South Korea's Perception Towards North Korea in Reunification Efforts during Moon Jae-In Administration: Image Theory

Moon Jae-in came to power in May 2017 in the wake of the Korean political crisis and impeachment of the previous president Park Geyn-hye. Since the very first days of his leadership President Moon has set a course for a sequential transformation of the inter-Korean relations and prevention of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The cornerstone of his program was the idea that the denuclearization of North Korea and the establishment of the long-lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula is possible provided that the North-South relations are normalized and Pyongyang is involved into the constructive peaceful dialogue. The authors demonstrate how Moon Jae-in was able to start the renaissance in the inter-Koran relations. He used the experience of the previous liberal governments of the Republic of Korea and successfully developed and enhanced the famous Sunshine Policy with his own ideas. The first stage of Moon Jane-in's presidency was marked with some serious foreign policy achievements. Thanks to the tactic of “summit diplomacy” President Moon was able to achieve significant reduction in tensions on the Korean Peninsula, which resulted in the fact that relations between the North and the South became more friendly and trustworthy. The historical documents signed during these summits - the Panmunjom Declaration (April 2018) and the Comprehensive Military Agreement (September 2018) - and their fast practical implementation can also be considered as President Moon's success. Further advancement of Moon Jae-in's course for building positive relationships with the DPRK faced serious obstruction from the United States. The authors show how simultaneously with settlement of inter-Korean relations President Moon had to deal with another difficult task - neutralization of the external factors (US sanctions and disagreements between Washington and Pyongyang) that were harmful for the development of the North Korea-South Korea relations. The tactics of being a mediator between the United States and North Korea chosen by Moon Jae-in was quite efficient in the beginning. The blatant enemies - Pyongyang and Washington - clamped down on their confrontation and sat at the negotiating table. However, the intransigence of Washington on the issue of a gradual and phase-based denuclearization of North Korea and withdrawal of sanctions altogether with the non-constructive criticism of the South Korean opposition made Moon Jae-in a hostage of the situation, limiting his potentially independent and substantive steps in foreign policy. Meanwhile, the authors of the research have come to the conclusion that on some issues President Moon was able to achieve much more than his predecessors. Despite the fact that he was unable to achieve a full-scaled settlement of the inter-Korean relations he did everything possible under the existing circumstances. Nowadays one can say that the challenges of the North Korean nuclear missile program and security on the Korean Peninsula are no longer entirely military topics, they are even more likely to be diplomatic issues. This fact is un-doubtfully his great accomplishment. Thus, it is possible to foresee good perspectives for the further declining level of the regional tensions and for the development of the inter-Korean relations.

Regarding North Korea’s denuclearization and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula, South-North Korean dialogues used to be secondary to the United States (US) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) negotiations. There were frictions between the two. However, this situation changed on the road to the US-DPRK summits in Singapore on June 12, 2018, and in Hanoi on February 26, 2019. From the perspective of a “détente as a policy,” this paper will define the Moon Jae-in administration’s policy as a “Tight Link Strategy” and examine how South Korea was trying to connect the South-North Korean dialogue and the US-DPRK negotiations tightly. The “Tight Link Strategy” has two aspects: one is that it made a new way to a “Fourth Détente” on the Korean Peninsular. Through this strategy, President Moon Jae-in was able to cooperate with Chairman Kim Jong-un for an integrated policy to obtain concrete results on denuclearization and peace-building at the US-DPRK summit. The other aspect is that the “Tight Link Strategy” contained a risk: if US-DPRK negotiation stagnates, the progress in the South-North Korean dialogue will become difficult as well. This risk became a reality after the failure of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi and caused the stagnation of South-North Korean relations. The Moon Jae-in administration will probably try to change its “Tight Link Strategy” policy. South Korea is now trying to expand its policy space toward North Korea by promoting individual tourism to North Korea, and the railway-road connection project between South and North Korea. At the same time, he will have to avoid possible friction with the United States for policy coordination toward North Korea and use a “Loose Link” between South-North Korean dialogues and US-DPRK negotiations.

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

The election of President Moon Jae-In in 2017 opened an opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations. North Korea’s participation in the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, became a turning point in the warming of relations between the two Koreas. The aim of the article is to present selected problems related to inter-Korean dialogue during the administration of President Moon Jae-In, which consisted of many initiatives aimed at undertaking negotiations for dialogue, understanding and cooperation. The theoretical tool used to analyze the above issues is the historical method and the comparative method. The first part of the article presents an outline of the history of inter-Korean dialogue, presenting the positions of the South Korean presidential administrations from President Park Chung Hee to Park Geun Hye. This part is a retrospective evaluation of the previous South Korean policies that sought to engage and cooperate with the North, with special attention to Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ and Roh Moo Hyun’s ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy,’ with both administrations engaging in inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation to resolve the problem of North Korean nuclear weapons through diplomatic means. The last half of the article describes Moon Jae-In’s Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative (KPPI) and Inter-Korean Summits in 2018. Diplomacy between North and South Korea continued at a brisk pace in 2018, and concluded with the Fifth Inter-Korean Summit in Pyeongyang. President Moon served as a direct mediator between the United States and North Korea. The similarities and differences between conservatives and progressives and their policies toward North Korea, and the elements of the Inter-Korean Summits in 2000, 2007, and 2018, followed by subsequent successes and failures of each administration, reveals vulnerabilities in the policies of reconciliation and openness with the North, the internal debates in South Korea derived from a contestation between ideological elements of ethno-centric nationalism and state-centric nationalism, and the structural factors leading to North Korean belligerence.

North and South Korea have made various peace efforts to overcome the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, so far the peace efforts that have been made by the two Koreas have not been successful. This is caused by the relations between the two countries which are still marked by mutual distrust, lack of cooperation, hatred, and ideological conflict. Then, the two Koreas made peace efforts again called the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018. The main points of this declaration are a commitment to end the confrontation of the legacy of war that has been going on for a long time, to increase cooperative relations between the Koreas, and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula region. At first, the Panmunjom Declaration became a new achievement in the peace of the Korean Peninsula. Over time, the Panmunjom Declaration became ineffective in carrying out its role as a medium for creating peace and denuclearizing the region. This research will answer the question "Why is the Panmunjom Declaration ineffective in improving relations between North Korea and South Korea?". This study aims to analyze the perceptions and misperceptions that occur between the two countries using the theory of perceptions and misperceptions by Robert Jervis. This study used a qualitative research method which explained that what caused the Panmunjom Declaration to be ineffective was due to misperceptions between North Korea and South Korea.

Economists have expressed their opinion that the economic trade between countries brings about economic prosperity as well as peace. Their opinion is based upon that the trading countries do not want to face the situation of decline in their welfare and benefits due to not participating in economic trade. They argue that economic trades between countries give them the opportunities of conversation, decrease misunderstanding, and leads them to peaceful mind and behavioral attitude to adjust the political conflicts. On the basis of this kind of opinion and the reunification of Germany, the economic trade between South and North Korea has been suggested as the most efficient measure to maintain the peace in Korean Peninsula. It has been twenty four years since the economic trade between South and North Korea was triggered in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo’s Declaration of July 7 in spite of several crises. The total turnover between South and North Korea is about US$ 18.3 billion from 1989 to 2012, out of which US$ 9.2 billion is the export to the North and US$ 9.1 billion is the import from the North. Since the end of cold war, South Korea and China have established diplomatic relations on July 24, 1992, and they have become strategic cooperative partners. The total turnover between South Korea and China was US$ 6.4 billion in 1992, and it increased to US$ 215.2 billion in 2012. On the other hand, the total turnover between North Korea and China amounts to US$ 5.9 billion in 2012, which is around three times as much as that between South and North Korea. The results of theoretical analyses are summarized as follows. First of all, exports and imports between South and North Korea turned out to ease the conflicts between two countries. Therefore, ‘theory of peace through trade’ by the liberalists was supported here. Secondly, it turned out that the economic trade between North Korea and China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if South Korea and China are in friendly partnership. It implies that China induces North Korea to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. Thirdly, exports from South Korea to China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are friendly partners politically. Imports from China to South. Korea affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are in antagonistic relationship politically. Empirical analysis shows that the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea turned out to have a significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It implies that the increase of the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea is likely to ease the conflicts between two countries. On the other hand, the difference quotient in the imports turned out to have significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It tells that the increase of the imports is likely to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. While the expand of trade with China will ease the conflicts in Korean Peninsula from the theoretical viewpoint, empirical analyses present opposite results. It implies that the relationship between North Korea and China since the end of cold war is not the same as that before the end of cold war. It also tells that North Korea puts the higher political priority to developing the nuclear weapon and long-range missile. Inter-Korean policy has to keep consistency focusing economic cooperation apart from political issues. Long-term goal of inter-Korean policy should be unification, although short-term one is peace and stability in Korean Peninsula.

Degradation, urbanization, and restoration: A review of the challenges and future of conservation on the Korean Peninsula

2017년 북한의 제6차 핵실험을 끝으로 대결국면이 종결되었고 북한의 평창올림픽 참가와 특사외교는 남북화해와 대화로 전환되는 계기가 되었다. 4.27 판문점 선언과 6.12 북미회담을 통해 북핵위기는 해결국면으로 전환되고 있고 한반도는 북한의 비핵화발표와 북미실무회담, 종전선언 그리고 한반도 평화체재 구축으로 이행하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 북한은 비핵화를 통해 개혁개방을 표명하였고 베트남식 개방정책에 깊은 관심을 가지고 있는 것으로 사료된다. 문재인 대통령이 주창한 한반도 신경제지도와 신북방정책은 점차 그 실현가능성이 높아지고 있고 남․북․러, 남․북․중 간의 협력 사업에 대한 기대감도 높아지고 있다. 문재인 정부의 신북방정책은 향후 대북관계의 진전과 더불어 동북아 평화체재구축과 단일시장 건설에 기여할 것임에 틀림없어 보인다.The confrontation between North and South Korea ended with North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017 as a last move. North Korea’s participation in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and diplomacy involving special envoys became the opportunity to switch North- South relations to the mode of reconciliation and conversations. This year, North Korea’s nuclear arms crisis is tipping the balance toward a resolution through the Panmunjeom Declaration on April 27 and the North Korea-U.S. talks on June 12, and the Korean Peninsula appears to be fulfilling its agreements through North Korea’s announcement of denuclearization, working-level talks with the US, declaration of the end of war, and cooperation to establish a peace regime in the peninsula. North Korea professed its willingness to reform and open the country through denuclearization and appears to be deeply interested in the Vietnamese open-door policy. The feasibility of the New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula and the New Nordpolitik, which President Moon Jae-In has advocated, is gradually increasing. Moreover, much anticipation is building for cooperative projects between South Korea, North Korea, and Russia as well as South Korea, North Korea, and China. Accordingly, the Moon Jae-In government’s New Nordpolitik will certainly contribute to the establishment of a peace regime and the creation of a single market in North Korea along with the future improvement of North-South relations.

OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the Policy. Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North KoreaIn June 2000, Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il of North Korea met for the first time to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since this meeting, the two Koreas have expanded the scope of reconciliation and economic cooperation. The two countries agreed on the reunion of separated families, the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, and the joint exploration of Kumgang Mountain as a means of promoting tourism. This honeymoon abruptly ended when North Korea fired two nuclear missiles on October 9, 2006. During the period 2000-06, President Kim Dae-jung and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun implemented the engagement policy of reconciliation toward North Korea. With generous economic aid from South Korea, North Korea was able to overcome severe food and energy shortages. In return, North Korea opened Kumgang Mountain to South Koreans, and allowed South Korean businesses to hire lower-wage workers in the Kaesong industrial complex. …

Research Article| November 01 1980 South Korea and the Communist Countries Ahn Byung-joon Ahn Byung-joon Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1951) 20 (11): 1098–1107. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643912 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Ahn Byung-joon; South Korea and the Communist Countries. Far Eastern Survey 30 May 1951; 20 (11): 1098–1107. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2643912 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1980 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …

Hazards on the Road Ahead:The United States and the Korean Peninsula Sue Mi Terry (bio) In important ways, U.S. relations with the Korean Peninsula have been frozen in amber since the end of the George W. Bush administration. President Barack Obama did not try to revive the failed six-party talks. Instead, he cooperated with a friendly conservative government in Seoul—first under President Lee Myung-bak, then under President Park Geun-hye—both to strengthen sanctions on North Korea and to improve alliance and defense coordination among the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan. This resulted in Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system and to share military intelligence with Tokyo. It did not, however, stop Kim Jong-un from pressing ahead with the regime’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. With North Korea now threatening to deploy nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting the continental United States, the need for unity between Seoul and Washington on how to confront this threat is greater than ever. But this comity will be harder to achieve than before because of the tectonic shifts that are occurring in South Korea just as the new U.S. administration is taking office. This essay examines the outlook for U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula, beginning with an examination of the political upheaval currently occurring in Seoul and the growing threat posed by the Kim regime. The essay then analyzes options for the United States and concludes with policy recommendations for the incoming administration. South Korea: Political Upheaval Could Challenge U.S.-ROK Alliance Donald Trump suggested during the campaign that he is likely to seek renegotiation with Seoul and Tokyo to convince the two allies to increase their share of the cost to subsidize the expense of stationing U.S. troops in Northeast Asia. He might actually have had a good chance of extracting a greater contribution out of South Korea if the conservative Park remained in office as president. But she is in the process of being ousted as a result [End Page 21] of a scandal involving the undue influence exerted over her by long-time confidant Choi Soon-sil. Choi stands accused of abusing her privileged position to extort $70 million or more from leading chaebols (South Korean business conglomerates), with some of the money allegedly siphoned off for her personal use. This scandal considerably decreases the odds of the conservative Saenuri Party staying in power and increases the likelihood of a more liberal candidate winning the presidency. If that were to happen, it could heighten uncertainty about the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance because the opposition parties in South Korea are more inclined than Washington to find common ground with Pyongyang. South Korea’s parliament impeached President Park in December 2016, and now the Constitutional Court must decide within six months whether to uphold the motion. If the impeachment motion is upheld, Park would have to leave office and a snap presidential election would occur within 60 days. Besides UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon, who has hinted strongly but not officially declared whether he will run when his term expires at the end of 2016, the leading candidate to replace Park is the liberal opposition leader, Moon Jae-in. Compared with President Park or Secretary General Ban, Moon is far less enamored of the United States and far more inclined to take a conciliatory line with North Korea. Moon is likely to revive his own version of the Sunshine Policy toward the North pursued by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roo Moo-hyun from 1998 to 2008. During this period, Seoul pumped approximately $8 billion in economic assistance into North Korea in the hopes of improving bilateral relations, and there was a wide gap between Washington and Seoul over how to handle Pyongyang.1 Moon has also repeatedly underscored a policy favoring Beijing, which will likely entail a greater diplomatic investment in relations with China than with the United States. All in all, having declared his intent to revive former president Roh’s legacy, Moon is likely to modify the U...

In this study, I examine the effect of US foreign policy on the relationship between South Korea and North Korea. In particular, I analyze whether two different foreign policy approaches—the hard-line approach and the soft-line approach—have played a role in advancing or slowing steps toward peace in the Korean peninsula. I use the Integrated Data for Events Analysis dataset for the period 1990–2004. By employing a Vector Autoregression model, which analyzes the behavioral patterns of South and North Korea and the United States, I find that US foreign policy affects the relationship between the two Koreas by affecting North Korea's behavior toward South Korea. The triangular relationship among the United States, North Korea, and South Korea shows a reciprocal behavior pattern. This finding suggests that a soft-line and reciprocal US foreign policy toward North Korea is critical to maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula.

The relevance of the research topic is due to the active development of the U.S.-South Korean relations and their impact on inter-Korean relations. The role of the United States in the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea is great which not only limits it in developing of its own potential due to the direct dependence on decisions and actions but also hinders the normalization of relations between the two Koreas. The purpose of the research is to examine the dynamics of relations in the triangle ‘‘ROK (Republic of Korea) - DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) - U.S.”. The main methods of the study include analyzing the events in the triangle ‘‘ROK - DPRK - the U.S.” as well as the texts of UNSC (United Nations Security Council) resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The study concludes that despite South Korea’s attempts to stabilize relations with its northern neighbor, its pro-American course in foreign policy has prevented it from making significant concessions. For today, the ROK’s foreign policy is aimed at deepening cooperation with the US and its security partners in the region. Therefore no warming in relations between the two Koreas is expected in the near future.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.