South Korean Democracy: Back to the Brink

Democracy is still the issue in South Korea. Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, much of the progress in South Korean democracy since 1987 has been either interrupted or reversed. Yet such a “reversal” actually represents a consistent and long-standing pursuit on the part of anti-democratic forces with deep roots in Korea's division system. The division of the peninsula was consolidated into a kind of system with considerable powers of self-reproduction when the Korean War ended in a stalemate in 1953 and the armistice agreement was never replaced by a peace treaty. The result is an inherently anti-democratic political regime on either side. Democratization in the South did render a blow to, but did not abolish, this peninsula-wide system, so that anti-democratic forces have remained potent under the “1987 regime” and even succeeded in regaining political power in 2008 (under Lee Myung-bak). The idea of a “2013 regime” is to accomplish, when the change of administration occurs in early 2013, a change as momentous as in 1987, which may pave the way for the overcoming of the division system itself. The essay concludes with some theoretical reflections on democracy as people's self-rule.

South Korea overcame the crisis of democracy in 2016–2017 by a heterarchy of massive candlelight demonstrations in the field of politics and the impeachment of President Park Geun Hye with due process of representative democracy, and renormalized democracy through elections. During the Moon Jae-in presidency, democratic politics had been polarized between rightist and leftist populists, judicialization of politics weakened the power of political parties and politicians, the conservative press led national political agenda setting in a conservative way, and all these discontents of democracy combined to made the third rotation of power (first in 1997, second in 2007) in the 2022 presidential election which elected a former Prosecutor General Yoon Suk Yeol. South Korean democracy is now in crisis, meaning that, something must be done to enable either the reconsolidation of democracy or continuous back-sliding of democracy. The major factors that will contribute to the (1) juristocracy and judicialization of politics; (2) mediatization of politics; (3) rightist and leftist populism; (4) polarization of politics. The strongest danger to South Korean democracy is the possibility of juristocracy and judicialization of politics in which a democratically elected president led the erosion and subversion of democracy by stealth using legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends. The second danger to South Korean democracy is mediatization in which big capital-dominated rightist media cooperates and colludes with a prosecutor regime to deepen the erosion of democratic institutions and norms. The third danger is rightist and leftist populism that divides on and offline political spaces and generates a de-facto civil war that may call for a strongman to restore law and order. The fourth danger is that party and representative institutions are too weak to counteract the subversion of democracy and renormalize democracy. Socio-economic polarization has led political polarization and the retreat of democracy such as the weakening of traditional political parties, the rise of extreme rightists, the erosion of people’s trust in democratic government and representative institutions and political parties. Whether Korean democracy continues to back-slide or renormalize and reconsolidate will be decided by the choice of voters and politicians in the forthcoming elections.

In 2017 the impeachment of then president Park Geun-hye and the peaceful turnover of political power marked a watershed moment in South Korean democracy. The new government introduced Deliberative Polling to resolve several contentious policy issues, including whether to resume construction of the Shin-Gori nuclear power plant. This chapter offers a case study of four Deliberative Polls in South Korea and analyses their characteristics and implications. Deliberative Polling has been focused on the most crucial issues for the nation, such as denuclearisation, and although the Polls have been linked to policymaking processes, the media has played a critical role in determining whether the outcomes are accepted. Finally, the chapter discusses the institutionalisation process of the South Korean Deliberative Polling model, including the establishment of public deliberation committees, which have been successful in raising the quality of Deliberative Polling and public deliberation. It recommends the establishment of a permanent public deliberation committee.

This article critically examines the state of South Korea’s consolidated democracy in the post‐2016 Candlelight period. More specifically, I identify a “glass ceiling” in raising the quality of South Korean democracy, drawing attention to institutional‐cultural factors as an underlying barrier for further democratic progress. Political culture reinforces existing institutional design flaws such as a strong executive and a weak political party system. This in turn creates a permissive environment encouraging ruling parties to protect the presidency and implement the Blue House’s agenda through means which do not necessarily comport with liberal democracy. After presenting data from several indexes that measure the quality of democracy in South Korea, I discuss how institutions and culture interact to limit democratic advancement. I then use the Sewol ferry disaster during the conservative Park Geun‐hye administration and implementation of South Korea’s inter‐Korea engagement policy during the progressive Moon Jae‐in government to illustrate my argument.

When Park Geun-hye was elected South Korea’s first female president in 2012, many expected that South Korea’s democracy would deepen. Contrary to the expectation, however, from the beginning of her administration, there were concerns about democracy retreating due to her leadership style/qualities. Despite her rather “undemocratic” leadership qualities, Park Geun-hye has consistently received 30% or higher job approval ratings until “Choi Soon-sil gate” broke out in October 2016. Thus, in this study, we analyzed what led to her leadership qualities and makes it possible for her to maintain a relatively high level of job approval ratings. We argue that her leadership qualities are the product of her unique personal background and South Korea’s immature democratic institutions. She receives relatively strong support thanks to her father, President Park Chung-hee’s (1961–1979) legacy.

본고는 한국의 민주화 과정에서 대중의 인식과 선호가 외교정책 결정 과정에 어떠한 영향을 끼치는지 살펴보았다. 특히 한국 민주주의에서 점점 뚜렷해지는 좌우 진영논리와 그로 인한 여론의 양분화와 정치화가 외교정책의 딜레마로 이어진 대표적인 세 가지 사례, 즉 i) 2008년 광우병 파동과 촛불시위로 인한 한미협상 결과; ii) 2015년 한일 ‘위안부합의’에 대한 여론의 반대와 그 결과; 그리고 iii) 2017년 THAAD 배치와 그에 따른 중국과의 관계에 대한 상충되는 주장을 비교 고찰하였다. 이들 사례를 통해 살펴볼 수 있듯이, 극도로 정치화･양분화된 여론 및 잘못된 포퓰리즘에 기반한 전략은 국익을 최우선시 해야하는 한국 외교에 커다란 걸림돌이 되어왔다. 따라서 정치지도자는 국익에 근거한 엄격한 외교정책원칙을 준수하며 불안정하고 자칫 감정에 치우칠 수 있는 여론에 휘둘리지 않는 인지적 분별력과 강단이 필요하다. 이와 동시에 민주적 책임을 진 지도자는 국민의 일상에 지대한 영향을 미칠 외교정책을 결정하기 전에 시민사회와의 ‘건설적인’ 대화를 지속해야 한다. 대중적 또는 당파적 선호 때문에 쉽게 흔들리지 않는 책임감 있고, 반응하고, 합법적인 외교정책을 수립·이행하기 위해 정부는 여론을 존중하고 국민은 국익이 무엇인지 이해하고 우선시하는 상호 윈-윈(win-win) 접근이 중요하다.

본고는 한국의 민주화 과정에서 대중의 인식과 선호가 외교정책 결정 과정에 어떠한 영향을 끼치는지 살펴보았다. 특히 한국 민주주의에서 점점 뚜렷해지는 좌우 진영논리와 그로 인한 여론의 양분화와 정치화가 외교정책의 딜레마로 이어진 대표적인 세 가지 사례, 즉 i) 2008년 광우병 파동과 촛불시위로 인한 한미협상 결과; ii) 2015년 한일 ‘위안부합의’에 대한 여론의 반대와 그 결과; 그리고 iii) 2017년 THAAD 배치와 그에 따른 중국과의 관계에 대한 상충되는 주장을 비교 고찰하였다. 이들 사례를 통해 살펴볼 수 있듯이, 극도로 정치화･양분화된 여론 및 잘못된 포퓰리즘에 기반한 전략은 국익을 최우선시 해야하는 한국 외교에 커다란 걸림돌이 되어왔다. 따라서 정치지도자는 국익에 근거한 엄격한 외교정책원칙을 준수하며 불안정하고 자칫 감정에 치우칠 수 있는 여론에 휘둘리지 않는 인지적 분별력과 강단이 필요하다. 이와 동시에 민주적 책임을 진 지도자는 국민의 일상에 지대한 영향을 미칠 외교정책을 결정하기 전에 시민사회와의 ‘건설적인’ 대화를 지속해야 한다. 대중적 또는 당파적 선호 때문에 쉽게 흔들리지 않는 책임감 있고, 반응하고, 합법적인 외교정책을 수립·이행하기 위해 정부는 여론을 존중하고 국민은 국익이 무엇인지 이해하고 우선시하는 상호 윈-윈(win-win) 접근이 중요하다.

South Korean Democracy

<titre>The South-Korean Democracy, or the Absence of Dynastic Rationales? </titre> Though the young South Korean democracy started in 1987, democratic political practices only appeared in the 1990s. Due to recurring political instability in the country during the 20th Century and the newness of the transition to democracy, the patrimonalization of elected political office is far from being obvious even if the traditional political culture rather favours it. Thanks to democratization, various movements of the civil society appeared in the 1990s, and one of the most striking changes (sometimes qualified as &#8220;civic political revolution&#8221;) of the two first legislative elections of the 2000s was their &#8220;black lists&#8221; spread on the Internet in order to block those candidates who were deemed not democratic enough. Though such actions have not yet fostered the patrimonalization of political office, they do not thwart it either. The entry of women into politics in the 1990s might mean the start of intra-family-like transmission of political duties, though remains to be confirmed. Given the stabilization of the democratic game, it is conceivable that family transmission strategies founded on political professionalism may be put into practice for the next generation.

The Neoliberal Police State and South Korean Democracy

1. Diverse Routes to Democracy: An Introduction, Lynn T. White III Part I: Variety among Asian Democracies and Democratizations 2. South Korean Democracy in Light of Taiwan, Erik Mobrand 3. Taiwan's Democratization and Mainland China's Future, Shelley Rigger 4. Strategic Hypocrisy: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Commerce in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, Justin V. Hastings 5. Democracy and Inequality in Thailand: The Rise of the Red Shirts, Erik Martinez Kuhonta Part II: Constitutional and Legal Proto-Democratic Changes in China 6. The Local Factor in China's Intra-Party Democracy, Cheng Li 7. Why Did China's Reform Start from the Provinces? De facto Federalism and its Limits, Yongnian Zheng and Cuiwen Weng 8. Law and Democracy in China: A Complex Relationship, Jacques deLisle 9. Suing the Government in China, Neysun A. Mahboubi 10. Petitioning as Policy Making: Chinese Rural Tax Reform, Jing Chen Part III: Proto-Democratization in Chinese Civil Society 11. The Fragmented State in Action: The Production and Governance of Art Districts in Beijing, Yue Zhang 12. China Invests Overseas: Does the Strong State Help China's Outbound Investment?, Min Ye 13. All the News, All the Politics: Sophisticated Propaganda in Capitalist-Authoritarian China, Guoguang Wu 14. Chinese Nationalism Reconsidered-Or, a Case for Historicising the Study of Chinese Politics, Ja Ian Chong 15. How the Internet is Changing China, Kate Xiao Zhou with Stephen Zierak.

South Korea's twenty-five-year-old democracy is a ”contentious” one, in which important public matters are often debated and decided through direct contention and confrontation between civil society and the state, without mediation through political parties as is usually the case in many Western ”representative” democracies. Popular protests and street demonstrations continue to be a preferred form of political expression in South Korean democracy. The other aspect of Korea's very active civil society is underinstitutionalized and ineffectual political parties. Whether underdeveloped political parties prove to be a temporary problem in an innovative experiment with creating a new type of ”contentious democracy,” or a fatal flaw that will undermine South Korean democracy, remains to be seen.

South Korean democracy in light of Taiwan

Among the countries which have experienced a political transition away from authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is usually considered as a model of both democracy and judicial review. Relying on an interpretive reading of jurisprudence, the present research however uncovers the double-edged way in which the Constitutional Court of Korea has discharged its role as guardian of the constitution. A critical analysis of constitutional jurisprudence indeed reveals how the court’s commitment to define and defend the post-transition constitutional order has translated into both liberal and illiberal outcomes. This ambivalent dimension of the court’s role has unfolded as the institution came to intervene in the major dispute opposing the state and parts of civil society after the 1987 change of regime: reshaping the contours of enmity in the post-transitional period. Through the contentious issue of enmity, what has been put at stake in the constitutional arena is the very challenge of delineating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in South Korean democracy. in light of this task, constitutional justice has imposed itself as a paradoxical site, where the post-transitional disagreement about what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ has been both staged and interrupted.

This essay explores the possible constructive role of a Confucian metaphysics in the pluralistic Confucian-democratic context of South Korea. In his recent landmark study, Sungmoon Kim has argued that South Korean democracy is sustained by a public culture of civility that is grounded in Confucian habits and mores and yet is pluralistic in ethos. I appreciatively interrogate Kim’s thesis in order to advance a claim that a comprehensive Confucian doctrine such as Confucian metaphysics can contribute significantly to the flourishing of Confucian democratic public culture, provided that it affirm a pluralistic ontology. I contend that the tradition of Korean Neo-Confucian li-ki metaphysics, particularly one found in the works of Nongmun Im Seong-ju, offers rich resources for a pluralistic ontology despite its history of ethical monism. By putting Nongmun’s thought in conversation with some of the contemporary critiques of the Schmittian (mis-)appropriation of the notion of popular sovereignty, I outline a pluralized version of the Rousseauian general will—a kind of critically affectionate solidarity of diverse groups of people—that is Confucian in character. My claim is that such a critically affectionate solidarity finds its grounds in and draws its nourishment from a pluralistic Confucian ontology.