter is developed with an inside out and forward-looking view of governance for the current topic: ‘critical space infrastructure’. The need and utility of CSG field are provided. The nature and definition of CSG are explored. Applicability of CSG to the design, execution, and development of governance functions is explored. As part of this exploration advantages, limitations, and challenges brought by CSG to practitioners and the practices for governing complex systems are suggested. Implications of CSG development to enhance practice are examined. The chapter closes with some concluding thoughts and several exercises that serve to underscore central concepts tenets of present research. Explorations in this chapter includes several vignettes and scenarios that serve to demonstrate the utility and contributions offered by CSG.

Actual scientific approaches related to critical infrastructure reveal its importance within many of the society’s essential services that are necessary for day-to-day people’s life. Besides other critical infrastructure systems, the emerging development of the space system results in the embedment of it within the critical space infrastructure concept that is based on its description related to the importance of the services provided to population, public or governing institutions, and industry. This paper intends to present the manner in which the space system services influence population’s life and to emphasize the importance of the space infrastructure related to the process of planning and conducting military operations. The reliability and well functioning of the space system from the perspective as a critical infrastructure proves its paramount importance related to essential services provided to the population that results into social well-being. Nowadays, the majority of military operations depend on the development of space infrastructure and its reliability. Moreover, the military space operations are based on satellite control system architectures as well as the interconnected systems on surface and underground systems. From this side, the protection of critical space infrastructure and its resilience level should have a paramount value for all stakeholders that are using the space system services.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a forward-looking summary to protection of ‘critical space infrastructures’. Critical space infrastructure protection is necessary due to increasing potential failures as well as impact on space systems as well as interconnected systems on surface and underground systems. Emphasis is placed on need for protection measures against special phenomena including space weather, space debris, electromagnetic pulse, and anti-satellite attacks.

Space systems have become key enablers for a wide variety of applications on Earth through evolving capabilities in navigation, positioning, timing, data gathering and communications. These capabilities have become, in certain instances, critical to the functioning of critical infrastructure systems. These are interconnected sociotechnical systems which provide critical goods and services and whose destruction or disruption would cause significant loss of human life, material damage and other effects. The paper argues that space systems can provide a new category of critical infrastructures and highlights the differences between terrestrial and spaceborne systems from the perspective of the critical infrastructure protection framework.

A U.S. Perspective on Deterrence and Geopolitics in Space