Abstract
Empirical support for sophisticated voting in the legislative setting has been sparse This is due to a number of factors, including the difficulty of identifying the ideal points of legislators in multidimensional spaces Whereas the conflict between sincere and strategic voting typically arises in such multidimensional settings, such conflict can also be found with respect to varied voting rules In this paper, the supermajority rules surrounding vetoes and cloture votes are examined to show their role in producing sophisticated voting outcomes. A single-dimensional model is developed that predicts sophisticated voting in two broad cases An empirical test with regard to votes on the 1989 minimum wage increase in the House of Representatives provides strong support for this theory Sincere voting is rejected, while sophisticated voting is supported, even when costly.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
