Southeast Asia and the Militarization of the South China Sea

Southeast Asia' calls to mind a wide range of images: tropical forests and mountains, islands and seas, and a multitude of languages, cultures and religions. The area has never formed a unified political realm nor has it ever developed a cultural or civilisational unity. Many academics have defined 'Southeast Asia' over the years as what is left after subtracting Australia, the South Pacific islands and China and India. Others have pointed at diversity—the variety and fluidity of the cultures, wide ranging forms of economic activity, and openness to external influences—as the defining feature of the region. But with area studies out of fashion, is 'Southeast Asia' even relevant any longer? This volume considers 'Southeast Asia' drawn from a number of regional and disciplinary perspectives. The authors look at the region from the standpoint of Thailand and the Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong, Japan and the Asian mainland, the South China Sea and the seacoasts of the region. They also discuss the significance of borders, monetary networks, transnational flows of people, goods and information, and knowledge in shaping Southeast Asia both for its residents, for the scholars who study it and for the wider world.

This article explores the impact of the Spratly Islands dispute on security relations between China and Southeast Asia after the Cold War. It is argued that the dispute reflects and promotes the emergence of a regional order combining deterrence with consultation and limited co-operation. The balance of power between China, Southeast Asia, and the United States promotes the emergence of a structure of deterrence. Within this structure, the approaches of China and Southeast Asia to diplomacy and international law allow for the development of a regional dialogue and a code of conduct based on consultation and co-operation on non-controversial issues. Consequently, the seeds of an order are emerging in the South China Sea that combines the extremes of deterrence and co-operation. Introduction The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are located at the intersection of the security spheres of China and Southeast Asia. As such, the dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over this area is not merely a difference of opinion on rights to territory and maritime space. It brings to the fore incompatibilities between the practices China and the countries of Southeast Asia normally employ to ensure peace and stability in their regional environment. The implications of this dispute for the development of mechanisms of deterrence and co-operation between China and the countries of Southeast Asia have tended to be overlooked in the scholarly debate. The Spratly dispute is treated as a peripheral, yet potentially explosive, aspect of Sino--Southeast Asian relations. It is regarded as a product rather than a determinant of their security practices. [1] The Spratlys have been a sore point in the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian claimant states for decades . The dispute oscillates between conflict and co-operation without reaching the stage of crisis or resolution. [2] This protracted stalemate suggests that the dispute is at the fringes of the security agendas of China and Southeast Asia, compared with more pressing security concerns such as the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s and the Taiwan problem. At the same time, the nationalist overtones inherent in the justifications of territorial and maritime claims, coupled with a continuous military build-up in the Spratly area, suggests that the dispute will at some point wreak havoc on peace in the South China Sea. The problem with the dominant approaches to the study of the Spratly dispute is the tendency to overlook the fact that, in the 1990s, it has turned into an arena where the compatibility of the security practices of China and Southeast Asia were tested. During the Cold War, Chinese security policies were directed against the subregional environment of Northeast Asia. By contrast, most of the countries of Southeast Asia formulated their security outlook within the confines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the increasing importance of the maritime resources of the South China Sea, and the allowances for extensive maritime zones in international law, have made China and Southeast Asia increasingly important variables in each other's security equations. This article argues that the Spratly dispute has profound implications for regional peace and stability because it promotes the development of a new order in the South China Sea between China and the Southeast Asian states. [3] By bringing representatives of contending security practices together around an issue of conflict, the Spratly dispute has changed the security practices of China and Southeast Asia. The dispute highlights differences in the approach of the two entities to the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law. As the contending parties attempt to find solutions to the problems coming to the fore, the seeds of a new order emerge, representing a compromise between the security practices employed by China and Southeast Asia. …

In this study, a comparison in the precipitation extremes as exhibited by the seven reference datasets is made to ascertain whether the inferences based on these datasets agree or they differ. These seven datasets, roughly grouped in three categories i.e. rain-gauge based (APHRODITE, CPC-UNI), satellite-based (TRMM, GPCP1DD) and reanalysis based (ERA-Interim, MERRA, and JRA55), having a common data period 1998–2007 are considered. Focus is to examine precipitation extremes in the summer monsoon rainfall over South Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia. Measures of extreme precipitation include the percentile thresholds, frequency of extreme precipitation events and other quantities. Results reveal that the differences in displaying extremes among the datasets are small over South Asia and East Asia but large differences among the datasets are displayed over the Southeast Asian region including the maritime continent. Furthermore, precipitation data appear to be more consistent over East Asia among the seven datasets. Decadal trends in extreme precipitation are consistent with known results over South and East Asia. No trends in extreme precipitation events are exhibited over Southeast Asia. Outputs of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) simulation data are categorized as high, medium and low-resolution models. The regions displaying maximum intensity of extreme precipitation appear to be dependent on model resolution. High-resolution models simulate maximum intensity of extreme precipitation over the Indian sub-continent, medium-resolution models over northeast India and South China and the low-resolution models over Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand. In summary, there are differences in displaying extreme precipitation statistics among the seven datasets considered here and among the 29 CMIP5 model data outputs.

Early Cenozoic drainage network and paleogeographic evolution within the SE Tibetan Plateau and its surrounding area: Synthetic constraints from onshore-offshore geological dataset

The first rainy season (April–June) of South China includes the phases before and after the onset of the South China Sea summer monsoon (SCSSM). Abundant moisture supply is the key dynamic process for precipitation formation. Thus, we employ the FLEXPART model to explore the corresponding moisture sources for the two phases. Before the onset of SCSSM, land regions contribute more moisture to the precipitation over South China than the ocean sources. The main source regions are Southeast Asia (27.01%), the South China Sea (25.96%), South China (11.12%), and the southern part of the northwestern Pacific (10.23%). Land sources (66.87%) play a more important role than ocean sources (33.13%) in the interannual variations, with the contributions mainly from Southeast Asia (47.56%) and the South China Sea (28.79%). After the onset of SCSSM, the climatological contribution of ocean sources is larger than that of land regions, and the main source regions are the South China Sea (20.78%), Southeast Asia (17.51%), the Bay of Bengal (13.76%), and South China (11.21%). For the interannual variations, the contributions of land sources and ocean regions are comparable, and mainly from Southeast Asia (33.53%) and the Bay of Bengal (32.26%). The moisture transports for the interannual variations in first rainy season precipitation over South China before and after the onset of SCSSM are significantly correlated with the east–west contrast of sea surface temperature anomalies over northern part of North Pacific and the uniform warming over Indian Ocean, respectively. This study provides important guidance in improving the regional precipitation predictions and understanding the water resources changes.

The Eurasian core and its edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu on the history of the world By OOI KEE BENG Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015. Pp. 254. Map, Illustrations, Index. doi: 10.1017/S0022463416000552 This book is a delightful and rare opportunity to listen in on a series of dialogues between two renowned scholars, Wang Gungwu and Ooi Kee Beng, on a variety of interesting topics and global issues. While for the most part the answers and responses in these dialogues are principally Wang's to questions raised by Ooi, the two agree that the book is the latter's. Ooi Kee Beng sets the scene for these dialogues and gives his reflections and useful background information on them in the prologue, introduction and epilogue. His dialogues with Wang are organised into five chapters. While the content of the dialogues is very wide-ranging, some crucial topics can be mentioned here to give a flavour of each of the chapters. Chapter 1, 'Of cores and edges', reviews human history and highlights the core of Central Asia (nomadic Eurasia) in world history. China, the Mediterranean, South Asia and Western Europe all remained edges. The tensions and conflicts between 'nomadic' societies (Xiongnu, Turks or Mongols) and agrarian counterparts (Chinese or Indian) continued until the twentieth century. During this long period, Chinese dynasties remained essentially continental and mainly agrarian, except for the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing, the latter being both agrarian and nomadic. The dialogue goes on to focus on China, covering a range of topics, such as Confucian order, Confucianism, state Confucianism, the Chinese interpretation of democracy, and the role of imperial literati. Chapter 2, 'The two-ocean Mediterranean', turns to early Southeast Asia, a maritime periphery in world history that was continually dominated by continental power struggles. Mainland Southeast Asia was more impacted, while the Malay world was left more alone. The continental expansions into the Southeast Asian maritime world such as the Thai, Chinese (Zheng He), Chola (Tamil) expeditions were only temporary invasions. While from the fifteenth century onward Southeast Asia turned itself into a semi-Mediterranean, it was not seen as a region until the Second World War, when it became strategically significant, first as embodied in the South East Asia Command (SEAC), followed by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Chapter 3, 'Southeast Asia and foreign empires', continues the discussion on the concept of Southeast Asia. Various Chinese conceptualisations of the area or part of the area later coined as Southeast Asia including Nanhai, Dongyang, Xiyang and Nanyang are placed in their historical contexts. Wang points out that it was the Japanese who first put the South China Sea under one jurisdiction and speculates that in fact, both the Kuomintang's Republic of China and the People's Republic of China accepted the Japanese legacy of the South China Sea region. Nation and nationstate constitute the latter part of the chapter, in which Wang insightfully clarifies the evolution of nation-states across the world. In Southeast Asia, the state came first, while nation was constructed by state. Chapter 4, 'China's struggle with the Western edge', discusses China's dealings with the West. Indeed, 'the West' was not monolithic, and many Wests existed. While China learned from either West A or B, the sense of belonging pushed China to seek inspiration from its own past. And that is why Confucianism still matters to present-day China. Since the West is maritime and thus global while China is still continental, China now seeks to navigate the sea to become a global power. The Chinese maritime initiatives, including redefining and appropriating soft power, can be seen in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan. …

The recent concept of Indo-Pacific region reveals increasing India’s engagement with the Southeast Asian and Asia Pacific nations, as a result of its “Look East” and “Act East” Policy. This research intends to clarify the essence of this policy, its major goals, directions and moving forces, continuity and changes during its different stages, and preliminary results. As a result of this study, we identified four stages in the implementation of “Look East”/“Act East” Policy: 1992–2000; 2000–2010; 2010–2014; since 2014. The shifts were mostly caused by external factors, namely, by regional policy of China and the initiatives of other regional states. Originally, the policy was aimed at development of trade and economic cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. The new direction of this policy, starting from 2000, included India’s engagement with Japan. Since 2010, India has increasingly expanded its strategic and security cooperation with Southeast Asian and Asia Pacific nations. The new stage of this policy under the title “Act East”, launched by N. Modi government (since 2014), was more results-oriented; its geography and strategic dimension expanded. These transformations demonstrated India’s adaptation to new international environment, including “opening” of Myanmar, increasing tensions in the South China Sea and growing China’s influence in India’s neighbouring countries. In the security area, Indian government strengthened cooperation with Japan, the U.S., Australia and some ASEAN nations to protect rules-based regional order. Simultaneously, it balanced relations with these regional partners and China. In trade and economic area, India’s greater regional involvement produced mixed results. On the one hand, India benefited from Japan’s concessional loans on infrastructural projects, including the northeast region, as well as from Japan and Republic of Korea’s direct investments. On the other hand, trade liberalization with ASEAN, Japan and Republic of Korea caused increasing India’s trade deficit. For this reason, Indian government initiated re-negotiation of its free trade agreements and withdrew from negotiations on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

El comercio y el consumo de opio en Asia, y particularmente en China, durante los siglos XVIII y XIX, así como sus implicaciones en la historia contemporánea de dichas regiones, han sido objeto de un debate que se ha revitalizado durante los últimos veinte años.

Sailing Together or Ships Passing in the Night?India and the United States in Southeast Asia Walter C. Ladwig III (bio) and Anit Mukherjee (bio) keywords india, united states, southeast asia, security architecture [End Page 51] executive summary This article examines the significant congruence of U.S. and Indian interests in Southeast Asia and assesses both the prospects and constraints that New Delhi and Washington face in coordinating their policies toward the region. main argument Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a global partnership with the potential to shape the future security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. As is widely acknowledged, the two countries' extraregional interests align most closely in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, this article examines the potential for and limitations of U.S. and Indian cooperation in the region to achieve shared aims. Extensive diplomatic consultations between the two countries have led to a significant convergence in their positions on regional security challenges. Active cooperation, however, remains constrained by a number of factors, including India's need to prioritize foreign policy challenges closer to home, concerns about provoking China, and a discomfort among countries in Southeast Asia regarding the idea of a joint U.S.-India approach toward the region. Due to these limitations, U.S.-India policies in Southeast Asia are expected to continue to operate in parallel instead of becoming a joint endeavor. policy implications • The U.S. and India, which are at the initial stages of a cooperative approach to Southeast Asia, should intensify their diplomatic and military exchanges and establish a dedicated forum to share views and information on political and security developments in the region. • Strengthening the regional security architecture should be a major focus of Indo-U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. In particular, they should concentrate on assisting the creation of a region-wide maritime domain awareness system, as well as working in parallel to develop the capacity of partner militaries. • Connectivity and infrastructure projects should be a renewed focus of Indian and U.S. efforts in the region, in partnership with like-minded third countries such as Japan. [End Page 52] The transformation in U.S.-India relations from alienation during the Cold War to a robust strategic partnership is one of the most significant geopolitical development of recent decades. In June 2017, at Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first meeting with President Donald Trump, the pair "resolved to expand and deepen the strategic partnership between the two countries and advance common objectives," most notably "promoting stability across the Indo-Pacific region."1 How likely is it that these two countries can actually cooperate and where is such cooperation most likely to happen? Across the subregions of the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia would appear to be an area where the transformation of Indo-U.S. strategic ties would have the most significant implications. For India, Southeast Asia is the most geographically proximate subregion and the focus of its efforts to both "look east" and "act east." For the United States, Southeast Asia historically has been a region where Washington's attention has ebbed and flowed.2 Under the Obama administration, however, both individual Southeast Asian nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole received enhanced attention at the highest levels. A decade ago, the idea of the United States and India working together in Southeast Asia would have appeared far-fetched. Due to a growing recognition of the congruence of their interests in the region, however, the two countries are increasingly articulating common diplomatic positions on key security challenges. Most prominently, the joint statement made after the Modi-Trump summit in 2017 addressed the maritime disputes in the South China Sea and reiterated "the importance of respecting freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce throughout the region."3 This high-profile diplomatic signal had been anticipated by some analysts who have long speculated about the close fit between the U.S. "rebalance" to Asia and India's "Act East" policy.4 Indeed, according to former U.S. defense secretary Ashton Carter, the United States focusing westward and India acting to its east have resulted in a "strategic [End Page 53] handshake" between the...

Japan’s principal security interest in Southeast Asia is the safety and security of regional sea lanes. Over the past several years, Japan has expressed growing concern at rising tensions in the South China Sea and the lack of progress by the claimants to negotiate effective conflict management mechanisms. Japan is not a claimant in the dispute, but as a major maritime trading nation, it is a significant stakeholder. Japan has two major concerns over the South China Sea. First, that instability has the potential to disrupt the free flow of maritime trade on which the country’s economic prosperity depends, and, second, that if China is able to persuade or coerce other Asian nations into accepting its claimed ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea, existing international legal norms would be undermined. Moreover, Tokyo is alarmed at China’s increasingly assertive posture in the maritime domain, and views the disputes in the South and East China Seas as linked. To mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea, Japan is pursuing a number of strategies: it raises the problem at regional security forums; it seeks to enhance cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on issues of maritime security and encourage unity within the organization on the South China Sea; it discusses the problem bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries and has started to provide capacity-building support to selected claimants (principally, the Philippines); and it seeks closer ties with other external stakeholders that share its concerns.

The maritime regions of Southeast Asia played an important but varying role in connecting South Asia and China prior to the sixteenth century. With regard to commercial exchanges, traders, ships, and polities in Southeast Asia facilitated and sometimes controlled the flow of goods. Additionally, merchant associations from South Asia and China established their bases in Southeast Asia to participate in trading activities in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea regions. At least three distinct networks emerged as a result of these maritime interactions: 1) networks of exchanges among the polities skirting the Bay of Bengal; 2) networks that connected the areas around the South China Sea; and 3) networks of direct exchanges between South Asia and China. Buddhist ideas also circulated through these networks, but seem to have made limited inroads in the maritime regions of Southeast Asia prior to the fifth century AD. By this time, Buddhism had already spread widely in China, with significant number of Buddhist missionaries arriving in the region through the maritime routes. Rather than playing a staging role in the transmission of Buddhism to China, the doctrine may have penetrated maritime Southeast Asia due to the vibrant Buddhist interactions and a significant increase in commercial activity along the networks linking South Asia and China during the fourth and fifth centuries. The use of Buddhism to legitimise new regimes in China and the diplomatic exchanges between Southeast Asian polities and these courts may have also facilitated the spread of Buddhism in the region.

Impact assessment of biomass burning on air quality in Southeast and East Asia during BASE-ASIA

executive summary: This article proposes that Southeast Asia is an ideal space for cooperation between Japan and South Korea, given that both countries share strategic priorities in the region. main argumentAlthough Japan and South Korea's bilateral ties are typically defined by long-standing issues over historical issues and territorial disputes, each country shares a wide set of geopolitical interests, leading to an "Asian paradox" of mismatched priorities. This paradox is clearly visible in Southeast Asia. While Tokyo's strategic ties with the subregion, often via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeper and predate Seoul's, South Korea is increasingly expanding its own relations with the region alongside its growing security outreach across the Asia-Pacific. As a result, Japan's and South Korea's interests and activities are meeting in strategic spaces in Southeast Asia, such as the South China Sea and the Mekong River basin. Despite sharing common goals in these spaces, so far Seoul and Tokyo have not collaborated in their efforts. While many hurdles still limit direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, even indirect cooperation in shared strategic spaces in Southeast Asia could provide both countries an opportunity to build trust and provide security benefits to countries in Southeast Asia. policy implications• The U.S. can incentivize Japan–South Korea cooperation in Southeast Asia through the Quad Plus framework. • Expanding the General Security of Military Information Agreement between Japan and South Korea could be a method of increasing their cooperation in Southeast Asia. • To achieve greater cooperation toward these aims, the U.S. should support strategic latitude for Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia.

Introduction - Arun Prakash Part I: Regional Strategic Environment - Contemporary Regional Relations 1. Between Rising Powers - A Broad Strategic Overview - C. Raja Mohan 2. China's Relations with Southeast Asia - Huang Jing 3. US Engagement with China, India and Southeast Asia - Bronson Percival 4. Japanese Engagement with China, India and Southeast Asia - Masashi Nishihara 5. Singapore's Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean - Emrys Chew 6. Chinese Perspective - Cai Peng Hong 7. The Korean Perspective - Park Chang Kwoun 8. The Malaysian Perspective - Mohd Nizam Basiron & Sumathy Permal Part II: Contemporary Regional Maritime Security 9. Regional Maritime Security - Threats and Risk Assessments - Sam Bateman 10. Cooperative Mechanisms for Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits - Robert C. Beckman 11. Shaping Naval Power - Implications of the Naval Buildup in Asia - Norman Friedman 12. Chinese Naval Developments - Zhang Junshe 13. Indian Perspective - Devbrat Chakraborty 14. US Perspective - Michael McDevitt 15. Japanese Perspective - Takeshi Kohno 16. Australian Perspective - Rory Medcalf 17. Scope for Maritime Cooperation and Confidence Building - Pradeep Chauhan 18. Towards a Cooperative Maritime Regime in Southeast Asian Seas - Contemporary Issues, including in the South China Sea - Li Mingjiang 19. Cooperation and Confidence Building: A Southeast Asian Perspective - Kwa Chong Guan Conclusion - Do rough seas lie ahead? - Sam Bateman

The α0-thalassemia (α0-thal) [– –SEA (Southeast Asian) deletion] is highly prevalent in Southeast Asia and South China. The linkage between the single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) rs77308790 and the – –SEA deletion was reported in the Chinese population. This study reported the genotype of SNP rs77308790 using the high resolution melting (HRM) curve analysis in the Thai population and the application for double-checking diagnosis of Hb Bart’s (γ4) hydrops fetalis syndrome. A total of 202 samples, including α0-thal carriers (– –SEA/αα) (n = 99) and wild-type (n = 103), was recruited. Minor allele frequency (MAF) of SNP rs77308790 (T allele) represented a significant difference (p<0.001) between carrier (– –SEA deletion) (MAF 0.455) and wild-type (MAF 0.039). The T allele of SNP rs77308790 showed a strong linkage with the – –SEA deletion allele [correlation coefficient between pairs of loci (D’ = 1)] based on constructed random samples (CRSs) in Thais. Moreover, worldwide populations, based on the 1000Genomes database, also found the T allele to be less than 1.0%. For providing a double-checked diagnosis, two SNP (rs3760053, rs77308790) genotypes showed 100.0% concordance with a conventional gap-polymerase chain reaction (gap-PCR) method in nine families at-risk for Hb Bart’s hydrops fetalis. The double-checked diagnosis based on the two SNPs (rs3760053, rs77308790) is suitable for implementation in routine diagnosis of Hb Bart’s hydrops fetalis syndrome. Furthermore, our HRM analysis system can be amplified with a small amount of fetal DNA and could avoid allele dropouts.