South Africa’s non-alignment posture under the GNU: Still seeking multipolarity amid great power rivalry?

Russian parties and the political internet

This research article examines the transformation of India’s foreign policy, particularly the policy of de-hyphenation in this emerging multipolar world order. In the post-Cold War period, the global power dynamics shifted significantly. The global order has moved away from a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower, namely the United States of America (USA), towards a more complex and diverse landscape of multi-polar world order. The beginning of the third decade of the 21st century has been marked by significant events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Palestine escalation, and the multiple conflicts between the United States and China in various fields. Moreover, the emergence of new alliance systems such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, QUAD, I2U2 and more are contributing further to global power politics. In 2014, a political leadership shift occurred in India, which subsequently led to a paradigm shift in its foreign policy approach. India has adopted various strategic initiatives to navigate this new global power structure, including Panchamrit, multi-alignment, strategic autonomy, and more. However, in this new global order, the East and West are divided on various issues, which has also been reflected in the new alliance mechanisms. In contrast, India has been able to make a strategic position in both East and West by being part of both alliances. In summary, this research paper comprehensively examines India’s policy of de-hyphenation in the emerging multipolar world order. Keywords De­hyphenation, Multi Polarity, Global order, Multi­alignment, Strategic autonomy, Panchamrit

This special issue aims to reflect on the legacies of the Bandung Conference in its 70th anniversary for the emerging multipolar world order. Seven articles in this special issue unpacks the many legacies of the Bandung Conference: from the epistemic visions of a new international order based on self-determination, sovereign equality, and postcolonial justice to the reshaping of the foreign policy of the ‘global south’ countries. We build on the legacies and pitfalls of the Bandung Conference to rethink what it means by, and what should be done for, the decolonisation agenda in world politics. We argue that the Bandung Conference has been able, primarily, to rethink the structure of international politics by embracing three visions of decolonisation: a political vision of territorial sovereignty and self-determination, an economic vision of equality and justice, and an epistemic vision for cultural and intellectual liberation from colonial legacies. However, these visions of decolonisation are threatened by the return of great power politics, sphere of influence, and the further marginalisation of the global south in an emerging multipolar world order. We argue that the global south needs to use opportunities from the multipolar world order to reassert their voices and agencies while at the same time critical of, and rejecting, the underlying imperial logic of the great powers. This special issue lays out some lessons from the Bandung Conference for a multipolar world order in three key sites of new global struggle: a political struggle to defend sovereignty, an economic struggle for global justice, and an intellectual struggle for equal knowledge production. These are the new Bandung visions for a multipolar world order.

Reflections on BDS

The end of the Cold War ushered in a Unipolar world characterized by the US hegemony. In 1990s and early 2000s the US was realizing the strategy of “liberal hegemony” with emphasis on democracy promotion in the former socialist camp. The NATO enlargement and the support to the EU extension were key pillars of this strategy. There was a perception among pundits and policymakers that the “liberal democracy” will spread all over the world, bringing a new era of peace and stability. However, the Unipolar moment was short lived. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 marked the beginning of the transformation of the post-Сold War order. The reasons behind this transformation are numerous - the relative decline of the US, the rise of others, most notably China, and the launch of the new multilateral organizations such as BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The transformation of the post-cold war order brings back the notion of multipolar world and the “great power competition”. The emergence of the "multi-polar world order" will inevitably trigger regional instability and the rivalry for regional hegemony. The absence of the world hegemon or the "world policeman" means that the second-tier states will be more inclined to use coercion as the primary tool to push forward their national interests. The world is facing the unraveling of the global world order with very few clues on what the new emerging order may look like. One pattern is obvious - states are putting more emphasis on the coercion, force and hybrid warfare as a key element of their foreign policy. Meanwhile, the absence of global hegemon triggers the tough and often violent struggle for dominance among regional powers. The South Caucasus was an arena of overlapping interests of many actors - Russia, the US, the EU, Turkey, and Iran. While in 1990s and 2000s the geopolitical configuration of the region was based on the competition between Turkey - Azerbaijan - Georgia partnership supported by the US, and Russia - Armenia alliance, the situation has changed in recent years. Turkey’s quest for independent foreign policy and growing tensions between Turkey and the US have resulted in a establishment of competitive/cooperative relations between Russia and Turkey. Ankara and Moscow are still competitors but they are able to manage their contradictions. The 2020 Karabakh war was a harbinger of upcoming changes in the regional balance of power. Azerbaijan won the war receiving significant military support from Turkey, Armenia suffered significant losses, while Russia deployed its peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh. As South Caucasus faces the growing competition between external actors vying for influence, and as Russia - West relations were completely ruined after the February 2022, the region has become another arena for Russia - West competition. The US and the EU are interested to push Russian peacekeepers out from Nagorno Karabakh after the end of the initial five-year term, viewing this as a significant step in reducing Russian influence in the region. Meanwhile, Russia seeks to stabilize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, meanwhile keeping its military presence in Nagorno Karabakh. Despite the growing tensions between Turkey and the US, Ankara still remains main tool for the US in its efforts to decrease Russian power in South Caucasus.

When considering global interests, it is evident that Russia aims to weaken the dominance of the United States in the current international order and establish itself as a key player in a multipolar world order. In this context, Russia prefers to pursue a policy based on opportunistic actions that would help it be recognized as a global power in different geographic areas and maintain this status. This article aims to examine Russia's growing relationship with Africa from 2014 to the present within the framework of these objectives. In line with Siegle's (2019) claim, the article will argue that Russia's opportunistic approach and Africa's declaration of itself as a "stage" rather than just a destination for Russia indicate that Africa is a global player. The study will discuss Russia's activities in Africa and its influence on the continent in various areas of cooperation, including economics, security, diplomacy, and geopolitics. Additionally, it will touch upon Russia's competition with other global powers in Africa. In this context, the article will demonstrate that Russia's relationship with African countries aligns with its goals of becoming a major power and undermining the global leadership role of the United States in a manner consistent with its global interests. Despite its increasing presence on the continent, the article will conclude by emphasizing that Russia remains a weak player compared to other global powers due to its limited economic and military resources. Key words: Russia, Africa, South South cooperation, global politics

Introduction. In the context of global transformations driven by economic crises, shifts in international politics, and processes of deglobalisation, the emergence of a new multipolar world order has become one of the key trends. The intergovernmental alliance BRICS+, which includes countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Ethiopia, plays a significant role in this process. BRICS+ is emerging as an alternative to traditional Western institutions, offering new approaches to economic cooperation, dedollarisation, and the creation of alternative payment systems. The objective of the study is to assess the impact of BRICS+ on the global economic architecture and to identify the current challenges associated with the expansion of this intergovernmental alliance. Materials and Methods. This study utilises data from open sources, including statistical reports, analytical materials from international organisations, and publications in academic journals. To analyse the economic indicators of BRICS+ member states, comparative analysis methods were employed, including the comparison of data on GDP, trade volumes, and energy resources. Initiatives by BRICS+ in the areas of dedollarisation and the creation of alternative payment systems were also examined. Particular attention was paid to the processes of the alliance's expansion and its impact on the global economic architecture. Results of the Study. The expansion of BRICS+ and its economic successes call into question the dominance of traditional Western institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. However, internal disagreements among member states, such as tensions between China and India or between Saudi Arabia and Iran, may hinder the achievement of consensus on key issues. Additionally, differences in levels of economic development and political systems necessitate a more flexible approach to coordinating cooperation. Despite these challenges, BRICS+ possesses significant potential to strengthen its role in the global economy. Initiatives aimed at dedollarisation and the creation of alternative payment systems could represent an important step towards establishing a new financial architecture independent of Western institutions. Expanding cooperation with regional blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), ASEAN, and MERCOSUR also opens up new opportunities for economic growth and integration. Discussion and Conclusion. BRICS+ is becoming a significant player on the global stage, offering an alternative to traditional Western institutions and contributing to the formation of a multipolar world order. The expansion of the alliance and its growing economic indicators demonstrate its increasing influence. However, for further success, member states need to strengthen coordination and find compromises on key issues. In the context of global economic instability, BRICS+ has the potential to become a platform for harmonious interaction among Global South countries and a counterbalance to the hegemony of Western powers.

BRICS is an informal group of countries that, due to its structure, is considered an intergovernmental organization. In essence, this is an alliance of countries that advocate for a multipolar world order, the main supporting countries of which are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the abbreviation of the first letters of the Latin names of these countries became the name of the organization. The consolidation of these countries is not coincidental, since they have been at the forefront of rapid development since the early XXI century. They realize that if such growth trends continue, they can become players dictating the rules of the game in the processes of the global economy. At their first summit in 2009, the BRICS countries vigorously reaffirmed their commitment to a multipolar world order and called for the creation of a new global reserve currency to replace the US dollar, allowing for greater economic and geopolitical integration, coordination and financial control among member states. In the expert community BRICS is usually viewed as an attempt to form a new geopolitical pole, capable of balancing the dominant influence of the West on the global economy through financial structures such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the World Bank (WB). However, it should also be taken into account that considering this structure as a real consolidated unit of the countries listed above is very conditional, especially considering it in the context of their leadership ambitions. Currently, four additional countries have joined the original five and become full members of the organization: Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia Moreover, there are approximately four dozen countries wishing to join, with some already engaged in practical negotiations. The paper is educational in nature and aligns withthe logic of implementing a diversified economic security policy in Armenia.

Vis-a-vis understandings of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa) group in terms of political–economic dynamics of global capitalism or a post-Western quest for multipolar world order and challenge to (neo)liberal global governance, this chapter investigates BRICS as a construction site for post-neoliberal global governmentality in response to the twin crisis of neoliberalism and US hegemony. In keeping with neoliberalism, BRICS mobilizes problematizations of “crisis” (especially the global financial and food crises of 2007–2008), institutional frameworks for markets and biopolitical strategies. Partly contravening neoliberalism, BRICS simultaneously underwrites a discourse of state sovereignty and multipolar world order. The paper interprets the economic/governmental-sovereign/multipolar duality of BRICS’ post-neoliberal global governmentality in terms of Mitchell Dean’s (2013) “signature of power” albeit with a “deconstructive” twist: BRICS oscillates between managerial efforts to govern the global economy (albeit through conventional diplomatic procedures and an ordoliberalism paradoxically conflated with state capitalism) and the “glorification” of a new multipolar nomos of the earth (albeit one issuing from acclamations of think tanks, academics, or journalists along with traditional state practice and symbology of sovereignty). Rather than directly challenging neoliberal global governance, BRICS’ signature of power injects the latter with a “political” globality of agonistic cooperation both in tension and complicit with a US-promoted “schizoid/narcissistic” post-neoliberal globality of isolationism/hegemony.

Current era in international politics is marked by relative decline of America’s power to control political events in various regions of the world without the involvement of regional allies. The present era is also marked with the rise of new world powers in the form of China and India. With Russia as a potential ‘center of power’ in this context, the present era has rightfully been described as the era of ‘emerging multipolarity’ in world politics. In such a scenario, Russia has two official foreign policy objectives: a) to achieve the status of a great power and b) to ensure the strategic survival and security of the Russian state. To achieve the above stated strategic objectives, Russia has the following strategic goal: expediting the creation of a ‘multipolar world order’and to further hasten the downfall of ‘unipolarity’ led by the USA. Primary ‘strategic management’ actions by Putin’s regime in Russia for the achievement of above strategic goals revolve around the creation, formalization and strengthening of new institutions created under the aegis of the BRICSalliance. This paper uses the ‘case study’ method to understand, explore and describe the various ‘strategic management’ measures initiated and executed under the leadership of President Putin of Russia through the platform of the BRICS alliance. Qualitative methods like analysis of secondary sources like journal articles and online blogs are used for data analysis. This study has found that ‘innovative’, strategicmanagement measures used by Putin’s regime through its leadership of the BRICS platform have expedited the creation of a ‘multipolar’ world order making this strategic goal of Russia quite successful. It has also hastened the downfall of ‘unipolar world order’ led by the USA. This study explores, describes and illustrates the same ‘innovative’, strategic management measures in international politics initiated by President Putin through the BRICS alliance.

Introduction - Richard S Katz and William Crotty PART ONE: DEFINITION OF PARTY What is a Political Party? - John Kenneth White The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties - Susan E Scarrow The Unwanted Emergence of Party-Based Politics Party Origins and Evolution in the United States - William Crotty Party in Democratic Theory - Richard S Katz Political Parties and Deliberative Democracy? - James Johnson Party Systems and Party System Types - Steven Wolinetz PART TWO: FUNCTIONS OF PARTY Political Parties as Mechanisms of Social Choice - Marjorie Randon Hershey Recruitment - Pippa Norris Candidate Selection - Reuven Y Hazan and Gideon Rahat Methods and Consequences Political Parties in a Changing Campaign Environment - David M Farrell On the Cusp of Change - John Green Party Finance in the United States Political Parties, American Campaigns, and Effects on Outcomes - Brian J Brox and Daron R. Shaw Parties and Government - Hans Keman Features of Governing in Representative Democracies Parties into Government - Lieven de Winter and Patrick Dumont Still Many Puzzles Party Patronage and Colonization of the State - Wolfgang C M[um]uller Exceptionalism in the United States - Nicol C Rae Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization - Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal Party Politics in Post-Communist Transitions - Zsolt Enyedi Party, Ethnicity and Democratization in Africa - Shaheen Mozaffar PART THREE: PARTY ORGANIZATION Party Models - Andr[ac]e Krouwel American Exceptionalism - Alan Ware Movement Parties - Herbert Kitschelt Political Parties as Multi-Level Organizations - Kris Deschouwer Party Membership and Participation - Knut Heidar Electoral Mobilization in the United States - James W Endersby, John R Petrocik and Daron R Shaw Professional Staff in Political Parties - Paul Webb and Robin Kolodny Party Crashers? The Relationship Between Political Consultants and Political Parties - David A Dulio PART FOUR: PARTY AND SOCIETY Party and Social Structure - Peter M Siavelis Cleavages - Peter Mair Political Parties and Social Capital, Political Parties or Social Capital - Eric M Uslaner Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World - Vicky Randall Political Parties and Other Organizations - Thomas Poguntke Clientelism and Party Politics - Jonathan Hopkin Party as a Carrier of Ideas - Francesca Vassallo and Clyde Wilcox Identifying Dimensions and Locating Parties - Ian Budge Methodological and Conceptual Problems PART FIVE: PARTIES AND THE STATE Party Law - Wolfgang C M[um]uller and Ulrich Sieberer Regulation of Party Finance - Karl-Heinz Nassmacher Legal Regulation and Protection of American Parties - Daniel H Lowenstein Party States and State Parties - Paul G Lewis PART SIX: PARTIES IN THE FUTURE The International Role of Political Parties - Kay Lawson European Union and Political Parties - Robert Ladrech Party Transformations - William Crotty The United States and Western Europe Parties in the Media Age - Holli A Semetko Cyber Parties - Helen Margetts

The Party Problem:Political Parties and Civil Order Roman J. Hoyos (bio) Jeffrey S. Selinger. Embracing Dissent: Political Violence and Party Development in the United States. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 254 pp. Notes and index. $55.00. Sean Wilentz. The Politicians and the Egalitarians: The Hidden History of American Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. xix + 364 pp. Notes and index. $28.95. Political parties have posed problems for American politics since at least the beginning of our national history. From George Washington's Farewell Address warning against the dangers of political parties, to Thomas Jefferson's first Inaugural Address, which sought to transcend politics, to the contemporary pejorative "partisan," Americans have struggled to embrace political parties, especially opposition parties. In the United States, a strong anti-party rhetoric has grown alongside the development of political parties and party systems. Jeffrey Selinger and Sean Wilentz continue this discussion about the connection between parties, political order, justice, and more broadly, democracy. For Wilentz, pragmatic party-politicians have always been the critical element in creating and maintaining political order. They have understood well, he tells us, that politics cannot be based upon the unrelenting pursuit of a particular principle, but must be translated into the realm of the possible. Selinger, by contrast, offers a more nuanced account of the relationship between political parties and political order. Emphasizing structure over agency, Selinger argues that prior to the Civil War political parties were perceived as a threat to the continued existence of the republic. Political parties, especially opposition parties, were able to survive only to the extent that they avoided addressing the major social, economic, and political issues of the day. The legitimacy of a political opposition was made possible only as the state (i.e., federal government) acquired a monopoly on legitimate violence following the Civil War. On one level, Wilentz and Selinger agree that parties and party politicians have pragmatically pursued order over justice. Where they disagree is over the [End Page 223] meaning of that history. For Wilentz that order has been in pursuit of justice, while for Selinger it has been at its expense. Wilentz is critical of what he calls the "antiparty current," which he argues somewhat circularly, "is by definition antidemocratic, as political parties have been the only reliable electoral vehicles for advancing the ideas and interests of ordinary voters" (Wilentz, p. 28). Parties are the solution, not the problem in Wilentz's analysis, as they have been singularly successful in translating claims for economic equality into legislative programs that ensure political and civil order. This dynamic between party leaders (i.e., "politicians") and leaders of movements challenging economic inequality (i.e., "egalitarians") are, according to Wilentz, the "two keys" that "unlock the whole of American political history." From emancipation through the Progressive Era and New Deal to the Great Society, the grand policy initiatives that politicians created in order to attempt to address economic inequality were also great party endeavors (Wilentz, p. xiv). Emancipation and Reconstruction, for example, were Republican efforts to create racial justice in the South, while the New Deal and the Great Society were Democratic programs for economic justice. The "moral achievement" of partisan-statesmen, then, has been the simultaneous pursuit of economic equality and political order. For example, as inequality deepened in the early national period, a number of dissenting movements appeared, including trade unions, abolitionists, and utopians, and then a new Democratic Party, whose main economic program sought to destroy the Second Bank of the United States. The struggle between Whigs and Democrats in the Second Party System based itself in part on competing understandings of the sources of economic inequality (privilege v. moral turpitude). Antislavery politics represented an expansion of the idea that all individuals were entitled to their labor. The rise of industrial capitalism transformed political economy into economics, and made inequality the natural consequence of the new corporate capitalism (p. 56). In each case, Wilentz tells us, it was the efforts of party politicians like Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and other presidents, who enacted programs to address and mitigate these problems of economic inequality. In other words, order and justice have been inextricably...

The Segregated Schooling of Blacks in the Southern United States and South Africa

Dans cet article, l'auteur se propose d'analyser les similitudes dans l'education des Afro-americains et sud-africains noirs durant les periodes de segregation et d'Apartheid. La nature de l'oppression en milieu scolaire permet de lier les approches des Etats-Unis et de l'Afrique du Sud en matiere d'education pour les populations visees ainsi que l'usage par les communautes noires, dans ces deux contextes, de l'education comme ascenseur social, permettant de depasser les limites imposees par la segregation. Il est a noter egalement les strategies identiques, dans ces deux environnements, mises en place par les parents, les chefs d'etablissements et les enseignants pour encourager les eleves a depasser le contexte de l'oppression...

The national interests of countries directly depend on the world order established at a certain time, which constantly transforms, exerting key influence on international economic relations. Understanding the changes of the world order of economic systems allows to understand the transformation of the national interests of countries. All countries can be conventionally divided into attractor countries and satellite countries, which form their national economic interests in accordance with the interests of attractor countries. At the same time, satellite countries can eventually become attractors, and vice versa. The goal of the article is to study the existing world order and its transformation from unipolar to multipolar. To achieve this goal, the authors have explored a change in the concept of national economic interests depending on the influence of global changes in the economy and on the transformation of national economic interests in a particular world order; they have also analyzed the historical change in the world order and determined its current format and assessed the current export-import operations of the leading European countries. It is assumed that the national economic interests of countries have changed as a result of the transition from a unipolar world order to a multipolar world order, including the national economic interests of European countries. As such, the national economic interests of countries should be transformed with due consideration of situational combinations of attractor countries. To test this hypothesis, the authors have analyzed publicly available documents, including statistical data on export-import operations of the key European countries, Russia, China, and the USA. In general, it has been proved that a multipolar world order has formed at the present stage of international economic relations; decision-making at the international level and ensuring national economic interests depend on the situational cooperation of the attractor countries, while some satellite countries are gradually transforming into attractor countries.