Soviet-Pakistan Ties since the Afghanistan Crisis

Abstract

ghanistan as a countermove to a U.S. diplomatic offensive in the Gulf region that commenced after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. Faced with the Soviet-backed Tarahki coup in Afghanistan, the removal of the Shah-chief protector of Western interests in the Gulf-and its strained relations with Pakistan, Washington intensified its efforts to safeguard U.S. interests in the area. This drive was manifest as much from the statements made by high U.S. officials in the wake of the Shah's downfall' as from such U.S. actions as the dispatch of an aircraft carrier (ordered by President Carter on March 6, 1979) to the Gulf, the supply of two AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia to monitor the North Yemen-South Yemen fight, delivery of arms to North Yemen, overt and covert attempts to influence and divert the tide of Iran's revolution, and Washington's alleged support to anti-Tarahki Afghan factions. These moves obviously provoked Moscow's reaction. By overreacting to the emerging inevitable realities in the region, Washington thus provided Moscow with the necessary pretext to intervene in Afghanistan. Apart from other consequences, the Soviet action in Afghanistan had a direct bearing on Pakistan's policy. On the one hand, it increased tension in Pakistan-Soviet relations, and, on the other, once again pushed Islamabad towards Washington. The crisis gave new twists and turns to Pak-Soviet ties. But having applied varying pressure devices against one another in the past two years, both countries now appear to be in the mood for a reconciliation. Pakistan's relations with the USSR had begun to show signs of stress following the Afghan coup in April 1978. The Daud government was overthrown by the leftist-oriented Tarahki at a time when it was trying to balance its ties with the West and Pakistan. This created an impression in some